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SYSTEMATIZING GOD’S LAW: RABBANITE JURISPRUDENCE IN THE 
ISLAMIC WORLD FROM THE TENTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURIES 
Marc Daniel Herman 
Talya Fishman 
This study examines the jurisprudential writings of medieval Rabbanites, Jews in 
the Islamic world who saw themselves as heirs to the talmudic tradition. Rabbanite Jews 
were the first to author systematic accounts of talmudic law, which they attempted to 
transform from an amorphous, dialectical, and discursive corpus into a structured, 
elegant, and logical system. In so doing, they sought to impose a coherent structure on 
their legal traditions that would be compatible with larger theological, philosophical, and 
epistemological ideas. By subjecting Rabbanite legal theory to diachronic and synchronic 
analysis, this dissertation demonstrates that Rabbanites were involved in a multilayered 
conversation that engaged their talmudic past, Rabbanite and non-Rabbanite 
coreligionists, and elements of the Islamic intellectual tradition that were most helpful for 
the explanation and reconsideration of their own tradition. While Rabbanite legal theory 
drew heavily on talmudic ideas, it was, at its core, profoundly contemporary, spurred by 
both Qaraite and Islamic legal theory, among many other factors. This study concentrates 
on Rabbanite thinking about two, frequently intertwined, topics: the nature and scope of 
extra-scriptural traditions, known as Oral Torah, and the methodology to be used in 
enumerating the 613 commandments, which, talmudic legend claims, were given to 
Moses at Sinai. Acknowledging earlier scholarship on these topics, this study presents a 
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more holistic picture of Rabbanite legal theory. Particular attention is paid to the Judeo-
Arabic writings of Moses Maimonides (1138-1204), the Rabbanite author who appears to 
have been most explicitly concerned with problems of legal theory. Other central figures 
include Saʿadya ben Joseph Gaon (882-942), Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli (fl. early 
thirteenth c.), and Abraham ben Moses Maimonides (1186-1237). 
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Note on Transliteration and Translation 
Transliterations from Hebrew follow the “General” system of the second edition of the 
Encyclopedia Judaica, with the exceptions of ʾ for א, which is only marked in intervocalic 
position, ṭ for ט, ʿ for ע, ṣ for צ, and q for ק. Exceptions have been made for journal titles 
such as Tarbiẓ and Ẓion, and similar transliterations that are adopted by the publishers 
themselves, as well as for names such as Shmuel and words that are commonly left 
untranslated in English, such as gaon or yisrael. Transliterations from Arabic follow the 
transliteration chart of the International Journal of Middle East Studies. Despite the 
inconsistency, the tāʾ marbūṭa in Arabic transliterations is omitted, except in the 
construct state, but the final heh in Hebrew transliterations is recorded. 
 
I have only drawn attention to non-standard spellings that appear in Judeo-Arabic texts in 
the body of this dissertation, but have not corrected them or otherwise noted them when 
they appear in footnotes. 
 
Translations of the Bible are based on the 1999 New Jewish Publication Society Tanakh, 
but have been altered to accord with the understanding of the talmudic rabbis or medieval 
Jews when necessary. Unless otherwise noted, all other translations are my own. 
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Till objects are distinguished, they cannot be arranged. It is thus that truth and order go 
on hand in hand. It is only in proportion as the former is discovered, that the latter can be 
improved. Before a certain order is established, truth can be but imperfectly announced: 
but until a certain proportion of truth has been developed and brought to light, that order 
cannot be established. The discovery of truth leads to the establishment of order: and the 
establishment of order fixes and propagates the discovery of truth. 
 
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
 
 
   
1 
 
Introduction 
Rabbanite Jews in the Islamic world were the first to author systematic accounts 
of talmudic law. These heirs to talmudic tradition are labeled Rabbanites in order to 
distinguish them from their late antique rabbinic predecessors and from their Qaraite 
coreligionists, who denied the exclusive authority of the talmudic rabbis to determine 
Jewish law. Rabbanites attempted to transform talmudic law from an amorphous, 
dialectical, and discursive corpus into a structured, elegant, and logical system. While late 
antique rabbis, particularly the Babylonian Amoraim, engaged in abstract legal thinking 
and in the construction of legal categories,1 medieval Rabbanites proposed holistic and 
methodological accounts of revelation and of rabbinic law; in so doing, they sought to 
impose a coherent structure on their legal traditions that would be compatible with the 
larger theological, philosophical, and epistemological ideas then in circulation. This 
dissertation, which seeks to recover and analyze Rabbanite thinking, considers the 
attempt of these scholars to provide rational explanations for the disparate and often 
conflicting legal data found in earlier texts to have been a “legal theory” project.2 This 
study concentrates on Rabbanite thinking about two, frequently intertwined, topics: the 
nature and scope of extra-scriptural traditions, known as Oral Torah,3 and the 
                                                 
1 On talmudic-era “conceptualization,” see Benjamin de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit: 
Peraqim Nivḥarim (Tel Aviv: A. Ṣiyoni, 1962), 142-56; Ephraim E. Urbach, Ha-Halakhah: Meqorotehah 
ve-Hitpatḥutehah (Givatayim: Yad la-Talmud, 1984), 123-38; Jeffrey Rubenstein, “On Some Abstract 
Concepts in Rabbinic Literature,” JSQ 4, no. 1 (1997): 33-73; and Leib Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning: 
From Casuistics to Conceptualization (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002); for review of earlier scholarship, 
see there, 11-15; for a definition of “conceptualization,” see there, 5-6; compare Rubenstein’s definition of 
“abstraction” (33). For suggested continuities between later conceptualization and Tannaitic pedagogic 
practices, see Elizabeth Shanks Alexander, Transmitting Mishnah: The Shaping Influence of Oral Tradition 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 174-219.  
2 I do not intend to preclude the possibility that legal theory shaped legal practice. 
3 Of course, these writings debate the definition of “Oral Torah.” 
2 
 
methodology to be used in enumerating the 613 commandments, which, talmudic legend 
claims, were given to Moses at Sinai. From the perspective of rabbinic and early post-
talmudic literature, there was no reason to expect that the number 613 would become 
central to the Jewish imagination, let alone to Rabbanite legal theory. Yet, Jewish jurists 
in both Islamic and Christian lands made this idea the basis of liturgical, philosophical, 
kabbalistic, and legal works. Acknowledging earlier scholarship on these theoretical 
topics, this study presents a more holistic picture of Rabbanite legal theory and points to 
some of the ways in which Rabbanite jurisprudence was in conversation with, and 
borrowed from, contemporaneous Islamic legal theory. 
Written primarily in Baghdad, the Maghreb, Andalusia, and Fusṭāṭ, Rabbanite 
jurisprudential thought was facilitated by the rise of single-authored works in the 
Islamicate cultural sphere4 and spurred, in both polemical and non-polemical respects, by 
contemporaneous Islamic and Qaraite legal theory.5 
Rabbanites of the Islamic world appear to have been the first medieval talmudists 
to engage these theoretical topics. As legal theory was held in high esteem in their 
society, like contemporaneous Qaraites and Muslims, Rabbanites were inclined to reflect 
on legal theory and to develop it through sustained discourse.6 One topic that was crucial 
                                                 
4 See below, n119.  
5 On the development of Islamic legal theory, see Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories: An Introduction to Sunnī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 30-35; 
and below, n173. For an overview Qaraite and Rabbanite legal theory in the tenth and eleventh centuries, 
see Gregor Schwarb, “Uṣūl al-fiqh im jüdischen ‘Kalám’ des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts: Ein Überblick,” in 
Orient als Grenzbereich? Rabbinisches und außerrabbinisches Judentum, eds. Annelies Kuyt and Gerold 
Necker (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 2007), 77-104. 
6 Qaraites appear to have been somewhat more engaged in legal theory than Rabbanites; see 
Gregor Schwarb, “Capturing the Meaning of God’s Speech: The Relevance of uṣūl al-fiqh to an 
Understanding of uṣūl al-tafsīr in Jewish and Muslim kalām,” in A Word Fitly Spoken: Studies in 
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to Rabbanite self-understanding, and of vital import in their debates with Qaraites and 
Muslims, was the source of extra-scriptural traditions and the relationship of these 
traditions to Scripture. Other themes developed in Rabbanite legal theory may not have 
been triggered by polemical concerns; Moses Maimonides (Cordoba, Fusṭāṭ; 1138-
1204),7 in particular, however, was concerned to depict Jewish law as a well-structured 
legal system. His Sefer ha-Miṣvot (Book of the Commandments) constitutes the most 
important and influential work on the enumeration of the commandments. In the Fourteen 
Principles of that work’s Introduction, the author presented a systematic series of axioms 
for determining the commandments to be included in the enumeration. It would not be a 
stretch to suggest that Rabbanites were stimulated to systematize and rationalize their 
own law because of the cultural currency of legal theory in their environment. Moreover, 
contemporaneous legal theory offered Rabbanites linguistic and intellectual tools that 
classical rabbinic literature did not provide. 
 
Historiography 
Study of medieval Jewish legal theory, both Rabbanite and Qaraite, remains in its 
relative infancy,8 despite the fact that legal theory, as David Sklare argued, “is clearly 
                                                 
Mediaeval Exegesis of the Hebrew Bible and the Qur’ān Presented to Haggai Ben-Shammai, eds. Meir 
Michael Bar-Asher et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2007), 119*-21*. 
7 On the year of Maimonides’ birth, see S.D. Goitein, “Moses Maimonides, Man of Action: 
Revision of the Master’s Biography in Light of Geniza Documents,” Hommage à Georges Vajda: Études 
d’histoire et de pensée juives, eds. Gérard Nahon and Charles Touati (Louvain: Peeters, 1980), 155; and 
Herbert Davidson, Moses Maimonides: The Man and His Works (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), 6-9. 
8 One early study is Judith Romney Wegner, “Islamic and Talmudic Jurisprudence: The Four 
Roots of Islamic Law and Their Talmudic Counterparts,” American Journal of Legal History 26 (1982): 
25-71. To Wegner’s argument, compare Jany János, “The Four Sources of Law in Zoroastrian and Islamic 
Jurisprudence,” Islamic Law and Society 12, no. 3 (2005): 291-332. For review of scholarship on 
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important to our understanding of how people of this period comprehended their religious 
life.”9 Significant work in this field was pioneered by Moshe Zucker, who underscored 
the need to situate Judeo-Arabic legal theory in its Islamic context.10 More recently, 
Gideon Libson has turned attention to the role of custom (minhag) in geonic 
jurisprudence and other theoretical matters,11 and Sklare himself has focused on the 
jurisprudential thought of Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. 1013), his contemporaries, and other pre-
Maimonidean jurists.12 Other scholars have begun to address this field,13 but most 
treatments consider Rabbanite and Qaraite legal theory within the context of other 
                                                 
comparative Jewish and Islamic law, see Gideon Libson, “Mishpaṭ Mashveh Yehudi-Muslami – Toldot ha-
Meḥqar u-Vaʿayotav,” Peʿamim 62 (1995): 43-81; idem, Jewish and Islamic Law: A Comparative Study of 
Custom During the Geonic Period (Cambridge: Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law School, 
2003), 1-15, 183-207; and idem, “Jewish and Islamic Law, A Comparative Review,” Encyclopaedia 
Judaica2, eds. Michael Berenbaum and Fred Skolnik (Detroit: Macmillan Reference USA, 2007), 11:262-
70.  
9 David Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon and His Cultural World: Texts & Studies (Leiden: Brill, 
1996), 158n62. 
10 See Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samāʿīya,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 4 (1973): 
373-410; idem, “Ha-Maḥloqet bein ha-Qaraʾim veha-Rabbaniyim be-ʿInyan ʿAseh doḥeh lo Taʿaseh,” Dine 
Israel 6 (1975): 181-94; and idem, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret (ha-Rambam neged R. Yaʿaqov 
ben Ephraim me-Ereṣ Yisrael),” in Salo Wittmayer Baron Jubilee Volume on the Occasion of his Eightieth 
Birthday, eds. Saul Lieberman and Arthur Hyman (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 
1975), 2:319-25. For another important example of geonic and Qaraite engagement with Islamic thought 
adduced by Zucker, see “Ha-Efshar she-Navi Yeḥaṭei? (ʿAl Baʿayat ‘ʿIṣma al-Anbiyāʾ’ bi-Islam uve-
Yahadut),” Tarbiẓ 35, no. 2 (1966): 149-73; see also idem, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Feirush Rabbi Shmuel ben Ḥofni 
le-Farashat va-Etḥanan,” ʿAlei Sefer 5 (1978): 5-24. 
11 See Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 16-112; idem, “Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic 
Period: Taqqanah, Minhag, Tradition and Consensus – Some Observations,” in The Jews of Medieval 
Islam: Community, Society, and Identity, ed. Daniel Frank (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 67-99; and idem, “Zikat 
ha-Rambam la-Halakhah ha-Muslemit ʿal Reqaʿ Tequfato,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, 
Mahapkhanut, ed. Aviezer Ravitsky (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 2008), 1:272-85. 
12 See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 56-57, 143-65; idem, “Yūsuf al-Baṣīr: Theological Aspects 
of his Halakhic Works,” in The Jews of Medieval Islam, 249-70; idem, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger ve-
Ḥiburo al-Ḥāwī,” Teʿudah 14 (1998): 103-123; and idem, “Are the Gentiles Obligated to Observe the 
Torah? The Discussion Concerning the Universality of the Torah in the East in the Tenth and Eleventh 
Centuries,” in Be’erot Yitzhak: Studies in Memory of Isadore Twersky, ed. Jay M. Harris (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 311-46. On David ben Saʿadya, see also Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ 
ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad be-meiʾah ha-11: Bein Geonim le-Rishonim (ʿal pi Kitāb al-Ḥāwī le-R. David ben 
Saʿadya),” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 25 (2008): 217-36. 
13 See below, n141. 
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disciplines, such as theology, philosophy, or scriptural exegesis. Mordecai Cohen’s 
monograph on Maimonidean exegesis is one such example; while its focus is biblical 
hermeneutics, it delves into Maimonides’ theories of law and discusses his views of the 
relationship between written Scripture and oral tradition.14 
The closest thematic and chronological parallel to Rabbanite jurisprudence is 
Islamic legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh); its exponents developed a complex and rich library of 
concepts and terms. Scholarly study of uṣūl al-fiqh has flourished in the past three 
decades,15 but much work remains to be done, especially in the study of individual 
jurists.16 This dissertation demonstrates that Rabbanite jurists frequently depicted their 
own legal system against the backdrop of Islamic legal theory. They found both the terms 
and concepts of uṣūl al-fiqh useful in presenting their ideas and, to a certain extent, in 
reconsidering their own tradition. However, before attempting to discern the influence of 
other legal cultures, Rabbanite ideas will be analyzed on their own terms and in relation 
                                                 
14 Mordecai Z. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation: Maimonides’ Biblical Hermeneutics 
in Light of his Geonic-Andalusian Heritage and Muslim Milieu (Leiden: Brill, 2011), esp. chaps. 2, 5, 6, 8; 
see similarly, Diana Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy: Sufi Language and Religious Experience in 
Judah ha-Levi’s Kuzari (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000), 56-68. 
15 In 1974, W. Montgomery Watt called for scholars to turn their attention to Islamic legal theory; 
“The Closing of the Gate of Iğtihād,” in Orientalia Hispanica sive Studia F.M. Pareja Octogenario Dicata, 
eds. Felix Maria Pareja Casañas and J.M. Barral (Leiden: Brill, 1974), 678. Around a decade later, two 
scholars independently noted the neglect of uṣūl al-fiqh; Nabil Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās in Early Islamic 
Legal Theory,” JAOS 102, no. 1 (1982): 27; and Wael Hallaq, “Considerations on the Function and 
Character of Sunnī Legal Theory,” JAOS 104, no. 4 (1984): 679-80. See similarly George Makdisi, The 
Rise of Colleges: Institutions and Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1981), 340n145. Aron’s Zysow’s 1984 doctoral dissertation opened many issues in this field, now 
published as The Economy of Certainty: An Introduction to the Typology of Islamic Legal Theory (Atlanta: 
Lockwood Press, 2013); see the laudatory comments in Robert Gleave’s Forward to that volume. 
16 The jurist subject to the most sustained analysis is Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī; see, e.g., 
George Makdisi, “The Juridical Theology of Shâfiʿî: Origins and Significance of Uṣûl al-Fiqh,” Studia 
Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47; and Joseph Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory: The Risāla of Muḥammad ibn 
Idrīs al-Shāfiʻī (Leiden: Brill, 2007). On other jurists, see Bernard Weiss, The Search for God’s Law: 
Islamic Jurisprudence in the Writings of Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidī (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 
2010); and Oussama Arabi et al., eds., Islamic Legal Thought: A Compendium of Muslim Jurists (Leiden: 
Brill, 2013).  
6 
 
to their rabbinic precedents. Thus, for example, this dissertation’s analysis of the 
assumptions that informed the Principles in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot will consider 
each theme discussed in relation to its treatment in pre- and post-Maimonidean thought. 
Many of the medieval texts treated here, particularly those (Maimonidean and 
otherwise) that discuss the Oral Torah and the scope of Sinaitic revelation, have been 
studied copiously by both traditional and academic scholars. Whenever possible, I have 
made use of medieval and early modern interpreters of Maimonidean writings, though it 
must be noted that exceedingly few of them read Maimonides’ Judeo-Arabic writings in 
their original language. As will become clear, academic interpreters of Maimonides’ 
approach to the Oral Torah frequently took up issues raised by the earliest readers to have 
scrutinized his writings. 
The seminal work of Jacob Levinger deserves credit for having challenged 
traditional assumptions about how Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah should be read, for 
having proposed new explanations of his distinction between biblical and rabbinic law, 
and for having worked through certain aspects of Maimonides’ approach to the 
enumeration of the commandments.17 Gerald Blidstein and Moshe Halbertal are among 
the more recent, influential, readers of Rabbanite approaches to the Oral Torah. The 
impact of Blidstein’s writings – on geonic and Maimonidean approaches to the Oral 
Torah and on medieval understandings of rabbinic authority – can be discerned 
throughout this work. A book-length study by Blidstein treats what may be Maimonides’ 
richest presentation of the Oral Torah in the Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Mamrim, chaps. 1-
                                                 
17 Jacob Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam: Meḥqar ʿal ha-Metodah 
shel Mishneh Torah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1965), chaps. 1-3. 
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4); some of his other publications have clarified “institutional” elements of Maimonides’ 
approach to the Oral Torah (e.g., the role of the elite in the promulgation and formulation 
of the law), and the relationship of Maimonidean thought to its geonic antecedents.18 
Though Blidstein has not focused explicitly on the Islamic context of Maimonidean 
thought, he has been attentive to it.19 Moshe Halbertal has likewise illuminated many 
relevant themes in Rabbanite jurisprudence, with particular focus on Maimonides; his 
studies clarify important debates among medieval talmudists regarding the nature of 
rabbinic authority and analyze Rabbanite depictions of their own sacred history.20 
Though it focuses primarily on the modern period, Jay Harris’s study of Jewish 
understandings of halakhic midrash lays important groundwork; his chapter on the 
                                                 
18 Important studies include Gerald Blidstien, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” Jewish Law Annual 1 
(1978): 108-122; idem, “Oral Law as Institution in Maimonides,” in The Thought of Moses Maimonides, 
eds. Ira Robinson et al. (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Press, 1990), 167-82; repr. in The Legacy of Maimonides: 
Religion, Reason and Community, eds. Yamin Levy and Shalom Carmy (Brooklyn: Yashar Books, 2006), 
203-216 (references will be to the first version); idem, “Maimonidean Structures of Institutional Authority: 
Sefer HaMizvot Aseh 172-177,” Dine Israel 17 (1993-1994): 103-126; idem, Samkhut u-Meri be-Hilkhat 
ha-Rambam: Peirush Nirḥav le-Hilkhot Mamrim 1-4 (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 2002); and 
“Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 31-55. 
19 An example of Blidstein’s attention to this subject is his “Muhtasib and Shoter – The Shape of 
Cultural Diffusion,” in Sobre la vida y obra de Maimonides: I congresso internacional, ed. Jesus Pelazez 
del Rossa (Cordoba: Ediciones el Almendo, 1991), 37-43. 
20 Among other studies, see Moshe Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam: ha-Arkiṭeqṭurah shel 
ha-Halakhah veha-Ṭeʾoriyah ha-Parshanit Shelah,” Tarbiẓ 59, no. 3-4 (1990): 457-80; idem, People of the 
Book: Canon, Meaning, and Authority (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), 45-89; and idem, 
Maimonides: Life and Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), 92-133. 
David Henshke has also extensively written on Maimonidean legal thought; see, e.g., his “Le-
Yesodei Tefisat ha-Halakhah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 20 (1997): 103-149; 
“Le-Ṭaʿamah shel Halakhah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000): 45-80; and “Le-
Ḥashivato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam – bein Dinamiyut Penimit le-Shamranut Memasdit: le-Ṭivah shel 
Halakhah ha-Shaquʿa be-Sefer ha-Miṣvot,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:119-
53. 
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medieval period offers a broad historical perspective, and his brief treatment of the 
thought of Judeo-Arabic authors identifies avenues for further research.21 
On the whole, the studies mentioned above do not place Rabbanite legal thought 
in its Islamic context; for the most part, researchers have accessed the Judeo-Arabic 
writings of the jurists in question through Hebrew translations, medieval and modern. 
The language barrier alone obscures the detection of both the themes and technical 
terminology of Islamic law that Rabbanite writers employed.22 
Furthermore, as Blidstein noted more than twenty-five years ago, interest in 
Maimonides’ legal theory has focused on Principles One and Two in his Introduction to 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot – those that address revelation and rabbinic authority.23 Scholars have 
begun to address the other twelve Principles,24 but much work remains to be done, 
particularly where the Judeo-Arabic original is concerned. 
                                                 
21 Jay Harris, How Do We Know This? Midrash and the Fragmentation of Modern Judaism 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 73-89. Harris focused on Saʿadya Gaon, Abraham Ibn 
Ezra, and Maimonides. 
22 On Maimonides’ use of Islamic legal terminology, see Jon Irving Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal 
Terms in Maimonides,” (PhD diss., Yale University, 1980); and idem, “Munaḥim Mishpaṭiyim ʿAraviyim 
mi-Dinei ha-Qinyan be-Geonim uve-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1989-1990): 61-87. 
Of course, not every Judeo-Arabic usage of Islamic legal terminology adopts the meaning of a given term 
in Islamic legal texts; see Phillip Ackerman-Lieberman, “Commercial Forms and Legal Norms in the 
Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt,” Law and History Review 30, no. 4 (2012): 1020-1023; and idem, 
“Arabic Legal Terminology in Judaeo-Arabic: Loanwords or Loan Shifts?” JSAI 43 (2016): 1-10. 
23 Gerald Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand in the Study of Maimonidean Halakhah?” in Studies in 
Maimonides, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for Jewish Studies, 1990), 18. 
Blidstein noted that Ferdinand Rosenthal, “Die Kritik des maimonidischen „Buches der Gesetze“ durch 
Nachmanides,” in Moses ben Maimon: Sein Leben, seine Werke und sein Einfluss, eds. Wilhelm Bacher et 
al. (Leipzig: Fock, 1908-1914), 1:475-95, only addressed Naḥmanides’ comments on the first two 
Principles, despite the fact that Naḥmanides discussed several others.  
24 Subsequent studies of other Principles include Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel 
Ḥuqim ve-Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 15-16 (1998-1999): 95-106; idem, 
“Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots: Logical Structure and Conceptual Analysis,” Jewish Law Annual 13 (2000): 
3-30; Avraham Feintuch, Sefer Piqudei Yesharim: Beiʾurim ʿal Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam zal (Jerusalem: 
Maʿaliyot, 1992), 46-58; Albert Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments: Maimonides on the 
Enumeration, Classification and Formulation of the Scriptural Commandments (Boston: Academic Studies 
Press, 2013), 52-60 and passim; Michael Abraham, “Miṣvot ve-Ḥelqei Miṣvot: ʿal Mahutam ha-Filosofiyit 
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This dissertation also draws on the study of “meta-halakhah,” i.e., inquiry into 
principles of halakhic jurisprudence that considers such matters as the nature and scope 
of rabbinic authority, the methodology of halakhic decision making, and the role of non- 
or extra-halakhic factors in Jewish law.25 When studies of meta-halakhah examine legal 
texts from jurisprudential, philosophical, or typological perspectives and ignore historical 
context, they frequently fail to notice chronological and cross-cultural relationships. The 
questions posed in these studies may also be examined from a historical perspective, 
often quite fruitfully.26  
Lastly, the present study is deeply informed by the historical study of the 
development of halakhah. This field’s pioneer, Jacob Katz, argued that a researcher 
interested in understanding halakhah’s historical development must first approach a 
source with the attitudes and assumptions of a traditional halakhist, and only second, 
                                                 
shel Musagim be-Halakhah,” Aqdamot 21 (2008): 160-75; idem, “Kelalav shel ha-Rambam le-Minyan ha-
Miṣvot,” and Shlomi Adler, “Miṣvat ha-Shevitah veha-Kelal ha-Shishi be-Sefer ha-Miṣvot,” in Mi-Birkat 
Moshe: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam li-Khvodo shel ha-Rav Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, 
eds. Zvi Heber and Carmiel Cohen (Maʿaleh Adumim: Maʿaliyot, 2011), 1:121-72, 2:491-515. Recent, 
broader studies of Sefer ha-Miṣvot include Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments; Feintuch, Sefer 
Piqudei Yesharim; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim (Jerusalem: 
Maʿaliyot, 2010). 
25 Eliezer Goldman was apparently the first to use the term “meta-halakhah”; Alexander Kaye, 
“Eliezer Goldman and the Origins of Meta-Halacha,” Modern Judaism 34, no. 3 (2014): 324-28. For a 
definition of this term, see Avinoam Rozenak, Halakhah ke-Meḥolelet Shinuy: ʿIyunim Biqortiyim be-
Filosofyahh shel ha-Halakhah (Jerusalem: Manges, 2007), 107-129. See also Isadore Twersky, 
“Talmudists, Philosophers, Kabbalists: The Quest for Spirituality in the Sixteenth Century,” in Jewish 
Thought in the Sixteenth Century, ed. Bernard Dov Cooperman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1983), 450n1.  
26 Useful studies include Yoḥanan Silman, “Torah Elohit she-‘Lo ba-Shamayim Hi’: Beirur 
Tipology,” Bar Ilan Annual 22-23 (1988): 261-86; idem, “Torat Yisrael le-Or Ḥidusheha – Beirur 
Finomanologi,” PAAJR 57 (1990-1991): 49-67; idem, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf: Torat Yisrael bein Shleimut 
le-Hishtalmut (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1999); Avi Sagi, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God: A Study of 
Two Models,” Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy 1 (1992): 305-329; idem, “Models of Authority 
and the Duty of Obedience in Halakhic Literature,” AJS Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 1-24; idem, Elu ve-Elu: 
Mashmaʿuto shel ha-Siaḥ ha-Hilkhati (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 1996); and Shlomo Kassierer and 
Shlomo Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit: Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Mishnatam shel ha-Rambam 
veha-Ramban (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2007). 
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from a historian’s perspective; this sequence, wrote Katz, would help to clarify the 
impact of historical circumstances on a given halakhic ruling.27 Katz’s student Haym 
Soloveitchik has written that if historians are to avoid “a simplistic sociology of law,” 
their detection of “extraneous factors … impinging on the course of immanent 
developments” must reflect, what he termed, an “angle of deflection,”28 such as 
economic, sociological, or other factors. This dissertation seeks to apply the methodology 
of this field to Rabbanite legal theory.  
 
Central Themes 
Rabbanites frequently disagreed about the interpretation of ambiguous concepts in 
rabbinic literature. One ancient binary they discussed – of particular importance for this 
dissertation – is the distinction between two types of laws: those of “biblical” (Hebrew: 
divrei torah; Aramaic: de-orayta) status, and those of “rabbinic” (Hebrew: divrei sofrim; 
Aramaic: de-rabbanan) status. This distinction is rooted in the Mishnah and was 
developed more fully in the Amoraic period.29 While laws that are explicit in the 
                                                 
27 See Jacob Katz, “Maḥloqet ha-Smikhah bein Rabbi Yaʿaqov Berav veha-Ralbaḥ,” Ẓion 16 
(1951): 41-44; and idem, Halakhah ve-Qabbalah: Meḥqarim be-Toldot Dat Yisrael ʿal Medorehah ve-
Ziqatah ha-Ḥevratit (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1984), 1-6, 342-46. See also Bernard Cooperman, “Afterword: 
Tradition and Crisis and the Study of Early Modern Jewish History,” in Jacob Katz, Tradition and Crisis: 
Jewish Society at the End of the Middle Ages, trans. and ed. Bernard Cooperman (New York: NYU Press, 
1993), 248-50. On earlier historical study of halakhah, see Marc Saperstein, “Abraham Geiger as Historian 
of Medieval Judaism,” in Jüdische Existenz in der Moderne: Abraham Geiger und die Wissenschaft des 
Judentums, eds. Christian Wiese et al. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2013), 277-78. 
28 Haym Soloveitchik, “Can Halakhic Texts Talk History?” AJS Review 3 (1978): 176; compare 
idem, “Religious Law and Change,” AJS Review 12 (1987): 205-206. See also Jeffrey Woolf, 
“Methodological Reflections in the Study of Halakhah,” European Journal of Jewish Studies Newsletter 11 
(2001): 9-14. 
29 On this distinction in rabbinic literature, see Ḥanokh Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah (Jerusalem: 
Bialik, 1959), 49-53; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 69-95; Martin S. Jaffee, “Halakhah as 
Primordial Tradition: A Gadamerian Dialogue with Early Rabbinic Memory and Jurisprudence,” in 
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Pentateuch are clearly of biblical status, and laws that are the result of rabbinic legislative 
activity are clearly rabbinic, there are many sources of law whose classification is far 
from obvious.30 These include laws found in the Prophets and Writings, laws termed 
“halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai” (a law given to Moses at Sinai), laws “rooted in the Torah 
(ʿiqaro mi-divrei torah) and explained by divrei sofrim” (see bSan 88b), and laws 
“derived” through rabbinic interpretation of Scripture.31 Further complicating matters, the 
Talmud claims that laws derived from “reasoning” (sevarah) are of biblical status, though 
they are not found in Scripture.32 It is certainly not clear that the designations “biblical” 
and “rabbinic” denote the source of the law (whether from God or from man) or its 
relationship to Scripture. 
A related question pertains to the enumeration of the 613 commandments: what 
constitutes a distinct commandment? Though some seem to assume that the categories of 
biblical law and enumerated commandment are equivalent,33 conflation of these 
categories has led to much confusion (this will be discussed in Chapters Two and Four). 
There is also no reason to assume that only laws that constitute distinct commandments 
are biblical in status, or that failure to include a law in the enumeration establishes its 
non-biblical status. 
                                                 
Interpreting Judaism in a Postmodern Age, ed. Steven Kepnes (New York: NYU Press, 1996), 99-107; and 
idem, Torah in the Mouth: Writing and Oral Tradition in Palestinian Judaism, 200 BCE-400 C.E. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 92-99. See also Mayer I. Gruber, “The Meaning of אתיירוא in the 
Babylonian Talmud,” Hebrew Studies 22 (1981): 25-33. 
30 Menaḥem Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 3rd ed. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 1:186.  
31 Compare Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 34-36, 46. Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Le-
Hishtalshelutam shel Isurei Shevut be-Shabbat,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies, 10, 
C, 1 (1989): 9-15, underscores the instability of the categories of “biblical” and “rabbinic” law. 
32 See Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:807-808. 
33 E.g., Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:186-87; and Harris, How Do We Know This, 88. 
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The 613 Commandments 
The notion that God gave Israel 613 commandments appears, first, in a non-legal 
passage of the Babylonian Talmud (bMak 23b-24a): 
Rabbi Simlai expounded (darash): “613 commandments were said to Moses (at 
Sinai),34 365 negative commandments, like the days of the year, and 248 positive 
commandments, corresponding to man’s limbs (eivarav).”35 Said Rav Hamnuna: 
“What is the verse? ‘Moses commanded us a Torah’ (Deut. 33:4) – torah in 
gemaṭria (numerical value of letters) is 611.36 ‘I am [the Lord your God who 
brought you out of the Land of Egypt’ and ‘You shall have no other [gods before 
me]’ (Ex. 20:2-3) we heard from the Almighty.” “David came and established 
them (heʿemidan) as eleven, as it is written, ‘A psalm of David: Lord, who may 
sojourn in Your tent, who may dwell in Your holy mountain? [1] He who lives 
without blame, [2] who does what is right, [3] and in his heart acknowledges the 
truth, [4] whose tongue is not given to evil, [5] who has never done harm to his 
fellow, [6] or borne reproach for acts towards his neighbor, [7] for whom 
contemptable man is abhorrent, [8] but who honors those who fear the Lord, [9] 
who stands by his oath even to his hurt, [10] who has never lent money at interest, 
[11] or accepted a bribe against the innocent. The man who acts thus shall never 
be shaken’ (Ps. 15). … Isaiah came and established them as six, as it is written, 
‘He who [1] walks in righteousness, [2] speaks uprightly, [3] spurns profit from 
fraudulent dealings, [4] waves away a bribe instead of grasping it, [5] stops his 
ears against listening to infamy, [6] and shuts his eyes against looking at evil’ 
(Isa. 33:16). … Micah came and established them as three, as it is written, ‘He 
has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires of you: [1] Only to 
do justice, [2] and to love goodness, [3] and to walk modestly with your God’ 
(Mic. 6:8). … Isaiah returned and established them as two, as it says, ‘Thus said 
the Lord: [1] Observe what is right [2] and do what is just’ (Isa. 56:1). Amos 
came and established them as one, as it says, ‘Thus said the Lord to the House of 
Israel: Seek Me, and you will live’ (Am. 5:4).”37 
                                                 
34 On the words “at Sinai,” see below, n190. 
35 This number is commonly accepted in rabbinic literature, e.g., mOhal 1:8; see Julius Preuss, 
Biblical and Talmudic Medicine, ed. and trans. Fred Rosner (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), 60-61. 
36 Tav = 400, reish = 200, vav = 6, heh = 5. 
37 This translation follows the printed text, as the precise wording of this passage is not at issue. 
For treatment, see Wilhelm Bacher, Aggadat Amorei Ereṣ-Yisrael, trans. Alexander Siskind Rabinovitz 
(Tel Aviv: Devir, 1924), 2:322-24 (on heʿemidan, see there, 323n1); Yaʿaqov Garṭner, “ʿIbud Bavli shel 
Derashat Rabbi Simlai ʿal Taryag ha-Miṣvot,” Sinai 96 (1985): 236-49; and Naomi G. Cohen, “Taryag and 
the Noahide Commandments,” JJS 43, no. 1 (1992): 46-57. 
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This passing mention of the number 613 appears to indicate that it “is a symbolic rather 
than mathematical number;”38 indeed, the narrative of the post-Sinaitic reductions of the 
commandments to ever smaller numbers suggests that the purpose of this passage is to 
assemble biblical verses that pithily catalogue man’s obligations. Furthermore, although 
printed editions of the Talmud cite the number 613 in other contexts, Ephraim Urbach 
showed that manuscripts of these passages almost invariably replace the phrase “613 
commandments” with “all the commandments” or similar phrases.39 It appears highly 
unlikely that Rabbi Simlai or anybody else in the rabbinic period counted the 
commandments,40 especially because, as medieval jurists noted, the Talmud never treats 
the enumeration of the commandments in any substantive way.41 
Though some Rabbanites expressed skepticism about the significance of the 
number 613, or its accuracy in reflecting the scope of Jewish law,42 this number became 
the basis for countless liturgical, philosophical, kabbalistic, and legal works in the post-
talmudic period. In 1878, Adolph Jellinek catalogued 144 works dedicated to this 
number, and this list can be expanded in light of subsequent research.43 The earliest and 
                                                 
38 Cohen, “Taryag and the Noahide Commandments,” 47; see earlier Moïse Bloch, “Les 613 
Lois,” REJ 1 (1880): 209-210. 
39 Ephraim E. Urbach, Ḥazal: Pirqei Emunot ve-Deiʿot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1969), 302. Note 
Ḥananel Mack, “‘ʿIm Lavan Garti Taryag Miṣvot Shamarti’ – Darkhah shel ha-Derashah mi-Sifro shel R. 
Moshe ha-Darshan el Peirush Rashi la-Torah,” Tarbiẓ 65 (1996): 251-62. 
40 See Neil Danzig, “‘Shalosh Meʾot’ ve-Reishit Hitpatḥuto shel Minyan ha-Miṣvot,” Sinai 83 
(1978): 153-58. For an alternative approach, see David Henshke, “Kelum Natnu ha-Tanaʾim Mispar la-
Miṣvot? (Mashehu le-ʿArikhato shel ha-Sifrei le-Devarim),” Sinai 116 (1995): 47-58. 
41 See below, n829. 
42 See below, n60, and nn831-834. 
43 Adolph Jellinek, Qunṭres Taryag (Vienna, 1878), 1-23; see also Zalman Halberstam, Igeret 
Biqoret, o Heʿarot ve-Hosafot le-S. Qunṭres Taryag (Lyck, 1878). To Jellinek’s list, add the works treated 
in Adolf Neubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica: Azharoth on the 613 Precepts,” JQR 6, no. 4 (o.s.) (1894): 709; 
Menaḥem Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥaq Ibn Gikatilla,” Tarbiẓ 20, no.1 (1949): 161-76; Isaac Hahn, “Qeṭaʿ 
min ha-Targum ha-ʿAravi shel Azharot ‘Atah Hinḥalta Torah le-ʿAmekha’,” in Ginzei Kaufmann, eds. 
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most widespread genre that employed the number 613 were liturgical poems (piyuṭim) 
known as azharot (“warnings”); these were recited on Shavuʿot, which according to the 
rabbis, celebrates the giving of the Torah.44 Israel Davidson’s 1933 Thesaurus of 
medieval piyuṭ lists more than fifty such poems.45 What is probably the earliest surviving 
azharah, Atah Hinḥalta, a poem apparently of Babylonian provenance (even ascribed in 
one manuscript to a Babylonian yeshiva), contains fewer than 613 commandments.46 The 
vast majority of azharot acknowledge various categories of commandments, adding 
parshiyot and punishments to the talmudic division between positive and negative 
                                                 
David Shmuel Levinger and Alexander Scheiber (Budapest, 1949), 71-80; Avraham Y. Havaṣelet, “Sefer 
Simanei Miṣvot le-Rabbeinu Avraham b.r. Ephrarim,” in Sefer ha-Zikaron li-Khvodo ule-Zikhro shel Rabbi 
Yiṣḥaq Yedidya Frank, ed. David Lau (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1992), 281-304; Binyamin Bar 
Tikvah, “Qavim le-Ṣivyonam shel Piyuṭei ha-Azharot ha-Qaṭaloniyim le-Ḥagim be-meiʾah ha-13,” in 
Masoret ha-Piyuṭ, eds. Benjamin Bar Tikvah and Ephraim Ḥazan (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan Univeristy, 1996), 
1:113-29; André Elbaz and Binyamin Bar-Tikva, “Tefillah le-David: Azharot Rabbi David ben Ḥasin,” 
Revue Européenne des Études Hébraïques 3 (2000): 1-73 (Hebrew pagination); Sklare, Samuel Ben Ḥofni, 
224; and Saverio Campanini, “Commentaries on the Azharot and Other Liturgical Poems Found in the 
Biblioteca Civica of Alessandria,” in ‘Genizat Germania’ – Hebrew and Aramaic Binding Fragments from 
Germany in Context, ed. Andreas Lehnardt (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 277-95. See also David Avraham, 
“Hagahot R. Tam ʿal Azharot Rabbeinu Eliyahu ha-Zaqein,” Moriyah 34, no. 4-6 (2015): 38-42. 
44 On this genre, see Jellinik, Qunṭres Taryag, 3-6; Halberstam, Igeret Biqoret, 2-6; Menaḥem 
Kasher, Ḥumash Torah Shleimah (New York, 1947-1983), 16:205-211; Shem Tov Gaguin, “‘Azharot’,” in 
Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J.H. Hertz, eds. Isidore Epstein et al. (London: Edward Goldston, 
1942), 45-50; Meir Ḥavaṣelet, “Qeriʾat ‘Azharot’ be-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot bi-Yemei ha-Geonim,” Ha-Doʾar 54 
(1975): 409; Menaḥem Zulai, “Azharot,” in Encyclopedia ha-ʿIvrit (Jerusalem, 1983), 2:346-47; Ezra 
Fleischer, “Yeṣirato shel Yosef ibn Avitur: Sugim ve-Tavniyot be-Piyuṭav,” (PhD diss., Hebrew 
University, 1968), 304-309; idem, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin (ben Shmuel) Payṭan,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 11, no. 1 
(21) (1985): 41-43; idem, Shirat ha-Qodesh ha-ʿIvrit bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2007), 
73, 95; Yonah Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot: le-fi Minhagei Benei Ashkenaz le-khol ʿAnfeihem (Jerusalem: 
Koren, 2000), 11-14; and Shulamit Eliṣur, “Le-Ofyav ule-Netivot Hashpaʿato shel ha-Merkaz ha-Payṭani 
be-Bavel,” Tarbiẓ 79, no. 2 (2010-2011): 244-45. See also Neil Danzig, “Bein Ereṣ Yisrael le-Bavel: 
Dapim Ḥadashim mi-Ḥibur ‘Pirqoy ben Bavoy’,” Shalem 8 (2009): 7 lines 20-21, 26-27. 
45 Israel Davidson, Oṣar ha-Shirah veha-Piyuṭ: mi-Zeman Ḥatimat Kitvei ha-Qodesh ʿad Reishit 
Tequfat ha-Haskalah (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1924-1933), 4:493. 
46 Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36-37; and below, n60. 
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commandments (see Chapter Four).47 The number 613 even found its way into works of 
Samaritan48 and Christian literature.49 
Listings of the 613 commandments may be related to other enumerations of 
(perhaps symbolic) numbers in Jewish texts,50 foremost among them, the Ten 
Commandments. Although the Pentateuch refers to the “ten words” (ʿaseret ha-dibrot) in 
three places (Ex. 34:28, Deut. 4:13, 10:4), neither scriptural presentation (Ex. 20:2-14; 
Deut. 5:6-15) contains a numbering.51 Attempts to enumerate other numbers appear 
throughout medieval Jewish literature.52 
                                                 
47 See below, nn864, 865. 
48 See Moses Gaster, “Die 613 Gebote und Verbote der Samaritaner,” in Festschrift zum 75 
jährigen Bestehen des Jüdisch-Theologischen Seminars (Breslau: M. & H. Marcus, 1929), 393-404 
(German), 35-67 (Hebrew); Abraham S. Halkin, “Taryag Miṣvot eṣel ha-Shomronim,” in Ignace Goldziher 
Memorial Volume, eds. Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi (Budapest: Globus 1948-1958), 2:86-100; 
Menaḥem Haran, “Minyan ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam be-Piyuṭ Shomroni (Shirat ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Payṭan 
Aharon ben Manir, Zemano u-Meqomo),” Ereṣ-Yisrael 4 (1956): 160-69; idem, “Shirat ha-Miṣvot le-
Aharon ben Manir: Piyuṭ Shomroni le-Yom ha-Kippurim ʿal Taryag Miṣvot ʿal-pi ha-Rambam,” Divrei ha-
Aqademyah ha-Leʾumit ha-Yisraelit le-Madaʿim 4 (1971): 229-80; idem, “The Song of the Precepts of 
Aaron Ben Manir: A Samaritan Hymn for the Day of Atonement on the 613 Precepts as listed by 
Maimonides,” Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 5 (1976): 174-209; and 
Ayala Lowenstamm, “Le-Sheʾelat Taryag eṣel ha-Shomronim,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 3 (1983): 306-312. 
49 See Luis Diez Merino, “Los 613 preceptos de la ley de Moises (manuscrito inédito de Alfonso 
de Zamora, Ms. Bibl. Nac. Madrid, 4188),” El Olivo 18 (1983): 169-98; and Diana Di Segni, “La table des 
préceptes dans le ‘Dux neutrorum’ de Moïse Maïmonide,” Das Gesetz – The Law – La loi, eds. Andreas 
Speer and Guy Guldentops (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2014), 229-62. 
50 I owe this suggestion to Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai. 
51 See Moshe Greenberg, “The Decalogue Tradition Critically Examined,” and Mordechai Breuer, 
“Dividing the Decalogue into Verses and Commandments,” in The Ten Commandments in History and 
Tradition, eds. Ben-Zion Segal and Gershon Levi (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1985), 96-109, 314-26; James 
Kugel, Traditions of the Bible: A Guide to the Bible as it Was at the Start of the Common Era (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1998), 641-43; Aaron J. Kleist, “The Division of the Ten Commandments in 
Anglo-Saxon England,” Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 103, no. 2 (2002): 227-40; Lesley Smith, The Ten 
Commandments: Interpreting the Bible in the Medieval World (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 48-75; and Jason S. 
DeRouchie, “Counting the Ten: An Investigation into the Numbering of the Decalogue,” in For Our God 
Always: Studies on the Message and Influence of Deuteronomy in Honor of Daniel I. Block, eds. Jason S. 
DeRouchie et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2013), 93-125; further references appear there, 94n3. 
52 Unsystematic study has turned up the following examples. (1) Identifying the thirteen middot of 
R. Ishmael, as the list appears to include sixteen items; see Moshe Ostrovsky, Ha-Middot sheha-Torah 
Nidreshet ba-hen (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1924), 26-28. (2) Saʿadya’s attempt to identify the “ten 
biblical songs” mentioned in Saul Horovitz and Israel Abraham Rabin, eds., Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael 
(Frankfurt, 1931), 116 (parashat ha-shirah, §1); and J.N. Epstein, ed., Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon ben 
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The 613 Commandments as a Locus of Legal Reflection 
Just as it was far from inevitable that the number 613 would gain a prominent 
place in Jewish literature, there was no reason to expect that it would become a locus of 
post-talmudic legal theory. The earliest compendia that went by the title “Book of the 
Commandments” were authored by (proto-)Qaraites, including ʿAnan ben David 
(Baghdad; late 8th c.) and Benjamin al-Nahāwandī (Iran[?]; mid. 9th c.); both authors were 
mentioned, among others, by the Qaraite Yefet ben ʿEli (Jerusalem; fl. 960-1005) as 
having written works with this title.53 It may well be that competition with Qaraites 
                                                 
Yoḥai (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1955), 71; see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Meṣiʾah Aḥat she-Hi 
Shetayim: Peirush Haʾazinu le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni u-Feirush va-Yoshaʿ le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon be-Khtav 
Nishkaḥ,” Qiryat Sefer 61, no. 2 (1987): 320-27; idem, “ʿAseret ʿIqarei ha-Emunah shel Rav Saʿadya 
Gaon,” Daʿat 37 (1996): 11-26; and idem, “Midrash Prognosṭi be-Khitvei Rasag: Petiḥat Peirusho le-Shirat 
David (2 Sam. 22) ke-Dugmah Meyaṣeget,” in Meiʾah Sheʿarim: ʿIyunim be-ʿOlamam ha-Ruḥani shel 
Yisrael bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: le-Zekher Yiṣḥaq Twersky, eds. Ezra Fleischer et al. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 
2001), 1-19. Many of Ben-Shammai’s studies of Saʿadya are now collected in his Mifʿalo shel Manhig: 
ʿIyunim be-Mishnato ha-Hagutit veha-Parshanit shel Rasag (Jerusalem: Bialik, 2015); references will be to 
earlier versions. (3) Isaac ben Judah Ibn Ghiyāth’s explication of Saʿadya’s statement that women are 
exempt from thirty commandments; see B.M. Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Qidushin, Ḥeileq ha-
Teshuvot (Haifa, 1928-1943), 9:79 (§177). (4) Attempts to figure out the “nine” prohibitions listed in 
Maimonides’ Hilkhot Ishut, 1:7, which appears to list several more. (5) Attempts to list the one hundred 
daily blessings; see below, n191. (6) Debate over the identification of the thirteen attributes of mercy in Ex. 
34:6; see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 94-96. (7) Listing the thirty commandments accepted 
by Noahides (see bḤul 92); see Aaron Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni Gaon 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1979), 66-74 (introductory pagination), 52-55 (Gen. 34:12; Hebrew 
pagination); Aaron Lichtenstein, “Noahide Laws from the Genizah: The Thirty Laws of Samuel ben 
Hophni Gaon,” Hebrew Studies 28 (1987): 113-16; and Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Some Genizah Fragments 
on the Duty of the Nations to Keep the Mosaic Law,” in Genizah Research after Ninety Years, the Case of 
Judaeo-Arabic: Papers Read at the Third Congress of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, eds. Joshua 
Blau and Stefan C. Reif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 24-25. (8) Saʿadya’s claim that 
there are eighteen appearances of the word tefillah (prayer) in the Bible, corresponding to the Eighteen 
Benedictions, and that other appearances of this word are “included under” the eighteen blessings; Saʿadya 
ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt wal-Tasābīḥ, eds. Israel Davidson et al. (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei 
Nirdamim, 1970), 6. Compare Muslim attempts to enumerate the “73 sects” into which Muḥammad’s 
community would divide; see Ignaz Goldziher, “Le dénombrement des sects Mohamétanes,” Revue de 
l’histoire des religions 26 (1892): 129-137. 
53 See Samuel Poznański, “Anan et ses écrits,” REJ 45 (1902): 184. On these works, known by 
various titles, see Zvi Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium: The Formative Years, 970-1100 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1959), 445n227; Bruno Chiesa, “A Note on Early Karaite Historiography,” 
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encouraged Rabbanites to compile similarly titled works. Halakhot Gedolot, a legal 
compendium of the geonic era ascribed to the ninth-century Simeon Qayyāra who may 
have hailed from Basra, Iraq,54 may be the first Rabbanite legal work to engage the 
enumeration, as it begins with a laconic list of the commandments. Apart from the 
Introduction, however, this text makes little reference to the enumeration, leading some 
to wonder if the enumeration was originally part of this work.55 
Saʿadya ben Joseph al-Fayyūmī Gaon (882-942), who “pioneered the writing of 
halakhic monographs and of systematic talmudic works,”56 appears to have been the first 
to do more than merely list the commandments. Saʿadya was ambivalent about the 
centrality of the 613 commandments in his prayer book, notwithstanding the reports of 
                                                 
History and Theory 27, no. 4 (1988): 59; and Fred Astren, Karaite Judaism and Historical 
Understanding (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 2004), 100n138, 171, 180. See also Ḥaggai 
Ben-Shammai, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash meha-Maqor ha-ʿAravi shel Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Levi ben Yefet ha-Qaraʾi,” 
Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 99-133. I did not find similar titles from this period in 
the indices in Abū al-Faraj Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Ayman Fuʾād Sayyid 
(London: al-Furqan Islamic Heritage Foundation, 2009); Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des arabischen 
Schrifttums, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1967); and Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der arabischen Litteratur 
(Leiden: Brill, 1937-1942). 
54 On this work, see Robert Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia and the Shaping of Medieval Jewish 
Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 223-30. 
55 For this position, see Michael Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot le-fi Minyanan, Siduran, ve-
Hitḥalqutan (Berlin: M. und H. Marcus, 1928), 11-12; Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim mi-Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-R. Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliah,” PAAJR 29 (1960-1961): 9-10; Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 41; 
and Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 12, 38. Zulai, “Azharot,” 346; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 284n4, incline towards this view; see also Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 183n41, 
222n152. Isadore Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides (Mishneh Torah) (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1980), 245n16, wrote that the date of this list “is not clear.” For the opposing view, see 
Yosef Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon: Mahadurah Madaʿit (shel ha-Yoṣrot) u-Mavo Kelali le-Yeṣirato,” 
(PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1982), 1:342n57a; and idem, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot le-Rav 
Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 53, no. 2 (1984): 227n20. See also Ezriel Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot 
Gedolot,” in Halakhot Gedolot (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1972), 3:9n1 (Hebrew pagination). This list 
was probably the most influential on later enumerators, at least until Maimonides’ time; see there, 24-26 
(Hebrew pagination). 
56 Brody, The Geonim of Babylonia, 241. 
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two later authors.57 Yet he did compose azharot, and explained, in Judeo-Arabic, his 
motive for doing so: 
We find that the people of our time are accustomed to having the category 
headings (ʿuyūn)58 of the 613 commandments (sharīʿa) recited to them during the 
musaf prayer [of Shavuʿot], which God commanded the Children of Israel, 
according to the work which begins Atah Hinḥaltah. I examined it and found that 
they (i.e., the commandments) fall short of 613. I saw in it repetitions and 
superfluities59 unfit to mention in this book. I saw fit to replace it, not because it is 
an indispensable principle (aṣl lā budd minhā), but because the hearts of men, 
whom I have seen, are devoted to it.60 
In the end, Saʿadya composed at least two azharot that list the commandments and a 
reshut (introductory piyuṭ) that divides the commandments into more than twenty 
classes.61 
                                                 
57 These ascribe to Saʿadya the assertion that, when Joshua “inscribed a copy of the teaching that 
Moses had written” (Josh. 8:32) on stones, he “wrote on them the number of the commandments, as they 
are written in the Halakhot Gedolot and azharot.” This statement appears in at least two medieval citations: 
Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah le-Rabbeinu Avraham Ibn Ezra, ed. Asher Weiser (Jerusalem: 
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1977), 3:291 (Deut. 27:1):  תוכלהב תובותכה ומכ תוצמה רפסמ םהילע בותכ יכ ל"ז ןואגה רמאיו
רמא הפיו תורהזאה ןינעב תולודג; and David Qimḥi to Josh. 8:32 in Menaḥem Cohen, ed. Miqraʾot Gedolot ha-
Keter (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992-2012), 6:32: ב ובתכ יכ ל"ז הידעס וניבר בתכו תווצמה רפסמ םה
תורהזאבו תולודג תוכלהב תובותכ ןהש ומכ רמא הפיו . I thank Gabi Weinberg for providing me with a copy of this 
second text. See also Yosef Kafiḥ, Peirushei Rabbeinu Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Torah (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-
Rav Kook, 1963), 182. 
58 See Joshua Blau, A Dictionary of Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic Texts (Jerusalem: Academy of the 
Hebrew Language, 2006), 472, s.v. نْيَع. 
59 This probably refers to commandments that, in Saʿadya’s view, are repeated in this list. 
60  ינב ילע 'עת הללא אהערש יתלא 'העירש 'ג'י'ר'ת ןויע ףסומ יפ םהל לאקי ןא ודוע דק א'דה אננאמז להא אנד'גוו
 ןא חלצת אל ושחו תאדאעא אהיפ תיארו 'ג'י'ר'ת למכת אל אהתד'גופ אהתנחתמאפ התלחנה התא הלוא י'דלא ףילאתלא ילע ליאראסא
בולק קלעתל ןכל אהנמ דב אל לצא אהנאל סיל אה'צוע לע'גא ןא תיארפ באתכלא א'דה יפ אהרכ'דא אהיפ תיאר ןי'דלא סאנלא ; 
Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156; see also below, n834. Note 
Saʿadya’s comment that the Ten Commandments include the 613; Saʿadya ben Joseph, Peirushei Rav 
Saʿadya Gaon le-Sefer Shemot, Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yehuda Raṣhabi (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-
Rav Kook, 1998), 317; see below, n65. 
61 See Henry Malter, Saadia Gaon, his Life and Works (Philadelphia: JPS, 1921), 150, 330-31, 
335-36; Robert Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, trans. Betsy Rosenberg (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish 
Civilization, 2013), 108; and Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah,” 226-29. See also Joshua Blau, “A Poem on the 
Decalogue Ascribed to Saadiah Gaon,” in Ten Commandments in History and Tradition, 355-62; and 
Joseph Dana, “The Piyyuṭ on the Ten Commandments Ascribed to Saadiah Gaon,” JQR 86, no. 3-4 (1996): 
323-75. 
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While Saʿadya’s lists may have established a more careful enumeration of the 613 
commandments (at least in his estimation), a greater literary innovation within the 
Rabbanite community was his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments),62 which 
appears to have inaugurated a series of Rabbanite works with similar titles. In the 
Introduction to this work, Saʿadya identified three ways in which it would be superior to 
liturgical enumerations of the commandments: Its composition in (Judeo-)Arabic would 
make the text more broadly accessible; it would include not only the “category heading” 
of each commandment, but basic information about it; and it was more organized than the 
azharot, which mixed positive and negative commandments.63 In this work, Saʿadya 
actually divided the commandments into 26 categories, among them, commandments that 
pertain to worship, impurity, particular places, and particular people.64 (Elsewhere, he 
offered different taxonomies, providing six classes of commandments in one of his 
azharot and linking each commandment to one of the Ten Commandments in another.65) 
                                                 
62 This work remains largely unpublished; selections appear in D.Z. Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” in Rav Saʿadya Gaon: Qoveṣ Torani-Madaʿi li-Melot Elef Shanah li-Feṭirato, ed. 
Yehuda Leib Fishman (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1943), 365-81; Alexander Scheiber and Isaac 
Hahn, “Leaves from Saadia’s Kitâb al-Šarâiʿ from the Kaufmann Geniza,” Acta Orientalia Hungarica 8 
(1958): 99-109; repr. in Alexander Scheiber Genizah Studies (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1981), 124-
34; idem, “Dapim mi-Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 28, no. 1 (1959): 48-53; idem, 
“Further Chapters from Saadia’s Kitâb al-Šarâiʿ from the Kaufmann Geniza,” Acta Orientalia 9 (1959): 
97-107; repr. in Genizah Studies, 146-56; Alexander Scheiber, “Peraqim mi-Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav 
Saʿadya Gaon,” in Sefer Yovel Mugash li-Khvod ha-Rav Dr. Shimon Federbush, ed. Judah Leib Maimon 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1960), 330-35; and David Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought of 
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon: Texts and Studies in Cultural History,” (PhD diss., Harvard University, 1992), 
2:189-202. I thank Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai for providing me with a draft of a translation of the Introduction 
to this work. 
63 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 184-85. On the disorganization of Atah Hinḥalta, see Frankel, 
Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36. 
64 See the chapter headings cited in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ in Sklare, Samuel ben 
Ḥofni Gaon, 223-24. 
65 For the former, see Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156; and Sklare, 
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 224; for the latter, see Dana, “Piyuṭ on the Ten Commandments,” 327; Saʿadya 
ben Joseph, Sefer Yeṣirah (Kitāb al-Mabādiʾ): ʿim Peirush ha-Gaon Rabbeinu Saʿadya b.r. Yosef Fayyūmī, 
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Dividing the law into 26 classes clearly required topical-conceptual 
arrangement,66 yet the logic of this work is hardly self-evident. For example, the fourth 
division of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, treating commandments that pertain to specific 
places, includes two commandments that obligate individuals and three that obligate the 
nation as a whole. Yet it is not clear what distinguishes this division from the fourteenth, 
which includes twenty-five commandments that obligate the collective and not the 
individual.67 It would appear that Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ was more a didactic 
composition than a work of legal philosophy.68 
The Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book on the Commandments) of Samuel ben Ḥofni, 
which was extensively studied by Sklare, is markedly different from Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-
Sharāʾiʿ.69 The first section of Samuel’s work discusses several standard issues of 
contemporaneous Islamic legal theory, such as the imposition of obligation (taklīf), the 
interpretation of revealed texts, the validity of extending revelation by means of analogy 
(qiyās) for the determination of the law, and the importance of intention in the 
                                                 
Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1972), 47-48; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni 
Gaon, 224. On other efforts to find the 613 commandments in the Ten Commandments, see Danzig, 
“‘Shalosh Meʾot’,” 156-57n16; and Zvi A. Yehuda, “ʿAseret ha-Dibrot ve-Taryag Miṣvot,” in Sefer Aviʿad: 
Qoveṣ Maʾamarim u-Meḥqarim le-Zekher Dr. Yeshayahu Wolfsberg-Aviʿad, eds. Oscar Wolfsberg and 
Yiṣḥaq Raphael (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1986), 268-79. Qaraite legal works often structure the 
law around the Ten Commandments; Astren, Karaite Judaism, 131. 
66 Isadore Twersky used this phrase to describe the organization of Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah; 
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 254.  
67 Similarly, Saʿadya had to determine the difference between laws that pertain to particular places 
and laws that pertain to sowing, addressed in part five, many of which are only operative in the land of 
Israel. 
68 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 185. 
69 On Samuel’s life and works, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 1-36; Moshe Gil, Jews in 
Islamic Countries in the Middle Ages, trans. David Strassler (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 359-72; and Gideon 
Libson, “Terumat ha-Genizah le-Ḥeiqer ha-Monografiyot ha-Hilkhatiyot shel Rabbi Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” 
Teʿudah 15 (1999): 189-239. 
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performance of the commandments. This section also addresses questions that are more 
distinctly Jewish, such as the status of the Noahide commandments and of laws revealed 
before Sinaitic revelation. Yet both these topics touched on the question of the 
universality of the law, a matter of great controversy in the tenth and eleventh centuries.70  
Following two chapters on the rational and revealed commandments, the second 
part of Samuel ben Ḥofni’s work places the commandments into categories without much 
comment.71 The author explained that he did not intend this treatise to set forth the law 
(fiqh), but to address the “classification of the commandments” (qismat al-miṣvot) and to 
refute those that he deemed heretics.72 Noting that Samuel did not categorize the 
commandments into mutually exclusive groups and that Samuel does not appear to have 
listed all of the 613 commandments, Sklare suggested that his classificatory undertaking 
may reflect a perspective of the Basran Muʿtazilites. These theologians perceived 
revealed law as a gift of grace (luṭf) given to man, and argued that the benefit (maṣlaḥa) 
of the law must change as man’s condition changes throughout life. Sklare noted that, in 
his ʿAshar Masāʾil (Ten Questions), Samuel argued that the commandments vary 
according to one’s circumstances (by time, place, personal status, etc.).73 As Sklare 
                                                 
70 For an outline of this part, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 172-75; on taklīf, see there, 148-
52; on the universality of the law, see there, 152-58; idem, “Are the Gentiles Obligated to Observe the 
Torah,” and Yoram Erder, “Early Karaite Conceptions about Commandments Given before the Revelation 
of the Torah,” PAAJR 60 (1994): 101-140.  
71 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 175; the contents of the third part are unknown. 
72 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 33 lines 1096-1097 (Hebrew pagination); translation there, 
177-78. 
73 Part two of the Kitāb fī al-Sharāʿiʾ classifies laws into overlapping categories and only treats the 
revealed commandments (samʿīya), not rationally based commandments (ʿaqlīya), apparently because only 
revealed laws can vary; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 232. For discussion of luṭf and its relationship to 
taklīf in the thought of ʿAbū al-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Samuel’s contemporary whose work Samuel may 
have studied (Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 53), see J.R.T.M. Peters, God’s Created Speech: A Study in 
the Speculative Theology of the Muʿtazilî Qâḍî l-Qudât Abû l-Ḥasan ʿAbd al-Jabbâr bn Aḥmad al-
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explained, the claim that the law’s benefits vary in accord with a person’s circumstance 
enabled Samuel to affirm the Torah’s ability to accommodate every life condition. This 
rebutted the Muslim charge that abrogation (naskh) of the Torah was necessary because 
the earlier revelation was outdated.74 When seen from this perspective, Samuel’s partial 
enumeration of the commandments may be understood to have served larger theological, 
theoretical, and polemical purposes.75 
The last significant Rabbanite Book of the Commandments composed before that 
of Maimonides is the Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments) by Ḥefeṣ ben 
Yaṣliaḥ (late tenth century?), of which only fragments remain.76 Unlike earlier Rabbanite 
works of similar titles, the legal compendium compiled by Ḥefeṣ was all-encompassing, 
structured around the 613 commandments. Benzion Halper, who first published sections 
of this work, estimated its length at 800 pages.77 The Introduction to this work contains a 
                                                 
Hamadânî (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 32-33; Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering in the Muʿtazilite Theology: 
ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Teaching on Pain and Divine Justice (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 142-51; and Aron Zysow, 
“Two Theories of the Obligation to Obey God’s Commands,” in The Law Applied: Contextualizing Islamic 
Sharīʿa, Essays in Honor of Frank E. Vogel, eds. Peri Bearman et al. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2008), 397-421. 
See also Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 381. 
74 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 186-88; see also there, 260-68. On the Kitāb fī al-Sharāʿiʾ, see 
also Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 295-96. 
75 Compare Boaz Cohen, “The Classification of the Law in the Mishneh Torah,” JQR 25, no. 4 
(1935): 526-27. Samuel offered a different, three-fold division of the law in his commentary to Deut. 11:32; 
unfortunately, this text is not preserved in full; see Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben 
Ḥofni, 515. 
76 For the identification of this author and his work, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 1-9; and 
Neil Danzig, “The First Discovered Leaves of Sefer Ḥefeṣ,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 54-60. Most of the 
medieval references to Ḥefeṣ are collected in Benzion Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts by Hefes 
ben Yasliah (Philadelphia: The Dropsie College for Hebrew and Cognate Learning, 1915), 9-49. For 
published texts, see Halper’s work; Simḥa Assaf, “Mi-Shiyarei Sifrutam shel ha-Geonim,” Tarbiẓ 15, no. 1 
(1944): 31-33; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 13-68; idem, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” PAAJR 49 (1982): 99-
100; and idem, “Miluʾim le-Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ,” Ha-Doʾar 42, no. 23 (Nisan, 1963): 
385-88. 
77 Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 50. 
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theoretical reflection on methodology and legal principles,78 and the remainder divides 
Jewish law into at least 36 classes, such as laws that pertain to animal blemishes, human 
blemishes, or ritual defilement.79 As in the cases of Saʿadya and Samuel ben Ḥofni, this 
work forced the author to grapple with questions of taxonomy.80 The fragmentary state of 
the evidence unfortunately precludes significant analysis of Ḥefeṣ’ theoretical reflections 
on the enumeration. 
Moses Maimonides’ engagement with the enumeration of the commandments 
both drew on and departed from these earlier models. In his Introduction to the 
Commentary on the Mishnah, a work completed by 1168,81 Maimonides’ asserted that 
Sinaitic revelation centered on the 613 commandments (sharīʿa) and on their 
“explanation.”82 This claim suggests that already at this early stage, Maimonides 
somehow understood that Sinaitic revelation was structured on the 613 commandments.83 
The idea that God revealed precisely 613 commandments also appears elsewhere in this 
work,84 in Maimonides’ Guide for the Perplexed,85 and in one of his letters to Joseph ibn 
                                                 
78 See Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 51; and Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 13-17. 
79 Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 52-57. 
80 See, e.g., the text treated below, n901. 
81 See Davidson, Maimonides, 147-48. 
82 Note the following: לוקי]פ אהריספת[ עמ הילע תלזנא אמנא וניבר השמ ילע הללא לזנא העירש לכ ]ןא םלעא[ 
הליואתו הריספת הל לוקי ם'ת ץנלא הל הללא; and אהריספתו יה העירש הרשע 'תאל'תלאו היאמ תסלא א'דכה; Maimonides, 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon: Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1963), 1:1-2, 3; idem, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat 
(Jerusalem: Maʻaliyot, 1992), 327, 328. Texts from the Introduction to the Commentary follow Shailat’s 
edition; references will be given to both editions.  
83 See also below, n527. 
84 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:247 (mMak 3:17); 5:212 (mḤul 7:6). Note two 
references to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, apparently added after the completion of the Commentary; there, 5:121, 
(mMen 4:1: תוצמלא דדע יפ אנבאתכ; see there, n6); 5:178 (mHul 1:5: תוצמלא דדע יפ יבאתכ ןמ ךל ןיבי אמכ). 
85 Guide, III:27, 31; Maimonides, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Salamon Munk and Issachar Joel 
(Jerusalem: Yunovits, 1930), 371, 383. 
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Jābir of Baghdad.86 The Mishneh Torah, of course, is structured around the 613 
commandments; as Halbertal put it, the commandments constitute the “architecture” of 
this work.87 It has recently been suggested that when Maimonides first envisioned the 
Mishneh Torah, he divided it into sections that address one or more related 
commandments and only later imposed on it the fourteen-book structure that (later) 
earned this work the title Yad (=14) ha-Ḥazaqah, i.e., “The Strong Hand.”88 
Maimonides appears to have composed his Judeo-Arabic Sefer ha-Miṣvot89 during 
the period that he was working on his Hebrew Mishneh Torah, which was completed in 
                                                 
86 Maimonides, Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat (Jerusalem: Maʿaliyot, 1987-1988), 
1:405. 
87 See Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 458-59, 465-66, 476. 
88 Davidson, Maimonides, 213; and Lawrence Kaplan, “Further Reflections on Classification of 
Mishneh Torah: Real Answers to Real Problems,” Ḥakirah 19 (2015): 41-44. Twersky, Introduction to the 
Code of Maimonides, 260, made this suggestion more tentatively. On the title Yad ha-Ḥazaqah, see Cohen, 
“The Classification of the Law,” 529n41; Isadore Twersky, “The Beginnings of Mishneh Torah Criticism,” 
in Biblical and Other Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), 
173n55; idem, “R. Yosef Ashkenazi ve-Sefer Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” in Salo Wittmayer Baron 
Jubilee Volume, 3:185-92; and idem, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 105, 527. 
89 This work does not seem to have had a stable Judeo-Arabic title; on the title Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
see Jacob Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1956), 91-100. For 
bibliographies, see Jacob I. Dienstag, “ʿEin ha-Miṣvot (Leksiqon Bio-Bibliografi le-Ḥoqrei Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
leha-Rambam ule-Mefarshav),” Talpiot 9 (1970): 663-759; and idem, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam: 
Bibliografiya shel Hoṣaʾot, Targumim, Beiʾurim,” Areshet 5 (1972): 34-80.  
Sefer ha-Miṣvot was translated three times in the medieval period; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-Rabbeinu Moshe be-Rabbi Maimon be-Tirgumo shel R. Moshe Ibn Tibbon, ʿal pi ketav yad 
Minkhen u-khtav yad London, ed. Ḥayim Heller (Jerusalem, Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1946), 2, 8 (introductory 
pagination). The standard translation is that of Moses Ibn Tibbon, the translation of Solomon ibn Ayyub is 
preserved mainly in manuscripts, and the translation of Abraham ben Ḥisdai ha-Levi is largely lost, though 
may be partially preserved in the editio princeps (Constantinople, 1510). On the question of which 
translation Naḥmanides possessed, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7-9 (introductory pagination); and 
Ḥayim Heller, “Peliʾah ʿal ha-Ramban,” Ha-Pardes 12, no. 1 (1938): 11-16. This dissertation primarily 
utilizes the following editions: Maimonides, Le Livre des Précepts par Moïse ben Maimon dit Maïmonide, 
ed. Moïse Bloch (Paris, 1888; hereinafter Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch); Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Heller; and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot: Maqor ve-Targum, trans. and ed. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem: 
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971). On Kafiḥ’s edition, see Joshua Blau, “Mahadurah Ḥadashah shel Sefer ha-
Miṣvot,” Lĕšonénu 37 (1973): 291-302. I also occasionally use the translation found in David ben Samuel 
Kokhavi, Sefer ha-Batim, ed. Moshe Hershler (Jerusalem: Beit Midrash la-Torah, 1982), vol. 2, which 
generally includes the translation of Solomon ibn Ayyub. Unless otherwise noted, texts follow Kafiḥ’s 
edition of Sefer ha-Misvot. 
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1178.90 The Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot depicts this work, in the words of Isadore 
Twersky, “as a Talmudic enchiridion, a manual preparatory and auxiliary to the Mishneh 
Torah.”91 According to one of Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s medieval Hebrew translators, Moses Ibn 
Tibbon (fl. Montpellier; 1244-83), Maimonides “wrote [Sefer ha-Miṣvot] in Arabic in 
order that it not be attached to his great compendium, even though [Sefer ha-Miṣvot] is 
like an opening to [the Mishneh Torah].”92 Later in life, Maimonides addressed his 
linguistic choice for Sefer ha-Miṣvot, stating “I greatly regret composing it in Arabic 
because all ought to read it, and I now await [a time] that I will translate it into the holy 
tongue.”93 However, as Abraham Halkin noted, it is unclear whether the phrase “because 
all ought to read it” explains Maimonides’ original decision to write this work in Judeo-
Arabic or explains why it should be translated into Hebrew.94 
                                                 
90 See Davidson, Maimonides, 174; on the date for the Mishneh Torah, see below, n387. 
Background on Sefer ha-Miṣvot appears in Davidson, Maimonides, 168-88. As Blidstein noted, however, 
“we possess a work produced in near chronological proximity with Mishneh Torah and yet … studded with 
disagreements with the Code”; “Where Do We Stand,” 20. 
91 Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 335; he also described this work as 
“propaedeutic” (24). Twersky deduced that Maimonides’ attitude towards Sefer ha-Miṣvot eventually grew 
more positive (336). 
92 וילא היחתפכ אוהש פ"עאו לודגה ורובח םע רבוחי אל ןעמל ירגה ןושלב הז רבחו; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Heller, 27 (introductory pagination). 
93 שדוקה ןושלל ותוא קיתעאש התע הכחמ ינאו ותורקל ןיכירצ לכהש ינפמ יברע ןושלב ויתרבחש לע הברה יתמחינו; 
Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam: Yoṣaʾot le-Or be-Paʿam ha-Rishonah be-Meqoran ha-ʿAravi, trans. 
and ed. Joshua Blau (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1957-1961), 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 
1:223. 
94 Abraham S. Halkin, “The Medieval Jewish Attitude Toward Hebrew,” in Biblical and Other 
Studies, 238n27: “this passage … is somewhat ambiguous but probably the explanation offers the reason 
why it is in Arabic.” Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 334, wrote: “this comment is 
ambiguous, for it is not clear whether the explanatory clause (‘because all people ought to read it’) refers to 
his original motivation for writing it in Arabic or to the reason for his retrospective regret.” Recent scholars 
have accepted the latter explanation; Sarah Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World: Portrait of a 
Mediterranean Thinker (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 21: “on another occasion 
Maimonides expresses his regret at having written the Book of Commandments in Arabic, ‘since this is a 
book that everyone needs’”; and Simon Hopkins, “The Languages of Maimonides,” in Trias of 
Maimonides, Jewish, Arabic, and Ancient Culture of Knowledge, ed. Georges Tamer Berlin (New York: W. 
de Gruyter, 2005), 97: “when later he expressed regret for [writing Sefer ha-Miṣvot in Arabic], it was not 
because matter and medium were inherently unsuited, but because of the mundane practical consideration 
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The stated purpose of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is to provide the necessary evidence and 
background for the enumeration of the commandments; this would serve as the structure 
upon which the Mishneh Torah would be built. Maimonides asserted that he had long 
recognized the woeful inadequacy of earlier enumerations, writing that the azharot that 
he heard in his Andalusian youth caused him “pains” (ālām).95 After the opening, which 
also outlines the plans for the Mishneh Torah, Maimonides offered fourteen principles 
(uṣūl; sing., aṣl),96 claiming that these would rectify the errors of earlier enumerators of 
the commandments. In the body of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he followed the talmudic distinction 
between positive and negative commandments. As he later put it, in this section, “I 
explained the enumeration of each and every commandment, and I brought proofs from 
the Sifra or Sifrei and from the Tosefta and from all places in the gemara for any 
commandment regarding which there is doubt.”97 
Gerald Blidstein noted that Sefer ha-Miṣvot “may well be the most pioneering of 
Maimonides’ works, at least in its undergirding concepts,” and yet, “as the most original 
                                                 
that the use of Arabic automatically restricted his readership to the Arabic-speaking world alone: … ‘and I 
much regret having composed it in the Arabic language, because everybody ought to read it.’” Mordechai 
Cohen, “Hirhurim ʿal Ḥeiqer ha-Munaḥ ‘Peshuṭo shel Miqra’ be-Teḥilat ha-meiʾah ha-ʿEsrim ve-Ahat,” in 
Le-Yashev Peshuṭo shel Miqra: Asupat Meḥqarim be-Farshanut ha-Miqra, eds. Sarah Japhet and Eran 
Viezel (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2011), 41n160, also took this position. 
95 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4, 5 (introduction). On ālām, see Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 4n2. On this passage, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 250-52. 
See also below, n856. 
96 In at least two places, Maimonides translated uṣūl in this context as “peraqim” (chapters); see 
Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:632 (§365), 2:725 (§447); and Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232, 2:451. For aṣl, Solomon ibn 
Ayyub used the word ʿiqar, and Moses Ibn Tibbon, shoresh; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7 
(introductory pagination). See also idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8n55; and idem, Maimonides, 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 1:78 and n5 (mBer 7:6, translating ʿiqar as aṣl), 4:7 (mBQ 1:1, translating avot as 
uṣūl). 
97  ןמו תותפסותה ןמו ירפס וא ארפס ןמ קפס הב שיש הוצמ לכ לע תויאר יתאבהו הוצמ הוצמ תווצמה לכ ןינמ וב יתראב
ארמגב םוקמ לכ; Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232. 
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and daring … [, it] would of necessity be the most flawed. For the basic question is 
whether the Talmud lends itself to the kind of systematization undertaken in this work, 
whether the Maimonidean categories and problems – Talmudic, of course – can be 
imposed consistently on the protean Talmud. The task was Herculean.”98 Nowhere is this 
“Herculean” task more evident than in the Fourteen Principles of this work’s 
Introduction, which Twersky called Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s “real novum.”99 Maimonides 
himself described the Fourteen Principles as ones which contain “great rules and many 
principles (ʿiqarim), which are like mountains, on which all the matters depend. I placed 
them in the preface,” he wrote, “in order to understand the ways that man can 
comprehend the enumeration of the commandments.”100 
The final Judeo-Arabic text addressed in this study is a debate concerning 
Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot that involved Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-
Bavli (Baghdad and Damascus; fl. early 13th c.) and Abraham ben Moses Maimonides 
(Fusṭāṭ; 1186-1237).101 In early 1213, Daniel sent Abraham forty-seven questions about 
                                                 
98 Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 26, 27. 
99 Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 3n3. 
100  םיכרדה ןיבהל םתוא יתמדקה םלוכו ןהב ןייולת םירבדה לכש םיררהכ ןהש םיבר םירקעו םילודג םיללכ םהב שיש
א סופתישתווצמה ןיינמב םד ; Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:725 (§447); idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:232. 
Compare Solomon ibn Ayyub’s comment in the Introduction to his translation:  םיבוט םירקע ד"י ותלחתב םשו
רב םהב הארה םיראובמואיכ תוצמה תונמל יואר ןיאש תורורב תוי לודגה ורפסב אוה םאנמש דצ לע םא ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 27 (introductory pagination). 
101 The correspondence between Abraham Maimonides and Daniel ha-Bavli is preserved in a 
unique manuscript, Oxford MS. Huntington 185; see Adolf Neubauer, Catalogue of the Hebrew 
Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library and in the College Libraries of Oxford (Kessinger Publishing, 1886), 
no. 628; and Malachi Beit-Arié, Catalogue of the Hebrew Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library: 
Supplement of Addenda and Corrigenda (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), no. 628. This text was first 
published as Abraham Maimonides and Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli, Brikat Avraham, hu Sefer Teshuvot 
le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam, ed. Baer Goldberg (Lyck, 1859); and idem, Maʿaseh Nissim, 
Sheʾelot Rabbeinu Daniel ha-Bavli ʿal Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam u-Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham 
beno Rabbeinu Moshe Maimon ʿal ha-Sheʾelot, ed. and trans. Baer Goldberg (Paris: Brill, 1867). For 
reviews, see Abraham Geiger, “Recensionen. Alte Schriften zum ersten Male herausgegeben,” JZWL 2 
(1863): 55-63; and idem, “Daniel ha-Babli und Abraham Sohn des Moses Maimonides,” JZWL 6 (1868): 
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the Mishneh Torah, five about the Principles in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and eight about that 
work’s enumeration of the commandments. (Abraham appears to have responded in 
                                                 
155-56. Maʿaseh Nissim has been reprinted twice: Maʿaseh Nissim, Sheʾelot Rabbeinu Daniel ha-Bavli ʿal 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam ve-Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham beno Rabbeinu Moshe Maimon ʿal ha-
Sheʾelot, ed. and trans. Kalman Kahana, in Sefer Mishneh Torah le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon, ve-
Nilvah elav Sefer ha-Miṣvot, gam hu la-Rambam, ʿim Kol ha-Peirushim, Hosafot Ḥadashot mi-Khitvei Yad 
(Tel Aviv: Pardes, 1958), 1-22 (repagination at the end of the volume); and Sefer Teshuvot Rabbeinu 
Avraham ben ha-Rambam le-Sheʾelot Rabbi Daniel ha-Bavli, trans. David Zvi Hellman, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon ʿim Hasagot ha-Ramban, ed. David Zvi Hellman (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat 
Shabbtai Frankel, 2002). Goldberg’s transcriptions of the manuscript are largely accurate. I thank Uri 
Melamed for providing me with a new transcription and a translation of the first three queries and 
responses in Maʿaseh Nissim. I utilize the unique manuscript and Goldberg’s editions; references will be to 
both. 
Joseph Karo quoted this correspondence sixteen times in his Kesef Mishneh; in addition to the lists 
in Geiger, “Recensionen,” 57n1; and Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Reuven Margaliyot 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1952), 25, see Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 5:2; Hilkhot Shegagot, 2:12; and 
Hilkhot Miqvaʾot, 4:4. Several of Daniel’s queries also overlap with questions sent to Abraham 
Maimonides from Aden, Yemen; see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-
Rambam, ed. A.H. Freimann and trans. S.D. Goitein (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1937), xv, 198-200, 
esp. n1. 
Note that Daniel actually referred to himself as Daniel ha-Bavli ben Saʿadya; see T.S. 24.41, 
printed in Jacob Mann, Texts and Studies in Jewish History and Literature (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union 
College Press, 1931; Philadelphia: JPS, 1935), 1:409-411; and Salomo A. Birnbaum, The Hebrew Scripts 
(London: Palaeographia, 1954), 2 no. 193; and MS. Hunt. 185, 5b; Birkat Avraham, 2. 
There is ongoing debate as to whether Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli is to be identified with Daniel 
Ibn al-Māshiṭa, author of a pietistic work titled Taqwīm al-Adyān (The Rectifications of Religion) and a 
(lost) Commentary on Ecclesiastes, both of which criticize Maimonidean philosophy. See Samuel 
Poznański, “Daniel Ibn al-Amschata: un adversaire litéraire de Maïmonide,” REJ 33 (1896): 308-311; 
idem, Babylonische Geonim im nachgaonäischen Zeitalter: Nach Handschriftlen und gedruckten Quellen 
(Berlin: Mayer & Müller, 1914), 16-17; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-
Rambam ʿal Bereishit u-Shemot, ed. E.J. Wiesenberg (London, 1958), 104n10; Paul Fenton, “Le Taqwīm 
al-Adyān de Daniel Ibn Al-Māšiṭa, nouvelle pièce de la controverse Maïmonidienne en orient,” REJ 144, 
no. 3-4 (1986): 287-89; and idem, “Daniel Ibn Al-Māshiṭa’s Taqwīm al-Adyān: New Light on the Oriental 
Phase of the Maimonidean Controversy,” in Genizah Research after Ninety years, 79-81. Fenton has found 
what he called “a near decisive proof” that Daniel ha-Bavli was indeed Daniel Ibn al-Māshiṭa; idem, “A 
Re-Discovered Description of Maimonides by a Contemporary,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 274n28; 
idem, “The Literary Legacy of Maimonides’ Descendants,” in Moses Maimonides (1138-1204): His 
Religious, Scientific, and Philosophical Wirkungsgeschichte in Different Cultural Contexts, eds. Görge K. 
Hasselhoff and Otfried Fraisse (Würzburg: Ergon, 2004), 103; and idem, “Moreshet ha-Sifrutit shel Ṣeṣaʾei 
ha-Rambam,” Peʿamim 97 (2004): 12; accepted in Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Masoret ve-Shinuy be-Defusei 
ha-Pulmus shel Shoshelet beit ha-Rambam (Raʾvam ve-Ravda),” in Masoret ve-Shinuy ba-Tarbut ha-
ʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim: Divrei ha-Veʿidah ha-Shishit shel ha-Ḥevrah le-Ḥeiqer ha-
Tarbut ha-ʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim, eds. Joshua Blau and David Doron (Ramat Gan: Bar 
Ilan University, 2000), 79. The conclusion in Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 451, 478-80, is unclear. See 
also Elisha Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety: Abraham Maimonides and His Times,” (PhD 
Diss., Harvard University, 2009), 27-30, 115-20. 
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relatively short order, but the precise date is unknown.102) Daniel posed his questions in 
the languages of Maimonides’ works; his queries on the Mishneh Torah were written in 
Hebrew, and those on Sefer ha-Miṣvot, in Arabic.103 
In his Milḥamot ha-Shem (Wars of the Lord), Abraham Maimonides reported that 
Daniel ha-Bavli was a student of Samuel ben ʿEli ibn al-Dastūr (Baghdad; d. c. 1194/7), 
self-styled gaon of the reborn Baghdadi yeshiva who engaged in protracted battles with 
Maimonides over political, halakhic, and philosophical matters.104 Daniel’s educational 
pedigree led several scholars to conclude that his challenges to Maimonides’ halakhic 
                                                 
102 See Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim: ʿIyunim be-Pulmus ha- 
Tefillah shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam u-Vnei Doro,” Teʿudah 10 (1996): 264-66; idem, “Abraham 
Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms: Continuations or Revision of His Father’s Teachings?” in Traditions of 
Maimonideanism, ed. Carlos Fraenkel (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 150; and idem, “Abraham Maimonides on His 
Leadership, Reforms, and Spiritual Imperfection,” JQR 104, no. 3 (2014): 508-510. 
103 Noted in Dienstag, “ʿEin ha-Miṣvot,” 688; and Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety,” 
27n126. 
104 Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Margaliyot, 54. On Samuel, see Simḥa Assaf, 
“Qoveṣ shel Igrot R. Shmuel ben ʿEli u-Vnei doro,” Tarbiẓ 1, no. 1 (1929): 102-130; 1 no. 2 (1930): 43-84; 
1 no. 3 (1930): 15-80; Simḥa Emmanuel, “Teshuvat Rav Shmuel ben ʿElī Gaon Baghdad le-Ḥakhmei 
Ṣarfat,” Tarbiẓ 66, no. 1 (2007): 93-100; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 450-61. On Samuel and 
Maimonides, see Daniel Jeremy Silver, Maimonidean Criticism and the Maimonidean Controversy, 1180-
1240 (Leiden: Brill, 1965), 58-65; Gerald Blidstein, “Maimonides on the Renewal of Semikha: Some 
Historical Perspective,” Jewish Political Studies Review 10, no. 3-4 (1998): 29-34; idem, ʿEqronot 
Mediniyim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam: ʿIyunim be-Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 
1983), 143-45; Sarah Stroumsa, “Twelfth Century Concepts of Soul and Body: The Maimonidean 
Controversy in Baghdad,” in Self, Soul and Body in Religious Experience, eds. A.I. Baumgartern et al. 
(Leiden, Brill: 1998), 313-34; idem, “Le-Pulmus ha-Rambam be-Mizraḥ: Meqomo shel Abū al-Barakat al-
Baghdadi,” in Ḥiqrei ʿEver va-ʿArav: Mugashim le-Yehoshua Blau, ed. Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai (Tel Aviv: 
Tel Aviv University, 1993), 415-22; idem, Reishito shel Pulmus ha-Rambam ba-Mizraḥ: Igeret ha-
Hashtaqah ʿal Odot Teḥiyat ha-Meitim le-Yosef ibn Shimon (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1999); idem, 
Maimonides in His World, 165-83; Y. Tzvi Langermann, Yemenite Midrash: Philosophical Commentaries 
on the Torah (San Francisco: Harper, 1996), 297-302; idem, “Igeret R. Shmuel ben ʿElī be-ʿInyan Teḥiyat 
ha-Meitim,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 15 (2001): 39-64; Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “The Maimonidean Dynasty – 
Between Conservativism and Revolution,” in Maimonides After 800 Years: Essays on Maimonides and his 
Influence, ed. Jay Harris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2n5; Herbert A. Davidson, 
“Maimonides and Samuel Ben Ali,” in Studies in the History of Culture and Science: A Tribute to Gad 
Freudenthal, eds. Resianne Fontaine et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 171-88; and the studies cited in below, 
n388. 
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writings continued the battle waged by his teacher.105 (In fact, the son-in-law and 
successor of Samuel ben ʿEli, Zekhariah ben Berakhel, wrote critiques of Maimonides’ 
Commentary on the Mishnah, though these are now lost.106) According to Menaḥem Ben-
Sasson, however, Daniel’s queries were an “accepted and legitimate genre” of halakhic 
writing; he concluded that figures in the circle of Abraham Maimonides misinterpreted 
Daniel’s goals.107 Ben-Sasson’s assessment may be supported by the fact that bitter 
rhetoric is largely absent from Daniel’s questions, while Abraham’s responses are replete 
with vituperative remarks (and praise).108 
In an early version of his Taḥkemoni, the poet Judah al-Ḥarīzī (b. Toledo, d. 
Aleppo; c. 1165-1225) wrote the following about Daniel ha-Bavli: 
He is an ever-flowing spring (mAv 2:10) / 
In his wisdom he smashes cedars (cf. Ps. 29:5) / 
And exerts strength (Eccl. 10:10).109 
                                                 
105 Simon Eppenstein, Abraham Maimuni: Sein Leben und seine Schriften (Berlin: L. Lamm, 
1914), 2; A.H. Freimann, “Teshuvot ha-Rambam le-R. Yosef ha-Maʿaravi Talmido ʿal Hasagot R. Shmuel 
be-R. ʿElī Rosh Yeshivat Baghdad,” in Sefer ha-Yovel: Qoveṣ Torani Madaʿi Mugash le-Doqtor Binyamin 
Menasheh Levin le-Yovlo ha-Shishim, ed. Judah Leib Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1939), 28-
29; Abraham Ben-Jacob, Yehudei Bavel: mi-Sof Tequfat ha-Geonim ʿad Yameinu (1038-1960) (Jerusalem: 
Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1965), 30; and Russ-Fishbane, “Between Politics and Piety,” 27-28. See also Silver, 
Maimonidean Criticism, 65-68. 
106 See Poznański, Babylonische Geonim, 32. On Zekhariah, see also Assaf, “Qoveṣ,” 107-108, 
128; Mann, Texts, 2:196, 2:240-42, 2:252; Maimonides, Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. and trans. D.Z. Baneth 
(Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1946), 31n2; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 459-63. 
107 Ben-Sasson, “Masoret ve-Shinuy,” 79; see there, 80-82. 
108 Margaliyot, in Abraham Maimonides, Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Margaliyot, 25-28, listed many 
of the examples of praise and rebuke. See similarly A. Ovadiah, “Rabbi Avraham ha-Maimuni,” Sinai 2 
(1937): 86-91. One important exception is Daniel’s accusation that Maimonides adopted a view of the 
Qaraites; see below, n1236. I hope to return to this question. On polemic between Jewish jurists, compare 
Isadore Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, a Twelfth-Century Talmudist (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1962), 42, 178, 192. 
109 ר ֵּבַגְי םיִלָיֲחַו / ר ֵּבַשְמ םיִזָרֲא   ותָמְכָחְבוּ / ר ֵּבַגְתִמ ןָיְעַמ אוּה / יִלְבַבַה לאֵּיִנָד 'ר ל  ודָגַה םָכָחֶה יִתיִאָר םָשְו; Judah al-
Ḥarīzī, Taḥkemoni: o, Maḥberot Heman ha-Ezraḥi, eds. Yosef Yahalom and Naoya Katsumata (Jerusalem: 
Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2010), 438 lines 124-25. See similarly idem, Kitāb al-Durar: ve-hu Sefer Peninei ha-
Musarim ve-Shivḥei ha-Qehalim, eds. Yehoshua Blau et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2009), 142 lines 221-
32. Al-Ḥarīzī considered Daniel “among the people of knowledge and virtue, masters of piety and 
 
31 
 
While al-Ḥarīzī, a committed “Maimonidean partisan,”110 removed this passage in a later 
version of the Taḥkemoni,111 his remarks about Daniel’s intellect are borne out in the 
latter’s analytical questions. 
Abraham Maimonides loyally defended his father, though, on several occasions, 
he confessed to uncertainty regarding his father’s reasoning, suggested that his father had 
later changed his mind, and even conceded that his father’s positions were difficult to 
understand. At the outset of his comments, Abraham wrote that Daniel “challenged well 
and asked appropriately”; his words, wrote Abraham, “are good and correct, and they 
testify that [he is] among the intelligent.” On balance, however, Abraham deemed 
Daniel’s questions “weak”; he felt compelled to respond to them, he wrote, because they 
imply that Maimonides erred.112 Abraham twice reminded readers that Daniel himself did 
                                                 
intelligence” (  בארבאו ל'צפלאו םלעלא להא ןמו\ ל'עלאו 'הנאידלא ) and wrote that Daniel’s “intelligence flashes like 
a kindled fire” (ירולא דזנלאכ האכ'ד >ח<ולי; translation there, 27*, 91*).  
110 Robert Chazan, The Jews of Medieval Western Christendom: 1000-1500 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 272, used this term to describe the poets, philosophers, and jurists who 
defended Maimonides’ legacy. On al-Ḥarīzī’s praise for Maimonides, see Samuel Miklós Stern, “Rabbi 
Yehuda al-Ḥarīzī be-shivḥo shel ha-Rambam,” in Hagut ʿIvrit be-Eiropah, eds. Menahem Zohori and 
Aryeh Tartakower (Tel Aviv: World Hebrew Union, 1969), 91-103; Twersky, “The Beginnings of Mishneh 
Torah Criticism,” 167; idem, “Some Reflections on the Historical Image of Maimonides: An Essay on His 
Unique Place in History,” in The Legacy of Maimonides, 3; and Angel Sáenz-Badillos, “Yĕhudah al-Ḥarizi, 
admirador de Maimónides,” Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 34, no. 2 (1985): 61-71. Compare 
Bernard Septimus, Hispano-Jewish Culture in Transition: The Career and Controversies of Ramah 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 3, 40. 
111 See Judah al-Ḥarīzī, Masʿei Yehuda: Ḥamishah Pirqei Masaʿ Meḥorazim le-al-Ḥarīzī, eds. 
Yosef Yahalom and Joshua Blau (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2002), xiv-xv; idem, Kitāb al-Durar, 25*-28*; 
idem, Taḥkemoni, xlviii-l; and Joshua Blau and Joseph Yahalom, “Kitāb al-Durar – ve-hu Sefer Ḥadash 
shel al-Ḥarīzī ʿal Shivḥei ha-El ve-ʿal Qehilot ha-Mizraḥ,” Peʿamim 108 (2007): 30-31. Compare the 
comments about Ḥarīzī’s temperament by a contemporary Muslim biographer in Joseph Sadan, “Rabbi 
Yehuda al-Ḥarīzī ke-Ṣomet Tarbuti: Biographiyah ʿAravit shel Yoṣer Yehudi be-ʿEnei Mizraḥan,” 
Peʿamim 68 (1996): 52; and idem, “Un intellectuel juif au confluent de deux cultures: Yehuda al-Harizi et 
sa biographie arabe,” in Judíos y musulmanes en al-Andalus y el Magreb: Contactos intelectuales, ed. 
Isabel María Fierro Bello (Madrid: Casa de Velázquez, 2002), 139. 
112  ךילע םידיעמו םיבוט ךירבד תמאבו םיעוער תוישוקה בור אלה םיעודי תומוקמב תלאש ןינעכו תישקה ינודא הפי םאו
ליבשב שפתנ ל"צז ברהש םללכמ האריו תולודג ירבד תולאשה ןושלב לבא םינובנה ןמ התאשתובר תויעטב ם ; MS. Hunt. 185, 8a; 
Birkat Avraham, 3 (introduction). 
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not offer a precise enumeration of the commandments, as if to imply that, whatever its 
difficulties, Maimonides had at least put forward a viable list.113 
 
Outline of This Study 
This dissertation is divided into two broad sections. The first three chapters 
address Rabbanite reflections on the identity of the extra-scriptural material that God 
gave the Israelites, and on the relationship of extra-scriptural traditions to written 
revelation. The final two chapters explore theoretical and methodological problems 
connected with the project of enumeration. 
Chapter One examines geonic approaches to the Oral Torah, and notes that all 
surviving pre-Maimonidean enumerations of the commandments consider post-Sinaitic 
laws to be of divine origin. Though scholars have long assumed that geonic assertions 
about the divine origin of the Oral Torah were designed to thwart Qaraism, I point out 
that geonic-era presentations of the Oral Torah and of the origins of non-biblical 
institutions share several features with the claims of contemporaneous Sunni Muslims, 
who asserted that all religious practices must be firmly grounded in prophetic dicta. This 
cross-cultural perspective suggests that the geonim portrayed the Oral Torah in terms that 
were coherent in their day, informed by broader discussions of religious authority and its 
sources. It also accounts for the surprising claims of Saʿadya Gaon and others, who 
                                                 
113 See MS. Hunt. 126a, 142a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 1 (introduction), 21 (§3). See Abraham’s comment 
that the Ten Commandments are the “roots” (uṣūl) of the 613 commandments; Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 
321-33; noted in Naḥem Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot ve-ʿEqronot Parshaniyim: Le-Ṭivo shel Peirush R. 
Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,” in A Word Fitly Spoken, 56. 
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described such non-biblical institutions as the mathematical calendar and the festival of 
Hanukah as ones that were of divine authority. 
Chapter Two examines Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah, as developed in 
his Judeo-Arabic Commentary on the Mishnah, Judeo-Arabic Sefer ha-Miṣvot and 
Hebrew Mishneh Torah. After uncovering previously unnoticed pre-Maimonidean 
reflections on the Oral Torah composed in Andalusia, this chapter demonstrates that ideas 
in the writings of Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth (Lucena [?], 1038-89) influenced claims about the 
Oral Torah made by twelfth-century Andalusian Rabbanites. These, I suggest, spurred 
Maimonides to reject the geonic approach to revelation. This chapter next traces two 
themes in Maimonides’ works: the content of Sinaitic revelation and the role of the 
rabbis. While many scholars have analyzed Maimonides’ presentations, I employ a 
holistic approach that integrates Maimonides’ Hebrew compositions with his Judeo-
Arabic writings. I show that while Maimonides sharply distinguished between laws of 
divine and human origin, his attempt to align the content of revelation with precisely 613 
commandments led him, on occasion, to blur his own neat definitions and conceptual 
boundaries. 
Chapter Three traces the writings of two thirteenth-century Judeo-Arabic jurists 
who, for different reasons, engaged Maimonides’ theories of the Oral Torah: Daniel ben 
Saʿadya ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides. While Daniel accepted that Maimonides 
had successfully dismantled the geonic-era approach to the Oral Torah, he felt that 
Maimonides had unduly minimized the scope of revelation – and vastly overstated the 
role of the rabbis – in the establishment of Jewish law. Daniel exploited several 
ambiguities in Maimonides’ works in order to criticize the ways that Maimonides 
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diverged from classical rabbinic presentations of revelation. He also attempted to uphold 
geonic conceptions of the Oral Torah, but the force of Maimonides’ arguments drove him 
to reread geonic assertions through a Maimonidean lens. Analysis of his comments on 
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot further demonstrates that Maimonides influenced Daniel’s 
terminology and his understanding of the Oral Torah. In his responses to Daniel, which, 
in all likelihood, constitute his earliest written reflections on the Oral Torah, Abraham 
Maimonides staunchly defended his father’s system, at times with palpable bias. The 
remainder of this chapter examines treatments of the Oral Torah in Abraham’s later 
writings, with particular focus on his Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn (The Sufficient Guide for the 
Servants of God) and responsa, building on earlier studies of Abraham’s Commentary on 
Genesis and Exodus. This study demonstrates that Abraham applied and expanded his 
father’s system in both pietistic and non-pietistic contexts. Maimonides’ understanding of 
the Oral Torah enabled Abraham to argue that human reason may support particular legal 
innovations and to defend his own pietistic reforms. 
The final two chapters examine theoretical problems connected with the process 
of enumeration itself and demonstrate how Rabbanites used this topic as a vehicle for 
ruminating on larger, more speculative legal problems. Chapter Four highlights the 
difficulties intrinsic to the project of reducing Jewish law to 613 commandments. 
Because the number 613 bears no substantive relationship to the scope of Talmudic law, 
enumerators of the commandments needed to formulate a system for identifying 
“commandment-units” that could encompass numerous “laws.” The first thinkers to 
tackle this problem, at least implicitly, were those who composed early azharot; later, 
Saʿadya Gaon, Samuel ben Ḥofni, and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ acknowledged this challenge. 
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The most systematic Judeo-Arabic reflections on this problem – by Maimonides, Daniel 
ben Saʿadya, and Abraham Maimonides – drew on formal logic, Islamic legal theory, and 
qurʾānic exegesis. The complexity of their systems underscores the challenges posed by 
enumeration and the creativity that such a project demanded. 
Chapter Five examines Maimonides’ contention that the text of the Pentateuch 
plays a decisive role in determining the 613 commandments. Though this claim has roots 
in his earlier Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides fully developed it in his Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot. Analysis of these writings shows that he drew on careful readings of 
Scripture, rabbinic literature, earlier Rabbanite lexicographic and hermeneutical works, 
and even on contemporary writings which affirmed the theory of spontaneous generation. 
This problem also brings the development of Maimonidean halakhah into sharp relief. 
This chapter closes by examining the debate between Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham 
Maimonides concerning Maimonides’ assertions regarding the relationship between the 
Pentateuch and the enumeration of the commandments, highlighting the ways that Daniel 
forced Abraham to critically evaluate his father’s halakhic corpus. 
The Conclusion reflects on the ramifications of Rabbanite attempts to systematize 
the law on the historiography of medieval Judaism. I suggest that the themes examined in 
this dissertation shed new light on central questions in the study of medieval Jewish life 
and Jews in the Islamic world, in particular, the ways that scholars conceive of Jewish 
law in its Islamic context. 
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Chapter One: Geonic-Era Reflections on the Oral Torah 
Introduction 
Enumerators of the 613 commandments often wondered if the enumeration should 
include laws instituted after Sinaitic revelation. For many, this problem touched on the 
larger, more pressing question of the origin of the rabbinic tradition. Pre-Maimondiean 
enumerations consistently include laws that later jurists considered post-Sinaitic. The 
liturgical setting of many of these lists makes it difficult to determine if the authors – 
among them great jurists – were asserting the divine origin of rabbinic law, or if they had 
different goals, such as teaching or summarizing the law. Whatever the import of these 
texts, geonic-era literature often claims that God authorized extra-scriptural traditions and 
post-Sinaitic practices. 
Geonic-era Rabbanites affirmed several, mutually-reinforcing themes. They 
argued that both the Written and Oral Torahs derive from revelation and asserted that the 
Written Torah is incomprehensible without the Oral Torah, they minimized the creative 
role of late antique rabbis – whom they characterized as tradents charged with preserving 
and transmitting traditions – and they deemphasized the talmudic distinction between 
biblical (de-orayta) and rabbinic (de-rabbanan) law. Many modern scholars have 
claimed that anti-Qaraite animus was the primary, if not exclusive, impetus for these 
perspectives. Several writers have even suggested that geonic anti-Qaraite polemic led 
the geonim to consciously adopt positions that were at variance with classical rabbinic 
understandings of the Oral Torah. Rabbanites themselves made the polemical context of 
their arguments clear, to be sure. However, I will argue that the scholarly focus on 
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Qaraism’s causative role overlooks an important cross-cultural factor that helped shape 
Rabbanite claims. In the very centuries that Rabbanites asserted the divine origin of the 
Oral Torah, Muslim jurists jettisoned non-prophetic elements of religious law and argued 
that only prophetic authority is valid. I will demonstrate that the geonim adopted both the 
arguments and the assumptions found in contemporaneous Islamic texts. Situating geonic 
claims in a broader historical context shows that geonic-era ideology was not merely a 
response to Qaraite polemics. Rather, it was coherent in its own time and consistent with 
larger societal views of religious authority. 
This chapter focuses on a cluster of claims about the Oral Torah and non-biblical 
institutions that, in my opinion, refer to “legal epistemology,” a phrase borrowed from 
studies of Islamic legal theory.114 I begin with a review of scholarly understandings of 
geonic-era legal epistemology, and then turn to Jewish and Islamic debates about the 
authenticity and authority of traditions that supplement written revelation. Next, I trace 
three topics in geonic-era texts – the scope of revelation, the role of the rabbis, and the 
origins of non-biblical institutions – in order to establish that Rabbanites utilized tropes 
from Islamic literature, and that they sought divine sources for all of their practices. 
                                                 
114 E.g., Wael Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change in Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 125; Joseph Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four Sources’ of Law?” in 
Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 43; idem, Early Islamic Legal 
Theory, 1, 8; and Ashk Dahlén, Islamic Law, Epistemology and Modernity: Legal Philosophy in 
Contemporary Iran (New York: Routledge, 2003), 4, 6. Joseph David has used this phrase in regards to 
Jewish jurisprudence; see his “Legal Comparability and Cultural Identity: The Case of Legal Reasoning in 
Jewish and Islamic Traditions,” Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 14, no. 1 (2010): 9; and idem, 
Jurisprudence and Theology in Late Ancient and Medieval Jewish Thought (Cham: Springer, 2014), 86. 
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This chapter primarily treats Rabbanite thought in the tenth and eleventh 
centuries, from approximately the time of Saʿadya Gaon until that of Hayya115 ben 
Sherira Gaon (939-1038),116 and it explores geonic and non-geonic sources from Iraq, 
Palestine, Qayrawān, and al-Andalus.117 While occasional voices of dissent are heard, 
and no single figure accepted all of the claims detailed in this chapter, the texts discussed 
here represent a significant trend in Rabbanite literature of this period. These centuries 
witnessed the crystallization of Qaraism (a Jewish movement that rejected the Talmud 
and Oral Torah),118 the efflorescence of new types of Jewish literature,119 and the 
                                                 
115 Traditionally pronounced Hai; on this pronunciation, see Shlomo Morag, “Hayyey=Ḥayim (le-
mahut shmo shel Rav Hai Gaon),” Tarbiẓ 31, no. 2 (1961): 188-90, accepted in Brody, The Geonim of 
Babylonia, 11n35. 
116 Earlier post-talmudic centuries are quite murky. Salo Baron described the period from 500-850 
as “dark and inarticulate”; SRHJ2 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), 6:132. According to S.D. 
Goitein, these centuries “are the most obscure in Jewish history”; Jews and Arabs: Their Contacts Through 
the Ages (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2005), 95. For treatment, see Steven M. Wasserstrom, 
Between Muslim and Jew: The Problem of Symbiosis under Early Islam (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1995), 17-18. Regarding the geonic academies in particular, Brody wrote, “our knowledge of the 
earlier Geonim and their doings is extremely limited”; Geonim of Babylonia, 10. On this last point, see also 
Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Kitvei-Yad u-Mesorot-Nusaḥ shel ha-Mishnah,” Proceedings of the World Congress of 
Jewish Studies 3, Studies in the Talmud, Halakha, and Midrash (1977): 237n90. 
117 The title gaon (pl., geonim) refers to the heads of the Jewish academies; see Brody, Geonim of 
Babylonia, 49, citing earlier scholarship. 
118 See Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Between Ananites and Karaites: Observations on Early Medieval 
Jewish Sectarianism,” in Studies in Muslim-Jewish Relations, ed. R.L. Nettler (Chur: Harwood Academic, 
1993), 19-29; idem, “Karaite Controversy – Scripture and Tradition in Early Karaism,” in 
Religionsgespräche im Mittelalter, eds. Bernard Lewis and Friedrich Niewöhner (Wiesbaden: Otto 
Harrassowitz, 1992), 11-24; idem, “Return to the Scriptures in Ancient and Medieval Jewish Sectarianism 
and in Early Islam,” in Les retours aux Écritures: fondamentalismes présents et passés, eds. Evelyne 
Patlagean and Alain Le Boulluec (Louvain: Peeters, 1993), 327-28; and Moshe Gil, “Qadmoniyot ha-
Qaraʾim,” Teʿudah 15 (1999): 71-107; trans. in idem, “The Origins of the Karaites,” in Karaite Judaism: A 
Guide to its History of Literary Sources, ed. Meira Polliack (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 73-118. Note Leon 
Nemoy’s comments about the diversity of groups that came to be known as Qaraite; “Stroumsa’s Edition of 
al-Muqammiṣ’s ʿIshrūn Maqālah,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 233. 
119 On Saʿadya’s role in expanding the Rabbanite library, see Rina Drory, Reishit ha-Magaʿim shel 
ha-Sifrut ha-Yehudit ʿim ha-Sifrut ha-ʿArvit ba-meiʾah ha-ʿAsirit (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 1988), 
156-78; Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 246; and Sarah Stroumsa, “Prolegomena as Historical Evidence: On 
Saadia’s Introductions to his Commentaries on the Bible,” in Vehicles of Transmission, Translation, and 
Transformation in Medieval Textual Culture, eds. Robert Winovsky et al. (Turnhout: Brepols, 2011), 131-
34. 
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development of new approaches to exegesis and extra-scriptural traditions in the Islamic 
world. These and other factors inspired Rabbanite deliberations about the origins, scope, 
and nature of the Oral Torah.120 
 
Historiography of Geonic Approaches to the Oral Torah 
Many have suggested that the need to parry Qaraism was the primary motive 
behind geonic claims for the divine origin of the Oral Torah. This position builds on the 
views of pre-modern writers such as Abraham Ibn Dāʾūd (Cordoba; 1110-80), who 
celebrated Saʿadya’s anti-Qaraite activity, and Maimonides, who rebuked Saʿadya for 
overstating the case for the mathematical calendar’s divine origin.121 Historians in the late 
                                                 
120 I use the term “rabbinic” to refer to rabbis of the talmudic period and their literary output and 
“Rabbanite” to post-talmudic Jews who saw themselves as the intellectual descendents of the talmudic 
rabbis. 
121 See Abraham ben David Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition: A Critical Edition with a 
Translation and Notes of the Book of Tradition (Sefer ha-Qabbalah), ed. and trans. Gerson D. Cohen 
(Philadelphia: JPS, 1967), 42 lines 102-105, writing that Saʿadya “overcame (heretics)” (naṣaḥum); and 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 2:317 (mRH 2:7); see also there, 5:161-62n32 (mMen 11:7); and idem, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9, 14n10, 136 and n40. Maimonides’ criticism may draw on comments of 
Sherira and Hayya Gaon; see below, nn317-321. Alternatively, Maimonides drew his criticism of Saʿadya 
from the eleventh-century Andalusian talmudist and astronomer R. Isaac ben Barukh al-Balīya, whose 
criticisms of Saʿadya’s views are preserved in Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Herschell Filipowski 
(London, 1851), 60-62 (2:8), see also there, 126 (3:5), 129 (3:7); and Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Baer 
Goldberg (Berlin, 1848), 2:9b-10a (4:6). On Maimonides’ claim, see also Dror Fixler, “Lashon Taqifah be-
Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam: Leshono shel ha-Rambam be-Fesiqat Halakhah be-Meqomot 
Mesupaqim, ule-Sheʾelat yaḥas ha-Peirush le-Talmud Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah,” Sinai 135-136 (2005): 
188-90; and Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem: Teshuvah min ha-Genizah 
ʿal Yom Tov Sheini shel Galuyot,” Tarbiẓ 83, no. 4 (2015): 584-85. Compare David Messer Leon, Kevod 
Ḥakhamim, ed. S. Bernfeld (Berlin, 1899) 57-60. 
Similar comments appear in other Jewish and non-Jewish chronographers. Saʿadya ben Maimun 
ibn Danan (Spain, North Africa; fl. second half of 15th c.) praised Saʿadya’s “victorious responses” 
(teshuvot niṣaḥot) to heretics; Maʾamar ʿal Seder ha-Dorot, in Ḥemdah Genuzah, ed. Z.H. Edelman 
(Königsberg, 1856), 28b; repr. in Judit Targarona Borrás, “Maʾamar ʿal Seder ha-Dorot de Seʿadyah ibn 
Danan: edición, traducción y notas,” Miscelánea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 35, no. 2 (1986): 94; and 
Saʿadya ben Maimun ibn Danan, Saadia ibn Danán: El orden de las generaciones ‘Seder ha-Dorot’, eds. 
C. del Valle and G. Stemberger (Alcobendas [Madrid]: Aben Ezra, 1997), 112. Moses ben Isaac da Rieti 
(Italy; d. c. 1460) claimed that Saʿadya entered paradise due to his rejoinders to sectarians; Miqdash Meʿat, 
ed. Jacob Goldenthal (Vienna, 1851), 95a. And Ṣāʿid ibn Aḥmad al-Andalusī (Spain; 1029-70), a Muslim 
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nineteenth and early twentieth centuries picked up on this theme; their debates focused on 
the question of whether all of Saʿadya’s writings can be ascribed to anti-Qaraism or just 
most of them.122 Although Salo Baron downplayed the anti-Qaraite element of Saʿadya’s 
                                                 
historian and philosopher, called attention to Saʿadya’s engagement with theological argument and debate 
(ṣināʿat jadal wa-ṭarīq al-tanāẓur); Ṭabaqāt al-Umam, ed. Ḥusayn Muʾnis (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1998), 
112. Joshua Finkel first drew attention to this last passage; see “An Eleventh Century Source for the 
History of Jewish Scientists in Mohammedan Land (Ibn Ṣaʿid),” JQR 18, no. 1 (1927): 54; and Bernard 
Lewis, “Ha-Madaʿ ha-Yehudi le-fi Sofer ʿAravi ba-meiʾah ha-11 (ibn Ṣāʿid al-Andalusī),” Sinai 7 (1940): 
25-29, repr. in Sofrim Muslemim ʿal Yehudim ve-Yahadut: ha-Yehudim be-Qerev Shkhenehem ha-
Muslemim, ed. Ḥava Lazarus-Yafeh (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1996), 69-74. On this text, see 
also David Wasserstein, “The Muslims and the Golden Age of the Jews in al-Andalus,” Israel Oriental 
Studies 17 (1997): 188-96. Several of these sources are mentioned in Samuel Poznański, “The Anti-Karaite 
Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” JQR 10, no. 2 (o.s.) (1898): 240. 
For the attempts of Saʿadya’s sons Sheʾerit and Dosa to detail the scope of their father’s anti-
Qaraite polemics in a topically arranged inventory of his writings (fihrist), see T.-S. 10 G 5.7, most recently 
printed in Neḥemya Allony et al., Ha-Sifriyah ha-Yehudit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim: Reshimot Sefarim mi-
Genizat Qahir (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2006), 313 lines 23-24. Jacob Mann used the earlier shelfmark T.-
S. 6 J91; see “A Fihrist of Saʿadya’s Works,” JQR 11, no. 4 (1921): 425 lines 24-25. See also Samuel 
Poznański, “A Fihrist of Saadya’s Works,” JQR 13, no. 4 (1923): 394-96; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 421-28; 
Alexander Scheiber, “Nusaḥ Shaleim shel Qeṭaʿ ha-Genizah ʿal Toldot Yemei Saʿadya Gaon,” Qiryat Sefer 
40 (1965): 571; and Moshe Gil, Be-Malkhut Yishmael bi-Tequfat ha-Geonim (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv 
University, 1997), 2:30-31. This text lists four polemical works; unfortunately, the document then cuts off. 
122 Solomon Schechter, “Peirush 13 Middot me-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Beth Talmud: Zeitschrift fur 
rabbinische Literatur und Geschichte 4 (1883): 237, claimed that anti-Qaraism motivated Saʿadya’s 
commentary on the middot of R. Ishmael. Samuel Poznański rejected this view, but stated that “a great 
portion of [Saʿadya’s] chequered life was devoted to combating the Karaite doctrines”; “The Anti-Karaite 
Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 240, 258-59. Hartwig Hirschfeld wrote, “it is no paradox that we owe the life 
work of Saadya to the Karaites. All his writings, without exception, served the one purpose of defeating the 
Karaites”; “Early Karaite Critics of the Mishnāh,” JQR 8, no. 2 (1917): 166. Hirschfeld was more cautious 
in an earlier article, saying only, “to combat this Karaite interference was perhaps the main-spring of 
Saʿadyah’s literary activity”; “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. (Tenth Article.): 
Further Saʿadyāh Fragments,” JQR 17, no. 4 (o.s.) (1905): 715. Citing Hirschfeld, Israel Davidson 
identified “an intimate connection between Saadia’s polemical monographs and his Biblical 
commentaries,” and wrote that Saʿadya’s “earlier writings, such as his polemics against Anan and Ḥiwi, 
served him as a sketch for his later writings on Bible and philosophy”; Saadia’s Polemic Against Ḥiwi al-
Balkhi: A Fragment (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1915), 36, 37. Judah Rosenthal 
concurred: “the literary activity of Saadia was to a great extent dedicated to combating the religious schism 
which menaced Judaism”; “Ḥiwi al-Balkhi: A Comparative Study,” JQR 38, no. 3 (1948): 320-21; see also 
idem, “Le-Toldot ha-Minut be-Tequfat Saʿadya,” Ḥorev 9 (1946): 37. In his biography of Saʿadya, Henry 
Malter distanced himself from Hirschfeld, writing, “we need not go so far as to assume with one recent 
investigator that everything Saadia has written in the numerous branches of Jewish literature had as its sole 
purpose the refutation of Karaite doctrines.” Malter nevertheless declared that “polemic against heresies in 
general and Karaism in particular, direct and indirect, is a very conspicuous feature in most of Saadia’s 
writings”; Saadia Gaon, 262; see also there, 168. Alexander Marx wrote: “polemical works by the great 
gaon fill an important part of his literary activity and are particularly characteristic of his fighting nature”; 
Essays in Jewish Biography (Philadelphia: JPS, 1947), 30. 
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activity,123 recent scholars have largely – though not entirely – asserted that anti-Qaraism 
had an overwhelming impact on Saʿadya’s writings.124 Emphasis on the anti-Qaraite 
aspects of Saʿadya’s oeuvre dovetails with the claim that Saʿadya’s arguments for the 
divine origin of rabbinic tradition are “weak”125 or unconvincing.126 Many have 
characterized Saʿadya’s approach to rabbinic tradition as “extreme,”127 or claimed that he 
“exaggerated” in his arguments about the calendar.128 Several others have taken 
                                                 
123 Baron wrote that that Saʿadya “was not particularly alarmed” by Qaraism and that “many other 
issues far overshadowed the struggle against these sectarians”; SRHJ2, 5:277; 5:415. See also idem, 
“Saadia’s Communal Activities,” in Saadia Anniversary Volume, ed. Boaz Cohen (New York: American 
Academy for Jewish Research, 1943), 9, 17-19. 
124 Lawrence Hoffman wrote that “Saadiah’s anti-Karaite bias … marked his whole career” and 
that “much of Saadiah’s geonic activity was directed at polemicizing against the Karaite heresy”; The 
Canonization of the Synagogue Service (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), 165, 15. See 
the similar conclusions in Eliezer Schlossberg, “Ha-Pulmus be-Yeṣirato shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Sinai 
126-127 (2000-2001): 305-324. Robert Brody more cautiously concluded that geonic approaches to 
tradition “may be tinged by polemical motives”; “The Talmud in the Geonic Period,” in Printing the 
Talmud: From Bomberg to Schottenstein, eds. Sharon Liberman Mintz and Gabriel M. Goldstein (New 
York: Yeshiva University Museum, 2005), 35. 
125 Heinrich Graetz, Geschichte der Juden von den ältesten Zeiten bis auf die Gegenwart (Leipzig: 
Leiner, 1871), 5:270; trans. in idem, History of the Jews (Philadelphia: JPS, 1891-1898), 3:189. 
126 Solomon Zeitlin claimed that Saʿadya put forward “untrue statements” that “gave the Karaites a 
weapon to attack both him and the Rabbinites [sic] and also the excuse to attack the rabbis, saying that they 
had distorted Jewish tradition”; “Saadia Gaon: Champion for Jewish Unity under Religious Leadership,” 
JQR 33, no. 3 (1943): 394 (for a reaction to Zeitlin, see below, n307). Samuel Krauss likewise declared that 
Saʿadya’s proofs for the claim that rabbinic tradition is necessary to understand biblical hapax legomena 
“are not of the best kind”; “Saadya’s Tafsir of the Seventy Hapax Legomena, Explained and Continued,” in 
Saadya Studies, in Commemoration of the One Thousandth Anniversary of the Death of R. Saadya Gaon, 
ed. Erwin I.J. Rosenthal (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1943), 47. 
127 Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 98; Marina Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community: The 
Jews of the Fatimid Caliphate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), 25-26; Harris, How Do We Know 
This, 79; Uriel Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of Psalms: From Saadiah Gaon to Abraham Ibn Ezra 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 39; and Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in 
Maimonides,” 30.  
128 See Davidson’s comments in Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem: Kolel Ṭaʿanot 
ha-Qaraʾi Salmon ben Yeruḥim neged Rav Saʿadya Gaon, ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Beit Midrash 
ha-Rabbanim be-America, 1934), 15; Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 
liii; and Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of Community, 53. See further Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 245-
46. Howard Kreisel wrote that Saʿadya “exaggerates” about the scope of revelation; Prophecy: The History 
of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2001), 41. 
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Saʿadya’s positions about the calendar as emblematic of the weakness of his defense of 
the divine origin of the Oral Torah.129 
Geonic assertions that halakhic midrash upholds laws known by tradition, but 
does not generate new law, have been particularly troubling. This perspective has been 
described as “thoroughly at odds”130 and “difficult to reconcile”131 with the self-
understanding of the rabbis. But as Gerald Blidstein noted, the geonic position is only 
radical if one concludes that the rabbis did, in fact, create law through exegesis, which is 
a matter of significant debate.132 Furthermore, geonic assertions about the origins of 
rabbinic tradition seem to echo what Blidstein termed “the dominant aggadic claim about 
the origins of the tradition,” namely, its divine origins.133 Blidstein himself nevertheless 
described the geonic approach, at least in the eyes of Maimonides, as “intellectually 
untenable” and as “based on Karaitic premises … that only that which had heavenly 
                                                 
129 Abraham S. Halkin, “Saadia’s Exegesis and Polemics,” in Rab Saadia Gaon: Studies in his 
Honor, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1944), 140; Leon 
Nemoy, “Early Karaism (The Need for a New Approach),” JQR 40, no. 3 (1950): 312; David Weiss 
Halivni, “Reflections on Classical Jewish Hermeneutics,” PAAJR 62 (1996): 79-81; Schlossberg, “Ha-
Pulmus be-Yeṣirato shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 306; and idem, “Hanhaguto u-Manhiguto shel Rav Saʿadya 
Gaon,” ʿAmudot 5 (2013): 240. See also Marc Shapiro, Changing the Immutable: How Orthodox Judaism 
Rewrites its History (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2015), 247-49. 
130 Harris, How do we Know This, 80; Harris added that the encounter with Islamic exegesis and 
lexicography also contributed to this, but this element is virtually absent from the remainder of his 
narrative. 
131 Mordecai Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 252. Note also José Faur’s claim that the 
geonim defended the divine origin of the rabbinic interpretation of the lex talionis due to polemical 
considerations; “Monolingualism and Judaism,” Cardozo Law Review 14, no. 6 (1993): 1736. 
132 Gerald Blidstein, “Review of Jay Harris, How Do We Know This? Midrash and the 
Fragmentation of Modern Judaism, Albany, 1995,” Qiryat Sefer 68, no. 4 (1998): 212. 
133 Gerald Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution in Maimonides,” 175. See also Blidstein, “Review of 
Jay Harris,” 213; and Berakhyahu Lifschitz’s argument that these geonic views have much in common with 
talmudic claims about the Oral Torah; “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo be-Midrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebe-ʿal 
Peh’,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 24 (2006-2007): 213. See below, n185. 
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origins was sacred, significant, normative, and obligatory.”134 Based on this line of 
reasoning, both Blidstein and Robert Brody questioned whether the geonim believed their 
own rhetoric. Blidstein demurred, “we wonder whether we do not read the geonim too 
simple-mindedly or too literally,”135 and Brody wrote, “we cannot say to what extent 
Se‘adyah genuinely believed in the claims he advanced and to what extent he simply 
chose apologetic arguments which he estimated to have the greatest chances of 
success.”136 Brody concluded, “whether [Saʿadya] actually believed his own claims or 
chose them for purely polemical purposes, a tendency to wax nostalgic over an idealized 
past was certainly characteristic of him.”137  
Others have taken a different approach. Yoḥanan Silman and, more recently, 
Moshe Halbertal, have placed geonic claims in conversation with post-talmudic “models” 
of revelation. Silman categorized geonic legal epistemology as part of “the preservation 
approach” (ha-tefisah ha-meshammeret)138 to received knowledge, a perspective that 
asserts the completeness and singularity of the Sinaitic revelation and downplays post-
Sinaitic contributions to the law. Halbertal termed the geonic view a “retrieval” model of 
the Oral Torah that sought to recover and preserve data that would otherwise have been 
                                                 
134 Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 176, 175 (emphasis in original). He added that 
Maimonides “challeng[ed] the Karaites, rather than responding to them as the geonim had done” (179). See 
also idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit le-Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Daʿat 
16 (1986): 18. Compare Harris’ claim that by rejecting the creativity of halakhic midrash, Saʿadya refused 
to battle the Qaraites “on their own turf”; How Do We Know This, 75-76. 
135 Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 171-72. 
136 Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 246. 
137 Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35. 
138 Silman, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf, 39-69; see also idem, “Torah Elohit she-‘Lo ba-Shamayim 
Hi’,” 263-71. Because Silman offered a typology of Jewish understandings of revelation, he mingled 
talmudic and post-talmudic sources; his integration of the geonim into this view is apparent in the notes. 
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lost over time. He focused particularly on the chains of transmission used by geonim to 
defend the Oral Torah and on their claims that forgetful and lazy students were the cause 
of talmudic debates.139 In their treatments of the geonic outlook as one of several post-
talmudic approaches to the Oral Torah, Silman and Halbertal appear to assume that 
geonic ideas are coherent beyond the context of Qaraite polemic. 
The Islamic context of geonic writings offers another vantage point on geonic 
claims about the Oral Torah’s divine origins. Moshe Zucker was one of the first scholars 
to situate Qaraite and Rabbanite jurisprudence in the context of Islamic scriptural 
interpretation and legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh);140 other studies have continued this 
approach.141 Regarding the Oral Torah in particular, David Sklare detailed how the 
                                                 
139 Halbertal, People of the Book, 54-57. See also idem, Maimonides, 100-103; and idem, ʿAl 
Derekh ha-Emet: ha-Ramban ve-Yeṣiratah shel Masoret (Jerusalem: Shalom Hartman Institute, 2006), 21-
22. Note Blidstein’s comment that the geonic approach “attempt[s] to recover aspects of the tradition lost 
by forgetfulness or error”; “Oral Law as Institution,” 171. On the term “model,” see below, n448. 
140 See above, n10. 
141 See above, nn11-12. On the role of ijmāʿ in geonic presentations of the Oral Torah, see Gerald 
Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh ve-Toldotav be-Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon,” Daʿat 4 (1980): 13; 
repr. in “Oral Torah: Ideology and History in the Epistle of Sherira Gaon,” in Religious Knowledge, 
Authority, and Charisma: Islamic and Jewish Perspectives, eds. Daphna Ephrat and Meir Hatina (Salt Lake 
City: University of Utah Press, 2014), 73-87 (references will be to the Hebrew version); idem, Samkhut u-
Meri, 148; Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lx-lxi; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 19-20; 
and Libson, “Halakhah and Reality in the Gaonic Period,” 95. Gerson Cohen compared the tools of 
Rabbanite anti-Qaraite polemic to Islamic defenses of ḥadīth; see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. 
Cohen, l-lvii. For other issues, see John Wansbrough, “Majāz al-Qurʾān: Periphrastic Exegesis,” BSOAS 
33, no. 2 (1970): 260-65; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Shiṭot ha-Maḥshavah ha-Datit shel Abū Yusūf Yaʿaqūb 
al-Qirqisānī ve-Yefet ben ʿEli,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1977), 1:89-100; Diana Lobel, Between 
Mysticism and Philosophy, 59-67; Gregor Schwarb, “Uṣūl al-fiqh im jüdischen ‘Kalám’ des 10. und 11. 
Jahrhunderts,” 77-89; idem, “Capturing the Meaning of God’s Speech,” 111-56; idem, “Sahl b. al-Faḍl al-
Tustarī’s Kitāb al-Īmāʾ,” Ginzei Qedem 2 (2006): 61-105; Joseph David, “Yediʿat davar ha-El: Ṭaʿut, 
Heqqesh, Zikaron u-Mesirah be-Sifrut ha-Geonim ve-Hakhmei Sefard ha-Rishonim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew 
University, 2005), 125-39; idem, Jurisprudence and Theology, 89-93; and Miriam Goldstein, “Abū l-Faraj 
Hārūn (Jerusalem, 11th c.) on Majāz: Between Uṣūl al-Naḥw, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, and Iʿjāz al-Qurʾān,” Der 
Islam 90, no. 2 (2013): 376-411. For an alternative approach, see Ḥava Lazuras-Yafeh, “Ha-Yaḥas le-
Meqorot ha-Halakhah ba-Islam be-hashvaʾah la-Yahadut,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish 
Studies 8, Division C: Talmud and Midrash, Philosophy and Mysticism, Hebrew and Yiddish Literature 
(1981): 47-49. 
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geonic portrait of the late antique rabbis as “transmitters and not initiators of tradition”142 
drew on notions of tradition current in the Islamic world. Placing geonic-era 
understandings of the Oral Torah in their intellectual context brackets the question of 
what the geonim “really” believed; instead, it looks for ways that geonic legal thought 
can be contextualized within debates that engaged broader society – about Scripture, 
extra-scriptural traditions, and the role of jurists after prophecy. As Sklare explained, the 
geonic concept of tradition “had to make sense within [their] conceptual world.”143 
There are distinct advantages to framing geonic legal epistemology as an outlook 
that developed in conversation with concerns other than Qaraism. This approach helps to 
explain why later geonim, whose writings contain far less anti-Qaraite invective than 
those of Saʿadya, largely upheld his model of the Oral Torah.144 Moreover, the 
assumption that Qaraism alone was responsible for geonic thinking about the Oral Torah 
does not explain geonic embrace of positions that would not have been helpful in anti-
Qaraite polemic.145 Researchers who did not place Saʿadya’s polemical writings in their 
                                                 
142 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 43; see there, 43-47, 55-56, 158-65. 
143 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 160. 
144 On the paucity of anti-Qaraite polemic among later Baghdadi geonim, see Poznański, “The 
Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 274; Baron, SRHJ2, 5:269; Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 98-99, 
242, 310-12; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 56, 76-77, 280 (where Samuel ben Ḥofni besought divine 
blessing for both Saʿadya and Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī); and Marina Rustow, “The Genizah and Jewish 
Communal History,” in “From a Sacred Source”: Genizah Studies in Honour of Stefan C. Reif, eds. Ben 
Outhwaite and Siam Bhayro (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 311-12. See also idem, “Rabbanite-Karaite Relations in 
Fatimid Egypt and Syria: A Study Based on Documents from the Cairo Genizah,” (PhD diss., Columbia 
University, 2004), 161-81. On a parallel development in eleventh-century Qaraism, see Ḥaggai Ben-
Shammai, “Major Trends in Karaite Philosophy and Polemics in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” in 
Karaite Judaism, 354. See also Baron, “Saadia’s Communal Activities,” 18-19. 
145 Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 172, noted that the claim that forgetfulness accounts for 
disagreements among the rabbis would not have been particularly helpful in disputes with Qaraites. This 
claim likely draws on contemporaneous Islamic approaches to ḥadīth; see below. 
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tenth-century context146 failed to note that literary rebuttals were a popular genre in this 
period, and that authors who composed stylized critiques frequently revived the figures of 
religious “deviants.”147 (This was particularly true, for example, of Saʿadya’s attacks on 
Ḥayyawayh148 al-Balkhī [9th c.], the prototypical heretic in Qaraite and Rabbanite 
writings.149) In short, while some writings of the geonic period were clearly polemical, 
geonic arguments were hardly “mere polemic.” It would be wrong to think that authors 
took positions that they knew to be false, merely to defeat their opponents. 
Other scholars have interrogated the portrait of geonic theology as motivated 
solely by polemics,150 and this chapter builds on their studies. It aims to illuminate the 
                                                 
146 Davidson wrote, “the virulent expressions frequently met with in this polemic jar upon our 
sense of decency. Some of them would shame an infuriated fishwife”; Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer 
Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, xliii. See also Rosenthal’s emphasis on Saʿadya’s attacks on Ḥayyawayh 
al-Balkhī; “Ḥiwi al-Balkhi: A Comparative Study,” 320-21. Halkin drew attention to the fact that Saʿadya’s 
writings reflect contemporary style; “Saadia’s Exegesis and Polemics,” 139; and Nemoy described the 
tenth century as “an age and milieu of Sturm und Drang”; “Review of A Critical Edition, with a 
Translation and Notes, of the Book of Tradition (Sefer ha-Qabbalah) by Gerson D. Cohen,” Jewish Social 
Studies 31, no. 1 (1969): 49. 
147 See Norman Calder, “The Barāhima: Literary Construct and Historical Reality,” BSOAS 57, no. 
1 (1994): 43-45. This motif likely has roots in the disputational nature of kalām discourse; see Steven 
Wasserstrom, “Islamicate History of Religions?” History of Religions 27, no. 4 (1988): 409; Josef van Ess, 
“Disputationspraxis in der islamischen Theologie: Eine vorläufige Skizze,” Revue des Études Islamiques 44 
(1976): 23-60; and idem, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra (Berlin: W. de 
Gruyter, 1991) 1:48-55. 
148 Earlier scholars transcribed his name as Ḥīwī; on this spelling see Ben-Shammai, “Major 
Trends in Karaite Philosophy,” 352n75; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 318. 
149 See Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rāwāndī, Abū Bakr al-Rāzī and 
Their Impact on Islamic Thought (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 219-21; and Ezra Fleischer, “Sarid me-Hasagotav 
shel Ḥiwi ha-Balkhī ʿal Sifrei ha-Miqra,” Tarbiẓ 51, no. 1 (1982): 50. 
150 Sarah Stroumsa questioned Malter’s evaluation of Saʿadya’s eclectic approach to kalām as 
“polemical”; see Malter, Saadia Gaon, 198-99; and Sarah Stroumsa, Saʿadya Gaon: Hogeh Yehudi be-
Ḥevrah Yam-Tikhonit (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002), 35. Others have debated the role of polemics 
in Saʿadya’s commentary on Sefer Yeṣirah; see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Saadya’s Goal in his Commentary 
on Sefer Yeẓira,” in Straight Path: Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Culture, ed. Jeremiah Hackett 
(Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1987), 6-7; Gyongyi Hegedus, “The Double 
Path: The Two Layers of Thinking and the Twofold Nature of Knowledge in the Works of Saadya Gaon,” 
in Reflecting Diversity: Historical and Thematical Perspectives in the Jewish and Christian Tradition, eds. 
Péter Losonczi and Géza G. Xeravits (Vienna: Lit, 2007), 43-61; and idem, The Double Path of the Mystic 
and the Rationalist (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 13-14. For discussion of the role that polemic played in Saʿadya’s 
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context that provided the geonim with the tools to defend the Oral Torah and it notes 
correspondences between Rabbanite claims of the geonic-era and the contemporaneous 
Muslim assumption that the only valid source of religious authority is revealed material, 
i.e., the Qurʾān and prophetic ḥadīth (extra-scriptural traditions). Throughout, I will 
consider Rabbanite claims in light of earlier rabbinic writings and contemporaneous 
Islam and Qaraism. 
 
Historical Background 
Tenth- and eleventh-century geonic defenses of the Oral Torah were in dialogue 
with both Qaraite criticism of the rabbis and Islamic debates about extra-scriptural 
traditions. The tenth-century Qaraite, Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī, reported that messianic figures 
in the first half of the eighth century were the first to endorse practices at variance with 
talmudic Judaism.151 The next well-known figures who opposed talmudic authority, 
ʿAnan ben David and Benjamin al-Nahāwandī, also denied the authority of the Talmud, 
                                                 
understanding of Psalms, see Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of Psalms, 31-42; Ḥaggai Ben-
Shammai, “Review of Simon, Uriel. Arbaʿ Gishot le-Sefer Tehillim, me-R. Saʿadya Gaon ʿad R. Avraham 
Ibn Ezra (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1982),” Qiryat Sefer 58, no. 2 (1983): 400-406; and idem, 
“ʿAl Yesod Pulmusi be-Torat-ha-Nevuʾah shel Rasag,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 7 (1988): 
130-32. Compare David I. Shyovitz, “Christians and Jews in the Twelfth-Century Werewolf Renaissance,” 
Journal of the History of Ideas 75, no. 4 (2014): 522: “medieval discourses of monstrosity were treated not 
solely as founts of polemical rhetoric, but also as theological problems in pressing need of solutions.” In a 
different context, Shaye Cohen wrote, “all is fair in love and polemics”; Why Aren’t Jewish Women 
Circumcised: Gender and Covenant in Judaism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 92, 181. 
This, I believe, is an overstatement in the context of geonic legal thought. 
151 Qirqisānī mentioned Abū ʿĪsā of Iṣfahān and Yūdghān of Hamadan; see Kitāb al-Anwār wal-
Marāqib, ed. Leon Nemoy (New York: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1939-1943), 1:51-53. On 
the doctrines of these figures, see Israel Friedlander, “Jewish-Arabic Studies,” JQR 1, no. 2 (1910): 214-15; 
3, no. 2 (1912): 295-99; and on the ʿIsāwīya specifically, Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew, 84-88. 
On seventh- and eighth-century messianic movements, see Aaron Aescoly, Ha-Tenuʿot ha-Meshiḥiyot be-
Yisrael: Oṣar ha-Meqorot veha-Teʿudot le-Toldot ha-Meshiḥiyut be-Yisrael (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 
1956), 1:115-55. 
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but were more measured opponents of Rabbanite Judaism than were non-Rabbanites of 
the later ninth century.152 The most vigorous early anti-Rabbanite figure was Daniel al-
Qūmisī, who moved to Jerusalem from Iran around 880 and introduced anti-Rabbanite 
polemic into nascent Qaraism.153 Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai has argued that al-Qūmisī’s 
rejection of tradition as a source of legal authority made him the first true Qaraite 
“scripturalist.”154 The term “Qaraism” covers a diverse group of tenth- and eleventh-
century thinkers,155 but leading figures such as Qirqisānī, Salmon ben Yeruḥim156 
(Jerusalem; fl. mid. 10th c.), Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ (Jerusalem; fl. late 10th c.), and Yefet ben 
ʿEli upheld earlier expressions of opposition to the Oral Torah and polemicized against 
                                                 
152 See above, n118. On ʿAnan’s legal methodology, see Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Babylonian 
Aramaic in Arabic Characters: A Passage from ʿAnan’s Book of Precepts in a Work of Yeshuʿah B. Judah 
the Karaite,” JSAI 32 (2006): 419-32. On al-Nahāwandī, see Yoram Erder, Avlei Ṣion ha-Qaraʾim u-
Megillot Qumran: Le-Toldot Ḥalufah le-Yahadut ha-Rabbanit (Tel Aviv: ha-Kibbuṣ ha-Meʾuḥad, 2004), 
71-81. 
153 Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Parshan ha-Qaraʾi ve-Savivato ha-Rabbanit,” Proceedings of the 
World Congress of Jewish Studies, 9, Panel Sessions: Bible Studies and Ancient Near East (1985): 50-51. 
On the absence of explicit polemic in ʿAnan’s writings, see also Leon Nemoy, “Anan Ben David: A Re-
Appraisal of the Historical Data,” in Semitic Studies in Memory of Immanuel Löw, ed. Sándor Scheiber 
(Budapest: Alexander Kohut Memorial Foundation, 1947), 246n37; repr. in Karaite Studies, ed. Philip 
Birnbaum (New York: Hermon Press, 1971), 316n37. 
154 Ben-Shammai, “Return to the Scriptures,” 327-28; and earlier, Moshe Zucker, ʿAl Targum 
Rasag la-Torah: Parshanut Halakhah u-Polemiqah be-Targum ha-Torah shel R. Saʿadya Gaon (New 
York: Feldheim, 1959), 168. On Daniel, see Jacob Mann, “A Tract by an Early Karaite Settler in 
Jerusalem,” JQR 12, no. 3 (1922): 257-98; Leon Nemoy, “The Pseudo-Qūmisīan Sermon to the Karaites,” 
PAAJR 43 (1976): 49-105; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Fragments of Daniel al-Qūmisī’s Commentary on the 
Book of Daniel as a Historical Source,” Henoch, 13, no. 3 (1991): 259-81; idem, “Seridei Peirush Daniel 
le-Daniel al-Qūmisī ke-Meqor Histori le-Toldot Ereṣ Yisrael,” Shalem 3 (1981): 295-307; and Neḥemyah 
Gordon, “Ha-Omnam raq Mashmaʿut aḥat la-Miqra? ʿIyun be-Gishato ha-Parshanit shel Daniel al-Qūmisī 
be-‘Pitron Shenayim ʿAsar’,” Tarbiẓ 76, no. 3-4 (2007): 385-414. 
155 Qirqisānī ascribed the diversity of contemporary Qaraites to their reliance on laws that are the 
product of reason (nustakhrij al-ʿilm istakhrājan bi-ʿuqūlinā). Rabbanites, he claimed, should not allow 
disagreement, given their assertion that they possess prophetic tradition (naql ʿan al-nubūwa); Kitāb al-
Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:63-64. On this passage, see Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 219-20. On the rise of 
opposition to Rabbanite Judaism in this period, see in general, Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 83-95. 
156 On the spelling of Salmon’s patronymic, see Michael G. Wechsler, The Arabic Translation and 
Commentary of Yefet ben ʿEli the Karaite on the Book of Esther (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 125n9; and James 
Robinson, Asceticism, Eschatology, Opposition to Philosophy: The Arabic Translation and Commentary of 
Salmon Ben Yeroham on Qohelet (Ecclesiastes) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 3n1. 
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Saʿadya and other Rabbanites.157 Qaraites rejected the divine origin of the Oral Torah, 
accused the ancient rabbis of adding to revelation, and denied the authority of 
contemporary Rabbanites. 
Midrashic literature of the geonic-era contains what may be the earliest responses 
to the sundry critics of Rabbinic Judaism.158 Defenders of the Talmud in this period used 
midrashic literature to advocate on behalf of the geonic academies,159 to respond to al-
                                                 
157 For background on these and other figures, see Samuel Poznański, The Karaite Literary 
Opponents of Saadiah Gaon (London: Luzac, 1908), 4-65; Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:3-49; Gil, Jews in 
Islamic Countries, 260-69; Daniel Frank, Search Scripture Well: Karaite Exegetes and the Origins of the 
Jewish Biblical Commentary in the Islamic East (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 1-32; and Yoram Erder, “The 
Mourners of Zion: The Karaites in Jerusalem in the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries,” in Karaite Judaism, 
213-35. 
158 See in general Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 203-218; and Myron B. Lerner, “The Works of 
Aggadic Midrash and the Esther Midrashim,” in The Literature of the Sages, Second Part: Midrash and 
Targum, Liturgy, Poetry, Mysticism, Contracts, Inscriptions, Ancient Science and the Languages of 
Rabbinic Literature, eds. Shmuel Safrai et al. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 2006), 2:153. On several relevant 
passages in the Tanna de-vei Eliyahu, see Wilhelm Bacher, “Antikaräisches in einem jüngeren Midrasch,” 
MGWJ 23, no. 6 (1874): 266-71; and Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 205-206. On the dating of this text, see 
Hermann Leberecht Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, ed. and trans. 
Markus Bockmuehl (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1996), 340-41. See also the Tanḥuma’s denigration of 
those who sit in darkness on the Sabbath, treated in Leopold Zunz, Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge der 
Juden historisch entwickelt (Frankfurt, 1892), 236n; and Marc Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedeinu 
(Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2003), 185. 
This literature builds on earlier rabbinic polemics apparently directed against scripturalist critics of 
Rabbinic Judaism. For example, Ben-Shammai dated bMak 22b to the early Islamic period and used it as 
evidence of late talmudic-era scripturalism; see “Karaite Controversy,” 24-26; and idem, “Return to the 
Scriptures,” 328. Yaakov Elman dated this passage and others like it to the fourth century; see “Middle 
Persian Culture and Babylonian Sages: Accommodation and Resistance in the Shaping of Rabbinic Legal 
Tradition,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Talmud and Rabbinic Literature, eds. Charlotte Elisheva 
Fonrobert and Martin S. Jaffee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 176-80; idem, 
“Acculturation to Elite Persian Norms and Modes of Thought in the Babylonian Jewish Community of Late 
Antiquity,” in Netiʿot Ledavid: Jubilee Volume for David Weiss Halivni, eds. Yaakov Elman et al. 
(Jerusalem: Orḥot Press, 2004), 38-43; and idem, “Rava as Mara de-Atra in Maḥoza,” Ḥakira 11 (2011): 
68-75. For another late sugya that may respond to the Islamic environment, see Yaakov Elman, “The World 
of the ‘Sabboraim’: Cultural Aspects of Post-Redactional Additions to the Bavli,” in Creation and 
Composition: The Contribution of the Bavli Redactors (Stammaim) to the Aggada, ed. Jeffrey L. 
Rubenstein (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 383-98. Yaʿaqov Sussman suggested that sugyot that relax 
the prohibition on writing the Oral Torah are relatively late as well; “‘Torah shebe-ʿal Peh’ – Peshuṭa ke- 
Mashmaʿa: Koḥo shel qoṣo shel yod,” in Mehqarei Talmud 3, Muqdash li-Zikhro shel Profesor Ephraim 
Elimelekh Urbach, eds. Yaʿaqov Sussman and David Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2005), 325, 334-35. 
159 See the Tanḥuma passage adduced in Zunz, Die gottesdienstlichen Vorträge, 235-36n; treated 
in Avigdor Aptowitzer, “Untersuchungen zur gaonäischen Literatur,” HUCA 8-9 (1931-1932): 415-17; 
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Qūmisī and Yefet ben ʿEli,160 and to defend the Oral Torah more generally.161 (It is 
noteworthy that scholars have identified numerous ḥadīth that respond to Muslim ḥadīth 
critics.162) Brody has also identified a pro-Rabbanite/anti-scripturalist defense of the Oral 
                                                 
Benjamin Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim be-Lashon, be-Shirah uve-Sifrut (Tel Aviv: Hoṣaʾat Maḥbarot le-
Sifrut, 1954), 333; and Bregman, Sifrut Tanḥuma-Yelammedeinu, 185-86, 192n8. Similar sentiments appear 
in Mishnat R. Eliezer; see H.G. Enelow, ed., Mishnat Rabbi Eliezer o Midrash Shloshim u-Shetayim Middot 
(New York: Bloch, 1933), 259; and in Otiyot de-R. Aqiva; see Abraham Joseph Wertheimer, Batei 
Midrashot: ʿEsrim va-Ḥamishah Midreshei Ḥazal ʿal pi kitvei yad mi-Genizot Yerushalayim u-Miṣrayim 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1950), 2:415. On the dating of these texts, see Strack and Stemberger, 
Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 22-23, 349; and below, n161. 
160 Burton L. Visotzky, “Midrash Mishle: A Critical Edition Based on Manuscripts and Early 
Editions with an Introduction and Annotated English Translation of Chapters One through Ten,” (PhD 
diss., Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1983), 1:47-64; and idem, The Midrash on Proverbs: 
Translated from the Hebrew with an Introduction and Annotations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992), 10-12. 
161 See the linguistic similarities between Pirqoy ben Baboy’s defense of the Oral Torah and a 
Tanḥuma passage that praises God for giving the Written and Oral Torahs at Sinai; treated in Aptowitzer, 
“Untersuchungen zur Gaonäischen Literatur,” 417; Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 333; Jacob Mann, 
“Genizah Studies,” The American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures 46, no. 4 (1930): 266; 
Sussman, “Kitvei-Yad u-Mesorot-Nusaḥ shel ha-Mishnah,” 238n91; and Neil Danzig, Mavo le-Sefer 
Halakhot Pesuqot: ʿim tashlum Halakhot Pesuqot (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim ba-America, 
1993), 21n28. A similar phenomenon is detectable in the thirty-two middot ascribed to R. Eliezer ben Yossi 
ha-Glili, which, in the words of David Stern, were probably compiled in order “to legitimate [rabbinic] 
hermeneutical methods and to provide polemical documentation against competing exegetical schools”; 
“Midrash and Indeterminacy,” Critical Inquiry 15, no. 1 (1988): 147. Zucker argued that this text belongs 
to the period after Saʿadya; “Le-Pitron Baʿayat 32 Middot u-‘Mishnat R. Eliezer’,” PAAJR 23 (1954): 1-19; 
and idem, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 250-60; accepted by Israel Ta-Shma, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Qadmon: Ḥeiqer 
ve-ʿIyun (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 300-301. Others disagreed; see J.N. Epstein, “Le-‘Mishnat Rabbi 
Eliezer beno shel Rabbi Yossi ha-Glili’,” Tarbiẓ 4, no. 4 (1933): 343-353; idem, “Mishnat R. Eliezer,” 
HUCA 23, no. 2 (1950-1951): 1-15; Menaḥem Moreshet, “Le-Loshona shel ‘Mishnat R. Eliezer’ o 
‘Midrash de-32 Middot’,” Bar Ilan Annual 11 (1973): 183-223; and Richard C. Steiner, “Muqdam u-
Meʿuḥar and Muqaddam wa-Muʿaḫḫar: On the History of Some Hebrew and Arabic Terms for Hysteron 
Proteron and Anastrophe,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 66, no 1 (2007): 39-41. See also Naftali 
Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism (London: East and West Library, 1958), 65-66; Ben-Shammai, 
“Ha-Parshan ha-Qaraʾi,” 47n20; and Robert Brody, Pirqoy ben Baboi ve-Toldot ha-Pulmus ha-Penim-
Yehudi (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2003), 30n49. 
162 Ignaz Goldziher, Muslim Studies, ed. and trans. S.M. Stern (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1971), 2:126-31; Joseph Schacht, The Origins of Muhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1950), 53-56; Michael Cook, “ʿAnan and Islam: The Origins of Karaite Scripturalism,” 
JSAI 9 (1987): 172-73; John Burton, The Sources of Islamic Law: Islamic Theories of Abrogation 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1990), 22-25; and more generally, Aisha Y. Musa, Ḥadīth as 
Scripture: Discussions on the Authority of Prophetic Traditions in Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 11-14, 17-21. For examples, see Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. 
and trans. Joseph Lowry (New York: NYU Press, 2013), 75-77 (treated in Schacht, Origins, 46); and Cook, 
“ʿAnan and Islam,” 173. 
 
51 
 
Torah that formed the basis of Pirqoy ben Baboy’s Epistle (written at the turn of the ninth 
century to advocate for the Babylonian tradition).163 By contrast, geonic texts with named 
authors prior to the time of Saʿadya preserve relatively few responses to Qaraites and 
others that the geonim deemed heretics.164 Although Saʿadya was not the first to engage 
in polemics, his sustained criticisms of a wide range of opponents, most prominently 
Ḥayyawayh and ʿAnan, was atypical among the Babylonian geonim.165 
The period from the eighth to the tenth centuries also witnessed significant 
changes in the framing, rhetoric, and sources of Islamic law. Prior to the ninth century, 
prophetic authority was one of several competing and complementary sources of legal 
practice. Jurists in this period freely cited ḥadīth ascribed to Muḥammad, his Companions 
(i.e., contemporaries), and his Successors (i.e., the subsequent generation).166 Many 
                                                 
163 Brody, Pirqoy ben Baboi; based on the text in B.M. Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,” Tarbiẓ 
2, no. 4 (1931): 400-405; see also Louis Ginzberg, Ginzei Schechter (New York: Beit Midrash ha-
Rabbanim Asher be-America, 1928-1929), 2:571-72, 2:638-39. See Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,” 
394-97; Shalom Spiegal, “Le-Farashat ha-Pulmus shel Pirqoy ben Baboy,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-khvod Ẓvi 
Wolfson, ed. Saul Liberman (Jerusalem: American Academy for Jewish Research, 1965), 261-66; and 
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 39. For background on Pirqoy’s Epistle, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, 
Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit be-Arṣot ha-Islam: Qairawan 800-1057 (Jerusalem: Magnes; 1996), 241-
44; and idem, “Benei ha-Maghreb ve-Qishreihem le-Ereṣ Yisrael, Meʾot 9-11,” Shalem 5 (1997): 31-43. 
164 A responsum ascribed to the eighth-century gaon Naṭronai ben Neḥemiah mentions two types 
of people whom the author viewed as heretics: those who reject the Talmud and those who reject the Torah 
entirely. See B.M. Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Shabbat, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 2:128-29 (§396); and 
Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Yevamot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 7:113-14 (§263). For authorship and 
background, see Ben-Shammai, “Karaite Controversy,” 19; Robert Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot shel Rav 
Naṭronai bar Hillay Gaon (Jerusalem: Ofeq, 2011), 31n18; and idem, Geonim of Babylonia, 84-85. 
Another responsum, attributed to the ninth-century gaon Naṭronai bar Hilay, indicates that the author had 
little direct knowledge of ʿAnan’s writings; see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 256-58; and idem, Geonim of 
Babylonia, 96. 
165 See Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 96-98, citing earlier scholarship, for the claim the Saʿadya 
“broke with geonic precedent”; see the modification of his view there, xii, based on the evidence cited 
above, n163. 
166 See Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 9th-10th Centuries C.E. 
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 15-16; idem, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents and the Framing of Islamic Law,” 
Islamic Law and Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 389-90, 399, 402-405; idem, Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (Oxford: 
OneWorld, 2006), 20, 41, 49-50; Wael Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: 
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jurists before the eighth century also employed raʾy, a term that might be rendered 
“considered opinion”167 or legal rulings with an “element of human reasoning,”168 to 
supplement received sources (both revealed and non-revealed), or to serve in their 
stead.169 In this period, the word Sunna – which in the Qurʾān does not refer to prophetic 
practices – denoted practices of Muḥammad or of early caliphs, or long-established 
practices (especially in Medina, where Mālik ibn Anas [d. 795] and others understood 
lived practice [ʿamal] as the best guarantor of prophetic tradition).170 
Against this background, the insistence of Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820 
in Egypt)171 that only revealed sources may constitute “any law which lay claim to being 
                                                 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 69-74; and Umar F. Abd-Allah Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina: 
Islamic Legal Reasoning in the Formative Period (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 102-107. This is also the 
conclusion of the quantitative studies in Harold Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence: Meccan 
Fiqh before the Classical Schools, trans. Marion H. Katz (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 107-108, 187, 209, 235, 
242, 255-56, 295-96. See also Scott Lucas, “Where are the Legal Ḥadīth? A Study of the Muṣannaf of Ibn 
Abī Shayba,” Islamic Law and Society 15 (2008): 238-314. 
167 Following Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 68; or “discretionary opinion” 
(44). See also Norman Calder, Studies in Muslim Jurisprudence (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), 12. 
168 Joseph Schacht, Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., s.v. “Aṣḥāb al-Raʾy,” 1:691 (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1986); see Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 386-87. Or, “the speculative elaboration of 
norms”; Lowry, in Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, xvi. 
169 See the earlier treatments in Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:78-83; and Schacht, Origins, 98-132. 
Later studies complicated this picture but confirmed the frequent use of raʾy; see, e.g., Melchert, The 
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 1-13; idem, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 385-88; Hallaq, The 
Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 74-76; Motzki, The Origins of Islamic Jurisprudence, 288, 297; 
idem, “The Jurisprudence of Ibn Shihāb al-Zuhrī. A Source-Critical Study,” in Analysing Muslim 
Traditions: Studies in Legal, Exegetical and Maghāzī Ḥadīth (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 6, 13, 19, 25-29; and 
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 141-45. 
170 See Schacht, Origins, 58-77; Zafar Ishaq Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Šāfiʿī: A 
Semantic Analysis with Special Reference to Kūfa,” Arabica 19, no. 3 (1972): 259-82; Patricia Crone and 
Martin Hinds, God’s Caliph: Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 58-96; G.H.A. Juynboll, “Some New Ideas on the Development of Sunna as a 
Technical Term in Early Islam,” JSAI 10 (1987): 97-118; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 167-69; and 
Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 293-328. 
171 For Shāfiʿī’s biography, see Kecia Ali, Imam Shafiʿi: Scholar and Saint (Oxford: Oneworld, 
2011), 1-45. 
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truly Islamic,”172 was a dramatic change. Shāfiʿī’s Risāla (Epistle), one of the earliest 
texts to articulate a theoretical justification of Islamic law,173 argued that only revealed 
texts constitute acceptable legal sources.174 Shāfiʿī maintained that the Qurʾān and the 
(exclusively) prophetic Sunna constitute the entirety of revelation. He thus limited the 
concept of Sunna to sunnat al-nabī, the Sunna of the Prophet, or sunnat rasūl Allāh, the 
Sunna of God’s messenger,175 and he considerably reduced the role played by ḥadīth 
from the Companions and Successors to Muḥammad.176 Shāfiʿī further insisted that the 
                                                 
172 This phrase belongs to Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 168, describing the views of the 
critics of qiyās. 
173 On Shāfiʿī and later uṣūl al-fiqh; see Wael Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi the Master Architect of 
Islamic Jurisprudence?” IJMES 25, no. 4 (1993): 587-605; idem, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 30-
35; Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four Sources’ of Law?” 23-50; idem, Early Islamic Legal 
Theory, 51-59; idem, “The Reception of al-Shāfiʿī’s Concept of Amr and Nahy in the Thought of his 
Student al-Muzanī,” in Law and Education in Medieval Islam: Studies in Memory of George Makdisi, eds. 
Joseph Lowry et al. (Cambridge: E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 2004), 128-49; and idem, “Some 
Preliminary Observations on al-Šāfiʿī and Later Uṣūl al-Fiqh: The Case of the Term bayān,” Arabica 55, 
no. 5-6 (2008): 505-527. Devin Stewart has identified traces of pre-Shāfiʿī uṣūl al-fiqh; see “Muḥammad b. 
Dawūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual of Jurisprudence, al-Wuṣūl ilā Maʿrifat al-Uṣūl,” in Studies in Islamic Legal 
Theory, 102-106; and idem, “Muḥammad b. Jarīr al-Ṭabarī’s al-Bayān ʿan Uṣūl al-Aḥkām and the Genre of 
Uṣūl al-Fiqh in Ninth Century Baghdad,” in ʿAbbasid Studies: Occasional Papers of the School of 
ʿAbbasid Studies, ed. James E. Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 330-49. For the legal theory of 
another early jurist, see Joseph Lowry, “The First Islamic Legal Theory: Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ on Interpretation, 
Authority, and the Structure of the Law,” JAOS 128, no. 1 (2008): 25-40. Norman Calder questioned 
Shāfiʿī’s authorship of the Risāla; see Studies in Muslim Jurisprudence, 241-43. This has largely been put 
to rest by Joseph Lowry, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba: A Reconsideration,” 
Islamic Law and Society 11, no. 1 (2004): 1-41; Ahmed El Shamsy, “From Tradition to Law: The Origins 
and Early Development of the Shāfiʿī School of Law in Ninth-Century Egypt,” (PhD diss., Harvard 
University, 2009), 265-77; and idem, “Al-Shāfiʿī’s Written Corpus: A Source-Critical Study,” JAOS 132, 
no. 2 (2012): 199-220. 
174 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 166-67; Hallaq, “Was al-Shafiʿi the Master Architect,” 
592-93; and idem, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 24-29. This argument appears in the later, 
surviving, Egyptian version of this text, but was apparently not the claim in the earlier, Iraqi version; 
Ahmed El Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī: The Traditionalist Legal Thought of Abū Yaʿqūb al-Buwayṭī (d. 
231/846),” Islamic Law and Society 14, no. 3 (2007): 317-18; and idem, The Canonization of Islamic Law: 
A Social and Intellectual History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 151. 
175 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 170-87. 
176 Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 18, put this strongly: “the elimination of the role 
of the Companions’ reports from the construction of the law was completed by [Shāfiʿī] who insisted, 
consistently and systematically, that the Quran and the Sunna of the Prophet are the sole material sources of 
the law.” Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 203-205, was more cautious: “non-prophetic reports play a 
de facto role in legal analysis, … and so are not rejected outright by Shāfiʿī. … Shāfiʿī did not banish these 
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Qurʾān and Sunna – written and oral revelation – are of equal standing, apparently 
arguing against the view that non-Qurʾānic reports reflect a lower degree of revelation.177 
Joseph Lowry showed that the Risāla is an extended argument about the interaction of 
revealed sources;178 according to Shāfiʿī , although abrogation, naskh, may affect one 
body of revelation, the Qurʾān may not abrogate the Sunna nor the Sunna the Qurʾān. 
This position – apparently unique in the history of Islamic law – appears to result from 
Shāfiʿī’s commitment to protect oral revelation as a valid source of law. Were it possible 
for the Qurʾān to abrogate the Sunna, Shāfiʿī explained, one might claim that any 
qurʾānic source should prevail over a Sunna that appears to modify it. Such reasoning, 
noted Shāfiʿī, could render the Sunna entirely extraneous.179 Lastly, Shāfiʿī downplayed 
non-divine sources of law, such as consensus (ijmāʿ); he used this only to corroborate 
otherwise debatable interpretations of revealed texts.180 
Many of Shāfiʿī’s contemporaries who preferred legal ḥadīth to speculative 
reasoning continued to affirm the authority of ḥadīth ascribed to non-prophetic figures. 
Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal, one of the most prominent mid-ninth century authorities, reportedly 
                                                 
entirely from his legal thought, but one suspects that he would have liked to do since they interfere with the 
neat categories … that implicitly draw a line between divine and human authority” (203); “their continued 
existence in Shāfiʿī’s legal thought shows how difficult it was to account neatly for all the legal materials in 
circulation during Shāfiʿī’s lifetime” (204). See also Mohyddin Yahia, Šāfiʿī et les deux sources de la loi 
islamique (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), 491-98. 
177 Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 403-404. 
178 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 23-46. 
179 See Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, 163-65; Hallaq, A History of Islamic 
Legal Theories, 71-73; and Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 89-91. See also John Wansbrough, 
Quranic Studies: Sources and Methods of Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Andrew Rippin (Amherst, NY: 
Prometheus Books, 2004), 196; and Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 86. 
180 Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 322-27; writing that Shāfiʿī used ijmāʿ “as a source of 
corroborative authority for interpretations of difficult passages from the revealed source texts” (357). 
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allowed ḥadīth from Muḥammad and from the first four caliphs. Others – including some 
of Shāfiʿī’s followers – were even more lenient. Nevertheless, Shāfiʿī’s revelation-only 
view of Islamic law became standard within Sunni Islam over the course of the late ninth 
and early tenth centuries, and jurists generally came to limit ḥadīth to prophetic texts.181 
The result of this process was “an exclusively textualist … conception of revelation,” in 
which “the ultimate author of the Sunna was God himself.”182 The Muslim jurist 
correspondingly sought to “salvage the authentic memory of the prophetic age and de-
legitimize the later accretions to the law,”183 so that prophetic traditions – as transmitted 
through written and oral revelation – became the sole source of religious authority. 
Many geonic claims become intelligible when read in light of this shift to a 
revelation-only perspective of religious law in broader Islamic society. Saʿadya, whose 
“highest aspiration” Brody described as “the restoration of a long-ago Golden Age,”184 
first articulated these assertions. Despite some criticism from Sherira ben Ḥanina Gaon 
(c. 906-1006), his son Hayya, and others, Rabbanites in Baghdad and North Africa 
largely upheld this perspective, successfully integrating and manipulating earlier rabbinic 
                                                 
181 Schacht, Origins, 57, 80, portrayed Shāfiʿī’s position on this issue as immediately victorious, a 
position accepted in Bernard Weiss, “The Primacy of Revelation in Classical Islamic Legal Theory as 
Expounded by Sayf al-Dîn al-Âmidî,” Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 84. For the view presented here, see 
Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 399-405. On Ibn Ḥanbal, see also Saud Al Sarhan, “The 
Responsa of Aḥmad Ibn Ḥanbal and the Formation of Ḥanbalism,” Islamic Law and Society 22 (2015): 18, 
38-39. On the position of Shāfiʿī’s followers, see Éric Chaumont, “Le «dire d'un Compagnon unique» 
(qawl al-wāḥid min l-ṣaḥāba) entre la sunna et l’iǧmāʿ dans les uṣūl al-fiqh šāfiʾites classiques,” Studia 
Islamica 93 (2001): 59-76; Susan Spectorsky, “Ḥadīth in the Responses of Isḥāq b. Rāhwayh,” Islamic Law 
and Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 429; Shamsy, “The First Shāfiʿī,” 317-19; and idem, The Canonization of 
Islamic Law, 216-20. See the similar conclusions about al-Bukhārī in Scott C. Lucas, “The Legal Principles 
of Muhammad b. Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī and Their Relationship to Classical Salafi Islam,” Islamic Law and 
Society 13, no. 3 (2006): 300. 
182 Weiss, “The Primacy of Revelation,” 83-84. 
183 Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law, 70; and idem, “Rethinking Taqlīd in the Early 
Shāfiʿī School,” JAOS 128, no. 1 (2008): 7. 
184 Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 247. 
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sources, and augmenting them with arguments found in contemporary Islamic texts. They 
thus established a doctrine that was consistent with many of the assumptions of the time. 
Because Rabbanite Judaism and Sunni Islam asserted the doctrine of a dual revelation, it 
is unsurprising that jurists in both communities defended their systems of religious law in 
similar ways. 
 
Late Geonic-Era Claims about the Scope of Revelation 
Geonic affirmations that revelation encompassed both the Written and Oral 
Torahs were largely continuous with claims about the origins of rabbinic tradition found 
in rabbinic aggadah.185 These theological and homiletical assertions do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Tannaim, however; Azzan Yadin has argued that the Aqiva and 
Ishmael schools debated the scope of extra-scriptural tradition,186 and others have noted 
that the Mishnah and Tosefta do not claim to be divinely authorized documents.187 
According to Martin Jaffee, the ambiguous relationship in these tannaitic documents 
                                                 
185 As noted by Blidstein and Lifschitz; see above, n133. On rabbinic aggadah, note also Bernard 
J. Bamberger, “Revelations of Torah after Sinai: An Aggadic Study,” HUCA 16 (1941): 97: “Most of the 
Aggadot either imply or state plainly, that … Moses received the Torah in absolutely completed form.” 
186 Azzan Yadin, “4QMMT, Rabbi Ishmael, and the Origins of Legal Midrash,” Dead Sea 
Discoveries 10, no. 1 (2003): 130-40; idem, “Resistance to Midrash? Midrash and ‘Halakhah’ in the 
Halakhic Midrashim,” in Current Trends in the Study of Midrash, ed. Carol Bakhos (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 
35-58; idem, Scripture as Logos: Rabbi Ishmael and the Origins of Midrash (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania, 2004), 1-11, 142-54; idem, “Concepts of Scripture in the Schools of Rabbi Akiva and Rabbi 
Ishmael,” in Jewish Concepts of Scripture: A Comparative Introduction, ed. Benjamin Sommer (New 
York: NYU Press, 2012), 47-63; and idem, Scripture and Tradition: Rabbi Akiva and the Triumph of 
Midrash (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014), 193-206. See also Yishai Rosen-Zvi, “‘Mi 
Yigaleh ʿAfar me-ʿEinekha’: Mishnat Soṭah pereq 5 u-Midrasho shel R. Aqivah,” Tarbiẓ 75, no. 1-2 (2005-
2006): 125-27; and earlier, Abraham Joshua Heschel, Torah min ha-Shamayim be-Aspaqlaryah shel ha-
Dorot (London: Shontsin, 1962-1990), 2:220-62, 2:360-413. 
187 Mayer I. Gruber, “The Mishnah as Oral Torah: A Reconsideration,” Journal for the Study of 
Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Period 15 (1984): 112-22; and Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, 
100. 
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between laws rooted in Scripture and laws established by the Sages gave rise to “a 
pressing jurisprudential problem” of determining the relationship and hierarchy of legal 
sources. In Jaffee’s view, the first to promulgate an ideology of the Oral Torah that 
located all post-scriptural innovations in divine revelation were the authors of third-
century midrashic literature.188 Rabbanite defenses of the Oral Torah maintained this 
ideological stance, but they did so in the language of contemporaneous Muslim defenses 
of extra-scriptural traditions. 
 
Enumerations of the Commandments 
Geonic-era enumerations of the 613 commandments – all of which include post-
Mosaic laws189 – are an important, if somewhat enigmatic, example of the ways that 
Rabbanites located post-biblical legislation at Sinai. Rabbanites cited different versions 
of the Talmud’s description of the 613 commandments (bMak 23b); some preserved a 
reading that the 613 were “said to Moses at Sinai,” or simply “said to Moses,” and others, 
that “Israel was commanded 613 commandments.” While some jurists after the twelfth 
century claimed that the “correct” wording of this passage should dictate whether or not 
the enumeration was intended to include post-Sinaitic laws, geonic-era works freely 
quote various versions of this text.190 Geonic-era enumerations counted some, or all, of 
                                                 
188 Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, 84-92. 
189 Herbert A Davidson, “The First Two Positive Commandments in Maimonides’ List of the 613 
Believed to Have Been Given to Moses at Sinai,” in Creation and Re-Creation in Jewish Thought, 
Festschrift in Honor of Joseph Dan, eds. Rachel Elior and Peter Schäfer (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), 
118; repr. in idem, Maimonides the Rationalist (Oxford: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2011), 20. 
190 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One); Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-
Rambam ʿim hasagot ha-Ramban, ed. Charles Ber Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1981), 8-10 
(Prin. One); and Simeon b. Ṣemaḥ Duran, Azharot le-Rabbeinu Shlomo ben Gabirol z"l ve-ʿalav Sefer 
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the following as commandments: the festival of Purim; the post-biblical festival of 
Hanukah; the lighting of Sabbath candles; the recitation of one hundred blessings a day, 
and the recitation of Hallel (Ps. 113-18) on celebratory days.191 Reflecting on this claim, 
Abraham Ibn Ezra (b. Toledo; 1089-1164) observed: “There is no difference between 
matters from them [i.e., the rabbis] and matters from the Torah where the commandments 
are concerned. They [i.e., the former] are also given to us; they, too, are a tradition from 
their fathers, and the fathers of their fathers from the prophets – all is from God to 
                                                 
Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, ed. David Abraham (Jerusalem, 1987), 6 (introductory pagination, Prin. One; hereinafter 
Zohar ha-Raqiʿa). For treatment, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 5n1; idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 7n53, 9n61; and Hildesheimer, ed. “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 70n324. Contrary to 
Naḥmanides’ argument, the words “at Sinai” do appear some surviving versions of the enumeration in the 
Halakhot Gedolot; see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 112; noted in Yeruḥam Fishel 
Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag: ʿim beiʾur Raḥav Mevaʾer Devarav ve-Yesodotav ve-Shiṭato (Jerusalem: 
Qeset, 1973), 1:17. See also Shmuel Mirsky, Sheʾiltot de-Rav Aḥai Gaon (Jerusalem: Sura, 1959), 5:77. 
191 The best collection of sources on these counts is Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot 
Gedolot.” On Purim, see there, 94-95n421. On Hanukkah and Sabbath candles, 84n378. On Sabbath 
candles, see also B.M. Lewin, “Le-Toldot Ner Shabbat,” in Essays and Studies in Memory of Linda R. 
Miller, ed. Israel Davidson (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1938), 58-68 (Hebrew 
pagination); and Myron Bialik Lerner, “Peirush Midrashi le-Shir ha-Shirim mi-Yemei ha-Geonim,” Qoveṣ 
ʿal Yad 14 (8) (1976): 145, 159. Brody concluded that the blessing on Sabbath candles was not instituted 
due to anti-Qaraite motives; see Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 174n5. For Saʿadya’s Maʾamar Ner Shabbat, see 
Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 242-58. On one hundred blessings a day, see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat 
Halakhot Gedolot,” 70-71n324; Naftali Wieder, “‘Meiʾah Berakhot’ = ‘Birkot ha-Shaḥar’,” Sinai 44 
(1959): 258-60; repr. in idem, Hitgabshut Nusaḥ ha-Tefillah ba-Mizraḥ uva-Maʿarav: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim 
(Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben-Ẓvi, 1998), 1:281-83; Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 106-113; and Stefan C. Reif, 
Jewish Prayer Texts from the Cairo Genizah: A Selection of Manuscripts at Cambridge University Library, 
Introduced, Transcribed, Translated, and Annotated, with Images (Leiden: Brill, 2016), 12-27. On Hallel, 
see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 81-82n367; note the language of Eliezar ben Samuel 
of Metz: “the eight days of Hanukkah are rabbinic, but since R. Simeon [Qayyāra, the presumed author of 
Halakhot Gedolot] included them in the count, I also included them among the positive biblical 
commandments” (אתיירואד השע תוצמב ינא םג םיתללכ ןובשחב ןועמש 'ר םללכו ליאוהו והנינ ןנברד הכונח ימי 'חו); Sefer 
Yireiʿim (Warsaw, 1931), 239 (§262 [§125]). Abraham Ibn Ezra, on the authority of Baḥya ibn Paquda, 
included Hallel as an example of a commandment hinted to in the Torah; Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. 
Joseph Cohen and Uriel Simon (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2007), 126 (6:1). See also Meir ha-
Levi Ibn Migash, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Ri Migash (Salonika, 1791), 7a (§44); and the sources in 
Menaḥem Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 11:220-21, 12:163-74. Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:508, argued 
that Saʿadya omitted Hallel from his enumeration. 
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Moses.”192 It is possible, however, that enumerators of the commandments sought to 
anthologize Jewish law and did not seek to limit themselves to laws of biblical (or divine) 
origin.193 By the same token, an author’s exclusion of a law from the enumeration need 
not have meant that he considered it rabbinic in origin, as the categories of biblical law 
and enumerated commandments overlap but are not equivalent. It seems likely, however, 
that enumerations of the commandments are consistent with a broader geonic-era trend in 
legal epistemology to downplay human contributions to divine law. 
Having said this, both Saʿadya and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, who were more cautious 
about listing post-Mosaic laws than other Rabbanite enumerators of this period, also 
counted laws that appear to be of rabbinic status.194 Ḥayim Sabbato recently argued that 
Saʿadya only included three post-Mosaic laws in his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the 
Commandments): Purim, Hanukah, and second-order prohibitions of forbidden sexual 
relations (sheniyot le-ʿarayot).195 Elsewhere, Saʿadya claimed pentateuchal authority (for 
Purim and Hanukah) or divine, extra-scriptural authority (naql; regarding the sheniyot) 
for these laws;196 this seems to indicate that his enumeration of the commandments only 
                                                 
192  םתובא תובאו םתובאמ הלבק םגו ןה ונל תונותנ םג יכ הרות ירבד ןיבו םהירבד ןיב תוצמה ירבדב שרפה ןיאו
השמ דיל םשה יפמ לכהו םיאיבנהמ; Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 106 
(2:14); for treatment, see there, 31. 
193 On this aspect of Ḥefeṣ’s work, see Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 49-50. I thank 
Bernard Septimus for his help clarifying some of these problems. 
194 For example, Perla noticed that unlike other enumerators, Saʿadya did not count lighting 
Sabbath as a commandment in one of his liturgical enumerations; Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:507. 
195 Ḥayim Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam et Sefer ha-Miṣvot ha-Shaleim le-Rasag?” in Mi-
Birkat Moshe, 2:760. It is hard to know if Sabbato’s assessment is correct until Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ 
appears in print. I thank Robert Brody for his help on this matter. On the sheniyot, see tYeb chap. 3 and 
bYeb 21a-22a. 
196 On Purim and Hanukah, see below. On the sheniyot, see Moshe Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim 
Neged Qaraʾim,” PAAJR 18 (1948-1949): 9 (on this text, see below, n294). Note Maimonides’ comment 
about the sheniyot; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. One). Maimonides categorized these laws as: 
מ תורוסאםירפוס יברדמ ןרוסיאו הלבקה יפ  (Hilkhot Ishut, 1:6); see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 88; 
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included laws that he considered to be of divine origin. Judah Ibn Bilʿam (Toledo, 
Seville; late 11th c.) reported that Ḥefeṣ had criticized the inclusion of rabbinic laws in the 
enumeration but did count both Purim and Hanukah among the 613 commandments.197  
Early enumerations of the commandments also included laws based on post-
Mosaic prophecy, such as the requirement to clothe the naked; according to Maimonides, 
this was rooted in Isa. 58:7 (“when you see the naked, clothe him”), further suggesting 
that, for these enumerators, the 613 covered all divine laws.198 In his Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ 
(Book on the Commandments), Samuel ben Ḥofni described laws found in the Prophets as 
oral traditions from Moses (compare bTan 17b and parallels199), describing each as a 
khabar (pl., akhbār; a prophetic report).200 Similarly, an anonymous geonic letter relied 
                                                 
and Eliav Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’ ve-‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai’: ʿIyun be-
Leshonot ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 411-12. 
197 According to Ibn Bilʿam, Ḥefeṣ criticized those who counted commandments to visit the sick 
and comfort the bereaved; Salomon Fuchs, Studien über Abu Zakaria Jachja (R. Jehuda) Ibn Balʿâm 
(Berlin, 1893), xxii-xxiii; Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 105; and Maravi Perez, “Commentary 
on Number & Deuteronomy (from ‘Kitāb altargiḥ’) by Jehuda b. Shmuel Ibn Balʿam,” (MA thesis, Bar Ilan 
University, 1970), 63-64. Like Ibn Bilʿam, Maimonides praised Ḥefeṣ for excluding rabbinic ordinances 
from the enumeration; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). Maimonides referred to the “author of 
the famous Book of the Commandments” (or “the famous author of Book of the Commandments”;  בחאצ
רוהשמלא עיארשלא באתכ). Solomon Judah Rapoport first identified Ḥefeṣ as the author that Maimonides had in 
mind; “Meṣiʾot Rav Ḥefeṣ ve-Qorot Sefarav,” in Qevuṣat Ḥakhamim, ed. W. Warnheim (Vienna, 1861), 
58. On this passage, see also Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 6. A fragment of Ḥefeṣ’s Kitāb al-
Sharāʾiʿ corroborates that Ḥefeṣ included Hanukah among the 613 commandments; see Zucker, “ʿIyunim 
ve-Heʿarot,” 99. 
198 For background in geonic-era literature, see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 
72-73n329. See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 11 (Prin. One). On this issue, see Halbertal, 
“Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 462-68; and idem, Maimonides, 126-33. 
199 On the rabbinic claim, see Halivni, “Reflections on Classical Jewish Hermeneutics,” 107-108. 
On this passage, see Ephraim Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” Tarbiẓ 18, no. 1 (1946): 19-20. 
200 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 215-16. The word khabar may denote a non-prophetic report; 
Sklare noted the Samuel and other geonim understood akhbār as “traditions from the Prophet Moses, 
transmitted by scholars from generation to generation” (43) and “conceive[d] of the Oral Law as the simple 
transmission of unwritten prophetic traditions,” terming rabbinic sources khabar (269n112). On this term, 
see also Raphael Jospe, “‘Ha-Haggadah ha-Neʾemenet’ shel R. Saʿadya Gaon: Mi Hem ‘Qahal ha-
Meyaḥdim’?” Daʿat 41 (1998): 6-8. 
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on laws found in the Prophets to defend rabbinic tradition as a whole.201 The author drew 
the following analogy: Just as laws that are not found in the Pentateuch yet appear 
elsewhere in Scripture were known before they were written, so too, laws reported by the 
rabbis must have been known before they were written.202 
 
Claims about the Scope of Revelation 
Enumerations of the commandments that treat laws as Sinaitic in origin that 
rabbinic literature appears to consider to be rabbinic in status are consistent with geonic-
era claims about the scope of revelation. Saʿadya’s writings contain the sharpest 
formulations of the geonic view. He proclaimed that God revealed both the uṣūl (roots or 
principles) and the furūʿ (branches or details) of the law,203 that the Mishnah and Talmud 
were transmitted orally until they were compiled,204 and that all of the details of how to 
                                                 
201 Jacob Mann surmised that the author of this text was the head of one of the academies after 
their late ninth-century move to Baghdad; “The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as a Source of Jewish 
History,” JQR 9, no. 1-2 (1918-1919): 145-46; see also idem, Texts and Studies, 1:73. On the date of the 
move to Baghdad, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 31. 
202 T.-S. 13J 31.4, fol. 4r lines 1-5; printed in Mann, “The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as 
a Source of Jewish History,” 149; see analysis there, 140-41. Mann later published more of this responsum 
from Mosseri II, 60.1; see “Gaonic Studies I, The Last Period of the Sura Gaonate,” in Hebrew Union 
College Jubilee Volume, 1875-1925, ed. David Philipson (Cincinnati, 1925), 260-61. Mann did not publish 
the entire second manuscript. Compare the claims about post-Mosaic prophecy in Enelow, ed., Mishnat 
Rabbi Eliezer, 117; mentioned in Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” 8n65. On the dating of this text, see 
above, n161. 
203 See ENA NS 74.14 (now NS 28.13); first noted in Moshe Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya Gaon 
le-Bereishit (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1984), 13-14n9 (introductory 
pagination); see also Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 160-61. The transcription in both of these works 
should be corrected; I thank David Sklare for providing me with a new transcription of this fragment. See 
also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 245-46; and Solomon Schechter, Saadyana: Geniza 
Fragments of Writings of R. Saadya Gaon and Others (Cambridge: Deighton and Bell, 1903), 5. Saʿadya’s 
use of the distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ is noted in Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 246n38. 
204 Abraham Elijah Harkavy, Zikhron le-Rishonim: Ha-Sarid veha-Paliṭ mi-Sefer ha-Egron ve-
Sefer ha-Galuy (St. Petersburg, 1891), 153; and Henry Malter, “Saadia Studies,” JQR 3, no. 4 (1913): 497. 
See also Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lii. See similarly his commentary to Sefer Yeṣirah, 
writing: הבותכמ ריג הלוקנמ הנשמלא תנאכ אמכ הבותכמ ריג אנתמא ןיב אמ יפ הלוקנמ לזת םלו; Sefer Yeṣirah, ed. Kafiḥ, 
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perform the commandments were transmitted as “the nation witnessed them from acts of 
the messenger (i.e., Moses).”205 Saʿadya contended that just as the Pentateuch presented 
the Tabernacle and its inauguration in great detail, so, too, God would not leave any of 
the commandments “unexplained” (ghayr bayyin). Therefore, he concluded, explanations 
that are not found in Scripture (al-maktūb) must be in the tradition (al-manqūl).206 
Later Rabbanites endorsed many of Saʿadya’s views. An unknown student of 
Saʿadya207 maintained that Ps. 19:8 (“The Torah of the Lord is perfect [temimah]”), a 
                                                 
33. Saʿadya claimed that the ʿulamāʾ (“scholars,” i.e., the rabbis) collected the orally transmitted diqduq 
sharāʾiʿ and aḥkām fiqh (details of the law[s];  אהעיארש קודקד אהל ולצח יתח המאלא םה םהמהא ןי'דלא אמלעלאפ
בותכמ ןוכת םל יתלא ראב'כאלא ריאסו אההקפ םאכחאו); Sefer Yeṣirah, ed. Kafiḥ, 142. 
205 לוסרלא לעפ ןמ המאלא אהתדהאש; Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 15. Zucker suggested that 
Saʿadya drew the emphasis on witnessing the prophet’s actions, as opposed to his words, from Muslim 
sources (185n100). See also Saʿadya’s commentary on Proverbs 25:1; Mishlei: ʿim Tirgum u-Feirush ha-
Gaon Saʿadya ben Yosef Fayyūmī, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1976), 104. Note the report of 
one Qaraite that Saʿadya said that “just as all of the commandments were ancient and unwritten, so too the 
Mishnah and the Talmud are ancient and were unwritten” (  תוצמה לככ ובתכנ ויה אלו םדקמ ויהו הנשמ ן ויה דומלתה
ו םדוקמאל נםבתכ ); Simḥa Pinsker, Liquṭei Qadmoniyot: le-Qorot Dat benei Miqra veha-Liṭeraṭur shelahem 
(Vienna, A. della Torre, 1860), 1:94. These two sources were adduced in Shraga Abramson, “Ketivat ha-
Mishnah (ʿal Daʿat Geonim ve-Rishonim),” in Tarbut ve-Ḥevrah be-Toldot Yisrael bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim, 
eds. Robert Bonfil et al. (Jerusalem: Merkaz Zalman Shazar, 1989), 38, 29. See also José Faur, ʿIyunim be-
Mishneh Torah leha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1978), 95-96. 
206 לוקנמלא יפ והפ בותכמלא יפ ד'גוי םל 'דאפ איפאש אחרש ךל'ד חרש דק ןכי ןא ב'גאו לב; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-
Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403; first published by Abraham Elijah Harkavy, “Me-Genizah Mizraḥit aḥat 
beha-Biblioteqiyah ha-Qesarit be-Petersburg,” Ha-Qedem 1 (1906): 65; see also Abramson, “Ketivat ha-
Mishnah,” 29. Saʿadya’s central argument in the Introduction to his Commentary on Genesis is that the 
Written Torah is incomprehensible without the Oral Torah; see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 13-15. For 
analysis, see Samuel Poznański, “Zu dem Geniza-Fragment,” ZfhB 3 (1899): 173n8; Abraham Halkin, “Mi-
Petiḥat Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Feirush ha-Torah,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-Khvod Levi Ginzberg li-Melot lo 
Shivʿim Shanah, eds. Saul Liebermann et al. (New York: American Academy of Jewish Research, 1946), 
132; Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 75; and Harris, How Do We Know This, 76. In his Essa 
Meshali, Saʿadya suggested two options for the scope of revelation: the decoding (or: deciphering; piʿnuaḥ) 
of the commandments can be derived entirely from Scripture, or “our Holy One established all of the 
explanations” (kol peirushim kedoshenu konen). It is clear which he preferred; B.M. Lewin, “Essa Meshali 
le-Rasag,” in Rav Saʿadya Gaon, 525 lines 20, 26. See Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 74-75; 
and Harris, How Do We Know This, 77-78. 
207 Samuel Poznański, suggested that the author was Jacob ben Samuel, the target of a lengthy 
missive from Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ; “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s gegen Salmon b. Jerocham,” 
ZfhB 10 (1906): 46-47. On these two figures, see idem, The Karaite Literary Opponents, 31; and Leon 
Nemoy, “The Epistle of Sahl ben Maṣliaḥ,” PAAJR 38-39 (1970-1971): 145-77. 
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verse that Qaraites cited to proves the Written Torah’s self-sufficiency,208 refers to both 
the written and oral revelations (al-maktūb wal-manqūl jamīʿan).209 In his view, 
revelation as a whole requires no human supplement. 
Sherira’s famed Epistle tempers some of Saʿadya’s claims, but it also locates 
rabbinic tradition in hoary antiquity and deemphasizes rabbinic legislative activity. 
Against Saʿadya, for example, Sherira asserted that the Mishnah was transmitted with 
linguistic diversity before it was compiled,210 and that the amoraic rabbis participated in 
the development of the Talmud.211 Sherira, however, largely minimized the role of the 
rabbis in developing Jewish law, declaring that while they used their intellects in order to 
work out legal problems and followed the majority in order to determine a ruling, they 
merely ascertained what earlier generations had already known.212 At the same time, the 
                                                 
208 Wieder termed this verse the “the battle-cry” of Qaraism; The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 57-
58. See also Salmon ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 12. 
209 Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 49. 
210 B.M. Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon (Haifa, 1921), 18, 22. See the treatment in Blidstein, 
“Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 6-10; see also there, 15n44. On the differences between Saʿadya and 
Sherira, see Harry Fox, “Neusner’s The Bavli and Its Sources, A Review Essay,” JQR 80, no. 3-4 (1990): 
353-54; and Abraham Rosenthal, “Gilyon Nosaf mi-‘Sefer ha-Galuy’ le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Osef ha-
Genizah ha-Qahirit be-Geneva: Qatalog u-Meḥqarim, ed. David Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2010), 
247-49. On Sherira’s ascription of divine origins to the Mishnah, see Talya Fishman, “Claims about the 
Mishnah in the Epistle of Sherira Gaon: Islamic Theology and Jewish History,” in Beyond Religious 
Borders: Interreligious Interaction and Intellectual Exchange in the Medieval Islamic World, eds. David 
Freidenreich and Miriam Goldstein (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 65-77. 
211 E.g., Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 52-54, 63-66. On the term “Talmud” in the Epistle, see 
Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 14-15; and Talya Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud: 
Oral Torah as Written Tradition in Medieval Jewish Cultures (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2011), 26-27. I do not find the argument in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96, compelling. 
212 E.g., Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 9 (citing the statement that R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai was 
aware of the debates [havayot] of Abaye and Rava; bBM 134a), 17 (concerning following the majority), 
36-37, 43, 49, 52, 62. Note also Blidstein’s comment that while the Talmud uses the phrase lehitgader bo to 
countenance the creation of a new law, Sherira used it to defend the replication of established norms; 
“Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 15. 
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Epistle repeats the talmudic notion that horaʾah (decision or instruction)213 existed 
throughout the talmudic period (bBM 86a), accepts that “explanations and opinions 
approximating horaʾah” continued into the Saboraic period,214 and tangentially describes 
certain rabbinic and geonic ordinances (taqqanot).215 
Among the North Africans, Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel of Qayrawān (c. 981-1053) 
affirmed that the Mishnah was a received tradition and asserted the equivalence of the 
oral and written traditions;216 his compatriot Nissim ben Jacob ibn Shāhīn (990-1062) 
also asserted that the Mishnah and Talmud are received traditions.217 
                                                 
213 Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 192: “It is not certain how 
horaʾah should be more precisely interpreted. Most likely it is to be regarded as a particular form of the 
teaching and authoritative decision of the halakhah, which is limited to the time of the Amoraim.” 
214 יארובס ןנבר אתאובר והנה ורקיאו הארוהל םיבורק יראבסו ישוריפ אכיא הוה תוה אל הארוהד ג"עא; Lewin, Igeret 
Rav Sherira Gaon, 69; translation based on Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 5. See Avinoam Cohen, “Le-
Ofyah shel ha-Halakhah ha-Savoraʾit: Sugyat ha-Bavli Reish Qiddushin u-Mesoret ha-Geonim,” Dine 
Israel 24 (2004): 166-75, 203-210. 
215 Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 75 (on the taqqanot of R. Yoḥanan ben Zakkai), 101, 105, 
108 (on the taqqanot of the geonim). On the latter, see Robert Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim 
Meḥoqeqim?” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 290-315. For the suggestion that Sherira 
mentioned these two taqqanot because they were the only two geonic taqqanot, see Eliav Shoḥetman, “Le-
Derekh Qeviʿatan shel Taqqanot ha-Geonim ule-Mahutah shel Horaʾat ha-Geonim be-Din ‘Qim li be-
Gavei,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 665. Sherira also mentioned that Rav Ashi 
ordained “good ordinances” (taqnata shapirata) and festivals and fasts like the festival of the Reish Galuta 
(Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 91); it is unclear how to categorize this activity. On the festival of the 
Reish Galuta, see J.N. Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Amoraʾim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1962), 612; and 
Mirsky, Sheʾiltot de-Rav Aḥai Gaon, 1:4-5. 
216 Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber Chavel 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1972), 9 (Gen. 18:4); treated in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96. 
Ḥananel also reiterated Sherira’s claim that later rabbis only stated laws that had been known to earlier 
rabbis; see Gerald Blidstein, “Mashehu ʿal ha-Meimad ha-Idiologi shel Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel le-
Talmud,” Sidra 15 (1999): 9. 
217 Nissim ben Jacob, Mafteaḥ shel Manʿulei ha-Talmud (Vienna, 1847), 2a. The Arabic Kitāb 
Miftāḥ Maghālīq al-Talmūdh only survives in medieval Hebrew translation; see idem, Ḥamishah Sefarim: 
Seridim me-Ḥiburav, ed. Shraga Abramson (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1965), 27-28. See there, 353-
54; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 96; Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, liv; and Sklare, 
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 164n80. For similar claims about the Mishnah (or what is apparently an imagined 
Mishnah-like work), see Shaʿarei Teshuvah (Leipzig, 1858), 2b (§20); and Kalman Kahana, ed., Seder 
Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim (Frankfurt, 1935), 8 lines 6-8. Note the claim in Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. 
Sayyid, 1:54, citing a “learned” Jew (rajulan min afāḍilihim) that the Mishnah (al-mishnā) is Mosaic (in 
origin?). This may refer to the Talmud, as Ibn al-Nadīm described this as a Aramaic and Hebrew work. 
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In Saʿadya’s view, the Oral Torah, as a divinely revealed body of knowledge, may 
reinterpret the Written Torah. Saʿadya presented this claim in discussing when Scripture 
should be read according to its apparent or manifest sense, known as its ẓāhir, and when a 
non-“apparent” reading was warranted.218 Saʿadya argued that, just as the ẓāhir of 
Scripture’s anthropomorphisms, and of verses that contradict reason, cannot be accepted, 
received tradition may justify ignoring Scripture’s ẓāhir.219 For instance, whereas 
Scripture limits punitive lashes to forty (Deut. 25:3), rabbinic tradition removed the ẓāhir 
sense of that verse and set the maximum number at thirty-nine (mMak 3:10). Tradition 
                                                 
Some criticism of the attempt to portray the entirety of rabbinic tradition as Sinaitic appears in 
Kitāb Istidrāk al-Sahw al-Mawjūd fī Kutub Raʾs al-Metība al-Fayyūmī (The Book of the Correction of the 
Mistakes Caused by Forgetfulness found in the Books of the Head of the Academy al-Fayyūmī) of 
Mubashshir ben Nissi ha-Levi ibn ʿUnāba. Mubashshir identified several places where he felt that Saʿadya 
exaggerated by describing traditions as prophetic in origin (i.e., jāʾa al-āthār); see his Kitāb Istidrāk al-
Sahw al-Mawjūd fī Kutub Raʾs al-Metība al-Fayyūmī, ed. and trans. Moshe Zucker (New York: Feldheim, 
1955), 31-36. On Mubashshir, see Marina Rustow, “Mubashshir ben Nissi ha-Levi,” Encyclopedia of Jews 
in the Islamic World, ed. Norman Stillman (Brill Online, 2014); and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 356. 
Zucker described Mubashshir as seeking to undermine Saʿadya’s authority; Mubashshir, Kitāb Istidrāk, ed. 
Zucker, 2-5. Others have viewed his critique as “in-family jousting”; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 
111n34; similarly, Shraga Abramson, “Teḥilat Sefer Hasagot Rav Mubashshir ʿal Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 
Sinai 57 (1965): 16-17. See also Samuel Miklós Stern, “The Beginning of Mubashshir’s Critique of 
Saʿadya Gaon’s Writings,” REJ 126 (1967): 113-17; and Moshe Zucker, “Beirurim be-‘Hasagot Rav 
Mubashshir’ ʿal Saʿadya Gaon,” Sinai 58 (1966): 95-98. 
218 For the range of meanings of ẓāhir al-naṣṣ in Maimonides’ writings, many of which were 
utilized in earlier Rabbanite texts, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 87-105. On the term 
ẓāhir among Muslim writers, see Robert Gleave, Islam and Literalism: Literal Meaning and Interpretation 
in Islamic Legal Theory (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 63-93. 
219 See Moshe Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag la-Torah,” Sura 2 (1956-1957): 319-20; Ḥaggai 
Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit-ha-Rabbanit be-Feirushei Rasag: Hemshekh ve-Ḥiddush,” in 
Masoret ve-Shinuy ba-Tarbut ha-ʿArvit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-Beinayim, eds. Joshua Blau and David 
Doron (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 2000), 35; idem, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-Yeshʿayah – 
Mavo le-Sifrei ha-Neviʾm,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 3 (1991): 379n38, and Simon, Four Approaches to the Book of 
Psalms, 34-36. For parallels between Saʿadya and contemporary Qurʾān interpretation, see Ḥaggai Ben-
Shammai, “Ribbuy Mashmaʿuyot ha-Ketuvim be-Shiṭato ha-Parshanit shel Rasag,” in Minḥah le-Mikhael: 
Meḥqarim be-Hagut Yehudit u-Muslemit Muqdashim le-Professor Michael Schwarz, eds. Sara Klein-
Braslavy et al. (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2009), 26-29. On God as a “consuming fire” (Deut. 4:24), 
see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 18; and Ben-Shammai, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-Yeshʿayah,” 
381-82. Anthropomorphism was a common reason to reject the ẓāhir of Scripture; see Binyamin 
Abrahamov, Anthropomorphism and Interpretation of the Qurʾān in the Theology of al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm: 
Kitāb al-Mustarshid (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 1-9. 
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similarly removed the ẓāhir of the prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk 
(Ex. 23:19, 34:26, and Deut. 14:21) when it forbade all mixtures of milk and meat (mḤul 
8:1).220 This controlling and determinative role of extra-scriptural traditions parallels the 
claim of Muslim jurists that the Sunna often establishes the meaning of the Qurʾān. They 
argued that a Prophetic ḥadīth could narrow a broad Qurʾānic term to a limited set of 
cases (i.e., from ʿāmm to khāṣṣ); for example, the general prohibition against the 
consumption of carrion (Q. 5:3) was qualified by a ḥadīth that excludes fish from the 
prohibition.221 
 
The Widespread Nature of Rabbinic Tradition 
In their defense of rabbinic tradition, geonic-era Rabbanites resorted to two other 
(related) concepts found in contemporary Islamic texts, tawātur and ijmāʿ, which find 
confirmation for extra-scriptural traditions in widespread knowledge or approval. A 
mutawātir tradition is a “concurrent” report whose transmission by multiple individuals 
                                                 
220 Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit,” 36; but see idem, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-
Yeshʿayah,” 382n50. Despite Saʿadya’s view that rabbinic tradition overrides Scripture’s ẓāhir, Saʿadya 
occasionally ignored rabbinic tradition where he could have integrated it into his Pentateuch translation 
(tafsīr); Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 319-479; see also David M. Freidenreich, “The Use of Islamic Sources 
in Saadiah Gaon’s Tafsīr of the Torah,” JQR no. 3-4 (2003): 368-69. On Qaraite use of ẓāhir and taʾwīl, see 
Ben-Shammai, “Major Trends in Karaite Philosophy,” 347. On Qirqisānī, see Ben-Shammai, “The Tension 
Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom,” 42. On Yefet ben ʿEli, see Daniel Frank, “The 
Limits of Karaite Scripturalism: Problems in Narrative Exegesis,” in A Word Fitly Spoken, eds. Bar-Asher 
et al., 45. 
221 On ʿāmm and khāṣṣ, see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 86-91; and Hallaq, A History of 
Islamic Legal Theories, 45-47. For Shāfiʿī’s views, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69-87; on the 
Sunna as an interpretative tool for the Qurʾān, see there, 104-118 (on jumla and naṣṣ); on ʿāmm and khāṣṣ, 
see also idem, “The Legal Hermeneutics of al-Shāfiʿī and Ibn Qutayba,” 7-20. On the relationship of the 
Sunna and the Qurʾān, see Shamsy, The Canonization of Islamic Law, 58, 77-78, 206, 219; and from a 
different perspective, Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 174-77. Many argued that Muḥammad’s acts recorded 
in ḥadīth clarify the Qurʾān; see Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 452-53. 
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in the generation of the Companions suffices to guarantee its authenticity. (This stands in 
contrast with reports that have a single point of origin [khabar al-wāḥid] and are thus less 
widespread; reports of this sort render “uncertain” knowledge).222 Saʿadya, Samuel ben 
Ḥofni, Jacob ben Ephraim al-Shāmī (Palestine, 10th c.), and Judah ha-Levi (Spain, d. 
1141) all repeated the trope, found in Islamic sources, that received tradition is mutawātir 
because can never be mass collusion (tawāṭuʾ) on falsehood.223 Jacob, Nissim of 
Qayrawān, and Judah ha-Levi also claimed that rabbinic tradition as a whole is 
mutawātir,224 and Saʿadya argued that Hanukah is based on a mutawātir tradition.225 
In pre-ninth century Islamic texts, ijmāʿ could denote practice supported by 
scholars, ongoing practice in Medina, or universal consensus of all scholars or all 
                                                 
222 See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 8-22; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 60-
64; G.H.A. Juynboll, “(Re)Appraisal of Some Technical Terms in Ḥadīth Science,” Islamic Law and 
Society 8, no. 3 (2001): 326-31; and Hüseyin Hansu, “Notes on the Term Mutawātir and Its Reception in 
Ḥadīth Criticism,” Islamic Law and Society 16, no. 3-4 (2009): 383-408. 
223 For Saʿadya, see Saʿadya ben Yosef, Iyov: ʿim Tirgum u-Feirush Saʿadya ben Yosef, ed. and 
trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1972), 100. For Samuel, see Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi shel 
‘Mavo ha-Talmud’ le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” Sinai 85, no. 5-7 (1981): 216-17; Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-
Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 320-21; and Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:183-84; and idem, 
Samuel ben Ḥofni, 255, 257 (from Samuel’s ʿAshar Masāʾil). On the ascription of Zucker’s text to Samuel 
ben Ḥofni, see Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 206-207; idem, “Heʿarot be-ʿInyan Shmuel ben 
Ḥofni,” Sinai 92 (1982-1983): 25-29; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 17n58; see also Zucker, “ʿIyunim ve-
Heʿarot,” 100-104; and Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lxi. For Jacob, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim 
mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 410. See also Jospe, “‘Ha-Haggadah ha-Neʾemenet’ shel R. Saʿadya Gaon,” 
8n16. On Jacob, see Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:26; Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 321n7; and Gil, Jews in 
Islamic Countries, 254-55. For ha-Levi, see Ehud Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” Journal 
of Jewish Thought & Philosophy 21 (2013): 49. On Muslim views, see Ignaz Goldziher, Introduction to 
Islamic Theology and Law, trans. Andras Hamori (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 50; 
Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 116; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 75-76; and Bernard 
Weiss, “Knowledge of the Past: The Theory of Tawâtur According to Ghazâlî,” Studia Islamica 61 (1985): 
92-93, 102-103. 
224 Nissim, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 353-54; and Judah ha-Levi, Kitāb al-Radd wal-
Dalīl fī al-Dīn al-Dhalīl, eds. D.H. Baneth and Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1977), 12 
(1:26), 26 (1:89); treated in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 133. See also Krinis, “The Arabic 
Background of the Kuzari,” 49. For Jacob ben Ephraim, see the previous note. 
225 Samuel Atlas and Moshe Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” PAAJR 14 
(1944): 6 line 14. 
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people.226 In later centuries, ijmāʿ was a tool to grant rulings based on sources of 
questionable authenticity the certainty of the Qurʾān and mutawātir traditions.227 At least 
two prominent Rabbanites dismissed the idea that rabbinic tradition was subject to ijmāʿ: 
Saʿadya invoked ijmāʿ in several contexts,228 but explicitly rejected it as grounds for 
defending the authenticity of the Oral Torah;229 and Sklare showed that Samuel ben 
Ḥofni Gaon similarly considered ijmāʿ secondary to mutawātir traditions, a view that he 
probably adopted from a Muslim contemporary.230  
Some later Rabbanites, however, appealed to ijmāʿ-type authority for the Oral 
Torah, though they did not always use the word ijmāʿ. An anonymous student of Saʿadya 
asserted that the reason the Mishnah, which he seems to have ascribed to Moses, does not 
                                                 
226 Ansari, “Islamic Juristic Terminology before Šāfiʿī,” 282-87; and Schacht, Origins, 82-87. 
Mālik’s position is somewhat more complex, that the living practice in Medina stretched back to the time 
of Muḥammad; see Wymann-Landgraf, Mālik and Medina, 131, 136n167. 
227 Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 147-48; Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 319-21; and 
Norman Calder, “Ikhtilâf and Ijmâʿ in Shâfiʿî’s Risâla,” Studia Islamica 58 (1983): 72-81; see also above, 
n180. Zysow rejected earlier claims that ijmāʿ formed the basis of Islamic law, see George F. Hourani, 
“The Basis of Authority of Consensus in Sunnite Islam,” Studia Islamica 21 (1964): 49-56; Weiss, “The 
Primacy of Revelation,” 79-82; and Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 113-14. 
228 On the resurrection of the dead, see Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb al-Amānāt wal-Iʿtiqādāt, ed. 
and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1970), 218. In the standard version, Saʿadya emphasized this at the 
beginning of this treatise, but in the other recension, it appears at the end; see Wilhelm Bacher, “Maʿamar 
Teḥiyat ha-Meitim le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Festschrift zum achtzigsten Geburtstage Moritz 
Steinschneider’s (Leipzig: O. Harrassowitz, 1896), 121 (Hebrew section). For background on this text, see 
Ben-Shammai, “The Tension Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom,” 36; and idem, 
“Medieval History and Religious Thought,” in The Cambridge Genizah Collections: Their Contents and 
Significance, eds. Stefan C. Reif and Shulamit Reif (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2002), 146-
47. On the Second Day of Festivals, see Hartwig Hirschfeld, “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at 
Cambridge. (Third Article.): Saadyāh Fragments,” JQR 16, no. 1 (o.s.) (1903): 103-104; and Zucker, 
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 407; see also Samuel Poznański, Samuel Poznański, “Addenda and 
Corrigenda to My Essay on ‘The Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon’ (JQR, X, 238-76),” JQR 20, no. 2 
(o.s.) (1908): 233-34. For the argument that the sages did not unanimously endorse the anthropomorphic 
Shiʿur Qomah, see Judah ben Barzillay al-Bargeloni, Peirush Sefer Yeṣirah, ed. Shlomo Zalman Ḥayim 
Halberstam (Berlin, 1885), 21 (דומלתב אלו הנשמב אל וניאש ינפמ םימכחה לכ ירבד וילע וצבקתנ אל). 
229 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 404-405. See Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal 
Terms,” 20-21. 
230 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 163, 257. 
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actually cite Moses is because when Israel was gathered together (mujtamiʿa), they 
preserved mishnaic traditions orally, only adding names after the exile.231 Sherira claimed 
that all Israel accepted the Mishnah as authoritative,232 and his assertion that the Mishnah 
was recited with “one mouth” (peh eḥad) was described, by Shraga Abramson, as an 
ijmāʿ-type defense of that work.233 Hayya Gaon’s defense of the way that Rabbanites 
blow the shofar (ram’s horn) on Rosh ha-Shanah also appears to invoke ijmāʿ; he argued 
that this practice – and rabbinic tradition as a whole – rests on an unbroken chain of 
transmission and on “the words of the multitudes” (divrei ha-rabim).234 Nissim of 
                                                 
231 Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 49. See the similar idea, also without the 
term ijmāʿ, in Saʿadya’s Sefer ha-Galuy, in Harkavy, Zikhron le-Rishonim: Ha-Sarid veha-Paliṭ mi-Sefer 
ha-Egron ve-Sefer ha-Galuy, 153. 
232 Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 30. See Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 13. 
233 See Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 29n2; and Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira 
Gaon, 21. See also Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Amoraʾim, 614; and Uziel Fuchs, “Meqomam shel ha-
Geonim be-Mesoret ha-Nusaḥ shel ha-Talmud ha-Bavli,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 2003), 76-77, 
102-103. 
234 ארמג לכ לעו הנשמ לכ לע חיכומה םיברה ירבד; Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, 
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:62 (§117). Translation follows Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 50. 
For the suggestion that Hayya’s claim is similar to claims for ijmāʿ, see there, 51; and Blidstein, Samkhut u-
Meri, 148. On this text, see also Daniel Sperber, “Divrei Rav Hayya Gaon ʿal Teqiʿat Shofar veha-Pulmus 
ha-Qaraʾi,” in Bi-Heyoto Qarov: Asupat Maʾamarim la-Yamim ha-Noraʾim, eds. Elḥanan Ganzel et al. 
(Merkaz Shapira: Or Eṣion, 2000), 246-54. For background, see Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-
Yehudit, 173-74; Reuven Bonfil, “Mitos, Reṭoriqah, Hisṭoriyah? ʿIyun be-Megillat Aḥimaʿaṣ,” in Tarbut 
ve-Ḥevrah, 119-23; and earlier, Samuel Poznański, Anshei Qayrawān, Mesudarim ʿal Seder Alef Bet 
(Warsaw, 1909), 14-15. Hayya’s responsum echoes a partially preserved responsum of his father; see 
Abramson, ʿInyanot be-Sifrut ha-Geonim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha Rav Kook, 1974), 192; and Ben-Sasson, 
Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 46. On Hayya’s position, see also Menaḥem Kasher, “Yom Teruʿah – 
Yom Yevava,” Ha-Darom 12 (1960): 211-13. For another example of ijmāʿ-type ideas in Sheira and 
Hayya, see Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Berakhot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 1:6 (§7). 
For Qaraite opposition to Rabbanite shofar practices, see Bernard Revel, The Karaite Halakah and 
its Relation to Saduccean, Samaritan and Philonian Halakah (Philadelphia: Cahan Print, 1913), 78-79; 
Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 283-85; Philip E. Miller, “At the Twilight of Byzantine Karaism: The 
Anachronism of Judah Gibbor,” (PhD diss., New York University, 1984), 94-111; and idem, “Karaite 
Perspectives on Yôm Tĕrûʿâ,” in Ki Baruch Hu: Ancient Near Eastern, Biblical, and Judaic Studies in 
Honor of Baruch A. Levine, eds. Robert Chazan et al. (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1999), 537-41. For 
talmudic background, see Ephraim Beṣalel Halivni, “Mi Tiqen Ribbuy Qolot be-Rosh ha-Shanah?’ Neṭuʿim 
19 (2015): 131-35. 
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Qayrawān, Ibn Dāʾūd, and Judah ha-Levi also turned to ijmāʿ to defend rabbinic 
tradition.235 
 
Geonic-Era Portrayals of the Role of the Rabbis 
Portrayal of the ancient rabbis as transmitters of tradition, and not as its initiators, 
is a second pillar of geonic-era Rabbanite legal epistemology. While late antique rabbinic 
literature does not definitively state whether the rabbis generated non-scriptural laws, the 
Rabbanite writers in Iraq, Palestine, and North Africa discussed below rejected the idea 
                                                 
235 For Nissim, see Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 353 lines 10-12 (see 
Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 164n80); and A. Hirschfeld, “Be-Sefer Megillat Setarim,” in Festschrift zum 
siebzigsten Geburtstage A. Berliner’s, eds. Aron Freimann and Meier Hildesheimer (Frankfurt: J. 
Kauffmann, 1903), 47 (see Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 282n237; and Ben-
Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 51). On the ascription of this text Nissim, see Abraham 
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, xii, with reference to earlier scholarship. For Ibn Dāʾūd, see Ibn 
Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 3 (English), 1 (Hebrew pagination); see there, lx-lxii, and 
106n13. See also Simḥa Emmanuel, “Sarid Ḥadash mi-Sefer Megillat Setarim le-Rav Nisim Gaon,” in 
Sefer ha-Yovel le-Rav Mordecai Breuer: Asupat Maʾamarim be-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, eds. Moshe Ahrend 
and Moshe Bar-Asher (Jerusalem: Aqdamon, 1992), 2:550. Naphtali Wieder noted that Ibn Dāʾūd’s claim 
for ijmāʿ relates to Qaraite reliance on this concept; he did not, however, point out the resonance of this 
claim in its Islamic context; “Berakhah Bilti Yaduʿah ʿal Qriʾat Pereq ‘be-Mah Madliqin’ mi-tokh ha-
Genizah,” Sinai 82 (1978): 206, repr. in idem, Hitgabshut Nusaḥ ha-Tefillah, 1:334. For ha-Levi, see 
Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 60, 63; Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Science and the Kuzari,” Science 
in Context 10, no. 3 (1997): 505-507; and Krinis, “The Arabic Background of the Kuzari,” 50. Ijmāʿ may 
lie behind Natan ha-Bavli’s depiction of the geonim answering queries in the presence of the entire 
academy; see Adolf Neubauer, Mediaeval Jewish Chronicles and Chronological Notes (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1887), 2:88. The Arabic original of this part of Natan’s report has not survived; for background, see 
Israel Friedlaender, “The Arabic Original of the Report of R. Nathan Hababli,” JQR 17, no. 4 (o.s.) (1905): 
747-61; and Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Ha-Mavneh, ha-Megamot veha-Tokhen shel Ḥibur Rav Natan ha-
Bavli,” in Tarbut ve-Ḥevrah, 137-96. On this line, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 61-62; and Fishman, 
Becoming the People of the Talmud, 62-63. Study of Rabbanite use of ijmāʿ remains a desideratum; as 
noted in Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 13n34; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-
Yehudit, 51n116. Qirqisānī reported that many ʿAnanites and Qaraites accepted ijmāʿ to verify knowledge 
of the commandments, and that some even termed the body of knowledge known through ijmāʿ “naqlan” 
(transmission); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:141. On this last claim, see Ankori, Karaites of Byzantium, 
229n48; and Wieder, “Three Terms for ‘Tradition’,” JQR 49, no. 2 (1958): 108-109; see also Geoffrey 
Khan, “Al-Qirqisānī’s Opinions Concerning the Text of the Bible and Parallel Muslim Attitudes Towards 
the Text of the Qurʾān,” JQR 81, no. 1-2 (1990): 59-73. For another claim from ijmāʿ, see Friedman, 
“Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 564-65. 
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that the rabbis had done so. Instead, they maintained that the ancient rabbis were tradents, 
dedicated to transmitting received wisdom.  
Geonic denial that the rabbis created law through exegesis, a corollary of their 
affirmation of the Oral Torah’s divine origin, drew on Islamic debates about the validity 
of qiyās to form a coherent anti-Qaraite argument.236 The Muʿtazilite Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm 
al-Naẓẓām (d. c. 836) famously rejected qiyās, which, in this period, denoted the results 
of any intellectual speculation;237 he seems to have done so because of revealed law’s 
inconsistent and arbitrary nature, which precludes attempts to deduce new laws.238 Other 
                                                 
236 Non-Rabbanites held a range of views on the use of qiyās in the determination of law. Qirqisānī 
reported that Benjamin al-Nahāwandī studiously avoided qiyās (yabʿudu minhu jiddan), preferring clear 
texts (nuṣūṣ) over qiyās, but was willing to use qiyās to derive law if there were “two premises” 
(muqaddimatayn) and not merely one. Qirqisānī described this as an “intermediate” position between the 
use of qiyās and strict scripturalism (mutawassiṭ bayna al-qiyās wal-naṣṣ); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 
1:13. Qirqisānī also mentioned a group (jamāʿa) of ʿAnanites and Qaraites who utilized qiyās; Kitāb al-
Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:141. On ʿAnan’s use of qiyās, see also Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 323-27; 
and idem, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 149. Note Saʿadya’s claim that ʿAnan used a great deal of qiyās; idem, 
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 402. While there is some evidence for the persistence of Qaraite 
opposition to qiyās, the use of qiyās became a feature of later Qaraite thought. See Ankori, Karaites in 
Byznatium, 217n26; Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Jewish Thought in Iraq in the 10th Century,” in Judaeo-Arabic 
Studies: Proceedings of the Founding Conference of the Society for Judaeo-Arabic Studies, ed. Norman 
Golb (Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1997), 29n48; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 
218n141. On later use of qiyās, see Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 76-77; Klar, Meḥqarim ve-
ʿIyunim, 320-24; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 86-92; and Erder, Avlei Ṣion ha-Qaraʾim, 326-27. On 
Qirqisānī’s engagement with the middot, see Aviram Ravitsky, “Peirusho ha-Biqorti shel Ya‘qūb al-
Qirqisānī le-ʿErqonot ha-Derashah ha-Talmudit: Targum ʿIvri le-Kitāb al-Anwār wal-Marāqib, ḥeileq 4, 
peraqim 9-21, ʿim mavo ve-heʿarot,” Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 22 (2011): 123-57; and Frank, 
Search Scripture Well, 9. 
237 Josef van Ess, “The Logical Structure of Islamic Theology,” in Logic in Classical Islamic 
Culture, ed. Gustave E. von Grunebaum (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1970), 34-35. On qiyās as more 
than just analogy, see Wael Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36, no. 
3 (1989): 286-306; and below, n426. 
238 Josef van Ess, Das Kitāb an-Nakt des Naẓẓām und seine Rezeption im Kitāb al-Futyā des Ǧaḥiẓ 
(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 20-21. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 169; David 
Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics: How Sunni Legal Theorists Imagined a Revealed Law 
(New Haven: American Oriental Society, 2011), 71n37, 73n43; and Josef van Ess, The Flowering of 
Muslim Theology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), 175-77; see also George F. Hourani, 
Reason and Tradition in Islamic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 188-89. On 
debates about qiyās in general, see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 167-87; Hallaq, A History of Islamic 
Legal Theories, 30-33; and idem, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law, 122-25. 
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ninth-century figures rejected qiyās and speculative attempts to reconcile conflicting 
ḥadīths, probably due to the uncertain nature of the interpretative process. Among them 
were early “Ẓāhirīs,” whom medieval biographers depicted as committed to the “literal” 
(ẓāhir) meaning of revealed texts.239 
 
Creating New Laws through Midrash and Qiyās 
Scholars have long debated whether halakhic midrash creates law or upholds law 
through ex post facto linkages to Scripture. (These views are known, respectively, as 
midrash yoṣer and midrash meqayem). Twentieth century scholars, who usually framed 
this problem as a radical dichotomy, asked if halakhic midrash or apodictic rulings 
                                                 
239 See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 173-84; Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic 
Hermeneutics, 78-88; and Gleave, Islam and Literalism, 147-50. On the rise of Ẓāhirīsm, see Melchert, The 
Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law, 178-90; and Amr Osman, The Ẓāhirī Madhhab (3rd/9th-10th/16th 
Century): A Textualist Theory of Islamic Law (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 11-47; see also Stewart, “Muḥammad 
b. Dawūd al-Ẓāhirī’s Manual,” 99-158; and Abū Ḥanīfa Nuʿmān ibn Muḥammad (al-Qāḍī al-Nuʿmān), The 
Disagreements of the Jurists: A Manual of Islamic Legal Theory, ed. and trans. Devin J. Stewart (New 
York: NYU Press, 2015), 212-67. On Ibn Ḥazm’s rejection of qiyās, see Roger Arnaldez, Grammaire et 
theologie chez Ibn Hazm de Cordoue (Paris: Vrin, 1956), 165-93. On Ibn Ḥazm’s connection to earlier 
Ẓāhirīs, see Camilla Adang, “The Beginnings of the Ẓāhirī Madhhab in al-Andalus,” in The Islamic School 
of Law: Evolution, Devolution, and Progress, eds. Peri J. Bearman et al. (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2005), 117-25. 
Al-Naẓẓām also appears to have denied the authority of most ḥadīth, apparently because he 
viewed the Companions as untrustworthy; see Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 71-74; 
and Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 13-14, 16. See al-Naẓẓām’s sharp criticism of conflicting ḥadīth in 
Josef van Ess, “Ein unbekanntes Fragment des Naẓẓām,” in Der Orient in der Forschung: Festchrift für 
Otto Spies, ed. Wilhelm Hoenerbach (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967), 171-72. On earlier rejection of 
ḥadīth, which may be linked to Muʿtazilite theology and Khārijite thought, see Burton, The Sources of 
Islamic Law, 22-23; Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 403-405; and Musa, Ḥadīth as Scripture, 
6, citing earlier scholarship. On the Muʿtazilite background, see Michael Cook, “ʿAnan and Islam,” 165-69; 
and Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 68-71. On Khārijites and scripturalism, see Cook, 
“Anan and Islam,” 169-72; and Gerald R. Hawting, “The Significance of the Slogan ‘lā hukma illā lillāh’ 
and the References to the ‘Ḥudūd’ in the Traditions about the Fitna and the Murder of ʿUthmān,” BSOAS 
41, no. 3 (1978): 460-63. 
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emerged first. Recent scholars, however, have shown that these two methods probably 
coexisted in the early rabbinic period.240 
Saʿadya’s discussion of this topic set the tone for tenth- and eleventh-century 
Rabbanite discourse.241 Saʿadya argued that the rabbis listed the hermeneutical principles 
ascribed to R. Ishmael (middot), not because they inferred (yastadillūn)242 laws using the 
middot, but because the laws in their possession divided into (yanmāz ʿilā)243 thirteen 
types (fann). He compared this to the activity of the Masoretes, who arrived at their 
                                                 
240 See Steven Fraade, “Interpreting Midrash 2: Midrash and its Literary Contexts,” Prooftexts 7, 
no. 3 (1987): 287-90; Aharon Shemesh, Halakhah in the Making: The Development of Jewish Law from 
Qumran to the Rabbis (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009), 176-77n36; Adiel Schremer, 
“‘[T]he[y] Did Not Read in the Sealed Book’: Qumran Halakhic Revolution and the Emergence of Torah 
Study in Second Temple Judaism,” in Historical Perspectives: From the Hasmoneans to Bar Kokhba in 
Light of the Dead Sea Scrolls, eds. David Goodblatt et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 105-126; Vered Noam, 
“Creative Interpretation and Integrative Interpretation in Qumran,” in The Dead Sea Scrolls and 
Contemporary Culture, eds. Adolfo Daniel Roitman et al. (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 363-76; and above, n186. 
For earlier views, see Jacob Lauterbach, “Midrash and Mishna: A Study in the Early History of Halakhah,” 
JQR 5, no. 4 (1915): 503-527; 6, no. 1 (1916): 23-95, no. 2: 303-323; repr. in idem, Rabbinic Essays 
(Cincinnati, Hebrew Union College Press, 1951), 163-256; J.N. Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim: 
Mishnah, Tosefta, u-Midreshei Halakhah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1957), 501-515; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal 
Divrei Sofrim, 101-150; Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah, 40-62; idem, “Ha-Halakhah veha-Derashot,” in Sefer 
ha-Yovel li-Khvod Alexander Marx, ed. Saul Lieberman (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim, 1950), 
1-8; Ephraim E. Urbach, “Ha-Derashah ke-Yesod ha-Halakhah u-Vaʿayat ha-Sofrim,” Tarbiẓ 27, no. 2-3 
(1958): 166-82; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 12-21; Abraham Goldberg, “Ha-Midrash ha-
Qadum veha-Midrash ha-Meʾuhar,” Tarbiẓ 50 (1981): 99-100; David Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah, 
and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection for Justified Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 18-
21; and Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:260-63. For further background, see Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Ḥeiqer 
Toldot ha-Halakhah u-Megillot Midbar-Yehuda: Hirhurim Talmudiyim Rishnoim le-or Megillat ‘Miqṣat 
Maʿaseh ha-Torah’,” Tarbiẓ 59, no. 1-2 (1990): 12-18. For treatment of earlier positions, see Harris, How 
Do We Know This, 103-250; and Menaḥem Kahana, “The Halakhic Midrashim,” in The Literature of the 
Sages, 2:64n289 and n292. On the ambiguity in rabbinic literature, see Robert Goldenberg, “The Problem 
of Originality in Talmudic Thought.” In From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism; Intellect in Quest of 
Understanding, eds. Jacob Neusner et al. (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 2:19-27; and Shmuel Safrai, 
“Oral Torah,” in The Literature of the Sages, 1:56-60. 
241 Harris, How Do We Know This, 80. 
242 On istidlāl in contemporaneous uṣūl al-fiqh, see Wael Hallaq, “Logic, Formal Arguments and 
Formalization of Arguments in Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37, no. 3 (1990): 317-18; and Vishanoff, 
The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 85-87. 
243 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 378, transcribed yanḥāz, but the manuscript 
(T.-S. Ar. 26.119) clearly reads yanmāz. 
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conclusions by examining received tradition.244 According to Sherira’s depiction, the 
early rabbis “discovered” the laws of the Torah (le-giluyei taʿamei torah) by means of 
scriptural interpretation (including the middot).245 Blidstein noted that this language is 
somewhat ambiguous, but assumed that Sherira meant that the rabbis searched for proofs 
for laws that they already knew from tradition. This is consistent with Sherira’s statement 
that halakhic midrashim identify scriptural passages which hint at received laws (heikha 
ramizan hilkheta be-qraʾi).246 In a well-known responsum, Hayya wrote that a certain 
talmudic derivation is not a true proof (lav reʾayah hi); rather the law in question is a 
received tradition (halakhah mequbelet).247 Israel son of Samuel ben Ḥofni (d. 1033) 
asserted that since Scripture can be interpreted in many ways, one should heed “the 
words of the rabbis, who have transmitted them (heʿetiqum) in order to explain each and 
                                                 
244 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 378. Treatment in Blidstein, “Oral Law as 
Institution,” 171; Harris, How Do We Know This, 76-80; Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 45; Brody, 
Saʿadyah Gaon, 34; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 246-47; and Aviram Ravitsky, Logiqah 
Arisṭoṭelit u-Metodologyah Talmudit: Yisumah shel ha-Logiqah ha-Arisṭoṭelit ba-Feirushim la-Middot 
sheha-Torah Nidreshet Bahen (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2009), 26-32. On Saʿadya’s criticism of the Masoretes, 
see Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 154. On Saʿadya’a commentary to the middot, see most recently Menaḥem 
Kahana, “Qavim le-Hitpatḥutah shel Middat Kelal u-Peraṭ be-Tequfat ha-Tanaʾim,” in Meḥqarim be-
Talmud uve-Midrash: Sefer Zikaron le-Tirṣah Lifschitz, eds. Aryeh Edrei et al. (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 
2005), 173n2, 175n7. Saʿadya’s depiction appears to echo the notion of takhrīj, an activity which sought 
revelational support for juristic formulations of rules; see Hallaq, Authority, Continuity, and Change, 43-
51. 
245 Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 48-49. 
246 Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 39; Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” 14; see also de 
Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 10. On this line, see Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim, 505. 
247 Simḥa Assaf, ed., Teshuvot ha-Geonim mi-tokh ha-Genizah (Jerusalem: Darom, 1928), 102 
(§13); and Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Bava Qamma, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 12:28 (§68). On this 
passage, see Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim, 511n103; and Albeck, Mavo la-Mishnah, 53-55n21. 
While Hayya’s statement is not a sweeping dismissal of the creativity of the rabbis, it may represent a 
larger assumption; see also Harris, How Do We Know This, 81. 
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every commandment.”248 According to this perspective, the rabbis (often?) approached 
Scripture having already reached their legal conclusions. 
Though Jay Harris described the geonic position as a “stunning” break with 
rabbinic precedent,249 it may be useful to focus on what the geonim affirmed, rather than 
on what they rejected, in order to understand geonic legal epistemology on its own terms. 
Saʿadya formulated his anti-qiyās views in several places. According to the rabbis, God 
had punished Nadab and Abihu because they had made a halakhic ruling in Moses’ 
presence (Lev. 10; bYom 53a). Expanding on this, Saʿadya took a jab at the Qaraites’ use 
of qiyās and taʾwīl ([subjective] interpretation), and asserted that Nadab and Abihu 
followed their own raʾy (personal view) and taʾwīl. Noting that his contemporaries 
similarly perform taʾwīl without consulting interpretations received from the messenger 
(i.e., Moses; tafāsīr al-rasūl), Saʿadya warned that if Nadab and Abihu were punished for 
disagreeing with “any single rule of the commandments” (farʿ min furūʿ al-sharāʾiʿ), 
God would certainly punish those who ignore received traditions.250 
                                                 
248 הוצמו הוצמ לכ ןורתפב םוקיתעה רשא וניתובר ירבד לא םדא בושבו; T-S Misc. 35.4; Mann, Texts and 
Studies, 1:174 line 9-11. It is difficult to determine whether or not geonic denial of the creativity of rabbinic 
exegesis impacted legal practice. Abramson identified several authors who rejected an earlier view that 
marriages transacted before witnesses who are invalid by dint of rabbinic midrash require a bill of divorce 
(geṭ) because biblically, such marriages are valid; ʻInyanot be-Sifrut ha-Geonim, 24-31; see also Neubauer, 
Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 8-15. The later view may reflect the claim that biblical law is equivalent to 
laws derived by midrash. 
249 Harris, How Do We Know This, 78. 
250 Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 337-38. Saʿadya interpreted Jeremiah’s demand not to 
describe God’s word as “the burden of the Lord” (Jer. 23:38) as an argument that the responsibility to 
interpret the law belongs to God’s messenger, not the people; ibid, 341. On the dating of Saʿadya’s anti-
qiyās work, Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samʿīya, see Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 386. 
On the anti-Qaraite context of these arguments, see also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 95-96. On the 
pejorative use of raʾy, see below, n483. 
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Like al-Naẓẓām, Saʿadya argued that, because the details of the revealed 
commandments are, at times, inconsistent with reason, human reasoning cannot extend 
their scope.251 What else, Saʿadya asked, accounts for the arbitrary distinctions between 
men and women or for the laws of the red heifer?252 He added that the laws of the 
Pentateuch are internally inconsistent: If the Torah could provide an alternative 
opportunity to bring the paschal sacrifice for those who had missed its scheduled time 
(Num. 9:9-12), why did it not do the same for those unable to fast on the Day of 
Atonement?253 Those who utilized qiyās extended the rationale (ʿilla) of an original case 
(aṣl) to a new case (farʿ), but skeptics of qiyās denied the possibility of identifying an 
ʿilla with certainty.254 Expressing such skepticism, Saʿadya noted that the Pentateuch 
sometimes contradicts an explicit ʿilla. For example, the Pentateuch condemns murder 
because God created man in His image (Gen. 9:6), yet it ordains capital punishment for 
numerous crimes!255 
                                                 
251 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 388-89; see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 
219n143. Samuel ben Ḥofni reported this view in Saʿadya’s name; idem, “The Religious and Legal 
Thought,” 2:130-31. On the similarities between Saʿadya’s arguments and Muslim writers, see Zucker’s 
notes throughout “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ”; see also idem, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 321-31; 
George Vajda, “Études sur Qirqisani,” REJ 107 (1946-1947): 57-60; Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 38n43; 
and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah shel ha-Heqqesh ha-Hilkhati ve-ʿal Gevulotav,” Masorah le-
Yosef 6 (2009): 329. 
252 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 395-400. See idem, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 
327-29; Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 39-42; and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 321-22. On 
Saʿadya’s comments regarding biblical distinctions between men and women, compare Ilana Sasson, 
“Gender Equality in Yefet Ben Eli's Commentary and Karaite Halakhah,” AJS Review 37, no. 1 (2013): 62-
65. 
253 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 401. 
254 The classic example is the prohibition on wine: the ʿilla is identified as inebriation and the 
prohibition is extended to other intoxicating beverages; see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 159; and 
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 83-84. For the anti-qiyās view, see Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās 
in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” 36; and Vishanoff, The Formation of Islamic Hermeneutics, 72-73n43. 
255 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 395. On the apparent contradiction between 
this argument and other places in Saʿadya’s writings, see Ravitsky, Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 44-48; and idem, 
“Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 329-30. One important aspect of Saʿadya’s rejection of qiyās remains 
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Rabbanite rejection of qiyās continued for some time. Samuel ben Ḥofni arrived 
at the same conclusion as Saʿadya using a different claim; he rejected qiyās not because it 
is epistemologically problematic but because there is no scriptural evidence that it is 
allowed. (Contemporary Muslims made similar arguments.256) According to Jacob ben 
Ephraim, “concurrent tradition” (al-khabar al-mutawātir) is preferable to qiyās. Qirqisānī 
explained that Jacob accepted qiyās for laws that would have been known on the basis of 
human reason (ʿaqlīya), without revelation, but not for laws that were derived solely from 
revelation (samʿīya).257 Judah ha-Levi also spoke disparagingly about qiyās.258 
                                                 
unclear. Saʿadya distinguished between “rational” (ʿaqlīya) commandments and “revealed” (samʿīya) 
commandments. As its title indicates, Saʿadya’s Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ al-Samʿīya (Book on Attaining the 
Revealed Commandments) focused on whether jurists could extend the scope of samʿīya laws through 
qiyās. Several scholars have claimed that this implies that Saʿadya accepted qiyās regarding the ʿaqlīya 
commandments; Halkin, “Mi-Petiḥat Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Feirush ha-Torah,” 133n30; and Yoav Elstein, 
“Torat ha-Miṣvot be-Mishnat Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 38, no. 2 (1968): 131-33; see also Bloomberg, 
“Arabic Legal Terms,” 29-30. However, Qirqisānī noted that while Saʿadya’s arguments should lead to this 
conclusion, he did not explicitly state this; Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:87. Ravitsky concluded that 
according to Saʿadya, jurists cannot apply qiyās to either the ʿaqlīya or the samʿīya; Logiqah Arisṭoṭelit, 43-
44; and idem, “Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal ha-Logiqah,” 326n29. See also Moses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim 
veha-Diyunim (Kitāb al-Muḥāḍarah wal-Mudhākarah), ed. and trans. Abraham Halkin (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei 
Nirdamim, 1975), 204. For background on the division between ʿaqlīya and samʿīya, see Alexander 
Altmann, “Saadya’s Conception of the Law,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 28 (1944): 320-21; 
Arthur Hyman, “A Note on Maimonides’ Classification of Law,” PAAJR 46 (1979-1980): 323-31; and 
Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “Ḥaluqat ha-Miṣvot u-Musag ha-Ḥokhmah be-Mishnat Rasag,” Tarbiẓ 41, no. 2 
(1973): 170-82. 
256 See Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 385; Sklare, “The Religious and Legal 
Thought,” 2:133-34l; and idem, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 218-20. See also Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 
23-24. For the arguments of Samuel’s contemporaries, see there, 220n143; compare Zysow, The Economy 
of Certainty, 191. 
257 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 410; and Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. 
Nemoy, 1:86-87. 
258 See Lobel, Between Mysticism and Philosophy, 59-67. See more generally, Daniel Lasker, 
“Judah Halevi and Karaism,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism, 3:111-25; and Blidstein, Samkhut 
u-Meri, 155. On the proposed anti-Qaraite intent of the Kuzari as a whole, see D.Z. Baneth, “Le-
Otographim shel Yehuda ha-Levi ule-Hithavut Sefer ha-Kuzari,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 3 (1947): 297-303; 
Langermann, “Science and the Kuzari,” 501n6; Mordecai Akiva Friedman, “Judah Ha-Levi on Writing the 
Kuzari: Responding to a Heretic,” in “From a Sacred Source”, 157-69; and Yishai Glazner, “Le-Ketivato 
shel Sefer ha-Kuzari,” Daʿat 77 (2014): 13-14n42. On ha-Levi’s affirmation of the divine origin of Jewish 
law, see Naḥum Arieli, “Tefisat ha-Halakhah eṣel R. Yehuda ha-Levi: Rihal ke-Ish Halakhah,” Daʿat 1 
(1978): 46-49. On ha-Levi and Qaraism, see also Yehuda Raṣhabi, “Shirim Ḥadashim le-R. Yehuda ha-
Levi,” Sinai 113 (1994): 1-4; Shraga Feivel Kornbluth, “Rabbi Yehuda ha-Levi lo Katav Shir be-Shevaḥ 
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The Ancient Rabbis as Transmitters 
Rabbanites in this period used other tools to emphasize that the ancient rabbis had 
transmitted received law. For example, they cited chains of transmission to demonstrate 
the authenticity of rabbinic tradition. Like the Islamic isnād, a chain of transmitters that 
traces the transmission of ḥadīths, Rabbanite isnāds assert the authenticity of received 
tradition and affirm that it, alone, is valid.259 Some scholars have even hypothesized that 
the chain of transmission at the outset of Mishnah Avot was composed in the Islamic 
period. While this appears unlikely,260 mAv 1:1 was an important text for Jews living in 
                                                 
ha-Qaraʾim,” Sinai 114 (1994): 94-95; and Yehuda Raṣhabi, “R. Yehuda ha-Levi veha-Qaraʾim,” Sinai 114 
(1994): 191. 
David, “Yediʿat davar ha-El,” 140, questioned the extent to which anti-qiyās arguments are 
representative of Rabbanite thought. While he correctly noted that several Andalusian Rabbanites were less 
sweeping in their rejection of qiyās than Saʿadya, this is not especially significant from the perspective of 
the geonim. Moreover, many of David’s sources come from beyod the Islamic world (150-52). He also 
argued that Saʿadya’s “theological rationalism,” leading to a “rationalist paradox” of admitting the limited 
ability of man’s mind, motivated Saʿadya’s arguments against qiyās (126-27, 138). This interpretation 
ignores the explicitly polemical character of Saʿadya’s anti-qiyās writings. 
259 On these lists, see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, li-lii. On chains of 
transmission in Heikhalot literature, which exhibit similar features, see Michael Swartz, Scholastic Magic: 
Ritual and Revelation in Early Jewish Mysticism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), 173-205; 
and Meir Bar-Ilan, “Shalshelet ha-Qabbalah be-Sifrut ha-Heikhalot,” Daʿat 56 (2005): 5-37. Gerald 
Blidstein wrote that in this period, “the unbroken Chain of Tradition itself becomes a guarantor of the 
integrity of the Oral Law”; “Mishnah Avot 1:1 and the Nature of Rabbinic Authority,” in Judaism and 
Education: Essays in Honor of Walter I. Ackerman, ed. Haim Marantz (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion 
University Press, 1998), 57. 
260 For this hypothesis, see Alexander Guttmann, “Tractate Abot: Its Place in Rabbinic Literature,” 
JQR 41, no. 2 (1950): 181-93; Günter Stemberger, “‘Moses received Torah…’ (M. Avot 1,1): Rabbinic 
Conceptions of Revelation,” in Jerusalem, Alexandria, Rome: Studies in Ancient Cultural Interaction in 
Honour of A. Hilhorst, eds. Florentino García Martínez and Gerard P. Luttikhuizen (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 
285-99; idem, “Mischna Avot: Frühe Weisheitsschrift, pharisäisches Erbe oder spätrabbinische Bildung?” 
Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft 96, no. 3-4 (2005): 243-58; and idem, “Die 
innerrabbinische Überlieferung von Mischna Abot,” in Geschichte—Tradition—Reflexion: Festschrift für 
Martin Hengel zum 70. Geburtstag, eds. Hubert Cancik et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1996), 1:511-27. 
For responses, see Amram Don Tropper, “Tractate Avot and Early Christian Succession Lists,” in The Ways 
That Never Parted; Jews and Christians in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, eds. Adam H. Becker 
and Annette Yoshiko Reed (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 160-61n3; and Peter Schäfer, “Rabbis and 
Priests, or: How to Do Away with the Glorious Past of the Sons of Aaron,” in Antiquity in Antiquity: 
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the Islamic world. During the geonic era, Rabbanites began to recite tractate Avot in 
synagogues.261 One pre-modern Yemenite text ascribes the significance of this passage to 
its description of “the transmitted and the transmitters” (al-naql wal-nāqlīn),262 terms 
familiar from Islamic descriptions of received traditions. Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, an 
anonymous work that was probably composed in the ninth century, begins with a lengthy 
chain of transmission whose chronological scope surpasses anything found in rabbinic 
literature.263 This and other Rabbanite isnāds confirmed rabbinic tradition in 
contemporary terms. 
As Sklare showed, the geonim stressed that the authority of the rabbis in legal 
matters rested on the accuracy of their transmission. He also noted that the geonim 
depicted the rabbis’ halakhic dicta as prophetic traditions.264 Samuel ben Ḥofni’s 
insistence that the talmudic rabbis were primarily tradents prompted him to prefer the 
principle that the law follows later views (hilkheta ke-batrai) over the principle that the 
                                                 
Jewish and Christian Pasts in the Greco-Roman World, eds. Gregg Gardner and Kevin Lee Osterloh 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008), 169-70. Compare Adiel Schremer, “Avot Reconsidered: Rethinking 
Rabbinic Judaism,” JQR 105, no. 3 (2015): 297-300. Stemberger focused on the denotation of the root q-b-l 
in mAv 1:1; note Cohen’s discussion of this verb in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lvi-lvii. 
261 Many scholars (and even one sixteenth-century Qaraite) attributed this to anti-Qaraism; see 
Wieder, The Judean Scrolls and Karaism, 212; and Yaʿaqov Garṭner, “Lamah Hinhigu ha-Geonim Amirat 
‘Avot’ be-Shabbat?” Sidra 4 (1988): 22-23. Brody questioned this; Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 202n6. 
262 See Shimon Sharvit, “Minhag ha-Qeriʾah shel Avot be-Shabbat u-Toldot ha-Baraitot she-
Nispaḥu lah be-ʿIqvotav,” Bar Ilan Annual 13 (1976): 173. 
263 See Kahana, ed., Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, 1-9. On this work see Shraga Abramson, “Le-
Toldot Nusaḥ ‘Seder Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim,’ [kolel pirsum qeṭaʿei genizah ḥadashim shel ha-ṭeqst ve-khen 
nispaḥim uva-hem tosefet meqorot mi-khitvei yad umi-defusim],” in ʿIyunim be-Sifrut Ḥazal, be-Miqra, 
uve-Toldot Yisrael: Muqdash li-Prof. ʿEzra Ṣion Melamed, eds. Yiṣḥaq Dov Gilat et al. (Ramat Gan: Bar 
Ilan University Press, 1982), 215-57; and Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 274-77. 
264 This differed from the geonic approach to non-legal (aggadah) statements; see Sklare, Samuel 
ben Ḥofni Gaon, 43-44, 159-60; Lifschitz, “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo be-Midrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebe-
ʿal Peh’,” 193; above, n200, and below, n271. On the geonic approach to aggadah, see also idem, 
“‘Aggadah’ u-Meqomah be-Toldot Torah shebe-ʿal Peh,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 
233n4-5. 
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law does not follow a student in the presence of his teacher (ein halakhah ke-talmid be-
meqom rabbo). According to Samuel, only the existence of an authentic tradition could 
motivate a later authority to disagree with an earlier one.265 
Rabbanites often used the Arabic word riwāya, a technical term in ḥadīth 
literature, to denote the act of transmission and to emphasize the role of the rabbis as 
transmitters.266 This term is especially prominent in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s al-Madkhal ilā 
ʿilm al-Mishnah wal-Talmud (The Introduction to the Study of the Mishnah and Talmud), 
the most extensive geonic-era discussion of rabbinic tradition.267 
                                                 
265 Zvi Stampfer, “‘Hilkheta ke-Batrai’ – Gishot Shonot be-Tequfat ha-Geonim,” Shenaton ha-
Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 428. See the text in Alexander Marx, “Kelalei ha-Talmud le-R. Beṣalel 
Ashkenazi,” in Festschrift zum siebzigsten Geburtstage David Hoffmann’s, eds. Simon Eppenstein et al. 
(Berlin: L. Lamm, 1914), 204-205 (§319). On the ascription to Samuel, see Shraga Abramson, “ʿAl Sefer 
‘Darkhei ha-Talmud’ she-meyuḥas le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” Qiryat Sefer 52 (1977): 381-82; idem, ʿInyanot 
be-Sifrut ha-Geonim, 165-73; and Eliav Shoḥetman, “Kelalei ha-Talmud le-R. Beṣalel Ashkenazi,” 
Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 8 (1981): 254n30. 
266 Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 37-38. 
267 See Samuel ben Ḥofni, Peraqim min Sefer ‘Mavo ha-Talmud’, ed. and trans. Shraga Abramson 
(Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1990), 23-26, 154, 155; Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi ,” 210; 
Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:176; and Ernst Roth, “Qeṭaʿ le-Shalshelet ha-Qabbalah mi-
Tequfat ha-Geonim,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 4 (1957): 418. On the ascription of Roth’s text to Samuel, see Shraga 
Abramson, “Le-Mavo ha-Talmud le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” Tarbiẓ 26, no. 4 (1957): 421-23; and Sklare, 
Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 18n59. 
On the root Hebrew root ʿ-t-q to denote transmission, see Abraham Elijah Harkavy, Zikhron le-
Rishonim ve-gam le-Aḥaronim: Zikhron Kamah Geonim uve-yiḥud Rav Sherira ve-Rav Hayya beno veha-
Rav R. Yiṣḥaq Alfasi (Berlin, 1887), 351; see also Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, 
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:62n1. For use in Saʿadya, see Schechter, Saadyana, 5. For Israel ben Samuel ben 
Ḥofni, see T-S Misc. 35.4, printed in Mann, Texts and Studies, 1:176 line 4; Ḥayim Hillel Ben-Sasson, Min 
ha-Merkaz la-Qehilah ba-Maqom: Igrot u-Shṭarot (Jerusalem: Zalman Shazar, 1977), 39 line 10; and Gil, 
Be-Malkhut Yishmael, 2:178 line 10. For the translation of Samuel’s al-Madkhal, see the Mavo ha-Talmud, 
printed in standard editions of the Babylonian Talmud, bBer, chap. 1. On the authorship of this text, see 
Mordecai Margaliyot, ed., Hilkhot ha-Nagid: Kolel Seridei Sefer Hilkheta Gavrata u-Seridim shel Sheʾar 
Ketavav ha-Hilkhatiyim (Jerusalem: Qeren Yehuda Leyb u-Mini Epstein, 1962), 68-73; and Shraga 
Abramson, “Mi-Torato shel Rav Shmuel ha-Nagid mi-Sefard,” Sinai 100, no. 1 (1987): 22-23. On Qaraite 
use of ʿ-t-q, see Wieder, “Three Terms for ‘Tradition’,” 113-17; and Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 226-
30. See also Henshke, “Le-Ṭaʿama shel Halakhah,” 47n10; and Neil Danzig, “Mi-Talmud ʿal Peh le-
Talmud be-Khetav: ʿAl Derekh Mesirat ha-Talmud ha-Bavli bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim,” Bar Ilan Annual 30-
31 (2006): 76n93. 
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Consistent with the characterization of the rabbis as transmitters of tradition, and 
not as its producers, Saʿadya portrayed rabbinic tradition as prophetic and of great 
antiquity. He referred to rabbinic tradition as naql (tradition),268 naql al-aslāf (tradition of 
the pious forbears), and āthār al-anbiyāʾ (traditions of the prophets).269 Saʿadya also 
described rabbinic traditions as having “reached” him (using phrases such as jāʾa al-
āthār bi- and jāʾa fī al-fiqh).270 In his biblical exegesis, these claims were not limited to 
legal topics, for as Ben-Shammai showed, Saʿadya cited rabbinic tradition in his 
commentary on non-legal sections of Scripture as well.271 
Sklare also showed that Saʿadya articulated his understanding of extra-scriptural 
traditions in the terms of contemporary Muʿtazilites, who divided knowledge into 
intuitive or “necessary knowledge” (ʿilm ḍarūrī) and “acquired knowledge” (ʿilm 
                                                 
268 See, e.g., Saʿadya’s introduction to his Pentateuch translation (tafsīr) in Joseph Derenbourg, 
Oeuvres complètes de R. Saadia Ben Iosef Al Fayyoûmî: 1 Version arabe du Pentateuque de R. Saadia ben 
Iosef al-Fayyoúmi (Paris, 1893), 4; the introduction to Kitāb al-Sabʿīn Lafẓa (Seventy Hapax Legomena), in 
Neḥemya Allony, “Haqdamat Rasag le-sifro ‘Shivʿim ha-Milim ha-Bodadot’ be-Tirgum ʿIvri uve-ṣiruf 
heʿarot u-mavo,” in Sefer Zaydel: Meḥqarim be-Ḥeiqer ha-Tanakh, ed. Eliezer Eliner (Jerusalem: ha-
Ḥevrah le-Ḥeqer ha-Miqra be-Yisrael, 1962), 241 lines 8-9; the opening of Kitāb al-Mawārīth (Book of 
Inheritances), in Robert Brody, Ḥiburim Hilkhatiyim shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav 
Nissim, 2015), 12 line 2; and the text cited above, n196. Another translation of Saʿadya’s introduction to 
his tafsīr appears in Kafiḥ, Peirushei Rabbeinu Saʿadya Gaon, 159-63. On this text see Ḥaggai Ben-
Shammai, “Ḥadashim gam Yeshanim: ‘ha-Haqdamah ha-Gedolah’ ve-‘ha-Haqdamat ha-Qeṭanah’ le-
Targum Rasag la-Torah,” Tarbiẓ 69, no. 2 (2000): 199-210; and Yitzhak Avishur, “Some New Sources for 
the Study of the Text and Language of Saadya’s Translation of the Pentateuch into Judaeo-Arabic,” in 
Genizah Research after Ninety Years, 5-13. 
269 See, e.g., Derenbourg, Oeuvres complètes, 1:3. On āthār, see Ben-Shammai, “Ribbuy 
Mashmaʿuyot ha-Ketuvim,” 24; on both terms, see idem, “Haqdamat R. Saʿadya Gaon le-Yeshʿayah,” 
398n41; and Jospe, “‘Ha-Haggadah ha-Neʾemenet’ shel R. Saʿadya Gaon,” 9-13. 
270 See Zucker, “Mi-Peirusho shel Rasag,” 348; and Ben-Shammai, “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit,” 40. 
271 See, e.g., Saʿadya, Iyov, ed. Kafiḥ, 23 (Job 1:1). See Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “The Tension 
Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom: Comparative Observations on Saadia’s Method,” 
in With Reverence for the Word: Medieval Scriptural Exegesis in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, eds. 
Jane Dammen McAuliffe et al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 42. See more generally, idem, 
“Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit,” 37-40; and above, n220. On midrashic literature in Saʿadya’s piyuṭim, see Yosef 
Tobi, “Midreshei Ḥazal be-Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon uve-Feirusho la-Miqra,” Meḥqarei Yerushalayim be-
Sifrut ʿIvrit 21 (2007): 91-131. 
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muktasab; this was eventually adopted within mainstream Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh as well). 
The first is acquired through perception, induction, or given by God; the second is the 
product of reflection and consideration.272 Adopting the position of the Basran 
Muʿtazilites, Saʿadya argued that received tradition, which he considered to be rabbinic 
teachings, possesses the characteristics of ʿilm ḍarūrī.273 
 
The Harmonization of Extra-Scriptural Traditions 
According to several geonim and their followers, while the ancient rabbis were 
largely passive tradents, they did take an active role in shaping the tradition by resolving 
contradictions between earlier sources. The Talmud, of course, is replete with Amoraic 
attempts to resolve contradictions between Tannaitic sources.274 Abraham Goldberg 
demonstrated that the Amoraim were not troubled by the existence of disagreement per 
se, but by contradictions between earlier and later generations and by internal 
inconsistencies in the Mishnah.275 The presence of disagreements in the Talmud did 
bother geonic authors, however; their resolutions of contradictions took place against the 
                                                 
272 See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 146-47; Peters, God’s Created Speech, 53-54; and 
Binyamin Abrahamov, “Necessary Knowledge in Islamic Theology,” BJMES 20, no. 1 (1993): 20-32. 
273 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 163. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 42, 
246. On the question of whether received traditions render ḍarūrī or muktasab knowledge in uṣūl al-fiqh 
literature, see Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 9-18; and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 
37-38. See also Jospe, “‘Ha-Haggadah ha-Neʾemenet’ shel R. Saʿadya Gaon,” 6n4. 
274 See J.N. Epstein, Mavo le-Nusaḥ ha-Mishnah (Jerusalem, 1948), 154-63; and de Vries, Toldot 
ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 129-41. On the Tannaitic approach to contradictions in the Bible, see Uziel 
Fuchs, “Darkhei ha-Hakhraʿa, Samkhut shel Ṭeqstim u-Mudaʿut ʿAṣmit,” in Sugyot be-Meḥqar ha-Talmud: 
Yom ʿIyun le-Ṣiyun ḥameish shanim li-Feṭirato shel Efrayim E. Urbach (Jerusalem: Aqademiyah ha-
Leʾumit ha-Yisraelit le-Madaʿim, 2001), 104n19, 105n24, and the literature cited there. 
275 Abraham Goldberg, “Ṣimṣum Maḥloqet eṣel Amorei Bavel,” in Meḥqarei Talmud 1, eds. 
Yaʿaqov Sussman and David Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1990), 135-53. 
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background of the Qaraite charge that disagreements in rabbinic literature undermine 
claims of the Oral Torah’s unbroken transmission,276 and of attempts by Muslim jurists to 
reconcile contradictions between legal ḥadīth. Shāfiʿī was perhaps the first to attempt to 
harmonize ḥadīth systematically. While he rejected some ḥadīth in favor of others, he 
also suggested ways to reconcile contradictions.277 For example, he suggested that 
transmitters took earlier statements out of context or heard earlier statements only 
partially.278 Abū Bakr Ibn Khuzayma (Khorasan; d. 923), a ḥadīth collector and jurist, is 
reported to have said that he was unaware of any two sound ḥadīths that are genuinely 
contradictory, and he boasted of his ability to reconcile all apparent contradictions.279 
Saʿadya appears to have been the first Rabbanite to attempt to harmonize 
conflicting traditions in the Talmud. Qirqisānī reported that Saʿadya identified three 
reasons for disagreements among transmitters of the Oral Torah: (i) temporary 
misunderstanding; (ii) a transmitter heard only one aspect of a prophetic report, and (iii) a 
transmitter assumed that a statement was of general application (ʿāmm) when it actually 
                                                 
276 See Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 240n77, writing that this began in the tenth century, based 
on Qirqisānī’s statement that Qaraites had only recently began to call attention to such contradictions 
(munāqaḍāt); Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:29. Salmon ben Yeruḥim used this claim to devastating effect 
in his polemic against Saʿadya; see Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 12-13. See also above, n155. 
277 See Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:85-87; Schacht, Origins, 13-14; Calder, Studies in Muslim 
Jurisprudence, 228-29; Gérard Lecomte, “Un exemple d’évolution de la controverse en Islam: de l’Iḫtilāf 
al-Ḥadīṯ d’al-Šāfiʿī au Muḫtalif al-Ḥadīṯ d’Ibn Qutayba,” Studia Islamica 27 (1967): 26-29; and Musa, 
Ḥadīth as Scripture, 53. On dating of Shāfiʿī’s Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth (Contradictory Ḥadīth), see Schacht, 
Origins, 330. For background, see Joseph Lowry, “Al-Shāfiʿī,” in Islamic Legal Thought, 51-54; and idem, 
Early Islamic Legal Theory, 125-42. 
278 See Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 127, 141. 
279 Cited in the thirteenth-century ʿUthmān ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn al-Ṣalāḥ al-Shahrazūrī, Kitāb 
Maʿrifat Anwāʿ ʿIlm al-Ḥadīth (Medina: al-Maktaba al-ʿIlmīya, 1966), 285. Harmonization of ḥadīth was 
distinct from isnād criticism, which identifies sound reports based on their transmitters; Eerik Dickinson, 
The Development of Early Sunnite Ḥadīth Criticism: The Taqdima of Ibn Abī Ḥātim Al-Rāzī (240/854-
327/938) (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 5-6. See also Melchert, “The Traditionist-Jurisprudents,” 398; and John 
Burton, An Introduction to the Ḥadīth (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), 113-16. 
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referred to a narrow set of facts (khāṣṣ).280 Zucker noted parallels between these 
suggestions and those made in Islamic literature,281 such as the claim that some 
transmitters assumed reports to be ʿāmm when they are actually khāṣṣ or vice-versa,282 
and that forgetfulness accounts for discrepancies in prophetic reports.283 More important 
than the specific parallels, however, is the shared assumption that contradictions and 
debates are (frequently?) the result of errors in transmission and interpretation. 
In addressing contradictions in rabbinic literature, the letter from Saʿadya’s 
student noted that the Bible, too, contains contradictions. The author pointed out that, 
according to 2 Sam. 24:9, King David’s army numbered eight hundred thousand, while 
according to 1 Chron. 21:5, it numbered over one million. This “apparent” contradiction, 
he wrote, must have a solution.284 He further claimed that the process of harmonization 
began in the Mishnah. He asserted that when the anonymous sages in mNid 1:1 rejected 
the positions of both Shammai and Hillel (lo ke-divrei zeh ve-lo ke-divrei zeh), they were, 
                                                 
280 Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:127. See also there, 1:115, reporting that Saʿadya 
reconciled (waffaqa) traditions. Saʿadya’s student reported that Saʿadya referred to this problem in many of 
his writings, including Sefer ha-Galuy:  תאפלת'כמ ןיב קיפותלא ףיכ הרי'תכ בתכ יפ הללא הדיא אנ'דאתסא ןייב דקו
יולגה רפס יפ ארקמלא ןמ תאלא'תמ אהל ל'תמו ... הנשמלא תאפלת'כמ ןיבו ארקמלא; Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines 
Schülers Saadja’s,” 48. It is not clear where these claims would fit in Sefer ha-Galuy. For outlines of that 
work, see Samuel Miklós Stern, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash mi-Sefer ha-Galuy le-R. Saʿadya Gaon,” Melilah 5 (1955): 
135; and Yosef Tobi, “Daf Nosaf mi-Sefer ha-Galuy le-Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” in Meḥqarim be-Sifrut ʿAm 
Yisrael uve-Tarbut Teiman, eds. Judith Dishon and Ephraim Hazan (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 
1991), 56-58. For similar claims, see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 16. 
281 Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 324-25. I do not find all of the suggested 
parallels between Saʿadya and Shāfiʿī convincing. On ʿāmm and khaṣṣ in geonic literature, see also Zucker, 
ʿAl Targum Rasag, 260n. 
282 Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, 157. On the distinction between ʿāmm and 
khaṣṣ in that work, see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69-86. For background, see there, 69n11. 
283 See Shāfiʿī, The Epistle on Legal Theory, ed. Lowry, 158; treated in Lowry, Early Islamic 
Legal Theory, 92. See the similar argument in Muḥammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfiʿī, Ikhtilāf al-Ḥadīth, in Kitāb 
al-Umm, ed. Rifʿat Fawzī ʿAbd al-Muṭallib (al-Manṣūra: Dār al-Wafāʾ, 2001), 10:44-45.  
284 Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 48. 
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in fact, harmonizing the disagreement by saying that the law follows neither view on its 
own (lo ke-divrei zeh waḥda) but, rather, both (kal-qawlayn majmūʿayn).285 In his view, 
disagreements began because the students of Shammai and Hillel served their teachers 
insufficiently (lo shimshu kol ṣorkhan; bSan 88b). For example, one student heard that 
there are three obligatory prayers each day, another that there are four, and another that 
there are five, without realizing that each statement referred to a different case: Regular 
days require three prayers, Sabbaths, four, and the Day of Atonement, five.286 
Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Madkhal contains the largest surviving discussion of 
talmudic contradictions in geonic literature.287 Samuel also ascribed disagreements to 
lackadaisical students who did not exert sufficient effort to understand their teachers (like 
the trope in bSan 88b).288 Like Saʿadya, Samuel explained that some transmitters 
interpreted statements as khāṣṣ when they were actually ʿāmm, and that 
misunderstandings and forgetfulness accounted for other disagreements.289 Samuel 
sought support for his theories in talmudic claims about disagreements, and he depicted 
                                                 
285 Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 48. On this claim, see Zucker, “Le-
Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 325-26n27. This is not what this phrase seems to mean in the Mishnah; 
see Epstein, Mevoʾot le-Sifrut ha-Tanaʾim, 429-30; and E.S. Rosenthal, “Mesoret-Halakhah ve-Ḥidushei-
Halakhot be-Mishnat Ḥakhamim,” Tarbiẓ 63, no. 3 (1994): 367-68. 
286 Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 50. I have not found this example in 
rabbinic literature.  
287 See Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 197-98; and Samuel ben Ḥofni, Peraqim min 
Sefer ‘Mavo ha-Talmud’, ed. Abramson, 193. 
288 See Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 209-215; and Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet 
be-Masoret,” 320. See also the table of contents of this work in Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 
2:174. 
289 Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 213; and Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-
Masoret,” 320. 
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the later talmudic rabbis –the “ahl al-Talmud” (lit., people of the Talmud)290 – as figures 
who reconciled (waffaqa) earlier traditions.291 
 
Geonic-Era Portrayal of the Origins of Non-Biblical Institutions 
Rabbanite claims about the origins of non-biblical institutions are perhaps the 
most surprising component of their legal epistemology. This section traces their remarks 
pertaining to the calendar, the Second Day of Festivals observed in the diaspora (yom tov 
sheini shel galuyot), Hanukah, translations of the Bible (Targumim; sing., Targum), and 
the geonic academies. As will be seen, Rabbanites resorted to similar arguments to 
defend each of these institutions. 
Many have noted that Saʿadya and others went beyond rabbinic claims when they 
argued for the biblical origin of the obligation to pray,292 and rooted both the anonymous 
                                                 
290 This phrase may be Samuel’s term for what are known today as the stamm or editorial layers of 
the Babylonian Talmud. For other appearances in Samuel’s writings, see Simḥa Assaf, “Sheloshah Sefarim 
Niftaḥim le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni,” in Zikaron le-Nishmat ha-Rav Avraham Yiṣḥaq ha-Kohen Kook, ed. 
Judah Leib Maimon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1945), 151; and Samuel ben Ḥofni, Sefer ha-
Geirushin, Kitāb al-Ṭalāq, ed. and trans. Y. Zvi Stampfer (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben-Ẓvi, 2008), 75. 
291 Samuel ben Ḥofni, Peraqim min Sefer ‘Mavo ha-Talmud’, ed. Abramson, 195; see above, 
n280. See Abramson’s evaluations of Samuel’s efforts in “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 210, 212. For 
Sherira’s use of this idea, see Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 23. Geonic attempts to minimize 
contradictions appear to relate to the idea that a rejected view is “objectively” wrong, a widely-held 
position in this period; see Fuchs, “Darkhei ha-Hakhraʿa,” 103n16. Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal 
Peh,” 7, noted the absence of talmudic passages that valorize disagreement in Sherira’s Epistle. 
Others have treated attempts to harmonize rabbinic disputes as foreign or based on Qaraite 
premises. Blidstein asked “is halakhah decided by verifying the traditions and their reliability, like in 
Islam?”; “Masoret ve-Samkhut,” 15n16. Shapiro, Changing the Immutable, 249, repeated Blidstein’s 
conclusion. Faur wrote that attempts to reconcile traditions are based on assumptions that are “the basis of 
the Qaraite movement”; ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 38. 
292 His sons included the relevant work among Saʿadya’s polemical writings; Allony et al., Ha-
Sifriyah ha-Yehudit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim, 313 line 24; see also Moshe Zucker, “Qeṭaʿ mi-Kitāb Wujūb al-
Ṣalawāt le-Rabbeinu Saʿadya,” PAAJR 43 (1976): 29-36; Saʿadya ben Joseph, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. 
Davidson et al., 1-10; and Shraga Abramson, “Qeṭaʿ Hadash min ha-sefer ‘Essa Meshali’ le-Rav Saʿadya 
Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 32, no. 2 (1964): 166-67. For other Rabbanite views, see Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines 
Schülers Saadja’s,” 51; Abramson, “Min ha-Pereq ha-Ḥamishi,” 216; and Sklare, “The Religious and Legal 
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ban (ḥerem stam) and the court oath (allah) in biblical texts.293 Yet, Saʿadya himself 
wrote that it was not always appropriate or prudent to cite biblical prooftexts for every 
practice. He recounted that, when he reached Iraq, he had encountered some non-
Rabbanites who demanded a scriptural source for every law. When their Rabbanite 
interlocutor was unable to produce such sources, they dismissed Rabbanite views. It was 
this experience, claimed Saʿadya, that led him to warn that one who seeks scriptural proof 
(dalīl min al-miqra) for everything in the Mishnah will have, in effect, rendered the 
Mishnah useless (abṭaltum al-mishnah) and adopted the Qaraite position (madhhab).294 
Despite this warning, Rabbanites, Saʿadya among them, routinely appealed to prophetic 
authority. 
 
The Mathematical Calendar 
The Mishnah depicts a calendar governed by sighting of the New Moon, and 
intercalated in order to fulfill the requirement that Passover occur in the spring, aviv (Ex. 
                                                 
Thought,” 2:180. Saʿadya asserted the biblical status of prayer times; see Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 
183n95; idem, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 33n17; and Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35. 
293 See Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 229n95; idem, “Gezerta ve-Ḥerem Stam be-Tequfat ha-
Geonim uve-Reishit Yemei ha-Beinayim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1979), 293n449; and 
Berakhyahu Lifschitz, “Gilgulah shel Shevuʿat Beit Din be-Allah,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 
(1984-1986): 398. For further background, see Gideon Libson, “Ḥerem Stam be-Tequfat ha-Geonim uve-
Reishit Yemei ha-Beinayim,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 (2001-2004): 125-28. 
294 ENA 2818 43v; Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 8-9. Zucker identified this as part of Saʿadya’s 
Kitāb al-Radd ʿalā Ibn Sāqawayh (Refutation of Ibn Sāqawayh). On Ibn Sāqawayh, see Simḥa Assaf, 
“Divrei Pulmus shel Qaraʿi Qadmon neged ha-Rabbanim,” Tarbiẓ 4, no. 1 (1932): 35-53; no. 2-3 (1933): 
193-206; Poznański, The Karaite Literary Opponents, 4-8; Simon Eppenstein, Beiträge zur Geschichte und 
Literatur im geonäischen Zeitalter (Berlin: L. Lamm, 1913), 107-109; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 265-67, 382-
85; Mann, Texts and Studies, 2:1469-70; Leon Nemoy, Karaite Anthology (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1963), 70; and Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 346. 
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12:2, 13:4), i.e., after the vernal equinox.295 The Rabbanite calendar received its final 
form in the 920s, during the controversy between Saʿadya and the Palestinian, Ben 
Meir.296 It is based on a nineteen-year cycle that includes seven intercalated years along 
with the postponements (deḥiyot) needed to prevent the first days of Rosh ha-Shanah and 
Passover from falling on certain days of the week. Sacha Stern demonstrated that this 
calendar developed throughout the rabbinic period, eventually rendering the Mishnaic 
system obsolete.297 
The two earliest references to a fixed Rabbanite calendar – a piyuṭ by the 
Palestinian payṭan, Pinḥas ha-Kohen (8th c.), and the post-talmudic (8th/9th c.?) Pirqei de-
R. Eliezer – affirm its antiquity. Both texts trace calendrical intercalation and the 
nineteen-year cycle to God, or to Moses and other prophets.298 
                                                 
295 Sacha Stern, Calendar and Community: A History of the Jewish Calendar, Second Century 
BCE – Tenth Century CE. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), is the most recent treatment. On the 
Mishnaic system, see there, 155-64; on the requirement of aviv, 47-48. 
296 Stern, Calendar and Community, 191-210, 264-75. Significant evidence suggests that the 
Rabbanite calendar was not uniform even in the eleventh century; see Rustow, Heresy and the Politics of 
Community, 58-64, 337-39; and idem, “Rabbanite-Karaite Relations in Fatimid Egypt and Syria,” 69-90. 
On pre-Saʿadya calendrical diversity, see Stern, Calendar and Community, 182-88; idem, “Fictitious 
Calendars: Early Rabbinic Notions of Time, Astronomy, and Reality,” JQR 87, no. 1-2 (1996): 117-29; 
idem, “A Primitive Rabbinic Calendar Text from the Cairo Genizah,” JJS 67, no. 1 (2016): 68-90; Sacha 
Stern and Piergabriele Mancuso, “An Astronomical Table by Shabbetai Donnolo and the Jewish Calendar 
in Tenth-Century Italy,” Aleph 7 (2007): 13-41; and Marina Rustow and Sacha Stern, “The Jewish 
Calendar Controversy of 921-22: Reconstructing the Manuscripts and their Transmission History,” in Time, 
Astronomy, and Calendars in the Jewish Tradition, eds. Sacha Stern and Charles Burnett (Leiden: Brill, 
2014), 81-82, 91-94. 
297 Stern, Calendar and Community, 182-90. On the claim that Hillel the Patriarch authorized 
changes to the calendar in 358/59, see there, 176-79, 193; Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-
Yadeikhem,” 600-601; and, e.g., Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 97 (3:7). Abraham bar 
Ḥiya attributed this claim to Hayya, but this appears to be an interpolation; Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 239-
40; and Stern, Calendar and Community, 175n82. 
298 For Pinḥas, see Shulamit Eliṣur, Piyuṭei Rabbi Pinḥas ha-Kohen (Jerusalem: World Union of 
Jewish Studies, 2004), 725-26; and Stern, Calendar and Community, 197n164. For Pirqei de-R. Eliezer, see 
Dagmar Börner-Klein, Pirke de-Rabbi Elieser (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2004), 70-83; and Stern, Calendar 
and Community, 197. Compare the text in Schechter, Saadyana, 93-94. For the dating of this work, see 
Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 329. For an early reference to the 
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Saʿadya argued that the calendar was always determined by calculation and never 
by observation.299 He wrote: “the intercalation (al-ʿibur) is ancient, from the time (ʿahd) 
of the first prophets.”300 Two medieval writers reported that Saʿadya had claimed that 
various elements of the Jewish calendar were given at Sinai or enacted at the time of the 
Exodus.301 Similarly, a fourteenth-century work quoted the tenth-century Ḥananel ben 
Ḥushiel as arguing, probably under Saʿadya’s influence, that Jews had always determined 
new months by calculation. Ḥananel wondered how the Israelites could have seen the 
New Moon, given that a pillar of smoke guided them during the day, and a pillar of fire at 
night (Ex. 13:21). Thus, he asserted, the “primary commandment” (ʿiqar miṣvah) must 
prescribe sanctification of the months by calculation.302 Similarly, in his Kitāb al-
                                                 
nineteen-year cycle in non-Jewish literature, see Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Eimatai Nosad ha-Luaḥ ha-ʿIvri? 
Qadmuto ʿal-pi Ḥiburo shel al-Khwārizmī,” Asufot 1 (1987): 164. 
299 For background, see Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n6; idem, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-
Sharāʾiʿ,” 375; idem, “Ḥelqo shel R. Saʿadya Gaon be-Fulmus mi-Maḥarat ha-Shabbat,” PAAJR 20 (1951): 
1-26; Richard C. Steiner, “Saadia vs. Rashi on the Shift from Meaning-Maximalism to Meaning-
Minimalism in Medieval Biblical Lexicology,” JQR 88 no. 3-4 (1998): 220-21; and Stern, Calendar and 
Community, 264-68. Compare Jacob Katz, “Rabbinical Authority and Authorization in the Middle Ages,” 
in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature 1, eds. Isadore Twersky and Jay M. Harris 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 43-46. See also Mordecai Halperin, “Lamah Naṭah Rav 
Saʿadya Gaon meha-Emet?” Yodʿei Binah 5 (2011): 44-57, 64-73; Aryeh Stern, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qiddush 
ha-Ḥodesh,” Teḥumin 23 (2003): 293-95; idem, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qiddush ha-Ḥodesh,” Yodʿei Binah 3 
(2006): 32-36; and Shai Walter, “Shiṭat Rasag be-Qeviʿut ha-Ḥodesh – ha-Baʿayah ha-Astronomit u-
Pitronah,” Yodʿei Binah 3 (2006): 40-56. 
300 אילוא אנאיבנא דהע ןמ םידק הנא אלא רוביעלא; text from Schechter, Saadyana, 32 line 10. See also T.-
S. 10 K2; in Poznański, “Addenda and Corrigenda,” 234. Poznański identified this as part of Saʿadya’s 
Kitāb al-Tamyīz. The heading of this fragment, however, states that it is a “polemical work regarding the 
two months [for which the messengers] violate the Sabbath” (תבשה תא ןיללחמ םישדח ינש לע לדג היפ באתכ). 
301 Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 59-60 (2:8), 126 (3:5), citing the claim that 
the calendrical postponements are Sinaitic and that the tequfot are from the time of the Exodus; 69 (2:9), 
and implying that somebody, undoubtedly Saʿadya, held that the mathematical calendar (ḥeshbon) was 
Sinaitic; and Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9a-9b (4:6), citing the claim that ḥeshbon, 
postponements, and rules found in the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim (Four Gates; a Babylonian calendrical algorithm) 
are Sinaitic in origin. On the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim, see Stern, Calendar and Community, 193, 268-70. 
302 Baḥya ben Asher ibn Ḥlava, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad 
ha-Rav Kook, 1966-1968), 2:87. In the remainder of this passage, Ḥananel repeated Hayya’s approach to 
the calendar (see below); see Ḥayim Jehiel Bornstein, “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” in Sefer 
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Sharāʾiʿ, Saʿadya wrote: “we are commanded that we learn something by which we know 
the new month, and we are warned regarding this ‘You shall keep this institution (i.e., 
Passover) [at its set time from year to year]’ (Ex. 13:10).”303 Yosef Kafiḥ connected this 
entry on Saʿadya’s list of the commandments with Saʿadya’s attempts to demonstrate the 
Sinaitic origin of the mathematical calendar.304 (Other early enumerators of the 
commandments listed a similar commandment.305) 
As Saʿadya recognized that this approach diverged from the rabbinic system of 
observation, he attempted to reinterpret the talmudic evidence.306 He dismissed as 
theoretical talmudic discussions that suggest that the “postponements” were not in effect 
in the rabbinic period.307 Though the Mishnah discusses the process of interrogating 
witnesses regarding the appearance of the New Moon, one medieval work, which may 
                                                 
ha-Yovel li-Khvod Naḥum Sokolov (Warsaw, 1904), 147n1. On Ḥananel’s dependence on Saʿadya, see 
Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 321; and the notes in Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Chavel, 2:87. 
303 תאזה הקחה תא תרמשו 'ק'כ 'דפ 'יהנו רהשלא שאר ףירענ הב אמ םלעתנ ןא אנרמאו; British Library OR 
5563G.25b, following the transcription on the Friedberg Genizah Project. Saʿadya read the word keep to 
imply a prohibition, in accordance with talmudic understanding of this word (bʿEiruv 96a and parallels). 
304 Kafiḥ, Peirushei Rabbeinu Saʿadya, 75n2 (Ex. 12:1); see also there, 72n1 (Ex. 12:1), 142-43n1 
(Lev. 23:4); Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya, 41-42 (from Saʿadya’s Commentary on Genesis); 436-47 
(from Kitāb al-Tamyīz); and the Maimonidean passages above, n121. I have not been able to locate the 
final reference in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:317n12 (mRH 2:7). 
305 See Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 78-79n358. 
306 Maimonides was one of the earliest to make this point, which may be based on Isaac al-Balīya 
(see above, n121); see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:317 (mRH 2:7), with the correction in Friedman, 
“Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 584-85. 
307 See Poznański, “The Anti-Karaite Writings of Saadiah Gaon,” 271-73; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-
Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 377; and Ezra Fleischer, “Pisqah Ḥadashah me-Essa Meshali le-Rav Saʿadya 
Gaon,” Tarbiẓ 49, no. 1-2 (1979-1980): 106-107. Others quoted Saʿadya on this point as well; see Salmon 
ben Yeruḥim, Sefer Milḥamot ha-Shem, ed. Davidson, 62; Abraham bar Ḥiya, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. 
Filipowski, 60 (2:8); and Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9b (4:6). Saul Lieberman, “Tiqunei 
Yerushalmi,” Tarbiẓ 5, no. 1 (1933-1934): 102, claimed that Saʿadya’s approach is found in rabbinic 
literature. Lieberman repeated his claim in “Mishnat Rishonim,” Talpiyot 2, no. 3-4 (1945-1946): 375-79; 
and in a more polemical vein in two letters to Solomon Zeitlin published in Marc Shapiro, Saul Lieberman 
and the Orthodox (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2006), 19-20, 22-24, 27-29. Stern, Calendar and 
Community, 166, 175, disagreed with Lieberman’s interpretation of the relevant passages.  
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quote Saʿadya, claims that the interrogation only concerned the moon’s form and its place 
on the horizon, not its actual appearance.308 According to an eleventh-century author, 
Saʿadya had also asserted that the court’s dispatch of messengers to announce new 
months was only intended to confirm that the observed New Moon matched the 
mathematical calculations. This source claims that they did so in order to counter the 
criticism of Zadok and Boethus, who allegedly disagreed with the sages about how new 
months are to be determined.309  
Several tenth-century Rabbanites repeated Saʿadya’s position,310 and Qirqisānī 
reported that a group of people (qawm) adopted Saʿadya’s view.311 Mubashshir ha-Levi, a 
relatively unknown Rabbanite who wrote in Baghdad in 997, seems to have been the first 
                                                 
308 Schechter, Saadyana, 34 lines 14-16. In the middle of the manuscript of Saʿadya’s work on the 
months when the messengers violate the Sabbath (see above, n300), a new work appears by an otherwise 
unknown Nathan bar Isaac of Sicily. Poznański, “Addenda and Corrigenda,” 234n1, claimed that this part 
of Nathan’s work quotes a lost part of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Tamyīz. Even if Poznański was incorrect, 
Nathan’s work was written in the spirit of Saʿadya’s calendar polemic. 
309 Natan Av ha-Yeshiva, Peirush Shishah Sidrei Mishnah, ed. and trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 
1956), 96 (mRH chap. 2). On the authorship of this work, see Simḥa Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim ve-Sifrutah 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1967), 294-96; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham 
Maimonides from the Cairo Geniza: A Preliminary Review,” PAAJR 56 (1990): 40-45; Neil Danzig, 
Qaṭalog shel Seridei Halakhah u-Midrash mi-Genizat-Qahir (New York: JTS, 1997), 47n170; and Naḥem 
Ilan, “ʿIyunim be-Feirush le-Masekhet Avot ha-Meyuḥas le-Rav Natan Av ha-Yeshiva,” in ʿAteret Yiṣḥaq: 
Qoveṣ Meḥqarim be-Moreshet Yehudei Teiman, ed. Yosef Tobi (Netanyah: ha-Agudah le-Tipuaḥ Ḥevrah 
ve-Tarbut, 2003), 11-13. Since Kafiḥ published this text, many more manuscripts have been identified; see 
Menaḥem Ẓvi Fuchs, “Ha-Mishnah be-Teiman: Ketav-Yad mi-Feirush Rav Natan Av ha-Yeshiva,” Asufot 
8 (1994): 161-67; and Ilan, “ʿIyunim be-Feirush le-Masekhet Avot,” 11-13. This claim also appears in the 
report of Saʿadya’s view in Isaac Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9b (4:6). 
One opponent of the mathematical calendar challenged Saʿadya by invoking a Mishnaic narrative 
of the calendar (mRH 2:8-9), in which R. Joshua’s disagreement with Rabban Gamliel resulted in different 
dates for the Day of Atonement, which seems to imply that witnesses were accepted to testify to the moon’s 
appearance. In a partially preserved response, Saʿadya claimed that there was no substantive disagreement 
between the two rabbis; Schechter, Saadyana, 32 line 6. 
310 See Poznański, “Die Streitschrift eines Schülers Saadja’s,” 52; and Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 
19-21. 
311 Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 4:805; noted in Zucker, “Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n11. Isaac 
Israeli, Yesod ʿOlam, ed. Goldberg, 2:9a-9b (4:6), also reported that a number of thinkers accepted 
Saʿadya’s approach. 
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to criticize Saʿadya, though his comments are not systematic and do not indicate a total 
rejection of Saʿadya’s approach.312 Qirqisānī himself sharply criticized Saʿadya’s claims; 
he merely had to quote the Mishnah – which he did at great length – to argue that the 
“true” calendar is based on observation.313 Saʿadya’s responses to critics of the Rabbanite 
calendar demonstrate that such criticism was a feature of debates before Qirqisānī as 
well.314 It is easy to see why many have regarded Saʿadya’s claims about the calendar as 
ones which feature his weaker arguments,315 yet other cases demonstrate that Saʿadya’s 
position on this topic should be seen as part of the larger geonic practice of antedating of 
non-biblical institutions. 
Moreover, even later geonim who found fault with Saʿadya’s views upheld the 
claim of divine authority for the Rabbanite calendar. A 994/95 responsum, presumably 
jointly authored by Sherira and Hayya,316 dismissed some of Saʿadya’s views and 
                                                 
312 Mubashshir, Kitāb Istidrāk, ed. Zucker, 59-60; see there, 108n237; and Ankori, Karaites in 
Byzantium, 300-301n22. On Mubashshir, see above, n217. 
313 Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 4:804-14. For other Qaraite citations of the relevant 
passages, see Ofrah Tirosh-Becker, Ginzei Ḥazal ba-Sifrut ha-Qaraʾit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: 
Bialik, 2011), 2:517-72. For Qaraite criticism of postponements, see Samuel Poznański, “Remarks on 
‘Early Karaite Critics of the Mishnah’,” JQR 11, no. 2 (1920): 237-44. On the Qaraite calendar, see Ankori, 
Karaites in Byzantium, 292-353; and Judith Olszowy-Schlanger, Karaite Marriage Documents from the 
Cairo Geniza: Legal Tradition and Community Life in Mediaeval Egypt and Palestine (Leiden: Brill, 
1998), 248-50. 
314 See Lewin, “Essa Meshali le-Rasag,” 496; Malter, Saadia Gaon, 263-65 (from Saʿadya’s Kitāb 
al-Tamyīz); and above, n300. 
315 See above, nn128-129. 
316 Mann ascribed this responsum to Sherira based on a reference to “Mar Rav Yehuda 
zaqeinenu,” which he interpreted as “grandfather”; “Gaonic Studies I,” 240; accepted in Moshe Gil, “Le-
Toldot Geonei Ereṣ Yisrael,” Tarbiẓ 44, no. 1-4 (1975): 145n16. Mann further surmised that this 
responsum is the basis of Abraham bar Ḥiya’s report of Hayya’s view (see Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 
97-98 [3:7]). Shraga Abramson wrote that this letter is a “responsum of (Rav Sherira and) Rav Hayya” and 
a “responsum of Rav Sherira (and Rav Hayya)”; Be-Merkazim uve-Tefuṣot be-Tequfat ha-Geonim 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1965), 29, 43n2. There are several reasons to assume co-authorship: the 
Pumbeditan responsa between 984 and 1004 were usually authored by Sherira and Hayya together; there is 
no reason to assume that Hayya would not have used the word zaqeinenu in a joint responsum; and 
zaqeinenu could refer to an illustrious ancestor and not a “grandfather.” On the authorship of these 
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concluded that his position was designed only to combat heresy, “like dismissing with a 
reed” (kmo deḥiya be-qaneh hu). “He wrote it,” the author(s) proclaimed, “for students 
and not scholars” (le-talmidim ḥibro ve-lo le-ḥakhamim).317 A later letter from Hayya to 
Nissim of Qayrawān repeated that Saʿadya’s arguments were merely “a reed to rebuff 
heretics” (qaneh hu she-daḥah et apiqeros). Hayya, by contrast, would endeavor to 
explicate “the truth of the matter” (amitat ha-davar). Hayya wrote that God had entrusted 
the court to intercalate the year318 and to keep the holidays in their seasons, “unlike those 
whose months are lunar but have no intercalation,” referring to contemporary Muslims.319 
In Hayya’s view, the rabbis had the prerogative to intercalate the calendar as necessary, 
provided that they maintained the framework of the nineteen-year cycle, which, he wrote, 
“was in Israel’s possession from the days of Moses.”320 He suggested that if the rabbis 
deemed it necessary to add a month at variance with the cycle, they would remove a 
month in subsequent years to ensure that only seven of nineteen years would contain an 
                                                 
Pumbeditan responsa, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 60-61n34; and idem, “Groner’s The Legal 
Methodology of Hai Gaon,” JQR 76, no. 3 (1986): 239. I thank Robert Brody for his assistance on this 
matter. For the identification of “Mar Rav Yehuda,” see Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 119. 
317 Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 242-43, 246. The former phrase is based on yBer 9:1.  
318 Simḥa Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot: ve-ʿIman Teshuvot, Pesaqim u-
Feirushim me-et Ḥakhmei Provence ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem: Ofeq, 1995), 148 (§116). For other printings, 
see there, 147n1; references follow Emmanuel’s edition. On Hayya’s position, see Bornstein, “Maḥloqet 
Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 146-50. 
319  הנבלה ישדח םהישדח ]רשאל[ ןיפיקמש ךרדכ ןמזל ןמזמ םידעומה ופיקי אלש ידכ הנשה ינמזב םיגחה תא הלת 'תכה יכ
רוביע םהל ןיאו; Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 149-50. For the claim of a Byzantine author 
that Passover must occur in the spring, “unlike the Ishmaelites,” see Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 
271n54. 
320 וניבר השמ תומימ לארשי לש םהידיב היה רוביעה דוס אוהש ונידיבש הזה ןובשחהו; Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-
Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 150. This position is repeated in an anonymous geonic-era responsum, probably 
from a Palestinian gaon; see Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 587; on the authorship of 
that responsum, see there, 602-603. 
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extra month. In his view, the rabbis thus integrated the cycle with the rules for 
intercalation set forth in rabbinic literature.321 
Several other Rabbanites followed Saʿadya to varying degrees. Ḥananel ben 
Ḥushiel repeated many of Hayya’s claims.322 The Palestinian gaon Evyatar ha-Kohen (c. 
1042 - c. 1112) repeated several assertions found in Saʿadya’s writings and in Pirqei de-
R. Eliezer,323 but held that the prerogative to intercalate the calendar was exclusively that 
of Palestinian Jewry.324 Judah Ibn Bilʿam claimed that since David had said to Jonathan 
that the New Moon (ḥodesh) would occur on the morrow (1 Sam. 20:5), the calendar 
                                                 
321 Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 151. This position also appears in a letter that 
Hayya sent to Elḥanan ben Shemariah of Fusṭāṭ; see B.M. Lewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon z"l ʿal Davar 
Shenei Yamim Tovin Shelgaluyot, u-Teshuvat Rabbeinu Yosef,” Ginzei Qedem 4 (1930): 36; and idem, 
Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:41 (§47). On Elḥanan, see Elinoar 
Bareket, Fustat on the Nile: The Jewish Elite in Medieval Egypt (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 205-222. 
322 See the lengthy quotation in Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Chavel, 2:85-88 (Ex. 
12:2); and the treatment in Bornstein, “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 147n1. This position 
appears in many places in Ḥananel’s commentary on the Talmud; see Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 13:46-48. 
The same claims appear in Abraham bar Ḥiya’s report of Hayya’s views, adding that Moses taught the 
mathematical calculation of the calendar to Israel; Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Filipowski, 97 (3:7). In this version, 
Hayya argued that earlier generations adjusted the mathematical calculation of the calendar as necessary 
and concluded that historical dates (seder ʿolam) cannot be known with certainty. Mann, “Gaonic Studies 
I,” 239, suggested that this may be a criticism of the account in Pirqei de-R. Eliezer. He added that the 
claim of Mosaic origin of the intercalated calendar is an interpolation; however, it is consistent with 
Hayya’s statement in the letter to Nissim. 
323 For the claim that the debate between R. Joshua and Rabban Gamliel demonstrates that the 
head of the court, alone, possesses the “secret of intercalation” (sod ha-ʿibur); see Schechter, Saadyana, 95 
line 22; and Moshe Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar – Maqor le-Toldot Maʾaviqah shel Yeshivat Yerushalayim be-
meḥiṣat ha-sheniya shel ha-meiʾah ha-11 (qeriʾah ḥadashah shel ha-Megillah),” in Peraqim be-Toldot 
Yerushalayim bi-Yemei-ha-Beinayim, ed. Benjamin Z. Kedar (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1979), 94 line 22. 
(On the shift of meaning of sod ha-ʿibur from “council of intercalation” to “secret of intercalation,” see 
Stern, Calendar and Community, 189-91.) For the claim that the court began accepting witnesses only after 
the criticism of Zadok and Boethus, see Schechter, Saadyana, 97 lines 24-25; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,” 
96 lines 24-25. Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel also repeated this argument; see Baḥya ben Asher, Beiʾur ʿal ha-
Torah, ed. Chavel, 2:88. 
324 See Schechter, Saadyana, 102; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,” 91. See the claim that the 
Palestinian Rabbi Judah the Prince had instituted the Arbaʿah Sheʿarim; Schechter, Saadyana, 102; and Gil, 
“Megillat Eviyatar,” 92-93; see also Schechter, Saadyana, 84n2. See the treatment in Bornstein, “Maḥloqet 
Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,”149-51; and Gil, “Megillat Eviyatar,” 70. This is similar to a claim made 
by Ben Meir; see Stern, Calendar and Community, 178n91. See also Rustow and Stern, “The Jewish 
Calendar Controversy of 921-22,” 81-82. 
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must have been based on calculation in their time. How else could David have known 
when the New Moon would appear?325 The Byzantine Rabbanite, Tobias ben Eliezer of 
Kastoria (late 11th c.), wrote that before the exile, months were based on testimony, but 
afterwards, they were based on the mathematical calculation first employed by Adam.326 
While Abraham Ibn Ezra rejected Saʿadya’s approach, he affirmed a tradition of the 
sages, transmitted from the prophets, according to which the calendar follows the 
mathematical calculation during the exile.327 In short, while some Rabbanites rejected 
certain aspects of Saʿadya’s claims about the Rabbanite calendar, they agreed that many 
of its elements originate with God, Moses, or the ancient prophets. 
 
The Second Day of Festivals in the Diaspora 
The practice of observing two days of biblical festivals other than the Day of 
Atonement, in the diaspora, in order to eliminate any doubt about the dates of festivals, 
                                                 
325 Shraga Abramson, “Sefer ha-Tanjīs (‘ha-Ṣimud’) le-Rav Yehuda ben Bilʿam,” in Sefer Ḥanokh 
Yalon: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim, eds. Saul Lieberman et al. (Jerusalem: Qiryat Sefer, 1963), 107-8. On anti-
Qaraism in Ibn Bilʿam’s biblical commentaries, see there, 60. The reference to Ibn Bilʿam’s commentary 
on Ezek. 18:6 should be to REJ vol. 45. See also Neḥemya Allony, “Ibn al-ʿAm, Balʿam, ve-Ibn Balʿam 
ha-Balshan veha-Parshan ve-hu ha-Meshorer veha-Payṭan ve-hu baʿal ha-Halakhah veha-Pulmusim,” in 
Studies in Jewish Religious and Intellectual History: Presented to Alexander Altmann on the Occasion of 
his Seventieth Birthday, eds. Siegfried Stein and Raphael Loewe (University of Alabama Press, 1979), 45 
(Hebrew pagination). Bornstein reported that Poznański identified a manuscript of Ibn Bilʿam’s 
commentary on 1 Sam. 20 that included this argument, but it is possible that this was a manuscript of Kitāb 
al-Tanjīs; “Maḥloqet Rav Saʿadya Gaon u-Ben Meʾir,” 147n1. A nearly identical claim appears in the name 
of the tenth-century R. Meshulam bar Qalonymos of Lucca in R. Moses ben Jacob of Coucy, Sefer Miṣvot 
ha-Gadol (Venice, 1547), 123b, suggesting, perhaps, a shared geonic-era source.  
326 Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 270n53. See also Stern, Calendar and Community, 213, 234-
35. On anti-Qaraite polemic in this work, see Israel Ta-Shma, “‘Midrash Leqaḥ Tov’ – Reqaʿo ve-Ofyo,” in 
Keneset Meḥqarim: ʿIyunim be-Sifrut ha-Rabbanit bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute, 
2004), 3:265-77. 
327 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:79, 3:82 (Lev. 23:4). See also his 
comments to Ex. 12:2 (2:70-74), and idem, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Solomon Zalman Ḥayim Halberstam (Lyck: 
L. Silbermann, 1874), 11b. 
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arose in a period when Jews outside of Palestine were uncertain that they would learn of 
the New Moon’s arrival in a timely manner. An early talmudic statement linked this 
practice (yom tov sheini shel galuyot) to doubts about the calendar, but a later view 
suggested it was motivated by concerns about “persecution” (shemada) (bBeṣ 4b).328 In 
the geonic period, Qaraites criticized the Second Day of Festivals, forcing Rabbanites to 
justify its continued observance.329 How, asked Qirqisānī, could divine law admit 
divergent practices (ikhtilāf), in which the Palestinians observe one day and Babylonians 
two? He argued that, from the Palestinian perspective, Babylonians violate the 
prohibition of adding to the law, while Babylonians perceive Palestinians as violating it 
by subtraction (“Neither add to it nor take away from it”; Deut. 13:1)!330 
Nissim of Qayrawān quoted Saʿadya’s Commentary on Exodus as having 
dismissed the idea that there had ever been doubt about the dates of the festivals. Rather, 
Saʿadya asserted, God instructed Moses that Jews in Palestine were to observe one day of 
festivals and Jews in the diaspora, two.331 Elsewhere, Saʿadya offered the somewhat 
                                                 
328 Stern proposed that the second defense was offered as the calendar became more predictable, 
and that “persecution” refers either to breaks in communication between Palestinians who fixed the 
calendar and Babylonians, or to attacks on local Babylonian experts; “The Second Day of Yom Tov in the 
Talmudic and Geonic Literature,” World Congress of Jewish Studies 11, C: Thought and Literature, volume 
1: Rabbinic and Talmudic Literature (1993): 49-55; and idem, Calendar and Community, 171, 174n79, 
245-46. See also Jacob Katz, “The Orthodox Defense of the Second Day of Festivals,” in Divine Law in 
Human Hands: Case Studies in Halakhic Flexibility (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998), 255-60. 
329 Nissim made the anti-Qaraite context explicit; see Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-
Ḥadashot, 148; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 173. 
330 Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:57, 4:814. This was part of Qaraite exploitation of 
discrepancies in practice between Palestinian and Babylonian Rabbanites; see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 
110-13; Zeʾev Elkin, “Ha-Nusaḥ ha-Qaraʾi shel ‘Sefer ha-Ḥiluqim bein benei Ereṣ-Yisrael le-vnei Bavel’,” 
Tarbiẓ 66, no. 1 (1997): 101-11; and Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “ʿAl Terumat ha-Genizah le-Ḥeiqer ha-
Halakhah,” Madaʿei Yahadut 38 (1998): 279-80. 
331 See Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 148. Zucker (“Shenei Qeṭaʿim,” 16n6; and 
“Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403n64a) claimed that he found relevant fragments of Saʿadya’s 
commentary to Ex. 12. In personal communication (Nov. 18, 2014), David Sklare confirmed the existence 
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circular argument that Moses must have known about the Second Day of Festivals; had 
he not, its observance would violate the prohibition of adding to the Torah. However, 
wrote Saʿadya, this requirement was not fully revealed until Jews in exile needed it.332 
In his Kitāb al-Tamyīz (Book of Distinction), Saʿadya may have gestured toward 
consensus (ijmāʿ), at least rhetorically, claiming that the entire community (jamāʿa) had 
heard from prophets and witnessed the prophetic practice of observing one day of 
Festivals in Palestine and two in the diaspora. He justified the observance of different 
practices in different places by pointing out that the requirement to offer the Paschal 
sacrifice depends on one’s location (Num. 9:10).333 Saʿadya further emphasized that the 
prohibition of adding to the law pertains only to “everything that I command you” (Deut. 
13:1) and not to “everything that I write for you.” He maintained that since the Second 
Day of Festivals is a transmitted tradition, and therefore included in “everything that I 
command you,” its observance does not violate this prohibition.334 
In a letter to the Jews of Qabīs, in the Maghreb, Hayya claimed that the prophets 
had instituted the Second Day of Festivals,335 and in a letter to Elḥanan ben Shemariah (d. 
                                                 
of these fragments and that Saʿadya based the Second Day of Festivals on naql and āthār. On the supposed 
lack of doubt regarding the calendar, see also Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 590. 
332 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 403. 
333 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim mi-Kitāb Taḥṣīl al-Sharāʾiʿ,” 407. 
334 Hartwig Hirschfeld, “The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge. (Third Article.): 
Saadyāh Fragments,” JQR 16, no. 1 (o.s.) (1903): 103-104. See also Poznański, “Addenda and 
Corrigenda,” 233-34; Brody, Saʿadyah Gaon, 35, 150-51; and Michael G. Wechsler, The Book of 
Conviviality in Exile (Kitāb al-Ῑnās biʾl-Jalwa): The Judaeo-Arabic Translation and Commentary of Saadia 
Gaon on the Book of Esther (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 377-79. Brief discussion of Saʿadya’s claims appears in 
Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 574n134, 582-83. 
335 םימי ינש םיבוט םימי ןישועש תוילגה תלחתמ לארשי תא וגיהנה ןכו םינושארה םיאיבנה תומימ הריזגה תאזו; A. 
Marmorstein, Teshuvot ha-Geonim, ʿim Haqdamah ve-Heʿarot (Deva, 1928), 27; and Lewin, Oṣar ha-
Geonim, Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:38-39 (§43). For the addressee, see Emmanuel, 
Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 148n15. On Qabīs, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “The Jewish Community 
of Gabes in the 11th Century,” in Communautés juives des marges sahariennes du Maghreb, ed. Michel 
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1026), he identified those prophets as Ezekiel and Daniel (probably because they lived in 
Babylonia).336 In a responsum to Nissim of Qayrawān, Hayya reiterated Saʿadya’s view 
about the prohibition of adding to the Torah. The prophets who began this practice, he 
wrote, would never have dreamed of adding to the Torah. Hayya further argued that the 
rationale for the Second Day of Festivals is analogous to the case of one lost in a desert. 
Uncertain whether a given day is Wednesday or Thursday, the traveler would rest on two 
days in order to avoid violating the Sabbath. Likewise, Jews beyond the borders of the 
Land of Israel observe the Second Day of Festivals, lest they desecrate the day. Hayya 
wrote that God commanded Israel to observe the Second Day of Festivals precisely in 
order to avoid similar situations of doubt, perhaps through the prophet Joshua, for in 
Joshua’s time, Jews first settled Palestine and began to travel from there.337 Hayya 
tempered Saʿadya’s position about the origins of the Second Day of Festivals, explaining 
it in a way that better accorded with historical events, but he affirmed both the prophetic 
origin of this practice and the claim that only divine law is authoritative.338 
                                                 
Abitbol (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1982), 265-84. Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 
600n246, argued that this responsum only repeats the claims of the letter to Qabīs but does not preserve the 
original text. 
336  ןאדלבלא עימג יפ ןיר'צאח איבנאלאו לבב יפ ךל'דב המאלא תלמעו ... לכל ונס ןיר'צאח איבנאלאו תולגלא תנאכ אמלפ
לאינדו לאקזחי ל'תמ איבנאלא למע הבו; Lewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon,” 36; and idem, Oṣar ha-Geonim, 
Masekhet Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:42 (§47). See also Assaf, Teshuvot ha-Geonim, 214 
(§36). For another example of geonic-era use of the term Sunna, see Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 
82n51, 84. On Elḥanan, see above, n321. 
337 Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 153-54; on divine commands in cases of doubt, 
see further, 155-56. 
338 See similarly Lewin, “Teshuvat Rav Hayya Gaon,” 37. Lewin ascribed this responsum to R. 
Joseph rosh ha-seder (Egypt; 12th / 13th c.); see however, Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-Yadeikhem,” 
560n8. Further treatment of Hayya’s position appears there, 580n178, 585-86, 600. See also, Ben-Sasson, 
Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 49-50n109. Note the claims of Jacob ben Ephraim al-Shāmī, cited in 
Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:136-37, treated briefly in Friedman, “Minhag Avoteikhem be-
Yadeikhem,” 594-95. Compare also Gerald Blidstein, “Ha-Qesher bein Samkhut Taqqanot Ḥazal u-Veit 
Midrash be-Maqor Ashkenazi Qadum,” Sinai 112 (1993): 163-65. 
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Hanukah 
The earliest geonic source that mentions the legal basis of Hanukah of which I am 
aware, evinces no qualms about admitting its rabbinic status. It is by Ṣemaḥ ben Paltoy 
Gaon (Pumbedita; 872-90), who was active prior to most geonic anti-Qaraite polemic.339 
In response to the Qaraite charge that this holiday was a rabbinic innovation,340 however, 
many Rabbanites either argued that Hanukah was divinely ordained, or that it was based 
on Mosaic prophecy.  
One early occurrence of this theme appears in Megillat Antiochus (Scroll of 
Antiochus), a work whose date has been subject to dispute since the nineteenth century.341 
                                                 
339  הכוס הכונח לש רנ דגנכ תועמ תוצרהל רוסא ןנברד הוצמד םתה המו הכונח לש רנמ רמוחו לקב איתאד 'מעט יאמ
תירואד הוצמ ןכש לכו ןנברד הכונח לש רנב היל טרפ הכירצ אל ןנבר יטרפ אל 'מעט יאמ 'מית יכו ןכש לכ אל 'תירואד' ; Emmanuel, 
Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 69 (§61). The beginning of this responsum appears in Marmorstein, 
Teshuvot ha-Geonim, 49 (§12; not §1, as Emanuel has), and Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Sukkah, 
Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 6:16 (§28). Emmanuel pointed out that R. Elijah Menaḥem ben Moses of London (c. 
1220-84) cited this material in the name of the Sheʾiltot; see Elijah Menaḥem ben Moses, Peirushei 
Rabbeinu Eliyahu mi-Londres u-Fesaqav, ed. Mordecai Yehuda Leib Sacks (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav 
Kook, 1956) 34 (Hebrew pagination). See also J.N. Epstein, “Prishat Rabbeinu Eliyahu Menaḥem b-R. 
Moshe me-Londres,” Madaʿei ha-Yahadut 1 (1926): 65. 
340 See Ḥilluq ha-Qaraʾim veha-Rabbanim ascribed to Elijah ben Abraham (11th / 12th c.) in 
Pinsker, Liquṭei Qadmoniyot, 102 (appendices, English pagination); this text is treated in Leon Nemoy, 
“Elijah Ben Abraham and his Tract against the Rabbanites,” HUCA 51 (1980): 63-87; and Astren, Karaite 
Judaism and Historical Understanding, 141-57. “What is more strange,” wrote Qirqisānī, “than a person 
pronouncing a blessing over the Sabbath-eve lamp and saying in the blessing that God commanded it? 
Likewise, over the lamp of Hanukah?”; Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:30; trans. in Leon Nemoy, “Al-
Qirqisānī’s Account of the Jewish Sects and Christianity,” HUCA 7 (1930): 349. On Qaraite anti-Hanukah 
claims, see Baron, SRHJ2, 5:226, 5:407; Ankori, Karaites in Byzantium, 282; Nemoy, Karaite Anthology, 
xxiv; and Astren, Karaite Judaism and Historical Understanding, 73-74. Saʿd Ibn Kammūna listed 
Hanukah among the differences between Qaraites and Rabbanites; see Leon Nemoy, “Ibn Kammūnah’s 
Treatise on the Differences between the Rabbanites and the Karaites,” PAAJR 36 (1968): 110; JQR 63, no. 
2 (1972): 115-16. 
341 Also known as Megillat (or Sefer) Beit Ḥashmonai. For bibliography, see Meir Rafeld, 
“Megillat Antiochus – Bibliografiya Nivḥeret,” in Minhagei Yisrael – Meqorot ve-Toldot, ed. Daniel 
Sperber (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1995), 5:117-20. For a list of editions, see Strack and 
Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331-32; and Zeʾev Safrai, “Appendix: The Scroll of 
Antiochus and the Scroll of the Fasts,” in The Literature of the Sages, 2:238n2-3. For dating, see Aryeh 
Kasher, “The Historical Background of Megillath Antiochus,” PAAJR 48 (1981): 208-210; add Emil 
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This work’s closing verses assert that the Hasmoneans and the entire people of Israel 
vowed to observe Hanukah in order “to inform the Children of Israel to make these eight 
days of happiness and joy, like the holidays that are written in the Torah (ke-yomei 
modʿaya de-khtivin be-orayta).”342 As the rhetoric of this claim suggests that Megillat 
Antiochus was written when the observance of Hanukah was contested, several scholars 
date this text to a time after the rise of Qaraism.343 Similarly, the geonic-era Midrash le-
Ḥanukah asserts, “God arose and established eight days of Hanukah for them, which was 
                                                 
Schrürer, A History of the Jewish People in the Time of Jesus Christ (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1897-1898), 
165. Menaḥem Zvi Kadari showed that the Aramaic of Megillat Antiochus is similar to the Aramaic of 
Onqelos; “Be-Ezo Aramit Nikhtavah Megillat Antiochus?” Lĕšonénu 23 (1959): 143-45; and idem, 
“Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” Bar Ilan 2 (1964): 210-13. Onqelos as it is known today was probably 
compiled between the sixth and ninth centuries; see Safrai “Appendix: The Scroll of Antiochus and the 
Scroll of the Fasts,” 239n15; Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331; and the 
views cited in Raphael Binyamin Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” Sidra 15 (1999): 96n2. Saʿadya was the first 
to mention Megillat Antiochus; a reference in Halakhot Gedolot is suspect; Louis Ginzberg, “Antiochus, 
Scroll of (Megillat Antiochus),” The Jewish Encyclopedia (New York, 1901), 1:637. The editio princeps of 
Halakhot Gedolot ([Venice, 1548], 141b, repr. [Vienna, 1811], 104b) refers to Megillat Beit Ḥashmonai, 
but the Rome manuscript (Ezriel Hildesheimer, ed. Halakhot Gedolot: ʿal pi Ketav-yad Romi [Berlin: H. 
Itzkowski, 1888], 615) has Megillat Taʿanit. Hildesheimer preferred the latter reading in his vivarium 
edition (3:335-36). Saʿadya referred to Megillat Antiochus in the Arabic version of his Sefer ha-Galuy; see 
Harkavy, Zikhron la-Rishonim, Ha-Sarid veha-Palit mi-Sefer ha-Egron ve-Sefer ha-Galuy, 151 lines 15-18, 
163 lines 6-8, 181 lines 4-10 (citing verse 25). For another early reference, see Julian Obermann, The 
Arabic Original of ibn Shâhîn’s Book of Comfort, Known as the Ḥibbûr Yaphê of R. Nissîm b. Yaʿaqobh 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933), 2; and Nissim ben Jacob, An Elegant Composition Concerning 
Relief after Adversity, trans. William M. Brinner (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 6. 
342 אתירואב ןיביתכד איעדומ ימויכ רקיו אודח ןימוי אינמת ןידה דבעמל לארשי ינבל אעדוהל; Menaḥem Ẓvi Kadari, 
“Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” Bar Ilan 1 (1962): 101; see variants there. On the resemblances with Est. 
9:18-32, which promotes the observance of Purim, see Kasher, “The Historical Background,” 218-19n32. 
343 Adolf Neubauer, “Two Monographs by Dr. M. Gaster,” JQR 6, no. 3 (o.s.) (1894): 575, 
followed by Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 331; Atlas and Perlmann, 
“Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 22; and Kasher, “The Historical Background,” 217, 229. 
Alternatively, Robert Brody suggested to me that the comparison between Hanukah and the biblical 
festivals may accept that Hanukah is a later creation which is to be observed as if it were of biblical origin. 
 
101 
 
not a holiday until now.”344 Inclusion of Hanukah in enumerations of the 613 
commandments also affirms its divine origin.345  
Saʿadya was among those who counted Hanukah among the 613 commandments, 
both in his liturgical enumerations346 and in his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ.347 In his Introduction to 
Megillat Antiochus, Saʿadya explained that he was inspired to defend Hanukah because 
some Jews (i.e., Qaraites) rejected it.348 He claimed that the pious ancestors (aslāf) 
                                                 
344 ויכשע דע דעומ היה אלש הכונח ימי הנומש םהל עבקו ב"קה דמעו; Adolf Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrasch: 
Sammlung kleiner Midraschim und vermischter Abhandlungen aus der ältern jüdischen Literatur (Leipzig, 
1853), 1:135. Mirky’s edition of the Sheʾiltot (1:185) contains a homily that claims that God established 
Hanukah and that King David prophesied about it. On this text, see Moshe Ḥayim Leiter, “Sheʾilta de-Rav 
Aḥai be-ʿInyanei Ḥanukah,” Yeshurun 19 (2007): 25-26. Robert Brody suggested that it is unlikely that this 
passage is original to Aḥai’s Sheʾiltot, as it is only preserved in one manuscript; see his Le-Toldot Nusaḥ 
ha-Sheʾiltot (Jerusalem: ha-Aqademiyah ha-Ameriqaʾit le-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, 1992), 92n106. On the 
sheʾilta genre, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 202-207. 
345 See above, n191. Note the comments of Eliezar of Metz, Sefer Yireiʿim, 496 (§429 [§100]); and 
Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 85n378. See also Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 
1:507-508. 
346 Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 158 line 20 (piyuṭ), 202 line 245 
(azharot). Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:507, argued that Saʿadya counted a commandment to observe 
Hanukkah, not a commandment to light the Hanukkah candles. See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 9n58. 
347  יול ינבלא הללא רצנ א'דאו רפסב ןורכז תאז בתכו אדיע הנו'דכ'כתי קלמע דלו ןמ ונל גירפי םוי ןוכי ןא רא'תאלא ןמ'צו
והימאקמל םהברח יפהיינינוילא אלא ובראח םוה>ד<גנ םלו הצרת וידי לעופו וליח 'ה ךרב 'ק'כ תקולא ךל'ד ןול'צת ןא ם ; Oxford 
MS Heb. e.45.65a, following the Friedberg Genizah Project transcription; published by Zucker, “ʿIyunim 
ve-Heʿarot,” 98. Zucker offered the shelfmark 21.165 from the Cambridge collection, which does not exist. 
Zucker’s text did not include the last sentence; it is published in translation in Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-
Rambam,” 760; and Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah? ʿIyun be-Kivtei 
Rav Saʿadya Gaon uve-Pulmosav,” in Nero Yaʾir: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim le-Ḥanukah le-Zikhro shel Oded 
Ḥamadi, eds. Ariel David and Yosef Parḥi (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 2013), 418-19.  
Saʿadya wrote that “tradition obligated” (wa-ḍammana al-āthār) the observance of Purim. 
Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam,” 760, translated ḍammana as “guaranteed,” reading ḍamana (form I); 
Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 419n34, preferred the form II meaning of 
“included.” Zucker, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 98, agreed with Stampfer. Blau preferred “obligated”; 
Dictionary, 388, s.v. نّمض. Note Saʿadya’s use of the fifth form of ḍ-m-n to state “tradition included” 
(taḍammanat al-āthār) that the weekday prayer is comprised of 18 blessings, based on the number of 
verses in the Song at the Sea (Ex. 15:2-19); Ben-Shammai, “Meṣiʾah aḥat she-Hi shetayim,” 325. On this 
root, see Adrian Gully, “Taḍmīn, ‘Implication of Meaning,’ in Medieval Arabic,” JAOS 117, no. 3 (1997): 
466-80. 
348 Atlas and Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 6 lines 9-11. See Franz 
Rosenthal, “Saadyah’s ‘Introduction to the Scroll of the Hasmoneans’,” JQR 36, no. 3 (1946): 299. This 
Introduction is preserved in two recensions. (1) Atlas and Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the 
Hasmoneans,” 6-21; repr. in Yosef Kafiḥ, Daniel ʿim Targum u-Feirush Saʿadya ben Yosef Fayyūmī u-
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transmitted Hanukah through a concurrent tradition (naqalahu naqlan mutawātiran),349 
but wondered if the prophets had also announced (bashshara) it. Unsurprisingly, he 
identified several prophecies for the Maccabean victory (Deut. 33:11, Joel 4:7-8, and 
Zekh. 9:13-16) and endeavored to prove the relevance of these verses. 
According to Saʿadya, a phrase in Moses’ final blessing to the tribe of Levi (Deut. 
33:11), “Smite the loins of his foes, and let his enemies rise no more,” concerns a future 
victory of the Levites over their enemies. Saʿadya engaged in the following excursus in 
order to demonstrate that these “enemies” are the Greeks. Noting that the usual object of 
the verb “smite” is the head (e.g., Hab. 3:13, Ps. 110:6), Saʿadya focused on the verse’s 
specification of “loins,” and linked it to Nebuchadnezzar’s vision of the Four Kingdoms 
(Dan. 2:37-45). According to Saʿadya, Moses highlighted the loins because they are the 
“most solid” (muʿtamad) part of the leg,350 and the legs and thighs in Nebuchadnezzar’s 
vision represent the third kingdom, namely the Greeks.351 Furthermore, wrote Saʿadya, 
“let his enemies rise no more” must refer to the Greeks because Megillat Antiochus 
                                                 
Feirush Tanḥum ha-Yerushalmi (Jerusalem: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1994), 221-25. See Rosenthal’s 
comments on this text; “Saadyah’s ‘Introduction to the Scroll of the Hasmoneans’,” 297-302. (2) T-S 
A45.15, in Simon Hopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces from the Cambridge Genizah Collections: A 
Catalogue and Selection of Texts in the Taylor-Schechter Collection, Old Series, box A45 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Library, 1978), 50-53; and Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-
Ḥanukkah,” 424-26; see there, 410n1, for publication history. Zucker claimed to have found a fragment of 
Saʿadya’s commentary to Daniel that makes similar arguments, which he listed under shelfmark T.S. 6.121 
(“ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 98). This shelfmark does not exist. Zucker’s transcription largely matches Atlas and 
Perlmann, “Saadia on the Scroll of the Hasmoneans,” 8-12. 
349 See Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lii. 
350 Translation based on Hopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces, 53. 
351 “The messenger [i.e., Moses] specifically referred to them [i.e., the Greeks]” ( םהילא לוסרלא
הצא'כ ראשא); Hopkins, A Miscellany of Literary Pieces, 52, fol. 3r lines 11-12. 
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reports that the Greek kingdom ceased after the revolt of the Maccabees, who were 
themselves Levites.352 
Later Rabbanites asserted Hanukah’s divine origins. Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ included 
Hanukah in his enumeration of the 613 commandments.353 A passage from Nissim of 
Qayrawān’s Megillat Setarim, preserved in Naḥmanides’ Commentary on the Torah, 
quotes a midrash which asserts that God promised Aaron that his descendents, the 
Hasmoneans, would “make for Israel miracles, salvations, and a dedication (ḥanukah) 
that is called by their names.”354 
 
                                                 
352 See the variant readings to verse 65 in Kadari, “Megillat Antiochus ha-Aramit,” 101. I have 
reconstructed Saʿadya’s argument from both recensions of this text. Stampfer noted that part of Saʿadya’s 
interpretation appears in Julius Theodor and Ḥanokh Albeck, eds., Midrash Bereishit Rabbah (Jerusalem: 
Wahrmann Books, 1965), 3:1274 (§99). Citing unpublished Genizah fragments, Stampfer also explained 
that Qirqisānī, Yefet ben Eli, and Jeshua ben Judah read Deut. 33:11 to refer to Koraḥ, Uzziah, or Jeroboam 
(“Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 411-12). Jeshua ben Judah even quoted Sifrei ʿal 
Devarim, ed. Louis Finkelstein (New York: Beit ha-Midrash ha-Rabbanim be-America, 1969), 409 (§352), 
for support. 
353 See above, n194 and n197. 
354  הב השוע ינאו תורנה תקלדה הב שיש תרחא הכונח שי וילא תרמאו ןרהא לא רבד השמל אוה ךורב שודקה ול רמא
יאנומשח ינב תכונח איהו םמש לע היורקש הכונחו העושתו םיסנ ךינב ידי לע לארשיל; Yosef Ofer and Jonathan Jacobs, 
Tosafot Ramban le-Feirusho la-Torah: she-Nikhtevu be-Ereṣ Yisrael (Jerusalem: ha-Mikhlalah ha-
Aqademit Herzog, 2013), 428; see also Naḥmanides, Peirush ha-Ramban ʿal ha-Torah, ed. Charles Ber 
Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1962), 2:220 (Num. 8:2). Naḥmanides only had access to this text 
after arriving in Palestine, and this comment was a later addition to his Commentary; Ofer and Jacobs, 
Tosafot Ramban le-Feirusho la-Torah, 429-30; and Jonathan Jacobs, “Sefarim Ḥadashim she-Hitagalu la-
Ramban be-Hagiʿo le-Ereṣ Yisrael,” JSIJ 11 (2012): 111-12. This text was first noticed by Samuel 
Poznański, Liquṭim min Sefer Megillat Setarim le-Rabbeinu Nissim be-Rav Yaʿaqov mi-Qayrawān 
(Budapest, 1922), 49-50, who noted that Nissim’s midrash is not found elsewhere. Simḥa Assaf published 
an index to this work by one of Nissim’s contemporaries. Under chapter 139, that text reads: “the fact that 
the Torah placed the section of be-haʿalotekha [Num. 8:1] next to zot ḥanukat ha-mizbeaḥ [Num. 7:88] is 
for a reason (yesh lo taʿam)” (םעט ול שי חבזמה תכונח תואזל ךתולעהב תשרפ 'תכה ךימסהש הזו); “Sefer Megillat 
Setarim le-Rav Nissim bar Yaʿaqov mi-Qayrawān,” Tarbiẓ 11, no. 3 (1940): 254 line 139; repr. in 
Nissim ben Jacob, Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 280. 
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Aramaic Bible Translations (Targumim) 
The claim that God authorized all non-scriptural practices is also found in geonic-
era ascriptions of prophetic authority to the Aramaic translations of the Bible, known as 
Targumim. These claims may have been triggered by the decline in the use of Targumim, 
as they were rendered obsolete by the rise of Arabic,355 or by Qaraite criticisms of 
Targum Onqelos, the Aramaic translation of the Pentateuch.356 
Naṭronai bar Hilay (Sura; mid. 9th c.) penned an early defense of Targum 
Onqelos, writing that the “rabbis linked it to verses” (ʿal qraʾi asmakhuhu rabannan), 
and that “the sages were meticulous in the Targum” (diqdequ ḥakhamim be-targum).357 
References to prophetic authority appear later in the geonic period. Qirqisānī reported 
that unnamed Rabbanites viewed Jonathan ben ʿUzziel, the presumed author of the 
Targum of the Prophets, as occupying the same “rank” (ṭabaqa) as Moses,358 and Hayya 
                                                 
355 See Phillip Alexander, “Notes on some Targums of the Targum of the Song of Songs,” in 
Targum and Scripture: Studies in Aramaic Translations and Interpretation in Memory of Ernest G. Clarke, 
ed. Paul V.M. Flesher (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 159; Avigdor Shinan, Targum va-Aggadah bo: ha-Aggadah 
be-Targum ha-Torah ha-Arami ha-Meyuḥas le-Yonatan Ben ʿUzziel (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1992), 198; 
Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 154n7; Leeor Gottlieb, “Composition of Targums after the Decline of 
Aramaic as a Spoken Language,” Aramaic Studies 12, no. 1 (2014): 1-2; and below, n359. On continued 
use of the Targumim in Arabic-speaking communities, see Stefan Reif, “The Cairo Genizah and its 
Treasures with Special Reference to Biblical Studies,” in The Aramaic Bible: Targums in Their Historical 
Context, eds. D.R.G. Beattle and M.J. McNamara (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 42-43. 
356 See Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:39-40, 1:121-22; treated in Meira Polliack, The 
Karaite Tradition of Arabic Bible Translation: A Linguistic and Exegetical Study of Karaite Translations of 
the Pentateuch from the Tenth and Eleventh Centuries C.E. (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997), 67-69. See also 
Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 102-105. On the use of the Targumim in the synagogue, see Zeʾev Safrai, 
“The Targums as Part of Rabbinic Literature,” in The Literature of the Sages, 2:245-47. 
357 Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet Megillah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:30-31 (§107); Daniel 
Goldschmidt, Seder Rav ʿAmram Gaon (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1971), 76-77; Brody, Teshuvot 
Hilkhatiyot, 152-53 (§45). On this passage, see also Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 100-102. On the similar 
phrase ḥakhamim dayqanim, see Fuchs, “Meqomam shel ha-Geonim,” 79-81. For an example of Naṭronai 
locating liturgical practices in prophetic antiquity, see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 130 (§24). 
358 Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār, ed. Nemoy, 1:121. 
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Gaon claimed that the Targumim are “an inherited halakahah from the days of the 
prophets.”359 
 
The Origin of the Geonic Academies 
The claim that divine input accompanied the establishment of the geonic 
academies appears in some of the earliest post-talmudic texts. The Tanḥuma, Mishnat R. 
Eliezer, and Pirqoy’s Epistle repeat the claim that God founded the two academies.360 A 
responsum ascribed to Ṣemaḥ ben Ḥayim Gaon concerning Eldad ha-Dani, a ninth-
century pseudo-messianic figure, also asserts that the “the most essential (ʿiqar) of the 
sages and prophets were exiled to Babylonia and they established the Torah and instituted 
the academy at the Euphrates. … They constituted the chain of wisdom and of 
prophecy.”361  
                                                 
359 םיאיבנה תומימ השורי הכלה; Ginzberg, Ginzei Schechter, 2:87; see there, 2:74-75. Halakhah here 
could mean “tradition” or “norm.” Mann assumed that the questioner in this responsum was from 
Qayrawān; “Addenda to ‘The Responsa of the Babylonian Geonim as a Source of Jewish History’ (JQR N. 
S., Vols. VII-X),” JQR 11, no. 4 (1921): 467. For similar claims, see Lewin, Oṣar ha-Geonim, Masekhet 
Berakhot, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 1:18-20 (§33), 1:29 (§54); Masekhet Megillah, Ḥeileq ha-Teshuvot, 5:5 
(§8); Masekhet Qiddushin, 9:129-31 (§295-96); Louis Ginzberg, Geonica (New York: Jewish Theological 
Seminary of America, 1909), 2:61-62; Emmanuel, Teshuvot ha-Geonim ha-Ḥadashot, 63-64 (§55); and the 
sources in Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 17:315-19. Several of these sources are treated from a different 
perspective in Posen, “‘Targum mi-Sinai,’” 100-106. Note also Samuel ibn Naghrella ha-Nagid’s ascription 
of heretical motives to those who did not recite Targum Onqelos; Margaliyot, Hilkhot ha-Nagid, 92-94. 
However, Judah Ibn Quraysh identified lack of familiarity with Aramaic as the cause for decline of use of 
the Targums; Dan Becker, Ha-‘Risāla’ shel Yehuda Ben Quraysh: Mahadurah Biqortit (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv 
University Press, 1984), 117. 
360 See above, n159; and Lewin, “Mi-Shiyarei ha-Genizah,” 395-96. 
361  םויה דעו הדוהי ךלמ ןיכיוהי ימימ תרפ רהנב הבישי ועבקו הרותה תא ודסי םהו ולג לבבל םיאיבנהו םימכחה רקיעש
האובנהו המכחה תלשלש ויה םהו הזה; Abraham Epstein, Eldad ha-Dani: Sipurav ve-Hilkhotav (Pressburg: Adolf 
Alkalay, 1891), 8. On the authorship of this responsum, see Gil, Jews in Islamic Countries, 336n203; and 
David J. Wasserstein, “Eldad ha-Dani and Prester John,” in Prester John, the Mongols and the Ten Lost 
Tribes, eds. C.F. Beckingham and B. Hamilton (Aldershot: Variorum, 1996), 223-24n17. On this line, see 
also Mann, “Gaonic Studies I,” 257; and Adiel Kadari, “‘All Drink from the Same Fountain’: The Initial 
Acceptance of the Halakhot of Eldad Ha-Dani into the Halakhic Discourse,” Review of Rabbinic Judaism 
13, no. 2 (2010): 224-25. 
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Somewhat later, Sherira Gaon recounted that exiles to Babylon built the 
academies from bricks and dirt of the destroyed First Temple, and presented this as 
evidence that God moved from the Temple to the academies.362 Writing from Spain, 
Judah ben Barzillay declared that the heads of the academies who (orally) transmit the 
Talmud in each generation received their traditions from Ezekiel, who had accompanied 
them in exile.363 The claims of divine guidance certainly aided in fundraising for the 
academies,364 and they were neither as expansive, nor as consequential, as claims about 
the origins of the Oral Torah. Common to both geonic-era claims however, was the 
legitimation of non-biblical institutions by claiming for them prophetic authority.365 
 
Conclusion 
Despite the fact that Sherira and Hayya occasionally criticized Saʿadya’s portrait 
of rabbinic tradition, and reached somewhat different conclusions, the “maximalist”366 
attempts of geonic-era Rabbanites to ascribe divine authority to the entire body of Jewish 
law left little room for forms of legislation that are of undeniably human origins, such as 
rabbinic decrees and ordinances (gezeirot and taqqanot).367 Ibn Dāʾūd seems to have 
                                                 
362 Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 72-73. Sherira claimed that even after Jews returned to 
Palestine, Exilarchs from the Davidic line continued to guide the Babylonian academies. On Exilarchic 
claims of Davidic descent, see Arnold Franklin, The Noble House: Jewish Descendants of King David in 
the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 41-43. 
363 Judah ben Barzillay, Peirush Sefer Yeṣirah, ed. Halberstam, 187. 
364 This was Mann’s approach; “Gaonic Studies I,” 257. 
365 See similarly Joseph David, “‘Kede-Mefaresh be-Sifro shel Adam ha-Rishon’: Toldot ha-
Halakhah veha-Tefisah ha-Mitit shel ha-Historiyah eṣel Aḥaronei Geonei Pumbetida,” Tarbiẓ 74, no. 4 
(2005): 582n18. 
366 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 206n98. 
367 Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, lvii; and Blidstein, “Raʿayon Torah shebe-ʿal 
Peh,” 15-16. See also Harris, How Do We Know This, 78. Compare above, n215. 
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noted the omission of rabbinic enactments from legal epistemological thought of the 
geonic era. In the prologue to his Sefer ha-Qabbalah (The Book of Tradition), he 
explained rabbinic decrees gesturing toward ijmāʿ: “The sages … never taught anything 
… of their own invention, except for the enactments (taqqanot) that were made by 
universal agreement (haskamat kulam).”368 
Ibn Dāʾūd’s perspective sheds little light on Rabbanite understandings of the 
talmudic distinction between de-orayta (biblical) and de-rabbanan (rabbinic) laws, terms 
that are widespread in geonic halakhic writings and responsa.369 Despite the fact that the 
geonim rarely enacted formal ordinances (taqqanot), and despite their depiction of 
themselves as passive transmitters of tradition, geonic authors clearly used their intellects 
when they applied received tradition to new cases, as authors of responsa and interpreters 
of the Talmud.370 
Reading geonic-era legal epistemology in concert with contemporaneous Islamic 
thinking about oral tradition helps account for the central Rabbanite theses that revelation 
was all-encompassing, covering (almost) all subsequent legal innovations, and that 
specific non-biblical institutions are grounded in divine authority. The ideas that 
                                                 
368 םלכ תמכסהב ונקיתש תונקתה ןמ ץוח םבלמ ורמא אל ןוטק רבד וליפא הנשמ ימכח ןכש לכו דומלת ימכח םלועלו; Ibn 
Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 3 (English), 1 (Hebrew pagination). Translation follows Cohen, 
with slight changes. See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 159-60n65. 
369 Halbertal suggested that for the geonim, the terms “biblical and rabbinic [do] not set boundaries 
on the revelation, but merely [make] internal legal differentiations”; Maimonides, 113. 
370 On geonic enactment of taqqanot, see Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim Meḥoqeqim?”; idem, 
Geonim of Babylonia, 39, 62-64; Shoḥetman, “Le-Derekh Qeviʿatan shel Taqqanot ha-Geonim,” 655-67; 
and Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 58-60; see however Lifschitz, “‘Minhag’ u-Meqomo be-
Midrag ha-Normot shel ‘Torah shebe-ʿal Peh’,” 242n351. On geonic innovations and interpretations that 
were not based on legislative authority, see Brody, “Kelum hayu ha-Geonim Meḥoqaqim?” 279-90, 
315n79; and idem, Geonim of Babylonia, 163-66.  
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Rabbanites used any means necessary to battle Qaraites, and that they only deployed 
Islamic terms and concepts under polemical pressures is problematic for a number of 
reasons. It assumes, among other things, that defenses of the Oral Torah were insincere, 
and fails to account for the fact that later geonim adopted a different attitude towards 
Qaraites than Saʿadya did.371 The examination of Rabbanite approaches to tradition from 
a broader perspective demonstrates that Rabbanites and Muslim jurists appealed to the 
same kind of authority and proposed similar defenses of post-scriptural traditions. In 
other words, the geonic-era portrayal of the Oral Torah was coherent in the tenth and 
eleventh centuries, given broader societal assumptions.372 The Rabbanite encounter with 
the Jewish and non-Jewish “other,” in polemical and non-polemical settings, provided 
geonic-era authors with a new vocabulary for systematizing rabbinic tradition and 
reconsidering it. Nevertheless, this study leaves open the question of the extent to which 
Saʿadya and others “genuinely believed”373 their own claims. Rabbanite authors clearly 
benefited from rabbinic assertions that denied or downplayed human contributions to 
Jewish law, but surviving sources do not indicate to which extent, if any, they recognized 
any dissonance between their own rhetoric and that of the tradition that they sought to 
defend.374 
                                                 
371 Compare Marina Rustow, “The Qaraites as Sect: The Tyranny of a Construct,” in Sects and 
Sectarianism in Jewish History, ed. Sacha Stern (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 149-86. 
372 See Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 177: “the significant parallel between the Judaic and 
Muslim traditions was insistence upon a single source of legislation, which was divine.” Ben-Shammai 
explained that although Qaraites and Rabbanites argued about the authority of the rabbinic tradition, all 
“agree[d] on the general principle that transmitted knowledge … is a valid source of knowledge”; “Jewish 
Thought in Iraq in the 10th Century,” 27. 
373 See above, n136. 
374 This could equally apply to the rabbinic tradition itself: to what extent did rabbinic rhetoric 
about the scope of revelation reflect what the rabbis “really” thought about their legal activity? 
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This study of the Rabbanite conceptualization of the Oral Torah in Islamic terms 
should complicate another longstanding historiographic emphasis on Qaraism’s 
supposedly Islamic origins. Saʿadya was probably the first to claim that Islamic thought 
influenced ʿAnan375 – a polemical jab, though perhaps with some basis in reality – and 
critical scholars since Graetz have tried to identify Islamic influences on Qaraism.376 This 
line of inquiry, however, obscures the impact that Islamic thought, and other 
developments in the Islamic world, had on all Jews.377 Rabbanite legal epistemology in 
the tenth and eleventh centuries is a prime example of how all medieval Jews, Rabbanites 
as well as Qaraites, reshaped Judaism in the Islamic world. 
 
 
                                                 
375 See Zucker, ʿAl Targum Rasag, 145-46. 
376 For a review, see Meira Polliack, “Rethinking Karaism: Between Judaism and Islam,” AJS 
Review 30, no. 1 (2006): 67-69. See also Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, “The Attitude of Some Early Karaites 
Towards Islam,” in Studies in Medieval Jewish History and Literature, ed. Isadore Twersky (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Center for Jewish Studies, 1984), 2:4-5; Daniel Lasker, “Islamic Influences on Karaite 
Origins,” in Studies in Islamic and Judaic Traditions II, eds. William M. Brinner and Stephen D. Ricks 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), 23-47; and Fred Astren, “Islamic Contexts of Medieval Karaism,” in 
Karaite Judaism, 145-77. 
377 Compare Ben-Shammai, “Karaite Controversy,” 15: “As to the question of a relationship 
between the beginnings of Karaism and Islam, it should be noted that since the majority of Jewish 
communities, and the major centers of Jewish autonomy and learning in the eighth century found 
themselves within the boundaries of Islam, one would expect that most of the important events in the 
history of Judaism at the time would have taken place within those boundaries.” 
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Chapter Two: Maimonides on the Scope of Revelation and the Role of the Rabbis  
Introduction 
Moses Maimonides addressed the origins and workings of the Oral Torah 
throughout his writings, and, for more than eight centuries, readers have explicated and 
challenged his system. This chapter engages Maimonides’ earlier discussions, focusing 
particularly on his Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot, two Judeo-Arabic 
works that have not received as much attention as has the Hebrew, Mishneh Torah. This 
more inclusive analysis of Maimonides’ halakhic oeuvre facilitates a reevaluation of his 
legal theory and underscores the importance of situating his ideas in their Islamic context. 
In the words of Gerald Blidstein, “Maimonides, far more than any predecessor or 
contemporary, was keenly (perhaps obsessively?) interested in the status of the different 
sources of Law and their interrelationship.” According to Blidstein, this fascination 
motivated Maimonides’ lengthy analyses of the content and nature of revelation, his 
consideration of the role of the rabbis in developing Jewish law, and his ongoing concern 
with the classification of particular laws.378 One could add that Maimonides was dogged 
in his attempts to defend his views on the Oral Torah; these defenses hold pride of place 
at the outset of his three main halakhic treatises. 
In marked contrast with geonic-era presentations of rabbinic tradition as wholly 
divine, Maimonides narrowed the corpus of Jewish law that was known through 
                                                 
378 Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 13. See also idem, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 108; and 
idem, “Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” 31-32. Haym Soloveitchik argued that Maimonides’ interest in 
distinguishing between biblical and rabbinic law and anti-Qaraite polemic motivated what Soloveitchik 
considered the odd structure of Hilkhot Shabbat; “Mishneh Torah: Polemic and Art,” in Maimonides After 
800 Years, 327-32; repr. in idem, Collected Essays (Oxford: Litmann, 2014), 2:378-84. Note also 
Stroumsa’s categorization of Maimonides as a “fundamentalist”; Maimonides in His World, 83. 
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revelation and spoke proudly of rabbinic expansions of divine law. These claims met with 
protest in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. One critic, Abraham ben David of 
Posquières (Rabad; c. 1128-95) wrote with exasperation, “I have seen [that for] this man 
[i.e., Maimonides], [regarding] everything that is difficult for him in the words of our 
rabbis, he says that it is rabbinic (mi-divreihem) and not biblical (din torah).”379 Daniel 
ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli also attacked Maimonides’ claims, and Naḥmanides (Catalonia; 
1194-1270) described Maimonides’ perspective as “nasty and bitter” (raʿ u-mar).380 By 
the fourteenth century, however, an apologetic tradition had emerged, one that attempted 
to bring Maimonides’ views in line with those of his critics.381 Despite differences among 
these apologists, and despite the fact that some late medieval and early modern readers 
upheld the earlier, more “radical” reading of Maimonides,382 Jay Harris identified “a 
                                                 
379 הרות ןיד וניאו הז אוה םהירבדמ רמאי וניתובר ירבדב וילע השקיש המ לכ שיאה הז יתיאר; Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 
5:5. See Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” 21n177; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 27n31; and 
Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 13. See also Rabad’s comments to Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, and 3:20; treated in 
Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, 136n16. Moses ha-Kohen, another Provençal critic of the Mishnah Torah 
who probably lived after Rabad, wrote similar challenges; see his comments to Hilkhot Ishut there. See also 
Yaʿaqov Sussman, “Shenei Qunṭresim be-Halakhah me-et R. Moshe Boṭarel,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 16 (1966): 
299-300, esp. n21-22. 
The relationship of Rabad and Moses ha-Kohen is unclear; as Twersky wrote in the revised edition 
of Rabad of Posquières (348), “the relation of the hassagot of R. Moses ha-Kohen to those to Rabad needs 
to be studied carefully”; see Silver, Maimonidean Criticism, 76-79; Twersky, Rabad of Posquières, 128, 
179, 239; idem, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 37, 103; and Shalem Yahalom, Bein Gironah le-
Narbonah: Avnei Binyan le-Yeṣirat ha-Ramban (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2012), 102-103. Sources about 
Moses ha-Kohen’s life are collected in J. Kohn, Hagahot ha-Ramakh: Hagahot she-Hegiyah ʿal Sefer 
Mishneh Torah leha-Rambam (Jerusalem, 1970), 201-208. 
380 Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 51 (Prin. Two). 
381 The beginning of this tradition is usually associated with Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran; Neubauer, 
Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 33; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 
47n50; and Yosef Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’,” in ʿIyunim be-Sifrut Ḥazal, 251. I am not convinced by 
Levinger’s attempt to attribute this tradition to Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Adret. For interpretations of Ibn 
Adret’s view, see the standard commentaries to Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 17:5. For the suggestion that 
there are textual problems in the relevant responsum, see Ibn Adret, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot (Jerusalem: 
Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1997), 3:146n2 (§255). On the role of Vidal Yom Tov of Tolosa in reinterpreting 
Maimonides, who predated Duran by several decades, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 30-31. 
382 See below, n640. 
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veritable industry” that deflected criticism of Maimonides and minimized his 
disagreements with Naḥmanides, whose own perspectives on the Oral Torah largely 
prevailed.383 The arguments in this chapter are mostly aligned with academic studies that 
read Maimonides on his own terms, that is, according to the earlier, “radical” 
interpretation, and that ignore later “harmonizing” apologetics.384 
This chapter begins with a review of the historiography of Maimonides’ approach 
to the Oral Torah, with particular focus on the various explanations that have been 
offered for his terminology. It then assesses what can be recovered from pre-
Maimonidean Andalusian Rabbanite jurisprudence. It next turns to the two topical pivots 
of Maimonides’ theories: the scope of revelation, i.e., what material was given to Moses, 
and the role of post-Mosaic jurists. Its final section examines the relevant statements in 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot; they are ambiguous, problematic, and controversial. Throughout this 
chapter, I make use of all of Maimonides’ halakhic writings in an attempt to shed light on 
his classification of specific laws. For the most part, this method reveals that 
Maimonides’ presentations throughout his life were consistent.385 
                                                 
383 Harris, How Do We Know This, 92-94. The most thorough treatment remains Neubauer, Ha-
Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 21-79. For brief critique, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 
45n44. 
384 As Neubauer noted, Maimonides’ adversaries usually understood him better than his supporters 
did. Neubauer also suggested that as Joseph Karo’s Shulḥan ʿArukh overtook the Mishneh Torah as the 
definitive guide for halakhic practice, readers felt more liberty to reject Maimonides’ views; Ha-Rambam 
ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 72, 46-47. 
385 On the relationship of the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah, see Yuval 
Sinai, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam ke-Kli le-Viʾur Halakhot be-Mishneh Torah,” Shenaton ha-
Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 23 (2005): 225-51; idem, “Bein Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam le-vein Mishneh Torah: 
Heqef ha-Ḥomer ha-Hilkhati, Shiṭat ha-Miyun veha-Fiṣul ha-Musagi,” HUCA 80 (2009): 21-37 (Hebrew 
pagination); idem, “‘Ḥaqirot’, ‘Derishot’ u-‘Bediqot’ – Pereq be-Gibush Hilkhot ha-Rambam,” Sidra 21 
(2006): 35-51; idem, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 203, 205-208, 243-45 esp. 
n158, 245-50; and Dror Fixler, “Hilkhot Miqvaʾot – ʿal Ḥazarah aḥat be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 
Maʿaliyot 12 (1992): 65-78. 
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Historiography and Background 
Interpreters of Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah have largely focused on 
the Hebrew translation of Principles One and Two in his Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
and on a series of technical terms in the Mishneh Torah that classify non-scriptural laws. 
Less attention has been paid to the Judeo-Arabic Commentary on the Mishnah and to the 
Judeo-Arabic original of Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Below, I review technical terminology used by 
Maimonides in his Hebrew and Judeo-Arabic writings, his so-called “model” of the Oral 
Torah, and the view of Jacob Levinger, who claimed that Maimonides held esoteric 
beliefs about the Oral Torah. 
 
The Classification of Laws in the Mishneh Torah and Problems of 
Terminology  
The Mishneh Torah’s classificatory lexicon is diverse and novel. Technical terms 
include: (mi-)divrei sofrim, i.e., (from) words (or: matters) of the scribes; (mi-)divrei 
qabbalah, i.e., (from) words (or: matters) of tradition; ba ba-qabbalah and mi-pi ha-
qabbalah, i.e., comes from tradition and “from the mouth of tradition”; mi-pi ha-
shemuʿah, i.e, from aural tradition; and halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, i.e., law given to 
Moses at Sinai. As criticism of these usages first arose in Maimonides’ lifetime,386 
Maimonides himself addressed these terms, particularly in his correspondences with two 
figures, Pinḥas ben Meshulam ha-dayan (fl. late 12th c.), a Provençal émigré and judge 
                                                 
386 Noted in Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 45. 
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active in Alexandria, probably in the mid-1180s or early 1190s,387 and Samuel ben ʿEli, 
with whom he exchanged a series of epistles.388 
The difficulty of mapping these terms onto the categories of “biblical” and 
“rabbinic” law is borne out in the array of interpretations proposed. One approach to 
determining the meaning of these terms has highlighted “classic” cases in the Mishneh 
Torah, but, as Jacob Neubauer showed, discussions of the term divrei sofrim that address 
only a handful of cases led to the (dubious) claim that divrei sofrim (sometimes) denotes 
biblical law.389 A more philologically sound investigation would examine all appearances 
                                                 
387 Text appears in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-54; dating is Shailat’s; 2:434. This letter 
considers the Mishneh Torah a finished work, so it must be after 1178; see Solomon Gandz, “Date of the 
Composition of Maimonides’ Code,” PAAJR 17 (1947-1948): 1-7; accepted in Twersky, “The Beginnings 
of Mishneh Torah Criticism,” 167n29; and Davidson, Maimonides, 203-206. For treatment, see Levinger, 
Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 45n46; and Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 105. Maimonides wrote several 
letters to Pinḥas; see the references in Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 3:217, with the correction in idem, 
Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:433n8. On Pinḥas, see idem, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 3:45, with references to earlier 
literature; idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:433-34; Joel Kraemer, Maimonides: The Life and World of One of 
Civilization’s Greatest Minds (New York: Doubleday, 2008), 266-67, 280-83; Davidson, Maimonides, 
72n311; and Miriam Frenkel, ‘Ha-Ohavim veha-Nedivim’: ʿIlit Manhigah be-Qerev Yehudei Aleqsandriyah 
bi-Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2007), 121-27; see also Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Ha-
Rambam u-Minuyav shel R. Anaṭoli le-Muqaddam Aleqsandriyah,” Tarbiẓ 83, no. 1-2 (2015): 142. On 
Maimonides and Pinḥas, see Menaḥem Ben-Sasson, “Maimonides in Egypt: the First Stage,” Maimonidean 
Studies 2 (1992): 25; and Stefan Reif, Problems with Prayers: Studies in the Textual History of Early 
Rabbinic Liturgy (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 2006), 217; repr. in “Problems with Prayers,” in Traditions of 
Maimonideanism, 84. 
388 See Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:275-76, 1:378-79. For treatment, see Jacob Katz, The 
“Shabbes Goy”: A Study in Halakhic Flexibility, trans. Yoel Lerner (Philadelphia: JPS, 1989), 25-26, 38, 
idem, “Plugta be-Davar ha-Haflagah be-Yam uve-Naharot,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 4 (1991): 667-72; Israel Ta-
Shma, “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan ha-Haflagah be-Naharot be-Shabbat,” Maimonidean Studies 1 
(1990): 23-42; idem, “ʿAl ha-‘Plugta’ be-Davar ha-Haflagah be-Yam uve-Naharot,” Tarbiẓ 60, no. 4 
(1991): 673-76; Dror Fixler, “Isur Teḥumin be-Rambam: Shamranut Hilkhatit ke-fi she-baʾah le-yedei 
biṭuy be-Dimaniyut Penimit,” Sinai 138 (2006): 52-54; Shlomo Zalman Havlin, “Bein Rishonim le-
Aḥaronim be-ʿInyanei Nusaḥ,” Meḥqarei Moreshetenu 1 (2009): 127-41; David Henshke, “Kelum 
Neʾeman ha-Rambam le-Haʿid al Nusaḥ Sifro?” Sinai 104 (1999): 76-80; and idem, “Ha-Rambam ke-
Mefaresh Divrei ʿAṣmo,” Sefunot 8 (23) (2003): 119-46, 159-62. See also Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 
3:171-77. 
389 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 2-3; see also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-
Hilkhatit, 47-48. 
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in the Mishneh Torah.390 However, Maimonides’ frequent use of this term and related 
ones poses a considerable challenge. According to the Bar Ilan Responsa Project, the 
phrase divrei sofrim appears more than 230 times in the Mishneh Torah, mi-pi ha-
shemuʿah, 190 times, mi-pi ha-qabbalah, 30 times, and mi-divrei qabbalah, 20 times.391 
Many of Maimonides’ programmatic statements about these terms are ambiguous. 
In the Commentary on the Mishnah, he wrote: “The phrase ‘mi-divrei sofrim’ denotes 
(yaqtaḍī)392 all matters that are transmissions of the scribes (riwāyat al-sofrim), like these 
interpretations (al-tafāsīr) and the transmitted laws (al-halakhot al-manqūla) from 
Moses, or ordinances of the scribes.”393 He also asserted that even laws designated as 
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai are mi-divrei sofrim because “everything that is not a verse 
(or: clear text; naṣṣ)394 is termed ‘divrei sofrim’.”395 In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he wrote in a 
more constrained manner, that “anything that was not explicitly (bi-bayān) heard at Sinai 
                                                 
390 Neubauer wrote: “The idea of interpreting Maimonides according to Maimonides himself 
remained strange” to most pre-modern readers (Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 79, with the notable 
exception of Allegri and some of his followers). See also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 1n1; and Marc 
Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides and his Interpreters (University of Scranton Press, 2008), 74.  
391 This text combines the 1881 Warsaw edition and more recent edition of Shabbtai Frankel. 
Kafiḥ wrote that there are 170 appearances of mi-pi ha-shemuʿah and 80 appearances of the word qabbalah 
with and without the modifiers mi-pi and (mi-)divrei; Maimonides, Sefer Mishneh Torah: Yoṣei la-Or 
Paʿam Rishonah ʿal-pi Kitvei Yad Teiman ʿim Peirush Maqif, ed. Yosef Kafiḥ (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon 
Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1983-1997), 21:251. I did not count the word qabbalah without a modifier because 
of the variety of possible meanings; see n400. 
392 See Blau, Dictionary, 551, s.v. يضق. 
393  ןוקת וא השמ ןע הלוקנמלא תוכלהלאו ריסאפתלא ל'תמ םירפוסלא ֿהיאור ישלא ןוכי ןא י'צתקי םירפוס ירבדמ הלוק
ורזגלאו תונקתלא ל'תמ םירפוסת ; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:162 (mKel 17:2).  
394 The term naṣṣ in Judeo-Arabic can mean “verse,” “Scripture,” or “clear text.” Translations of 
this term will therefore vary. On this term as “texts that do not require interpretive intervention,” see 
Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 105; and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 45. 
395 םירפוס ירבד הנומסי ץנ וה סיל אמ לכ; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:563 (mMik 
6:7). This relies on the comment in the Introduction to the Commentary that halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai 
laws have no connection to Scripture; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. 
Shailat, 338. See the letter to Pinḥas: היל ןנירק םירפוס ירבדמ יניסמ השמל הכלה אוהש רבד וליפאש; idem, Igrot, ed. 
Shailat, 2:453. 
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is mi-divrei sofrim.”396 These definitions raise many questions. Does the perspective 
expressed in Sefer ha-Miṣvot contradict earlier Maimonidean claims by implying that no 
Sinaitic laws are mi-divrei sofrim? Or is it consistent with them, acknowledging that even 
some Sinaitic laws are mi-divrei sofrim? Why are rabbinic ordinances and Sinaitic laws 
in the same category? To complicate matters, several scholars have contended that the 
Commentary addresses mishnaic terminology, and that Maimonides did not rely on these 
definitions in his own works;397 other scholars have rejected this theory, implicitly and 
explicitly.398 It would have been surprising for Maimonides, who relied on the Mishnah 
as a linguistic and structural model,399 to have refashioned (his understanding of) the 
mishnaic term divrei sofrim in his Mishneh Torah. 
                                                 
396 םירפוס ירבדמ והפ ןאיבב יניסב העמסי םל אמ לכ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. 
Two). “Explicit,” however, may denote “written in the Pentateuch.” 
397 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 48; David Henshke, “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-
Mishpaṭit be-Mishnat ha-Rambam: le-Vaʿayat ha-Yaḥas bein Divrei Sofrim le-Dinei Torah,” Sinai 92 
(1983): 229n5; idem, “Le-Havḥanat ha-Rambam bein ‘De-Orayta’ le-‘de-Rabbanan’,” Sinai 102 (1988): 
206n2; idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 104; and Dror Fixler, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” 
in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 1:304n49. 
398 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 83; Samuel Atlas, Netivim be-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri (New 
York: Sepher-Hermon Press, 1978), 254; Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-
Rambam, 2nd ed. (Jerusalem: Maʿaliyot, 1998), 105; and Eliav Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’ 
ve-‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai’: ʿIyun be-Leshonot ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 22 
(2001-2004): 379-80, 382. See also Isaac Bekhor David of Constantinople, Divrei Emet (Constantinople, 
1760), 83a. 
399 See Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-45; idem, “Maimonides and Eretz 
Yisrael: Halakhic, Philosophic, and Historical Perspectives,” in Perspectives on Maimonides; 
Philosophical and Historical Studies, ed. Joel L. Kraemer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 268-
69; Shamma Friedman, “The Organizational Pattern of the Mishneh Torah,” Jewish Law Annual 1 (1978): 
37-41; Davidson, Maimonides, 211-17; Moshe Halbertal, “What is the Mishneh Torah? On Codification 
and Ambivalence,” in Maimonides After 800 Years, 83-94; and Yiṣḥaq Hershkowitz, “Mishneh Torah 
veha-Mishnah – Hashlamah Tokhnit u-Mavnit,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 355-74. See the praises of R. Judah 
the Prince collected in Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 88; and Dror Fixler, “Pesiqat 
Halakhah be-Feirush ha-Rambam la-mishnah,” Mesorah le-Yosef 8 (2014): 363n2. See also Twerksy, 
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-39 and n2, 242-44. 
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The phrase (mi-)divrei qabbalah usually denotes a Sinaitic tradition, but it can 
also refer to the Prophets and Writings.400 In at least one instance, Maimonides referred to 
both divrei qabbalah and to decrees and preventative measures (gezeirot ve-harḥaqot) as 
“divrei sofrim” (Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 19:6). This apparent blurring of boundaries prompts 
further questions. Does each term denote a unique type of knowledge, or does 
Maimonides have stylistic reasons for choosing one over another? If each phrase does 
have a unique denotation, any attempt to correlate Maimonides’ lexicon with the 
categories of biblical law and rabbinic law must account for the variety of terms he used.  
These issues point to a larger methodological quandary. Jacob Levinger and Marc 
Shapiro have challenged the traditionalist assumption that the Mishneh Torah is 
exceedingly exact in its language,401 while Isadore Twersky emphasized “Maimonides’ 
relentless quest for exact conceptual classification, … repeated insistence that he wrote 
with great care and … statements about sustained and relentless review of difficult 
matters.”402 Support for this latter perspective – especially regarding issues related to the 
                                                 
400 E.g., Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:13, Hilkhot Taʿaniyot, 4:7; see Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-
Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 106. Kafiḥ also noted this; see Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:276-
84 passim. 
401 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 13-33; and Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides, 
57-68. Both Levinger (21) and Shapiro (67) called attention to the claim that the Mishneh Torah is intended 
for “young and old”; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah: hu ha-Yad ha-Ḥazaqah le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben 
Maimon, ʿal pi Defus Kushṭa 269, eds. Jacob ben Eliezer Cohen et al. (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 
1964), 14 line 163. Text and references to the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah and Sefer ha-Maddaʿ 
follow this edition. For an opposing view, see Yuval Sinai, “Rimzei Leshono shel ha-Rambam [ḥeileq 2],” 
Sinai 128 (2001): 111; and idem, “Setirot Penimiyot Medumot be-Divrei ha-Rambam,” in Rambam: 
Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 174-76. See also Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-
Rambam, 52-69. 
402 Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 311; see further, 311-20. 
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sources of the law – may be found in the fact that particular cases that troubled 
Maimonides his whole life.403 
The Mishneh Torah also leaves unclear important distinctions between biblical 
law and rabbinic law. As Levinger noted, Maimonides mentioned the principle that where 
there is some element of doubt in contested cases of biblical law, the ruling follows the 
more stringent perspective (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:5), but he did not explicitly generalize 
this rule to all cases of doubt.404 Two other assumptions, frequently adopted by 
Maimonides’ readers, have complicated the interpretation of Maimonides’ positions: (1) 
biblical sins are the only ones that incur biblically-mandated punishments;405 and (2) 
marriage and divorce can only be effectuated through biblically-authorized means. These 
principles led Maimonides’ commentators to pose many questions, including the 
following three: If a woman who married through the exchange of money, a method of 
acquisition which Maimonides regarded as mi-divrei sofrim (Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, 3:20), 
subsequently committed adultery, why should she incur capital punishment? A similar 
problem concerns the priest whose wife has died. Since the biblical prohibition of priestly 
                                                 
403 On Hilkhot Ishut 1:2, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 153-54; Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14 (introductory pagination), 167-68n17; idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 
3:280-81n15 (mQid 1:1); idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 7:13-15, 17-21; and Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei 
Sofrim’,” 250-52. On Hilkhot Sheḥitah, 5:3, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 31-32; 
Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 114-23, 144-45; and Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 404n117. See 
further Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 412-25; and below, nn602, 695. 
404 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 35n1. Levinger noted that Maimonides did hint 
to this principle elsewhere in the Mishneh Torah and in his responsa. Maimonides also ruled that the 
prohibition of doubtful cases is rabbinic in status; see, e.g., Hilkhot Isurei Biʾah, 18:17; Hilkhot Tumat 
Meit, 9:12. Note that in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides explained that doubtful cases of 
divrei sofrim impurity are treated leniently, except an impurity from an overarching category of impurity 
(avot ha-tumot) whose status is divrei sofrim; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:507 (mToh 4:11). He 
repeated this there, 6:543-44 (mMik 2:2), 6:510 (mToh 5:6). In the Mishneh Torah, he seems to have 
changed his mind about exceptions to this rule; see Hilkhot Shar Avot ha-Tumah, 13:10-13. 
405 See below, nn689-697. 
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contact with a corpse applies to all those who are not blood relatives (an obligation that 
remains operative even in the absence of the Temple), how can the widowed priest be 
obligated to engage in the burial of his dead wife, a requirement which Maimonides 
considered merely mi-divrei sofrim. (Hilkhot Aveil, 2:7)? A third problem concerns the 
validity of a marriage if it is effectuated in the presence of witnesses who are disqualified 
by dint of family relationships. Could such a marriage be “biblically” valid if the 
witnesses are maternal relatives, whose disqualification Maimonides regarded as rooted 
“in their words” (mi-divreihem; Hilkhot ʿEdut, 13:1; as opposed to paternal relatives, a 
biblical law [din torah])?406  
Problems like these prompted claims that divrei sofrim denotes, or may denote, 
biblical law.407 Yet most academic interpreters, along with Yosef Kafiḥ, perceive the 
                                                 
406 See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 34-35. The first issue may be complicated 
by the suggestion that rabbinically ordained transactions affect biblical status (qinyan de-rabbanan moʿil 
de-orayta); see the next note. Naḥmanides was the first to systematically note many of these problems; see 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 34-40 (Prin. Two). See the list of distinctions between biblical 
and rabbinic law in Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon 
z"l, ed. David Zvi Hellman (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat Shabtai Frankel, 2002), 29-31 (Prin. One). 
407 See Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 30-45. Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-
Hilkhatit, 85-86, argued that marriages effectuated through money are a rabbinic “detail” rooted in biblical 
law; see also there, 44. Henshke resorted to the principle that rabbinically ordained transactions affect 
biblical status; see his “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-Mishpaṭit,” 229-31; idem, “Lavin she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem le-
Shiṭat ha-Rambam,” Ha-Maʿayan 24, no. 2 (1984): 34n6; and idem, “Sheniyot le-‘Divrei Sofrim’,” Sinai 
108 (1991): 59. For responses, see Shimshon Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot le-Darkho shel ha-Rambam be-
Mishneh Torah,” Sinai 106 (1990): 234-37; and Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 93-
94. As Rabinovitch noted, Henshke’s solution is similar to the one proposed by Isaac Halevy, Dorot ha-
Rishonim: Divrei ha-Yamim le-Vnei Yisrael, ed. Salomon Bamberger (Jerusalem, 1967), 4:530. 
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term divrei sofrim as one that denotes rabbinic law.408 Others maintain that divrei sofrim 
may, at times, denote biblical law, and, at other times, rabbinic law.409  
Similar debates concern Maimonides’ use of the terms, mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, mi-pi 
ha-qabbalah, and divrei qabbalah.410 Kafiḥ argued that shemuʿah denotes widely 
accepted post-Sinaitic scriptural interpretations, while qabbalah usually denotes Sinaitic 
                                                 
408 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 81-89; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-
Hilkhatit, 46-50; Moshe Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 464n12; Henshke, “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-
Mishpaṭit,” 229-31; idem, “Le-Darkhei Pitronan shel Setirot be-‘Mishneh Torah’ le-Rambam,” Sinai 112 
(1993): 61; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 383n53, 388; Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot,” 234-37; 
and Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’.” See also Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:13-15, 5:17-21. 
409 Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 91-105; Fixler, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-
Hilkhatiyim,” 291-303; Moshe Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim ‘Divrei Sofrim’ ve-‘Divrei Qabbalah’ be-
Rambam,” Higayon: Meḥqarim be-Darkhei Ḥashivah shel Ḥazal 5 (2001): 63-64; and Shailat’s comments 
in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-52. See also Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 25-32. Compare 
David Weiss Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis (New York: 
Oxford, 1991), 83-88: “What exactly (divrei sofrim) is, is not clear. In terms of its binding nature, it is less 
binding than a biblical law but more binding than a rabbinic ordinance. It is neither biblical nor rabbinic. … 
The concept remains elusive” (83). 
410 Adolf Schwarz, Der Mischneh Thorah: Ein System der mosaisch-talmudischen Gesetzeslehre 
(Vienna, 1905), 142-229, argued that mi-pi ha-shemuʿah and mi-pi qabbalah are different types of 
knowledge, but Wilhelm Bacher, “Zum sprachlichen Charakter des Mischne Thora,” in Moses ben 
Maimon, 2:280-305, demonstrated that Schwarz overplayed the distinction. Levinger, Darkhei ha-
Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 16n11, agreed with Bacher. See also Michael Guttmann, “Die Bedeutung der 
Tradition für die halachische Bibelexegese bei Maimonides,” MGWJ 80, no. 3 (1936): 211-12. Several 
recent writers have argued that shemuʿah denotes biblical law, while qabbalah denotes biblical or rabbinic 
law; see Dror Fixler, “‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai’ be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” Sinai 118 
(1996): 257; idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 324-32; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 
371-74, 407-408; and Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 140-44. For the claim that qabbalah has a broad meaning, 
see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 21; Henshke, “Le-Havḥanat ha-Rambam,” 206n2; and 
Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim,” 63. See also David Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’: Pereq be-Tefisat 
ha-Halakhah shel ha-Rambam,” in Tiferet le-Yisrael: Jubilee Volume in Honor of Israel Francus, eds. Joel 
Roth et al. (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 2010), 243n37. Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200n68, 
wrote that the categories are indistinguishable; Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 110-
12, that shemuʿah and qabbalah refer to traditional laws whose origin is unclear; Shimshon Ettinger, “ʿAl 
Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah be-Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1988-
1989): 21n86, that both can denote biblical or rabbinic law; and Friedberg that he is “less confident” that 
shemuʿah denotes biblical law; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 231; see there, 228-40, for treatment of 
the use of the term shemuʿah regarding the Positive Commandments. 
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laws.411 Others have argued – convincingly, in my view – that the term shemuʿah denotes 
Sinaitic interpretations of biblical verses that control Scripture’s meaning.412  
The term halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai deserves special consideration. As noted, 
Maimonides explained in Sefer ha-Miṣvot that divrei sofrim includes anything that was 
not explicitly heard at Sinai. On the other hand, he wrote in his Commentary on the 
Mishnah that the term divrei sofrim covers laws designated as halakhah le-Moshe mi-
Sinai.413 Maimonides’ programmatic statements about the term halakhah le-Moshe mi-
Sinai are also controversial. In the longest discussion, which appears in his Introduction 
to the Commentary on the Mishnah, he asserted that these laws admit no disagreement 
(khilāf) and that one cannot find “true” scriptural inferences (istidlāl) for them.414 When 
rabbinic literature provides a link to Scripture, he wrote, this is merely a “sign” (siman) 
or an asmakhta, that is, an aide-mémoire or justification after the fact. Moreover, no laws 
in this category can be derived through reasoning (here: qiyās) and the rabbis did not 
                                                 
411 See Kafiḥ’s case-by-case discussion in Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:251-84. 
Elsewhere, Kafiḥ wavered on this definition of shemuʿah; see there, 3:749, §13 (Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor, 
1:4). 
412 Henshke, “Lavin she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem,” 33; idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 140; Shoḥetman, 
“‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 410-15, 435; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 392-94. 
See Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 240: “Maimonides relies on certain interpretive traditions 
… even when these intrepretations fail to offer the most contextual, and therefore plainest, readings.” Note 
Blidstein’s comments in “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 17; and idem, “Oral Law as Institution,” 170. 
413 Above, nn393-396. For rabbinic background, see Christine Hayes, “‘Halakhah le-Moshe mi-
Sinai’ in Rabbinic Sources: A Methodological Case Study,” in The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic 
Literature, ed. Shaye J.D. Cohen (Providence: Brown University, 2000), 61-117; idem, “Rabbinic 
Contestations of Authority,” Cardozo Law Review 28, no. 1 (2006): 131-32; Shmuel Safrai, “Halakhah le-
Moshe mi-Sinai – Hisṭoriyah o Teʾologiyah?” in Meḥqarei Talmud 1, eds. Yaʿaqov Sussman and David 
Rosenthal (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1990), 11-38 (for views of medieval jurists, see there, 15-16); and idem, 
“Halakha,” in The Literature of the Sages, 1:180-85. 
414 אהיפ ףאל'כ אל אממ א'ציא ה'דהו ... אהילע לאלדתסא אלו יניסמ השמל הכלה אהנא אהיפ ליק יתלא םאכחלא; 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. See the 
similar statement about interpretations transmitted from Moses (tafāsir marwīya ʿan Moshe) in idem, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 28 (Prin. Eight). 
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develop other laws (tafaqqahū) from them.415 Maimonides also claimed to list “most … 
or perhaps all” of these laws.416 In the Mishneh Torah, he wrote that “debate never 
occurred regarding matters of tradition (divrei ha-qabbalah)” (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:4).417 
Later writers, R. Yair Ḥayim Bacharach (Worms and Metz; 1639-1702) most thoroughly, 
showed that it is difficult to square the claim that laws designated by Maimonides as 
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws were never subject to debate within rabbinic 
literature.418 
Scholars attempting to determine whether laws designated as halakhah le-Moshe 
mi-Sinai have the status of biblical or rabbinic law have approached the question in 
different ways, and the debate about their status continues.419 Some interpreters of 
Maimonides have wondered whether biblical punishment is incurred for violation of 
                                                 
415 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338. 
On the use of this form of the verb f-q-h, see below nn488, 569-570, 921-944. 
416 אהלכ אהנא אמבר דק לב יניסמ השמל הכלה אהיפ אולאק יתלא םאכחאלא ם'טעמ; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:18; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338. Levinger highlighted differences 
between the lists of halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws in the Commentary and the Mishneh Torah, and 
argued that Maimonides distinguished between the phrase halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai and other modifiers 
of the word halakhah, such as halakhah mi-pi ha-qabbalah or halakhah ish mi-pi ish; Darkhei ha-
Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 51-54, 206-209. For criticism, see Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 
400-404. It is unclear how to align Levinger’s careful – or hairsplitting – argument with his caution (see 
above, n401) not to make too much of slight changes in Maimonides’ language. 
417 םלועל תקולחמ םהב ןיא הלבקה ירבד; this broad statement refers to halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws 
and other matters. Gerald Blidstein noted that Maimonides admitted doubt in two issues: how to blow the 
shofar and astronomical knowledge required to calculate the calendar; Samkhut u-Meri, 49-53. 
418 Yair Bacharach, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Ḥavvat Yair (Frankfurt, 1699), 175a-187a (§192). For 
discussion, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 50-51; and Halbertal, People of the Book, 
67-72. I have not found any satisfactory ways to align Maimonides’ views with rabbinic literature. For 
recent discussion, see Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 126-41; Fixler, “‘Halakhah le-
Moshe mi-Sinai’,” 258-61; and idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 317-20; see also Levinger, Darkhei 
ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 190-205. Kalman Kahana, Ḥeqer ve-ʿIyun: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim (Tel Aviv, 
1960), 1:7-57, remains useful. I do not find the argument in Koppel, “ʿAl ha-Munaḥim,” 66-68, 
compelling. On Shailat’s interpretation in Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 90, see 
Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 47n3. 
419 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 50-61, felt that Maimonides was unsure about 
their status. See the reaction in Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 376; and Dror Fixler, “Ha-
Biṭuy ‘Ḥakhamim/Ḥasidim Rishonim’ be-‘Mishneh Torah’ le-Rambam,” Sinai 109 (1992): 82n43.  
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these laws.420 According to one view, the fact that they are of divine origin and termed 
divrei sofrim means that this term cannot refer to rabbinic laws. Others have argued that 
laws designated halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai are of rabbinic status, and that only laws 
directly connected to Scripture are of biblical status.421 
As with the Hebrew terminology in his Hebrew writings, Maimonides employed a 
set of Judeo-Arabic terms to classify the sources of the law. Study of Maimonides’ 
Judeo-Arabic halakhic writings has lagged behind research on the Mishneh Torah,422 and 
the meaning of the technical Judeo-Arabic terms has been obfuscated by the fact that 
some scholars have only read these works in Hebrew translation. Mordechai Cohen 
recently reiterated Simon Rawidowicz’s warning that “the distinctiveness of 
[Maimonides’ terminology…] is unfortunately lost in most if not all Hebrew 
                                                 
420 Naḥmanides also raised this point; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 32 (Prin. Two). 
Note the claim that God gave these laws; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17-18; Haqdamot 
ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 338. 
421 For the view that halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai laws are biblical in status, see Fixler, “‘Halakhah 
le-Moshe mi-Sinai’,” 252-57; and idem, “Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 304-340. For the view that they 
are rabbinic in status, see Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 105-123; Shoḥetman, “‘Halakhah mi-Pi ha-Qabbalah’,” 
375-88; and earlier, Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 63 (Prin. Two). 
Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 465n14, described Maimonides’ position as “problematic.” 
422 Blidstein wrote: “Deficiency in the study of Maimonidean law lies in the relative neglect of 
works other than the Mishneh Torah”; “Where Do We Stand,” 19. Shapiro explained that traditional 
commentators placed the Mishneh Torah “on a much higher pedestal than any of Maimonides’ other 
works” (Studies in Maimonides, 4). On neglect of the Commentary on the Mishnah, see Michael Guttmann, 
“The Decisions of Maimonides in his Commentary on the Mishna,” HUCA 2 (1925): 229; Aaron Adler, 
“Yaḥaso shel ha-Rambam le-Talmud ha-Yerushalmi (Pereq be-Ḥeiqer Peirush ha-Mishnah leha-
Rambam),” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David Kafiḥ, eds. Zohar Amel and Ḥananel Sari (Ramat 
Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2001), 205 and n20; Neryah Goṭel, “Derekh ha-Melekh be-Mishnah: Le-
Veirur Darkho shel ha-Rambam be-Feirusho la-mishnah,” Sinai 135-136 (2005): 89-91; and Sinai, “Setirot 
Penimiyot,” 159n16. Some have blamed the neglect of the Commentary on the fact that Maimonides wrote 
it in Arabic; Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 19; and Judah Leib Maimon, Rabbi Moshe 
ben Maimon: Toldot Ḥayav ve-Yeṣirato ha-Sifrutit (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1960), 66. Menaḥem 
Azariah da Fano claimed that the Commentary contains errors because Maimonides wrote it in his youth; 
Sefer Teshuvot u-Feirush Sugyot (Venice, 1600), §117. Joseph Korkos explained that Maimonides was “not 
careful” (lo diqdeq) in this work; see his comments to Hilkhot Terumot, 11:11, in Maimonides, Sefer 
Mishneh Torah, ed. Shabbtai Frankel (Jerusalem: Hoṣaʾat Shabbtai Frankel, 1975-2007), 6:219; see also 
below, nn597, 639.  
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translations.”423 Long ago, Wilhelm Bacher showed that the term tafsīr marwī, i.e., a 
transmitted interpretation, denotes a Sinaitic interpretation of Scripture,424 and several 
other scholars, from Bacher’s time onward, have discussed Maimonides’ use of the 
concept of ijmāʿ (consensus).425 
Another important term used by Maimonides is qiyās. Recognizing the broad 
meanings of this word, Joshua Blau’s Judeo-Arabic dictionary offers as viable definitions 
analogy, deduction by analogy, correct reasoning, authentic explanation, and proper 
inference.426 In their Hebrew translations of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Moses Ibn Tibbon 
consistently translated qiyās as heqqesh (analogy; a cognate word), and Solomon ibn 
Ayyūb (fl. mid. 13th c.) usually translated it as sevarah (logic or reasoning).427 Kafiḥ 
insisted that Maimonides only used the word qiyās with regard to employment of the 
thirteen middot (hermeneutical rules) of R. Ishmael;428 he connected the translation 
                                                 
423 Simon Rawidowicz, “On Interpretation,” PAAJR 26 (1957): 102n38. Cohen cited this in 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, xv; and “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Bāb/Abwāb al-Taʾwīl’ be-Torato ha-Parshanit 
shel ha-Rambam,” in ʿIyunim be-Tarbut ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit, eds. Yoram Erder et al. (Tel Aviv: Tel 
Aviv University, 2014), 156. 
424 Wilhelm Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s (Strassburg: K. J. Trübner, 1897), 27-28; 
Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, trans. Alexander Siskind Rabinovitz (Tel Aviv: Defus Aḥdut, 1931), 31-
32. Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 33, 38-41, reached the same conclusion. 
425 See Ludwig Blau, “Das Gesetzbuch des Maimonides historisch betrachtet,” in Moses ben 
Maimon, 1:351-54; Daniel Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” Sefunot 5 [20] (1991): 154, 
158n73; Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 23n21, 145-49; Gideon Libson, “Zikat ha-Rambam la-Halakhah ha-
Muslemit ʿal Reqaʿ Tequfato,” in Ha-Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:278-83; and 
David, “‘Kede-Mefaresh be-Sifro shel Adam ha-Rishon’,” 598n83. 
426 Blau, Dictionary, 579, s.v. سايق; Hallaq wrote that portraying qiyās as analogy “has been so 
predominant that the great majority of modern scholars conceive of qiyās as a term which exclusively 
denotes analogy” (“Non-Analogical Arguments,” 289), and dismissed the “misconception … that qiyās 
amounts to no more than analogy” (A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 101). 
427 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 5 (introductory pagination); and Cohen, Opening 
the Gates of Interpretation, 468n31. 
428 E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10 (Prin. One), 13, 15 (Prin. Two), 55 
(supplemental introduction), 147 (Pos. 174), 211 (Neg. 60); and idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 
1:33n71, 3:11n28 (mYeb 1:4), 4:7-8n5 (mBQ 1:1), 5:109n23 (mMen 2:2), 6:54n1 (mKel 2:1). See also 
idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 21:251-52. The middot appear at the outset of the Sifra; for background, 
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heqqesh with Qaraites.429 Yet Kafiḥ himself often used din (argument) or a similar term 
as a translation for qiyās;430 in one place, he admitted that Maimonides used the term to 
denote all sorts of reasoning.431 Most scholars agree with this latter conclusion.432 In his 
recent discussion of the specific terms from logic that relate to the late antique rabbis’ use 
of “qiyās,” Aviram Ravitsky noted that Maimonides compared rabbinic qiyās to 
dialectical syllogisms, and not to apodictic ones.433 I would add that any translation of the 
term qiyās runs the risk of masking Maimonides’ positive understanding of this term. In 
this sense, Maimonides thought very differently from Saʿadya.434 
Study of Maimonides’ Judeo-Arabic terminology is also important for 
understanding his scriptural exegesis. It has long been clear that Maimonides read 
                                                 
see Strack and Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 15-30. The authors noted (20) that 
thirteen is the traditional count; others have counted more (see above, n52). 
429 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12-13n91; see also there, 261n45. 
430 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 41 (Prin. Nine), 44 (Prin. Nine), 102 (Pos. 62), 261 
(Neg. 170), 269 (Neg. 179), 292 (Neg. 236). 
431 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14n27; see similarly 1:19-20n85, 1:342n32 
(mMaʿasS 2:5), 2:10-11n35 (mSab 1:1),  
432 Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 25-31, 56n144; Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 
145; idem, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’,” 250n67; and Aviram Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi ʿal 
Hitpatḥut ha-Halakhah,” in ʿIyunim Ḥadashim be-Filosophia shel ha-Halakhah, eds. Aviezer Ravitsky and 
Avinoam Rozenak (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2008), 212n6; see below, n581. Maimonides wrote that it is 
difficult to assert that a post-talmudic judge erred regarding “legal qiyās” (al-qiyāsāt al-sharīʿa); ןאו  ד'גוי םל
בסחב גיאס היפ הסאיק ןאכו הפאל'כ גותי ןאכ ןאו היערשלא תאסאיקלאףאל'כ ה' הילע תב'תי ןא רדקי סילפ הב יתפא אמ  'דא טלגלא
ןכממ הסאיק; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:242 (mBek 4:4). Qiyās here cannot mean “laws derived by 
the middot”; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 27. Shailat followed Kafiḥ’s translation; 
see Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 28-29n14. 
433 Aviram Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim ke-Heqqeshim Diyaleqṭiyim be-Mishnat ha-
Rambam veha-Middot sheha-Torah Nidreshet ba-hen ke-τόποι Arisṭoṭiliyim,” Tarbiẓ 73, no. 2 (2004): 197-
213. See also Joel Kraemer, “Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic,” in Maimonides and the 
Sciences, eds. Robert S. Cohen and Hillel Levine (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2000), 115-16. On dialectical and 
apodictic syllogisms, see below, n582. On the authorship of the Treatise on Logic, see below, n930. Ijtihād 
also deserves detailed treatment; see Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 158n73; and Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 460, 470-72. 
434 Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 31, wrote: “Maimonides’ constant use of the term qiyās 
shows him to be unhesitating in affirming and emphasizing the role of human reason in halakhah despite 
the Karaite challenge.” 
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biblical verses differently than did the rabbis of late antiquity; one sixteenth-century 
writer exclaimed, “[Maimonides] is not careful with [scriptural] proofs and derashot of 
verses; even though a [scriptural] proof was rejected [by the rabbis], he will write it (in 
the Mishneh Torah).”435 In other words, if the rabbis derived a law from one verse, what 
license did Maimonides have to identify a different scriptural source? This problem is 
closely connected to Maimonides’ understanding of revelation and the role of the 
rabbis.436 
Several scholars have noted the problematic uses of the phrase peshaṭeh di-qera 
in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, which impinge directly on Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic 
scriptural exegesis.437 Mordechai Cohen devoted a lengthy monograph to Maimonidean 
terms which have been understood to refer to Scripture’s apparent, literal, or “plain” 
                                                 
435 וניבר התוא בתוכ היארה תיחדנש י"פעאו םיקוספה תושרדבו תויארב קדקדמ וניבר ןיאש; Joseph Korkos, Hilkhot 
Shemiṭah ve-Yovel, 1:1, in Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 6:495. For a list of Korkos’ similar comments, see 
there, 7*:67 (Hilkhot Kelei ha-Miqdash, 6:3).  
436 For treatment, see David Sykes, “‘Seṭiyotav’ shel ha-Rambam mi-Meqorotav be-Halakhah,” 
Dine Israel 13-14 (1988): 115-22, 140; Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides, 79-80n324 (with reference to 
earlier studies); Eliav Shoḥetman, “Le-Sheʾelat ha-Yaḥas bein ha-Halakhah u-vein Peshuṭo shel Miqra,” 
Sinai 139 (2008): 45-46; idem, “Le-Shimusho shel ha-Rambam be-Meqorot shebe-Miqra,” in Mi-Birkat 
Moshe, 1:428-34; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 317. For a different approach, see 
Binyamin Zeʾev Benedikt, Asupat Maʾamarim (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1994), 184-90. Noting 
Maimonides’ “creative attainments in exegesis” and his “original explication and application” of Scripture, 
Twersky wrote that “the study of Scripture and its relation to the Oral Law is a leitmotif of the Mishneh 
Torah”; Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 57, 150; see there, 145-50. Subsequent scholars have 
taken up Twersky’s call “to identify and appraise Maimonides’ original exegesis” (150n172). For a review, 
see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 2-14; add Moshe Greenberg, “The Uses of Scripture in 
Classical Medieval Judaism: Prooftexts in Maimonides’ Code,” in Return to Scripture in Judaism and 
Christianity: Essays in Postcritical Scriptural Interpretation, ed. Peter Ochs (New York: Paulist Press, 
1993), 197-219, 224-32; Sykes, “‘Seṭiyotav’ shel ha-Rambam”; Goṭel, “Derekh ha-Melekh be-Mishnah,” 
102n36, 127-28n86 (on the Commentary in particular); and David Henshke, “Le-Ofyah shel Parshanut ha-
Rambam le-Parshiyot ha-Halakhah shebe-Torah: Bein Neʾemanut le-Talmud le-vein Ṣorekh Haganah 
ʿAlav,” Maimonidean Studies 5 (2008): 1-21; other references appear there, 1n1-2. 
437 See the foundational comments in Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 31-
32, 40-45 (Prin. Two). For recent discussion, see Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 462-78; 
Ettinger, “ʿAl Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 19-25; and Feintuch, Sefer Piqudei Yesharim, 28-32; see below, 
n445. 
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sense: the Arabic ẓāhir al-naṣṣ and the Aramaic, peshaṭeh di-qera (or Hebrew, peshuṭo 
shel miqra). Cohen argued that Maimonides distinguished between Scripture’s ẓāhir 
(Arabic) and its peshaṭ (Hebrew). Cohen noted that the geonim used the term ẓāhir to 
denote Scripture’s “elementary” or “basic” sense, and that Andalusian exegetes were the 
first to endow the term peshaṭ with special significance.438 Because there is no objective 
“peshaṭ,” argued Cohen, scholarly notions of peshaṭ, largely developed in connection 
with the oeuvre of northern French exegetes, may not be fully congruent with 
Maimonides’ use of this term.439 
According to Cohen, it was only in Sefer ha-Miṣvot that Maimonides used peshaṭ 
as a “technical term.”440 Maimonides’ invocation of the talmudic statement, “a biblical 
verse does not leave the realm of (yoṣei mi-yedei) its peshaṭ” (bSab 63a etc.), in Principle 
Two led Cohen to label this Principle “the rule of peshaṭ.”441 Cohen also argued that 
Maimonides understood Scripture’s ẓāhir to be its “straightforward” or “plain” sense 
(one use of the term peshaṭ).442 Seeking to account for the fact that Maimonides 
interpreted many verses according to their “plain” sense, and not according to their 
rabbinic readings, Cohen claimed that, for Maimonides, the ẓāhir sense of Scripture may 
                                                 
438 For earlier usage, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 31-85. For the range of the 
meanings of ẓāhir al-naṣṣ, see 87-105; and for the history of the “peshaṭ principle,” see 347-81. Cohen’s 
depiction of geonic exegesis relies on the work of Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai; see his “Ha-Sifrut ha-Midrashit-
ha-Rabbanit,” 35-69; idem, “The Tension Between Literal Interpretation and Exegetical Freedom,” 33-50; 
and idem, “Ribbuy Mashmaʿuyot ha-Ketuvim,” 21-44. 
439 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 3-4, 15-17. 
440 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 18; see also 304n71: “as a rule, Maimonides does 
not invoke the rule of peshaṭ explicitly with this terminology in his other major writings.” For treatment of 
those writings; see there, 291, 296n50, 386-89, 500-509. 
441 וטושפ ידימ אצוי ארקמ ןיא; translation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 495-99. 
On Principle Two as “the rule of peshaṭ,” see there, 293-94n41. Add Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 91-92 (Prin. Two). See below, n445. 
442 See Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 294. 
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have halakhic import even if it conflicts with rabbinic interpretations.443 Cohen concluded 
that Maimonides understood peshaṭ to be the meaning of Scripture as rendered by the 
tafsīr marwī (transmitted interpretation). In Cohen’s words, peshaṭ denotes “what is 
known … to be the meaning of the text, either because the text is explicit or because it is 
an interpretation from Sinai.”444 Using the language of Islamic law, Cohen wrote that 
peshaṭ combines all manṣūṣ (explicitly stated) sources, i.e., written and oral 
revelations.445 
 
                                                 
443 For the term ẓāhir in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 117-27. 
444 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 297; or peshaṭ is the “text of Scripture itself, the 
meaning of which is self-evident in some cases, but in others is determined by the original Sinaitic 
interpretation” (334-35). Elsewhere, peshaṭ is “the object of interpretation, not its result” (296), i.e., the 
interpreter interprets the ẓāhir of Scripture as rendered by the tafsīr marwī. 
445 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 489; and idem, “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Bāb/Abwāb al-
Taʾwīl’,” 169n53. Cohen further underscored Maimonides’ distinction between revealed texts and matters 
subsequently derived from them. He noted that this “two-tiered legal system” (Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 260) parallels Islamic legal theory, which makes a distinction between revealed texts and 
laws derived from those texts. The former are often termed uṣūl (roots) and the latter furūʿ (branches). 
Maimonides used these and other terms from uṣūl al-fiqh to frame both revelation and the work of the 
rabbis (254-76, 488-89). However, Cohen insisted that the “most natural and immediate impetus” for 
Maimonides’ use of peshaṭ was not Islamic legal theory but Andalusian exegesis” (489, see also 267n93). 
This contention is surprising because Cohen claimed that, for Maimonides, peshaṭ is “jurisprudential,” not 
“fundamentally exegetical” (335). Several of Cohen’s conclusions are summarized in his “Hirhurim ʿal 
Ḥeiqer ha-Munaḥ ‘Peshuṭo shel Miqra’,” 40-56; and idem, “Emergence of the Rule of Peshat in Medieval 
Jewish Bible Exegesis,” in Interpreting Scriptures in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam: Overlapping 
Inquiries, eds. Mordechai Z. Cohen and Adele Berlin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 219-
22. 
I often find Cohen’s argument compelling, but am unsure that Principle Two is “the rule of 
peshaṭ.” As Cohen noted, the term peshaṭ appears only late in this Principle (see above, n441). I understand 
Principle Two to address instances in which the tafsīr marwī creates distinct commandments; see below. I 
am also not convinced that the term peshaṭ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot always adheres to Cohen’s definition. As he 
noted, three of the nine appearances of this term outside of Principle Two are not based on rabbinic texts 
and probably should not be equated with the tafsīr marwī, and another three could easily be called the ẓāhir 
al-naṣṣ (307). See also below, n1173. Friedberg has offered other criticisms of Cohen’s approach and 
another intpretation of Maimonides’ use of peshat; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 339-45. 
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Maimonides’ “Model” of the Oral Torah 
According to the early modern English rabbi David Nieto (1654-1728), 
Maimonides’ views on the Oral Torah were in agreement with those of the geonim.446 
Several recent studies uphold this view,447 yet most contemporary scholars perceive 
Maimonides as having rejected the geonic “model”448 of the Oral Torah, which 
emphasized the revealed nature of Jewish law.449 Moshe Halbertal described Maimonides 
as having adopted a “cumulative view” of the Oral Torah in which “each generation 
add[s] substantive norms … to the given, revealed body of knowledge.”450 Echoing 
Maimonides’ Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Halbertal wrote that, for 
Maimonides, “interpretation is not meant to retrieve but to derive” and that “controversy 
arises out of the process of derivation rather than through a crisis in transmission.”451 
Blidstein, who focused on the “institutional” roles of the Sanhedrin and of elite 
                                                 
446 Noted in Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 100n5; Blidstein, “Oral Law as 
Institution,” 170; and idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 15-16. On Nieto’s defense of the Oral Torah, 
see Jakob Petuchowski, The Theology of Haham David Nieto: An Eighteenth Century Defense of the 
Jewish Tradition (New York: Ktav, 1970), 69-98. 
447 See José Faur, “Law and Hermeneutics in Rabbinic Jurisprudence: A Maimonidean 
Perspective,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993): 1660; idem, “Monolingualism and Judaism,” 1729-31 
(though here Faur adopted a rather idiosyncratic interpretation of the geonim); the somewhat ambiguous 
statements of David Weiss Halivni, “The Breaking of the Tablets and the Begetting of the Oral Laws: A 
History of ‘Torah Shebe’al Peh’,” in Gershom Scholem (1897-1982) – in Memoriam, ed. Joseph Dan 
(Jerusalem: Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 2007), 2:140-41; and Silman, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf, 28, 
44n11. 
448 A number of writers use this term; Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 113; idem, 
“Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” 32-33; Halbertal, People of the Book, 52-72; idem, Maimonides, 105; 
Sagi, “Halakhic Praxis and the Word of God,” 319; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 20, 
261, 264, 267n95, 389. 
449 Blidstein credited Abraham Joshua Heschel as one of the earliest to point this out; Torah min 
ha-Shamayim, 2:321. This position is affirmed in Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 167-70; idem, 
“Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 15-16; Halbertal, People of the Book, 59-63; Harris, How Do We Know 
This, 86-90; and Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 150. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates 
of Interpretation, 257-60. 
450 Halbertal, People of the Book, 59. 
451 Halbertal, People of the Book, 61. 
 
130 
 
interpreters of the law in Maimonidean jurisprudence (esp. in Hilkhot Mamrim, chaps. 1-
4452), emphasized that for Maimonides, only the elite may interpret revelation. He 
explained that these “men of knowledge” prevent communal debate,453 transmit the Oral 
Torah,454 and preclude post-Mosaic prophecy as a possible source of legal norms.455 
Blidstein added that, for Maimonides, the Sanhedrin had a monopoly on legal rulings, 
tolerated little deviance, and issued enactments that were difficult to revoke because they 
ensured “social stability and order.”456 As Blidstein noted, Maimonides’ “institutional” 
emphasis may have served his own need to rebuff contemporary claimants to have 
inherited the authority of the Sanhedrin, such as the Baghdadi Gaon, Samuel ben ʿEli.457 
Jacob Levinger’s Straussian claims about Maimonides’ approach to the Oral 
Torah lie beyond the scope of this chapter, but will be briefly mentioned. According to 
Levinger, inconsistencies in Maimonides’ presentation of laws designated halakhah le-
Moshe mi-Sinai indicate Maimonides’ need to present a “dogmatic,” “necessary belief,” 
                                                 
452 Which Blidstein treated in an extensive commentary; Samkhut u-Meri. 
453 Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 120. 
454 Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 177. 
455 Gerald Blidstein, “Mi-Yesod ha-Nevuʾah be-Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam,” Daʿat 
43 (1999): 25. 
456 Blidstein, “Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” 31-37. See also idem, “‘Afilu Omer lekha ʿal 
Yamin she-hu Smol’: le-ʿOṣmat ha-Samkhut ha-Mosdit be-Halakhah u-Gevolteha,” in ʿIyunim be-
Maḥshevet ha-Halakhah veha-Aggadah (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion Unversity, 2004), 332; and Kassierer 
and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 117-18. Lawrence Kaplan argued that the “institutional 
model” was more prominent in Maimonides’ later writings; “Daas Torah: A Modern Conception of 
Rabbinic Authority,” in Rabbinic Authority and Personal Autonomy, ed. Moshe Sokol (Northvale, NJ: 
Aronson, 1992), 39n61; and idem, “Maimonides and Mendelssohn on the Origins of Idolatry, the Election 
of Israel, and the Oral Law,” Perspectives on Jewish Thought and Mysticism, eds. Alfred L. Ivry et al. 
(Amsterdam: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), 442-43. Note that Maimonides’ anti-Qaraite polemic 
in the Commentary to mAv 1:3 is based on Deut. 17:11, the central verse for the “institutional model”; 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:408-410. 
457 Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 27; idem, “Maimonides on the Renewal of Semikha,” 
29-34; and idem, “Halakhic Authority in Maimonides,” 32. On anti-Qaraite aspects, see idem, “Oral Law 
as Institution,” 179. On tension between this model and Maimonides’ historical situation, see Halbertal, 
“What is the Mishneh Torah,” 110. 
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rather than one that reflected his true position.458 Levinger also claimed that Maimonides’ 
Guide purveyed an esoteric view of the Oral Torah, because of its attempt to base its 
explanations of the commandments on “the verses (al-nuṣūṣ) and not the pronouncements 
of the law (taʿlīl al-fiqh).”459 The fact that Maimonides read the lex talionis “literally,” 
when the rabbis did not, was particularly problematic. Levinger asked: If Maimonides 
considered rabbinic interpretations of the lex talionis to be Sinaitic (as Maimonides wrote 
elsewhere), what authority did he have to read it literally, divorced from the divinely-
granted interpretation? Levinger noted other contradictions between the Guide’s 
declarations of the immutability of divine law and assertions that it can change, and 
concluded that Maimonides must have secretly held that the Oral Torah was post-Sinaitic 
and devoid of divine authority.460 
                                                 
458 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 65.  
459 הקפלא לילעת אל ץוצנלא לילעת ןאלא דצקלא ןאל; Guide III:41; Maimonides, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. 
Munk and Joel, 409. Translations generally follow idem, The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963). Pines (2:558) has “legal science” for al-fiqh; Salomon Munk 
has “l’explication traditionnelle”; Le guide des egares: traite de Theologie et de Philosophie par Moise Ben 
Maimon, die Maimonide (Paris: Franck, 1856-1866), 3:313; and Schwarz has halakhah; Maimonides, 
Moreh Nevukhim: Tirgem me-ʿArvit ve-hosif heʿarot, nispaḥim u-mafteḥot, ed. and trans. Michael Schwarz 
(Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2002), 2:578. 
460 See Jacob Levinger, “ʿAl Torah shebe-ʿal-Peh be-Haguto shel ha-Rambam,” Tarbiẓ 37, no. 3 
(1968): 282-93; repr. as “Maʿamadah shel ha-Torah shebe-Khtav be-Maḥshevet ha-Rambam,” in Ha-Miqra 
ve-Anaḥnu, ed. Uriel Simon (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1979), 120-32. See also idem, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-
Foseq (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1989), 56-66. Schwarz noted that Munk offered a similar interpretation; see 
Munk, Le guide des egares, 3:313-14n1, 3:334-35n4; and Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, ed. Schwarz, 
2:578n4, 2:590n102. 
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Although many have accepted Levinger’s claims,461 others have argued that 
Maimonides only admitted temporary changes to the law.462 Halbertal accounted for 
Maimonides’ divergent readings of Scripture by claiming that the Guide offers a 
“philosophical” reading of the law, while Maimonides’ other writings are “halakhic” in 
nature.463 Mordechai Cohen argued that the Guide follows Scripture’s ẓāhir, rather than 
the divinely authorized peshaṭ (which includes the tafsīr marwī).464 Blidstein 
demonstrated that presentations of the law as static and dynamic are interwoven in 
Maimonides’ writings,465 and he observed that the Mishneh Torah incorporates the 
straightforward meaning of Scripture, even when it is not the halakhic meaning. 
Regarding the lex talionis in particular, Blidstein noted that the Mishneh Torah 
understands “the injury he inflicted on another shall be inflicted on him” (Lev. 24:20) to 
mean, “the injurer deserves (raʾuy) to be deprived of a limb or to be wounded to the same 
                                                 
461 See the list in Gerald Blidstein, “‘Maṭarati ʿAkhshav Latet Ṭaʿamim le-Ketuvim ve-Lo Latet 
Ṭaʿamim le-Halakhah’ – ha-Omnam?” in Karmi Sheli: Meḥqarim be-Aggadah uve-Farshanuteha 
Mugashim le-Prof. Karim Horowtiz, eds. Naḥem Ilan et al. (Jerusalem: Lander, 2012), 48n5, esp. Yair 
Lorberbaum, “Ha-Rambam ʿal ha-Aggadah, Halakhah ve-‘Ḥoq Elohi’,” Dine Israel 26-27 (2009-2010): 
253-97; add Kreisel, Prophecy, 261-62. Against Lorberbaum, see also Shimshon Ettinger, “ʿOd le-Sheʾelat 
ha-Halakhah ve-‘Ḥoq ha-Elohi’ be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Dine Israel 28 (2011): 251-63; see also Halivni, 
Peshat and Derash, 85-88; and Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 150. 
462 Eliezer Shimson Rosenthal, “ʿAl ‘Derekh ha-Rov’,” Peraqim: Sefer ha-Shanah shel Mahkon 
Shoken le-Meḥqar ha-Yahadut 1 (1967-1968): 199n62; and Izhak Englard, “‘ʿAl Derekh ha-Rov’ u-
Vaʿayat ha-Yosher be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1988-1989): 43-
44; trans. in idem, “The Problem of Equity in Maimonides,” Israel Law Review 21 (1986): 311-12. See the 
similar suggestion in Shalom Rosenberg, “Ve-Shuv ʿal ‘Derekh ha-Rov’,” in Manhigut Ruḥanit be-Yisrael, 
Morashah ve-Yaʿad, ed. Ella Belfer (Ramat Gan: Mekhon le-Yahadut ule-Maḥshavah bat-Zemaneinu, 
1982), 302-303n30. 
463 Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 478-80; similarly, Shoḥetman, “Le-Sheʾelat ha-
Yaḥas,” 51-65. 
464 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 130-37, 449-52. 
465 Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 120n33; and idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 53-54; see also 
there, 48. 
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extent” (Hilkhot Ḥovel u-Maziq, 1:3)466 – thereby integrating the verse’s apparent (or 
ẓāhir) meaning. Blidstein also showed that Maimonides assimilated rabbinic tradition 
into the Guide’s discussion of reasons for the commandments.467  
 
Maimonides’ Andalusian Predecessors 
Recent scholars have demonstrated that several eleventh- and twelfth-century 
Andalusian rabbis broke from Saʿadya’s depiction of the Oral Torah, and portrayed qiyās 
and other human contributions to divine law in positive terms. This widespread 
Andalusian tradition anticipated and contributed to Maimonides’ rejection of geonic legal 
epistemology and to his perspective on the Oral Torah.468 
Qaraite activity is far more difficult to document in Andalusia than in Iraq and 
Palestine; only one name, (Sayyid?) Abū al-Ṭarās (or al-Aṭrās) survives, and there are no 
known texts. Nevertheless, Qaraism loomed large in Andalusian Rabbanite writings and 
several local Rabbanites proudly recounted having persecuted Qaraites in their region.469 
                                                 
466 וקזנ םלשמ ךכיפלו השעש ומכ וב לובחל וא רבא ורסחל יואר אוהש אלא ורבחב לבחש ומכ הזב לובחל וניא; unless 
otherwise noted, texts of the Mishneh Torah follow Kafiḥ’s edition. Translation follows Maimonides, The 
Code of Maimonides, Book 11: The Book of Torts, trans. Hyman Klein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1954), 160. 
467 Blidstein, “‘Maṭarati ʿAkhshav Latet Ṭaʿamim le-Ketuvim.” Blidstein noted his debt to 
Lorberbaum, “Ha-Rambam ʿal ha-Aggadah, Halakhah ve-‘Ḥoq Elohi’,” 263n35, for some examples. For an 
alternative suggestion, see Benedikt, Asupat Maʾamarim, 186-90; followed by Yiṣḥaq Isaac and Alexander 
Klein, “Torah shebe-ʿal Peh: Gidrah, Meqorah ve-Goralah ʿal pi ha-Rambam,” BDD 25 (2001): 126-27. 
See also Sykes, “‘Seṭiyotav’ shel ha-Rambam,” 121-22. For an alternative reading of this passage, see 
Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200-201n75. 
468 Unfortunately, othan than one brief comment (see below), I have found little indication that 
Maimonides’ Andalusian heroes in the realm of halakhah – Isaac ben Jacob Alfasi and Joseph ben Meir ha-
Levi Ibn Migash – reflected on the sources of the law. 
469 For background, see Daniel Lasker, “Karaism in Twelfth-Century Spain,” Journal of Jewish 
Thought and Philosophy 1 (1992): 179-195; see there, 179n2 for earlier studies; repr. in idem, From Judah 
Hadassi to Elijah Bashyatchi: Studies in Late Medieval Karaite Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 125-40. 
Add Judah Rosenthal, “The Talmud on Trial: The Disputation at Paris in the Year 1240,” JQR 47, no. 1 
(1956): 65-67. Subsequently, see Ben-Shammai, “Between Ananites and Karaites,” 25; Camilla Adang 
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Given the paltry knowledge of Andalusian Qaraism, little can be said about its impact on 
Andalusian Rabbanite presentations of the Oral Torah. Yet other features of the 
Andalusian milieu can be reconstructed. Mordechai Cohen’s above-mentioned study of 
peshaṭ, the “philological-contextual” understanding of Scripture, traces the influence of 
Andalusian writers on Maimonidean biblical exegesis.470 The examination of 
jurisprudential comments that follows draws attention to a unqiue Andalusian perspective 
on rabbinic tradition. 
To the best of my knowledge, the earliest Andalusian Rabbanite reflection on the 
human expansion of divine law appears in the Introduction to Kitāb al-Zuhd (The Book of 
Continence), a commentary on Ecclesiastes by Isaac Ibn Ghiyāth.471 The author began by 
repeating geonic assertions about the Oral Torah. He explained that Deut. 17:8-9, which 
commands Israel to bring doubtful cases to the “Levitical priests and judge in charge at 
the time,” demonstrates that “the obligated servants” (al-mukallafīn al-mutaʿabbidīn) 
must turn to the “sages of the tradition” (aʾimmat al-talqīn). Noting that these verses 
                                                 
“Élements karaïtes dans la polémique anti-judaïque d’Ibn Ḥazm,” in Diálogo filosófico-religioso entre 
cristianismo, judaísmo e islamismo durante la edad media en la Península Iberica, ed. Horacio Santiago-
Otero (Turnhout: Brepols, 1994), 419-41; idem, “The Karaites as Portrayed in Medieval Islamic Sources,” 
in Karaite Judaism, 187-90; Daniel Lasker, “Maimonides and the Karaites: From Critic to Cultural Hero,” 
in Maimonides y su época, eds. Carlos del Valle et al. (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones 
Culturales, 2007), 313-14; Friedman, “Judah Ha-Levi on Writing the Kuzari,” 162-64; Rustow, “The 
Qaraites as Sect,” 152-56; Bernard Septimus, “‘Nevarekh (le-)Eloheinu’: Ṭaharanut Leshonit ve-Hisṭoriyah 
Hilkhatit,” in Ta Shma: Meḥqarim be-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut le-Zikhro shel Yisrael Ta-Shma, eds. Avraham 
Reiner et al. (Alon Shvut: Tevunot, 2012), 2:578-79 and Sarah Stroumsa, “The Muʿtazila in al-Andalus: 
The Footprints of a Phantom,” Intellectual History of the Islamicate World 2 (2014): 93-96. On Abū al-
Ṭarās, see Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 94-95. On Qaraite persecution in Andalusia, see 
Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 148n19. 
470 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 54-85, 359-62, 365-75. See the summary, 83-85. 
471 Yosef Kafiḥ ascribed this work to Saʿadya; see his Ḥameish Megillot: Shir ha-Shirim, Rut, 
Qohelet, Esther, Eikhah ʿim Peirushim ʿAtiqim (Jerusalem, 1962), 147-48. On the ascription to Ibn 
Ghiyāth, see Hagit Mittelman, “Peirush le-Sefer ‘Qohelet’ be-ʿAravit-Yehudit ha-Meyuḥas le-R. Yiṣḥaq 
Ibn Ghiyāth: Hebeiṭim Filosofiyim u-Farshaniyim,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 1999), 43-80. 
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command that a judge be consulted, but make no mention of a prophet, Ibn Ghiyāth 
argued that, since prophecy’s cessation, Israel has fulfilled this requirement by relying on 
“the students of the prophets, who fill their place.”472 As evidence, he cited “the authentic 
tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ) that understands “Incline your ear and listen to the words of 
the sages” (Prov. 22:17) as a verse that refers to the period after prophecy’s end.473 
Ibn Ghiyāth, however, presented the role of “obligated servants” differently than 
did the geonim. He explained: “An obligated individual is only commanded if he 
possesses intellect and understanding, [and is capable of] extracting branch and deduction 
(farʿ wa-natīja).” “Through sound reflection,” he continued, “I have found that the 
masters of the tradition (shuyūkh al-talqīn) are preferred over those who convey 
prophecy,” in keeping with the talmudic claim, “a sage is greater than a prophet” (bBB 
12a).474 In Ibn Ghiyāth’s view, the sages are superior to prophets because they use their 
natural abilities (gharāʾiz wa-qarāʾiḥ) to “extract deductions from its [i.e., the tradition’s] 
                                                 
472 םהנאכמ ןימיאקלא איבנאלא ת'דמאלת; Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 162. 
473 םימכח ירבד עמשו ךנזא טה ךליאו ןאכמ לארשימ הניכש הקלתסנ יכאלמו הירכז יגח תמשמ; Kafiḥ, Ḥameish 
Megillot, 162. I could not find this exact language in any rabbinic text; the closest parallel is Chaim 
Milikowsky, Seder ʿOlam: Mahadurah Madaʿit, Peirush u-Mavo (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2013) 1:322 
lines 21-22 (chap. 30); see there, 2:522-23. On this passage, see Nehemia Polen, “The Spirit Among the 
Sages: Seder Olam, the End of Prophecy, and Sagely Illumination,” in “It’s Better to Hear the Rebuke of 
the Wise than the Song of Fools” (Qoh 7:5): Proceedings of the Midrash Section, Society of Biblical 
Literature, volume 6, eds. W. David Nelson and Rivka Ulmer (Piscataway, N.J.: Gorgias Press, 2015), 83-
94. Translation of talqīn follows Blau, Dictionary, 638, s.v. نيقلت. Blau also offered oral torah. 
474  הר'תא ןיקלתלא 'ךוישל תדגו חיחצלא ראבתעאלא דנעו ... הגיתנו ערפ ןמ לצחתמ םהפו לקע ו'ד אלא רומאמ ףלכמ אל
איבנמ ףידע םכח ליאקלא עונ עונלא י'דה ילאו ... והבנלא דאומ ןמ ןודתהיו יחולא תלמח ילע הדיזמ; Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 
162-63; first noted in Moses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 36-37n29. Kafiḥ’s text 
differs slightly from Halkin’s, which is from JTS MS. L1011 (EMC 203), fol. 148b. Halkin’s text should 
read הדיזמ, instead of הדיז. On “a sage is greater than a prophet,” see Alon Goshen-Gottstein, “‘Ḥakham 
ʿAdif mi-Navi’: Tefisat ha-Torah be-Reʾi Parshanut ha-Pitgam le-Doroteha,” in Limud ve-Daʿat be-
Maḥshava Yehudit, ed. Howard Kreisel (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press, 2006), 37-42; and 
Elliot Wolfson, “‘Sage is Preferable to Prophet’: Revisioning Midrashic Imagination,” in Scriptural 
Exegesis: The Shapes of Culture and the Religious Imagination, Essays in Honour of Michael Fishbane, 
eds. Deborah A. Green and Laura S. Lieber (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 188-90. 
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principles, and extend branches from its roots” (yastanbiṭūn al-natāʾij min ummātihā475 
wa-yastamiddūn al-furūʿ min uṣūlihā). By comparison, the knowledge of Prophets is 
deficient because it is “external”; prophets are unable to generate it themselves. To 
illustrate this, Ibn Ghiyāth contrasted King David with King Solomon: Notwithstanding 
prophetic assurances of divine guidance (2 Sam. 7), David failed to build the Temple. It 
was built instead by Solomon, the archetypal “sage,” who relied on internal wisdom to 
correctly adjudicate a case of disputed motherhood (1 Kings 3).476 
When viewed in the light of earlier Jewish discussions of the talmudic aphorism 
“a sage is greater than a prophet,” Ibn Ghiyāth’s arguments are striking. The tenth-
century Qaraite polymath Yaʿqūb al-Qirqisānī had cited this phrase to challenge 
Saʿadya’s claim that Moses had received “explanations and meanings” of Scripture at 
Sinai.477 In Qirqisānī’s view, this dictum testifies to Saʿadya’s distance from the self-
understanding of the rabbis, in that it expresses a preference for sages over prophets. 
According to the Talmud, Qirqisānī claimed, sages produced (mustanbiṭīn) knowledge 
through the intellect, yet Saʿadya claimed that sages (merely) transmitted received 
                                                 
475 Following Kafiḥ’s text; Halkin (above, n474) has אהתאהמא, an alternative plural. 
476 Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 162-63. Abraham bar Solomon, a fifteenth-century Yemenite, quoted 
this passage and added further comments that may also be from Ibn Ghiyāth. According to his report, Ibn 
Ghiyāth explained that a prophet cannot add even a single word to what God revealed, but a sage 
“innovates over and over” (שדחמ אוה הברהו הברה המכח ירבדבו); Peirush Neviʾim Rishonim, ed. and trans. 
Yosef Kafiḥ (Qiryat Ono: Mekhon Mishnat ha-Rambam, 1999), 3:59. The wording of Abraham’s report 
differs slightly from the text of Ibn Ghiyāth that Kafiḥ published. On Abraham bar Solomon, see Eliezer 
Schlossberg, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben Shlomo le-Sefer Yoel,” in Meḥqarim ba-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit 
uve-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, eds. Aharon Ben-David and Isaac Gluska (Jerusalem: ha-Agudah le-Tipuaḥ 
Ḥevrah ve-Tarbut, 2001), 209-210. 
477 اهيناعمو اهريسافت هفّرع יניס يف ملاسلا هيلع ىسوم ىلا ةيروتلا عفد اّمل ّّزعو ّّلج ئرابلا نا اومعز; Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-
Anwār wal-Marāqib, 1:111 (I.13.1). 
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knowledge.478 Though I have not found a response to this assertion in geonic texts, 
Nissim ben Jacob attempted to limit the import of the talmudic saying. Addressing those 
who, he reported, took umbrage at the rabbis’ devaluation of the status of biblical 
prophets, i.e., Qaraites, Nissim offered a rejoinder to those “who rejoice in doing evil” 
(Prov. 2:15). Nissim explained that this talmudic dictum refers only to prophets who are 
not sages. By contrast, he wrote, biblical prophets, who were also sages, are “the most 
preferred and honored” (al-afḍal wal-ashraf). A sage is only greater than “a temporary 
prophet,” that is, one whose prophecy is not preserved in Scripture.479 Knowingly or not, 
Ibn Ghiyāth read the saying “a sage is greater than a prophet” in the manner of Qirqisānī. 
In using Islamic legal theory’s image of extracting “branches” from “roots,”480 he 
defended the rabbis and rejected Saʿadya’s claims.  
Baḥya ben Joseph ibn Paqūda (Saragossa; fl. c. 1050-90)481 cited the dictum “a 
sage is greater than a prophet” with approval and he applied it to all intellectual 
endeavors. He claimed that God guides all who undertake to learn a new discipline 
                                                 
478  ءامكح اوناك ناو اوملع امو مهل ليق امب اوربخأ امنا ناك ذا ءامكحب اوسيلف نوّينابرلا مهنا اومعز نيذلا ءلاؤه مه ءامكحلا ناك ناف
َّنيطبنتسم عيمجل هولاقام امف يذلا اولقن ; Qirqisānī, Kitāb al-Anwār wal-Marāqib, ed. Nemoy, 1:116-17 (I:13.3) 
479 Hirschfeld, “Be-Sefer Megillat Setarim,” 47-48. For background, see Nissim ben Jacob, 
Ḥamishah Sefarim, ed. Abramson, 282n237; and Ben-Sasson, Ṣemiḥat ha-Qehilah ha-Yehudit, 51. On the 
ascription to Nissim, see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, xii, with reference to earlier 
scholarship. For a slightly different treatment, see Goshen-Gottstein, “‘Ḥakham ʿAdif mi-Navi’,” 52-54. 
See also Shraga Abramson, Bava Batra ʿim Targum ʿIvri u-Feirush Ḥadash, Ḥilufei Girsaʾot u-Marʾei 
Meqomot, ed. Jacob N. Epstein (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1953), 209. 
480 See Bernard Weiss, The Spirit of Islamic Law (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1998), 22-
23; and Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 153. See al-Ghazālī’s expansion of this metaphor in 
al-Mustaṣfa min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl (Beirut, 1948), 1:8, trans. in Ahmad Zaki Mansur Hammad, “Abū Ḥāmid al-
Ghazālī’s Juristic Doctrine in al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, With a Translation of Volume One of al-
Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl,” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1987), 2:315. Hallaq discussed this passage 
there, 117. 
481 See Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 1-2. 
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beyond what a human teacher offers.482 Baḥya’s analysis of rabbinic legal activity also 
aligns with Ibn Ghiyāth’s depiction of the rabbis. In his view, whenever possible, the 
rabbis applied (anfadhū) principles that were transmitted from the prophets (uṣūlihim al-
manqūla ʿan al-anbiyāʾ). However, when a new question arose about the details (furūʿ) 
of the law, the rabbis resorted to qiyās and raʾy (subjective reasoning) – controversial 
terms that Baḥya apparently used synonymously;483 along with naẓar (speculation), these 
enabled them to extract (istanbaṭū) rulings from received uṣūl.484 
Several other Andalusian Rabbanites explained this talmudic dictum in the same 
manner as Ibn Ghiyāth. Moses Ibn Ezra (Grenada and Lucena; c. 1055 - d. after 1138) 
explained that God graced (laṭafa) the Jews with sages to replace the prophets. The 
assertion, “a sage is greater than a prophet,” he wrote, indicates that the sages’ knowledge 
is double that of the prophets, because a prophet simply fulfills his mission, but a sage 
derives (yufarriʿu) new laws, extends (yastamiddu) that which is known, and deduces 
                                                 
482 Baḥya ibn Paqudah, Sefer Torat Ḥovot ha-Levavot: Maqor ve-Targum, ed. and trans. Yosef 
Kafiḥ (Jerusalem, 1973), 363 (8:3); see Lobel, A Sufi-Jewish Dialogue, 185. 
483 Noted by Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 253n43. On these terms, see Goldziher, 
Muslim Studies, 2:78-83, 2:201-202; Schacht, Origins, 98-132; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal 
Theories, 15, 18-19; and idem, Origins, 113-18. On raʾy, compare above, n250. 
484 Baḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 28-29 (introduction). See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni, 
161n67, noting Baḥya’s claim that Torah study examines both written and logical (al-maktūb wal-maʿqūl) 
components of tradition (ed. Kafiḥ, 150 [3:4]); see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 252-
53. Cohen’s suggestions that “it is reasonable to assume that Bahya did not depart from Saadia’s model on 
his own authority, since he was not known as a particularly distinguished or innovative Talmudist” and that 
“it is also possible to explain Bahya’s positive attitude toward qiyās simply as a reflection of what seems to 
occur in the Talmud itself” (253 and n44) rely on arguments from silence. Baḥya acted as a judge (as 
Cohen noted), and must have had more than passing familiarity with legal texts. 
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(yuntiju) from known intellectual premises.485 Joseph ben Meir ha-Levi Ibn Migash486 
(Seville and Lucena; 1077-1141), offered a similar explanation; sages, he wrote, 
understand divine dicta that they have not heard, but prophets merely repeat what God 
has told them.487 Maimonides’ fellow Andalusian refugee, Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn (Barcelona 
and Fez; 12th c.), similarly affirmed that a prophet merely conveys a message (yuʾaddī al-
risāla), while a sage expands (yatafaqqahu) revelation.488 
Andalusian Jewish uses of the distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ to explain 
rabbinic activity sheds new light on a well-known comment of Abraham Ibn Dāʾūd. In 
the prologue to his Sefer ha-Qabbalah, Ibn Dāʾūd wrote that the rabbis always agreed 
about the “principle” (ʿiqar) of a commandment; their debates concerned only “its 
                                                 
485  ֿהלאסרלא ידוי יבנלא ןאפ איבנמ ףידע םכח ולאק אמכ איבנאלא ןמ אפאע'צא םהמלע ןוכי אמב איבנאלא ןמ 'ץיועתלאו
לוקי םכחלאו אהב יבנ אמ ילע ֿהובנלא ןא אהאיא למח אמ בסח  התרכפ ןמ דמתסיפ העירפת ערשלא הל חאבא אמ ערפיו איבנאלא ןע
ןמ 'גתניו עאדבאלא ל'צפ הלפ ֿהילקעלא התאמדקמ ; Moses Ibn Ezra, Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 36. 
For treatment see Abraham Halkin, “Hashqafat R. Moshe Ibn Ezra ʿal ha-Miṣvot,” in Meḥqarim be-ʿAravit 
uva-Islam, ed. Yaʿaqov Manṣur (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1973), 2:29-32; and David, 
“Yediʿat davar ha-El,” 143-44. Moses Ibn Ezra cited Saʿadya’s criticism of qiyās; Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-
Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 204. Moses Ibn Ezra even characterized rabbinic contributions as ibdāʿ, a term that 
usually describes improper religious innovations; on bidʿa, see Goldziher, Muslim Studies, 2:33-37.  
486 On the spelling of Migash, see Israel Ta-Shma, “Yeṣirato ha-Sifrutit shel Rabbeinu Yosef ha-
Levi Ibn Migash,” in Keneset Meḥqarim, 2:16n1. 
487  הימופב יבהיו עמשד המ אלא רמא אל איבנ ולאד איבנמ ףידע םכח ירה םלועמ אתלימ ךהל העמש אל ארבג ךהד ג"עאו
אלד ג"עאו יניסמ השמל רמתאד יאמ רמאק םכח ולאו רמימל ל"ז שגימ 'ן י"רה תטישמ כ"ע העמש ; this appears in the Shiṭṭa 
Mequbbeṣet on tractate Bava Batra by Beṣalel ben Abraham Ashkenazi, which preserves a significant 
number of Ibn Migash’s comments. Text follows the first edition (Sefer Asifat Zeqenim [Livorno, 1774], 
8b). On Ibn Migash and Ashkenazi’s Shiṭṭa Mequbbeṣet, see Ta-Shma, “Yeṣirato ha-Safrutit shel Rabbeinu 
Yosef ha-Levi Ibn Migash,” 2:23n21; and Louis Ginzberg, “Post Scriptum,” REJ 67 (1914): 150-51 
(referenced by Ta-Shma). Without any evidence, Faur repeatedly insisted Ibn Migash was the source of 
many ideas of later Andalusian Rabbanites. See Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 4, 33, 38. On Judah ha-
Levi’s opposition to qiyās, see above, n258. 
488  יבנלא םאלכ הקפתי םכחלאו הילע תילת אמ בסח הלאסרלא ידוי יבנלא ןאל איבנמ ףידע םכח ל"ז וניתובר אולאק אמכו
הל'צפ ה'גולא א'דה ל'גאלפ; Joseph ibn ʿAqnīn, Inkishāf al-Asrār wa-Ẓuhūr al-Anwār, ed. and trans. Abraham S. 
Halkin (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1964), 458. As far as I know, other than Maimonides, ibn ʿAqnīn is 
the only writer to use the fifth form of the verb f-q-h to denote detailing or expanding the law; see below. 
On ibn ʿAqnīn and Maimonides, see Abraham S. Halkin, “Ibn ʿAḳnin’s Commentary on the Song of 
Songs,” in Alexander Marx Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, ed. Saul 
Lieberman (New York: JTS, 1950), 396-401; and idem, “Le-Demuto shel R. Yosef ben Yehuda ibn 
ʿAqnīn,” in Sefer ha-Yovel li-khvod Ẓvi Wolfson, ed. Saul Lieberman (Jerusalem: American Academy for 
Jewish Research, 1965), 103-105. 
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offshoots” (toldoteha; or as Gerson Cohen translated the term in this context, “its 
details,”) and debates arose only due to inattentive students.489 Though some scholars 
have regarded Ibn Dāʾūd’s claim as a restatement of geonic-era explanations of rabbinic 
disputes,490 earlier texts did not connect the trope of lackadaisical students with the 
distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ.491 
The discovery of David ben Saʿadya al-Ger’s Kitāb al-Ḥāwī (The Comprehensive 
Book) has transformed scholarly understanding of eleventh-century Andalusian 
Rabbanite legal theory. Little is known about the author of this enormous, well-organized 
judges’ manual.492 David Sklare suggested that David ben Saʿadya’s father may have 
emigrated from northern (Christian) Spain or southern France after embracing Judaism, a 
relocation made by contemporaneous converts.493 David ben Saʿadya appears to have 
been the first Andalusian Rabbanite to engage the discipline of uṣūl al-fiqh at length.494 
Echoing geonic claims, he affirmed that Moses “soundly related” (ḥadīthan ṣaḥīḥan) “the 
                                                 
489 Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of Tradition, ed. Cohen, 1 (English), 3 (Hebrew). This distinction clearly 
relies on the division between uṣūl and furūʿ, as noted in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 20n6; and 
Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 214. See, however, Cohen’s comments in Ibn Dāʾūd, The Book of 
Tradition, ed. Cohen, 107. 
490 Halbertal, People of the Book, 54-56; idem, Maimonides, 100-102; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam 
ve-al-Fārābi,” 214-15. 
491 See above, nn286, 288. 
492 On the scope of this work, see Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 103-109; on the identity 
of the author, see there, 109-116, with reference to earlier scholarship. See also Israel Ta-Shma, Ha-Sifrut 
ha-Parshanit la-Talmud be-Eiropah uve-Ṣfon Afriqah: Qorot, Ishim ve-Shiṭot (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2004), 
1:170-73; Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham Maimonides,” 40-42; Y. Zvi Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-
ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 217-20; and idem, “On the Spanish Source of Short Halakhic Works Attributed to Hayya 
Gaon,” in Judæo-Arabic Culture in al-Andalus, ed. Amir Ashur (Cordoba: Cordoba Near Eastern Research 
Unit, 2013), 245-53. On the Kitāb al-Ḥāwī as a judges’ manual, see Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 
104; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 220; for the structure of this work, see Sklare, “R. 
David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 109n19. 
493 Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 119-20. On the possibility of Provençal influence on 
the Kitāb al-Ḥāwī, see Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 226-27n40. 
494 Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 104-105; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-
Sefarad,” 221. 
 
141 
 
authentic transmission” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ), including the principles of the laws (al-uṣūl 
al-fiqhīyāt) and the “meanings of aspects of the commandments” (maʿānī fuṣūl al-
sharʿiyāt).495 Nonetheless, David presented a more nuanced picture of the sources of 
Jewish law than had the geonim496 by identifying three sources: revealed Scripture (naṣṣ 
al-kitāb al-manzūl [sic]), transmitted traditions (al-ḥadīth al-manqūl), and explanations 
of the “people of the Talmud” (sharḥ al-maʿānī li-ahl al-talmud).497 He similarly 
differentiated between transmitted explanations (sharḥ manqūl) and explanations inferred 
(al-mustadall; or elsewhere, al-mustakhraj, derived) by means of qiyās and raʾy. The 
author even explained that the talmudic phrase “his view is more logical” (mistaber 
ṭaʿamei) refers to laws created by logic.498 Like Baḥya, David’s failure to distinguish 
between the terms raʾy and qiyās underscores his positive portrayal of human reasoning 
and his break with the geonim. Moreover, as Sklare noted, David often cited rabbinic 
works to prove his arguments, while his geonic predecessors seem to have preferred 
Scriptural proofs.499 
The writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra provide further insight into Andalusian 
thinking about rabbinic tradition. Mordechai Cohen has detailed similarities between the 
approaches to peshaṭ in the writings of Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides,500 but it is 
                                                 
495 Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 222. 
496 Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 105-106; and Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-
Sefarad,” 221-24. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 253-54. 
497 Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 221. On the meaning of “Talmud,” see there, n17. 
For one possible meaning of ahl al-Talmud, see above, n290. 
498 Stampfer, “Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri be-Sefarad,” 223, 224. 
499 Sklare, “R. David ben Saʿadya al-Ger,” 105. On Saʿadya’s citations, see however Abramson, 
ʿInyanot be-Sifrut ha-Geonim, 231-32; Brody, Ḥiburim Hilkhatiyim, 15-16 (Hebrew pagination), 3-4 
(English pagination). 
500 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 74-83, 365-75. On Ibn Ezra’s approach to peshaṭ, 
see also Uriel Simon, “Le-Darkho ha-Parshanit shel Rabiʿ ʿal-pi Sheloshet Beiʾurav le-Pasuq Eḥad,” Bar 
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difficult to discern if Abraham influenced Maimonides or if they shared a common body 
of knowledge.501 Abraham Ibn Ezra divided law into three categories: written, received, 
and ordained by the ancestors.502 The last designation suggests that Abraham was willing 
to acknowledge post-Sinaitic legal innovations. 
In over thirty places in his scriptural commentaries, Abraham Ibn Ezra labeled a 
rabbinic interpretation that he rejected “a lone opinion” (divrei yaḥid) or claimed that it 
was subject to debate.503 In one instance, he contrasted a minority view or a debated 
interpretation with “tradition” (qabbalah), implying that most sages were privy to the 
                                                 
Ilan Annual 3 (1965): 92-138; and Sarah Japhet, “Ha-Meitaḥ bein Peshuṭo shel Miqra u-vein Midrash ha-
Halakhah: Baʿayah le-lo Pitron,” in Dor va-Dor u-Farshanav: Asupat Meḥqarim be-Farshanut ha-Miqra 
(Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2008), 37-47. 
501 Isadore Twersky wrote that Abraham Ibn Ezra “exerted considerable influence on 
Maimonides,” a position he later modified; see “Review of Moses Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed 
by Moses Maimonides, Translated with an Introduction and Notes by Shlomo Pines. With an Introductory 
Essay by Leo Strauss,” Speculum 41, no. 3 (1966): 558; and idem, “Ha-Hishpiʿa Rabiʿ ʿal ha-Rambam?” in 
Rabbi Abraham Ibn Ezra: Studies in the Writings of a Twelfth-Century Jewish Polymath, eds. Isadore 
Twersky and Jay M. Harris (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), 21-48. In his Introduction 
to the Code of Maimonides, 252n33, Twersky appears to have accepted a “link” between Ibn Ezra and 
Maimonides, “especially in connection with philosophy.” Blidstein, “Where do We Stand,” 26, rejected the 
possibility of influence. Others adopted Twersky’s early view; see Saul Lieberman, “Mishnat Shir ha-
Shirim,” in Jewish Gnosticism, Merkabah Mysticism, and Talmudic Tradition, by Gershom Scholem (New 
York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1965), 124; Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod 
Mora ve-Sod Torah: ha-Shorashim le-Minyan ha-Miṣvot shel Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra,” Dine Israel 22 
(2003): 177-78; Davidson, Maimonides, 175n214; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 26n88, 368-
69, 510-13; and Norman Roth, “Abraham Ibn Ezra and Mysticism,” Iberia Judaica 4 (2012): 141 (writing 
“Maimonides … was very much influenced by Ibn Ezra”). Twersky, “Ha-Hishpiʿa Rabiʿ ʿal ha-Rambam?” 
39, suggested that the Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah may not have reached Maimonides in time to impact Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, because Abraham composed that work in London. Norman Roth, “Abraham Ibn Ezra – 
Highlights of his Life,” Iberia Judaica 4 (2012): 33n39, however, placed the composition of Yesod Mora in 
Provence. See also Howard Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides,” Maimonidean Studies 2 
(1991): 97-98; and Tamás Visi, “Ibn Ezra, A Maimonidean Authority: The Evidence of the Early Ibn Ezra 
Supercommentaries,” in The Cultures of Maimonideanism: New Approaches to the History of Jewish 
Thought, ed. James Robinson (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 90-93. 
502 תובאה ונקתש םינוקתה וא תולבוקמה וא הרותב תובותכה תוצמה לכ יכ; Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-
Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 140 (7:7). See the editors’ introduction, 35-37; and Cohen, Opening the 
Gates of Interpretation, 510-13. Compare, however, above, n192. 
503 Yeshayahu Maori, “ʿAl Mashmaʿut ha-Munaḥ ‘Divrei Yaḥid’ be-Feirush Rabiʿ la-Miqra: le-
Yaḥaso shel Rabiʿ le-Midreshei Ḥazal,” Shenaton le-Ḥeiqer ha-Miqra veha-Mizraḥ ha-Qadum 13 (2002): 
201-246. For examples, see there, 231-46. Surviving evidence does not always support this claim; see 
there, 217-22. 
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latter.504 Uriel Simon suggested that this approach relates to Maimonides’ claim that there 
are no debates about received traditions.505 When taken together, these discussions 
establish a long Andalusian tradition that anticipated many Maimonidean claims about 
the Oral Torah. 
 
The Scope of Revelation 
Maimonides began both the Commentary on the Mishnah and the Mishneh Torah 
with lengthy discussions of revelation and its transmission that describe the compilation 
of the Written Torah and the characteristics and scope of its accompanying oral 
traditions, the Oral Torah.506 Affirming the divine source of both Torahs, Maimonides 
defined the latter, quite significantly, as a circumscribed set of revealed traditions. 
At the outset of the Commentary, Maimonides focused on the commandments and 
neglected the non-legal parts of Scripture, stating: “God revealed every commandment 
(sharīʿa) … with its explanation (tafsīrihā).”507 In the subsequent discussion, he wrote 
that God told Moses a verse (naṣṣ), its tafsīr and taʾwīl (two terms for commentary or 
explanation that are sometimes considered to be equivalent, and at other times, placed in 
                                                 
504 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 2:265 (Short Commentary to Ex. 13:18); 
see Maori, “ʿAl Mashmaʿut ha-Munaḥ ‘Divrei Yaḥid’,” 212-13n40. 
505 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Shenei Peirushei R. Avraham Ibn Ezra le-Trei-ʿAsar, ed. Uriel Simon 
(Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1989), 178. See above, n417. 
506 The Prophets and Writings are conspicuously absent; see below, esp. n568.  
507 ]אהריספת[ עמ תלזנא אהנא וניבר השמ ילע הללא לזנא העירש לכ ]ןא םלעא[; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. On sharīʿa, which here means 
commandment, see Joel Kraemer, “Nomos ve-Sharīʿa be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Teʿudah 4 (1986): 185-
202. 
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opposition), and what “the unambiguous (or: clear) verse” (al-naṣṣ al-muḥkam) covers.508 
The distinction between unambiguous and ambiguous verses is qurʾānic (3:7); these 
terms figured prominently in medieval Muslim and Jewish exegesis.509 The insistence 
that revealed commentary accompanied even “unambiguous” verses underscores the 
omnipresent need for tradition.  
In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides elaborated 
on a talmudic legend (bʿEiruv 54b) stating that, after each experience of revelation, 
Moses returned to his tent and transmitted his knowledge to Aaron, then to Aaron’s sons, 
then to the Seventy Elders, and finally to what Maimonides termed “the multitude of 
people” (jumhūr al-nās) who “sought God” (Ex. 33:7). In his telling, Moses would then 
depart, and each participant would repeat the verse and depart, until each had heard the 
revelation four times. After this procedure, wrote Maimonides, the people wrote the 
verses in scrolls and memorized the tradition (al-naql).510 Before his death, wrote 
Maimonides, Moses composed thirteen Torah scrolls, one for each of the twelve tribes, 
                                                 
508 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1-2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. 
Cohen noted the surprising word taʾwīl: not only is this at odds with Saʿadya’s use, Maimonides himself 
focused on tafsīr marwī, not taʾwīl; Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 473; see there, 114-15. 
509 For Muslim writers, see Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 148-70; Leah Kinberg, “Muḥkamāt and 
Mutashābihāt (Koran 3/7): Implication of a Koranic Pair of Terms in Medieval Exegesis,” Arabica 35, no. 
2 (1988): 143-72; and Jane Dammen McAuliffe, “Quranic Hermeneutics: The Views of al-Ṭabraī and Ibn 
Kathīr,” in Approaches to the History of Interpretation of the Qurʾān, ed. Andrew Rippin (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 51-53. For Jewish writers, see Richard C. Steiner, “Saadia vs. Rashi,” 216-17; 
Goldstein, “Abū l-Faraj Hārūn,” 382-83; and Mordechai Cohen, Three Approaches to Biblical Metaphor: 
From Abraham Ibn Ezra and Maimonides to David Kimhi (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 41-42, 83-84. Numerous 
appearances of these terms are collected in Blau, Dictionary, 140, s.v. مكحم, 325, s.v. ةهبش. Note the use of 
muḥkam in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:201 (Introduction to mSan10); Haqdamot ha-
Rambam, ed. Shailat, 363; and Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:126 (mKel 12:7). 
510 On Maimonides’ claim that the oral nature of extra-scriptural traditions guarantees its 
perfection and authenticity, see Halbertal, “What is the Mishneh Torah,” 89-90. 
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and one for the Levites, and the people verified (ṣaḥḥaḥū) the received traditions with 
Moses.511 
Maimonides made very similar claims in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah: 
“All of the commandments that Moses received at Sinai,” he wrote, “were given together 
with their interpretation (be-feirushan nitnu).” Citing Ex. 24:12, “I will give you the stone 
tablets with the teaching (ha-torah) and the commandment (ha-miṣvah)” as evidence, 
Maimonides explained:  
‘The teaching,’ refers to Written Torah, ‘and the commandment,’ to its 
interpretation. God bade us fulfill (laʿasot) in accordance with ‘the 
commandment’. This “commandment” refers to that which is called the Oral 
Torah.512  
The Introduction to the Mishneh Torah also repeats the claims that Moses copied thirteen 
Torahs before his death and that the transmission was preserved orally.513 In this text, 
however, Maimonides omitted the talmudic narrative regarding Moses’ four-fold 
repetition of revelation and the unique role of Aaron and his sons. Instead, he provided a 
long isnād (chain of transmission) linking Moses with his own time. Through the time of 
Hillel the Elder, the phrase “and his court” (u-veit dino) accompanies each name; after 
this, names of particular rabbis replace “and his court.”514 The Introduction concludes 
                                                 
511 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2-3; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327-
28. Maimonides did not consistently mention Scripture and its tafsīr; he wrote that Moses recited a verse 
and taught its tafsīr to Aaron, but for the others, Moses only recited the verse. He only mentioned the tafsīr 
again when describing how the people shared revelation. 
512  הרות וז הרות הוצמהו הרותהו ןבאה תוחול תא ךל הנתאו רמאנש ונתינ ןשוריפב יניסב השמל ול ונתינש תוצמה לכ
הפ לעבש הרות תארקנה איה וז הוצמו הוצמה יפ לע הרותה 'ושעל ונוצו השוריפ וז הוצמהו בתכבש; Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1 lines 2-4. For sources of this midrash, see the notes there. Translation follows 
Isadore Twersky, A Maimonides Reader (New York: Behrman House, 1972), 35, with slight changes. 
513 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1 lines 4-9; see above, n510. 
514 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2-8. In the letter to Pinḥas, he explained that 
“his court” indicates that many in each generation knew the Oral Torah; idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:442. 
Compare the comments about the list of transmitters in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 1-2. See also 
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with a list of the forty generations that made up the period between Moses and the end of 
the Talmud.515  
Despite their differences, both Introductions emphasize that revelation was two-
fold, consisting of written texts and their interpretations. In his formulation of the 
Principles of Faith in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides similarly affirmed 
the divine origin of both the Written Torah and “its transmitted interpretation” (tafsīrihā 
al-marwī).516 By the same token, the Mishneh Torah asserts that those who reject Mosaic 
authorship of the Pentateuch or “deny its explanation, which is the Oral Torah” have no 
portion in the World to Come (Hilkhot Teshuvah, 3:8).517 And in the Epistle to Yemen, he 
explained that one may neither add to nor subtract from the Written Torah, or from “its 
transmitted interpretation (tafsīrihā al-marwī), which is what the Sages transmitted – that 
is, the Oral Torah.”518 Maimonides’ son, Abraham, explicated the midrash cited in the 
Introduction to the Mishneh Torah similarly. He explained that the Talmud’s (bBer 5a) 
                                                 
Blidstein, “Mishnah Avot 1:1,” 60-62. On the term “his court,” see also Twersky, Introduction to the Code 
of Maimonides, 98n3. 
515 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2-8; see Salo W. Baron, “The Historical 
Outlook of Maimonides,” PAAJR 6 (1934-1935): 96-101; and Yiṣḥaq Hershkowitz, “Ish mi-pi Ish: ʿIyunim 
be-Hishtalshalut ha-Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Haqdamat Mishneh Torah le-Rambam,” JSIJ 7 (2008): 105-25. 
For other medieval Jewish genealogies that emphasize the number forty, see Arnold Franklin, The Noble 
House: Jewish Descendants of King David in the Middle Ages (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2013), 73, 84, 94. Perhaps as a restatement of the entire law, the Mishneh Torah demanded a 
complete isnād. The Commentary does contain a brief isnād (to R. Judah the Prince); see Maimonides, 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14-15; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335-36. 
516 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:214-15 (Introduction to mSan); Haqdamot ha-
Rambam, ed. Shailat, 372-73; see Shailat’s comments there, 211; Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-
Rambam,” 150n28; and idem, “Maimonides and the Karaites,” 313n8. 
517  'רות אוהו השורפב רפוכה ןכו ... תחא הבית 'יפא דחא קוספ 'יפא 'ה םעמ הרותה ןיאש 'מואה הרותב 'ירפוכה ןה השלש
הפ לעבש; see similar formulations in Hilkhot Sheḥiṭah, 4:16, Hilkhot ʿAvodat Yom ha-Kippurim, 1:7, and 
Hilkhot Mamrim, 3:3. 
518  ל"ז םימכחלא הוור י'דלא והו יורמלא אהריספת יפ ךל'דכו אהצוצנ יפ אדבא ןאצקנ אלו השמ העירש יפ הדאיז אל אמכ
פ לעבש הרות יהוה ; Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:98. See also the statement that aspects of certain 
sacrificial rituals are known by scriptural verse (naṣṣ al-torah) and others are “transmitted [and] appended 
to the verses” (  הלוקנמץוצנ ילא הדנסמ ); idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:127 (mMen 5:5). 
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gloss of the word, “the commandment” (Ex. 24:12) as “the Mishnah,” and his father’s 
explanation of the same word as “the Oral Torah,” were, in effect, identical, for both 
referred to “the unwritten, transmitted explanation of the commandment.”519 According 
to Abraham, even the rabbis referred to “the principles of tradition (uṣūl al-naql), rather 
than [to] the text of the Mishnah.”520 
Maimonides’ deployment – and transformation – of another midrash in the 
Commentary on the Mishnah underscores his impulse to narrow the scope of oral 
revelation. According to the Sifra, the discussion of the Sabbatical year in Lev. 25, begins 
with “The Lord spoke to Moses on Mount Sinai,” in order to teach that just as the 
Sabbatical year’s “general rules, details, and particulars” (kelaloteha u-peraṭoteha ve-
diqduqeha) were given at Sinai, so all of the other commandments were similarly 
revealed at Sinai.521 Medieval and modern interpreters have usually understood this as a 
reference to written details of the law,522 but Maimonides offered a different reading. 
Equating the “general rules, details, and particulars” with the Oral Torah,523 he linked 
these to the revealed tafsīr no less than three times. (Maimonides chose as his example 
                                                 
519 רוטסמ ריגלא לקנלא ןע הוצמה חרש ןוכ לחני ךל'דבו הוצמהו הרותהו ןבאה תחל; Abraham Maimonides, 
Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 383.  
520 הנשמלא ץנ אל לקנלא לוצא הב דצקלאפ; ibid., 385. In Hilkhot Sheḥiṭah, 1:4, Maimonides glossed 
“commanded you” (ṣivitikha; Deut. 12:21) as orally transmitted laws. See also Blidstein, “Masoret ve-
Samkhut Mosdit,” 11. 
521 This is Maimonides’ version. See Sifra de-Vei Rav, Sefer Torat Kohanim, ed. Isaac Hirsch 
(Vienna, 1862), 105a (parashat be-har, §1). For background, see Michael Chernick, “Kelaloteha u-
Peraṭoteha mi-Sinai,” in Gevurot ha-Romaḥ: Divrei Ḥakhamim ka-Darbonot ukhe-Mazmerot Kutetu le-
Romaḥ, le-R. Moshe Ḥayim Weiler, ed. Zeʾev W. Falk (Jerusalem: Mesharim, 1987), 107-119; and 
Shamma Friedman, “Mah ʿInyan Har Sinai eṣel Shemiṭah? Temurot be-Shiṭat ‘R. Ishmael ve-R. Aqivah’ 
be-Hitgalut ha-Torah,” Sidra 24-25 (2010): 387-425. 
522 See Chernik, “Kelaloteha u-Peraṭoteh,” 109; and Friedman, “Mah ʿInyan Har Sinai eṣel 
Shemiṭah,” 394-95n24. 
523 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. 
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the identification of “fruit of the goodly tree” [Lev. 23:40] as the citron as the paradigm 
of unanimously accepted interpretations contained in the Oral Torah.524) Maimonides 
even suggested that the phrases “general rules” and “details” refer to use of the middot 
(hermeneutical rules; among which are the rules of kelal u-peraṭ and peraṭ u-kelal) and 
other interpretive tools to discover “prooftexts (isnādāt), allusions (talwīḥāt), and hints 
(ishārāt)” to transmitted interpretations.525 A similar idea appears in the Introduction to 
the Mishneh Torah, where Maimonides wrote that the 613 commandments “were orally 
imparted to Moses at Sinai, together with their general rules, details, and particulars. All 
these general rules, details, particulars, and expositions (veha-beiʾurin) of every 
commandment constitute the Oral Torah, which each court received from its 
predecessor.”526 
Maimonides’ repeated emphasis on the two-fold revelation of the commandments 
and their explanations suggests that he structured revelation itself around the 613 
commandments (as mentioned in the Introduction), and that he viewed the revealed text 
of Scripture as a vehicle for their transmission.527 
                                                 
524 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16-17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
336-37. Shailat, there, 89-90, noted Maimonides’ rereading of this midrash in the Commentary. See also 
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 263-64. Compare Hilkhot Shofar ve-Sukkah ve-Lulav, 7:2. 
525 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 337. 
Translation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 271. On these terms, see there, 272-76. 
See the similar statement at the outset of Principle Two; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12. 
526  ןיקודקדהו תוטרפהו תוללכה ןתוא לכ ןהיקודקדו ןהיתוטרפו ןהיתוללכו ןה יניסב השמל ול ורמאנש תוצמ ג"ירת םה ולא
קש הפ לעבש הרות איה הוצמו הוצמ לכ לש ןירואיבהויןיד תיב יפמ ןיד תיב ולב ; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen 
et al., 65 lines 503-505. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 40-41, with slight changes. 
527 This suggestion differs somewhat from Halbertal’s suggestion that Maimonides used the 613 
commandments as the “architecture” or “structure” of the Mishneh Torah and of the law as a whole (see 
above, nn82, 87); “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 459-61; and idem, Maimonides, 107-111. For an 
alternative explanation of Maimonides’ interest in the 613 commandments, see Friedberg, Crafting the 613 
Commandments, 28-29, 134-53. 
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The Oral Torah and the Tafsīr Marwī 
Maimonides did not use the term “Oral Torah” (torah shebe-ʿal peh) in a 
consistent manner throughout his writings. In its one appearance in the Commentary on 
the Mishnah, Maimonides equated the “Oral Torah” with “the tradition” (al-naql) and the 
revealed tafsīr, and he contrasted it with Scripture (naṣṣ).528 In the Introduction to Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, “Oral Torah” refers to Sinaitic laws. Maimonides asserted that “all of the laws 
of the Torah (sharīʿa), in their entirety – which is the Oral Torah – were transmitted from 
so-and-so, and so-and-so from so-and-so, to Ezra [and] to Moses.”529 In the Introduction 
to the Mishneh Torah, “Oral Torah” usually denotes traditions that originated with 
Moses: Moses transmitted the Oral Torah to Joshua,530 and “the great sages of Israel” 
were also its “transmitters” (maʿatiqim).531 In certain places in that work, however, 
Maimonides included post-Mosaic laws in the term “Oral Torah.” Thus, for example, he 
claimed that the Mishneh Torah covers the entire Oral Torah,532 and he described the 
Sanhedrin as the “essence (ʿiqar) of the Oral Torah” (Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:1).533 
                                                 
528 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:1-2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. 
See also idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:98, 1:320. Kafiḥ usually translated naql and the passive participle 
manqūl as torah shebe-ʿal peh; e.g., idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:148 (mSan 1:3), 5:175 (mHul 
1:2). 
529 ונבר השמ ילא ארזע ילא ןאלפ ןע ןאלפו ןאלפ ןע היורמ הפ לעבש הרות יהו אהלכ העירשלא םאכחא; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 2 (introduction). 
530 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 2 lines 11-12. 
531 הפ לעבש הרות םיקיתעמה לארשי ימכח ילודג; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 10 line 
109. This denotation appears elsewhere, as in the division between the Written Torah, Oral Torah, and 
Talmud (Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:11-12); see below. 
532 לכה יפב הרודס הלוכ הפ לעבש הרות אהתש דע; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 13 lines 
158-59. 
533 הפ לעבש הרות רקיע םה םילשוריבש לודגה ןיד תיב. Note the narrow use of “Oral Torah” in the Short 
Enumeration in the Introduction to the Mishnah Torah, Negative Commandment #313 (hereafter the Short 
Enumeration), where Maimonides defined the Oral Torah as “the explanation” of the Written Torah 
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In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides asserted that 
the tafsīr marwī (transmitted interpretation) contains “meanings of ambiguous 
expressions” (jumal maʿānī).534 Referring to Lev. 23:42, “You shall sit in booths seven 
days,” he wrote that the tafsīr marwī relates divine clarifications of this verse: who is 
obligated to sit in a booth, how to construct it, and how to “sit” in it.535 According to 
Maimonides, there could be no disagreement (ikhtilāf) over a matter of tafsīr; nobody 
ever denied that “fruit of the goodly tree” (Lev. 23:40) is the citron or that “an eye for an 
eye” (Ex. 21:24; Deut. 19:21536) imposes financial, and not physical, punishment. Any 
“sources” for these readings in rabbinic literature, he claimed, are merely hints to laws 
that are known by means of the tafsīr.537 By the same token, asserted Maimonides, a 
prophet may neither add to nor subtract from either the verses (nuṣūṣ) or the tafsīr marwī. 
                                                 
(peirushah); Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 61 lines 431-32. At the outset of Hilkhot Mamrim, this 
prohibition is “Not to add to the Torah, neither the written commandments nor their explanation (be-
feirushan) that we learned mi-pi ha-shmuʿa” and “Not to subtract from the entirety (min ha-kol).” 
According to Hilkhot Megillah ve-Ḥanukah, 2:18, unlike the rest of the Prophets and Writings, the Book of 
Esther will never be annulled, “like the Five Books of the Torah and the laws (halakhot) of the Oral 
Torah.” Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 8:15, forbids benefit from forbidden foods “unless Scripture exempts it 
… or it is explicated (she-yitparesh) in the Oral Torah.” See the usage in the Epistle to Yemen; above, n518. 
Discussion of the Mishneh Torah sources largely relies on Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 168; idem, 
“Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,”13n8; and idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 27; Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 114n91, 260n71, accepted Blidstein’s view. It is possible to read Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:1, 
more narrowly. Henshke claimed Maimonides always used this term in the narrow sense; “Le-Yesodei,” 
128-29n78. See Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 488-92, who discussed many of these 
sources; and Chernick, “Kelaloteha u-Peraṭoteha mi-Sinai,” 119. 
534 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:2; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 327. 
See Shailat’s notes there, 27n3, 327n2. On the term mujmal, see Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 440-50; 
Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 43-44; and Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 106-108. For 
other Maimonidean use of the term mujmal, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:21; Haqdamot ha-
Rambam, ed. Shailat, 340 ( למ'גמ םאלכב אהלעפיב הללא רמא ... לקנלא א'גו ); and Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 
2:175 (mPes 4:6). Elsewhere, the phrase jumal (al-)maʿānī appears to mean “groups of matters”; see Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 337 (Neg. 349); and Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:341 (mKer 1:1). 
535 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:3; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328.  
536 See Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16n50. 
537 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16-17; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
336-37; see above, n524. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 161-64, 276-80. 
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For example, a prophet cannot read Deut. 25:12, “You shall cut off her hand,” literally 
(ḥaqīqa), according to its ẓāhir meaning, because “the tradition brought” (jāʾa al-naql) 
teaching that “cut off” refers to the imposition of financial punishment.538 Material 
designated as naql, i.e., tradition, can also play an interpretive role. For example, one 
teaching which Maimonides described as having “brought to us by the tradition” (jāʾnā 
al-naql),539 is designated in the Mishneh Torah as mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, from aural 
tradition (Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 9:3).540 This underscores Maimonides’ claim that 
rabbinic exegesis often records Sinaitic traditions that are not contained in Scripture.541 
These uses of the term tafsīr resemble ways in which the term was used by certain 
qurʾānic exegetes, as Mordechai Cohen noted.542 For example, both Abū Manṣūr al-
Māturīdī (d. c. 944) and Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (15th c.) used “tafsīr” to denote traditional, 
transmitted exegesis.543 
                                                 
538 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:6; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 330. 
The verb jāʾa, to reach or arrive, was Maimonides’ preferred way to describe the transmission of extra-
scriptural traditions. 
539 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:13; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 334.  
540 העומשה יפמ םינושאר 'ימכחמ ונדמל. In the Introduction to the Commentary, Maimonides also termed 
this a “statement of the Sages (naṣṣ lil-ḥakhamim) in the Talmud”; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:12; 
Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 334. This may relate to the uncommon phrase “the early Sages taught 
us” here. The tradition is a gloss of Deut. 18:15 found in bSan 90a. 
541 See Guttmann, “Die Bedeutung der Tradition,” 211-12; and the similar point in Rabinovitch, 
ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 132-35. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 262-63, 
coordinated Maimonides’ Hebrew and Arabic classificatory terms. See the examples there, 392. 
542 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 457-58; and idem, “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Bāb/Abwāb al-
Taʾwīl’,” 163. 
543 See Andrew Rippin, “Exegesis of the Qurʾān: Classical and Medieval,” Encyclopaedia of the 
Qurʾān, ed. Jane Dammen McAuliffe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 2:100-101; and Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 
154. While the term tafsīr marwī usually refers to legal matters, Bacher collected several examples in 
which it denotes non-legal material; Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 28n1; Ha-Rambam 
Parshan ha-Miqra, 32n1; and idem, “Die Agada in Maimunis Werken,” in Moses ben Maimon, 2:160. 
Bloomberg described the tafsīr marwī as the “traditional interpretation of a verse as revealed to Moses”; 
“Arabic Legal Terms,” 33. 
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In the Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides subtly 
distinguished between the terms tafsīr marwī and halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, both of 
which denote Sinaitic traditions that were never subject to debate. Because of the 
“wisdom of the revealed speech” (ḥikmat al-kalām al-munzal),544 he claimed, later 
generations were able to use qiyās to derive (istikhrāj) hints to the tafsīr. By contrast, he 
wrote, a hint about a law designated as halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai is more tenuous, and 
is designated an asmakhta (support) or siman (sign). Hints of this sort did not discern the 
“intent” (gharaḍ) of Scripture.545  
 
Post-Mosaic Legal Activity 
According to Maimonides, religious leaders who transmitted Sinaitic traditions 
after revelation passed on the innovations of previous generations and expanded the law 
through their own intellectual exploration. This process, he claimed, continued without 
interruption from the time of Joshua until that of Ravina and Rav Ashi, which is 
designated (bBM 86a) as the “end” of authoritative teaching (sof horaʾah).546 Post-
Mosaic expansion utilized qiyās and intellectual speculation; prophecy was excluded 
from this process. 
Maimonides asserted that the Mishnah and the two Talmuds comprise both the 
received traditions and their expansions. In the Introduction to the Commentary on the 
                                                 
544 Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two). See also Bacher, Die 
Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 28-29n6; Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, 32n4. 
545 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:17-19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
336-39. See Bacher, Die Bibelexegese Moses Maimûni’s, 29n1; Ha-Rambam Parshan ha-Miqra, 33n1. On 
gharaḍ, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 278n126. 
546 On the term horaʾah, see above, n213. 
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Mishnah, he explained that R. Judah the Prince, the second-century redactor of the 
Mishnah, “collected the transmitted material (al-riwāyāt), doctrines, and stated debates 
from Moses until his time.”547 The Mishnah, wrote Maimonides, includes three 
components: (1) the explanation of the written commandments (tafsīr al-sharāʾiʿ al-
manṣūṣa), meaning traditions transmitted (riwāyāt marwīya) from Moses; (2) material 
whose validity or authority is unanimously agreed on that is derived (mustakhrājāt) 
through qiyās; and (3) material debated by those who perform qiyās (al-qiyāsīyīn).548 Rav 
Ashi, claimed Maimonides, did the same for the Talmud; he collected the doctrines, 
details (tafaqqah; see below), and the explanation (tafsīr)549 of the law. In so doing, he 
wrote, Rav Ashi verified the accuracy of the transmitted material (ṣaḥḥaḥa al-riwāyāt).550 
In his comments on “the rebellious elder,” Maimonides posited that this fractious figure 
is one who disagrees either with a transmitted matter (al-shayʾ al-marwī) or with a 
product of the Sanhedrin’s qiyās and speculation (naẓar). Interpreting the scriptural 
instruction (Deut. 17:11) to obey the High Court, Maimonides pointedly identified these 
two categories: “In accordance with the instruction given you and the ruling handed 
down to you” refers to derived laws while “the verdict that they announce to you” to 
received interpretations.551 
                                                 
547 המאיא ילא וניבר השמ ןדל ןמ הלוקמלא תאפאלת'כאלאו ליואקאלאו תאיאורלא עמ'גו; Maimonides, Mishnah 
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336. 
548 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336. 
549 Kafiḥ translated this word using the plural (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34), but Shailat, 
the singular (Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 51). 
550 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 348. 
551 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:221 (mSan 11:2). See also Hilkhot Mamrim, 
1:2; and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10 (Prin. One). According to Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 45, the 
similar interpretation of Deut. 17:11 in Hilkhot Mamrim, 1:2, is not found in rabbinic literature; see 
however below, n578. On the rebellious elder, see also Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 
158. 
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Maimonides also drew attention to these two sources of law in the Introduction to 
the Mishneh Torah. He claimed that the jurists who lived prior to R. Judah the Prince had 
written for themselves “the exposition of the Torah and of its laws … and the new 
matters innovated (she-nitḥadshu) in each generation, which had not been received by 
aural tradition (mi-pi ha-shemuʿah) but had been deduced by application of the thirteen 
middot (hermeneutical rules).”552 R. Judah the Prince, he wrote, collected the Mosaic 
traditions (shmuʿot) and the material that the court of each generation derived (lamdu).553 
Similarly, wrote Maimonides, the two Talmuds include matters innovated after the time 
of Moses, along with the law “transmitted in an unbroken chain (she-heʿetiqu ish mi-pi 
ish) from the time of Moses, as he received it from Sinai.”554 
 
The Transmission of Received Material 
Maimonides used the Arabic root r-w-y to denote the act of transmission and the 
noun riwāya to denote transmitted material; this root also appears in the phrase tafsīr 
marwī (a transmitted interpretation).555 Muslim writers used this root similarly, often 
referring to the study of ḥadīth as ilm al-riwāya (lit., the science of transmission).556 In 
                                                 
552  אלש 'ינידב רדו רוד לכב ושדחנתש םירבדמו עשש ומכ היתוכלהמו הרותה רואיבמ וחוכ יפכ ומצעל בתוכ דחאו דחא לכ
תודמ הרשע שלשמ הדמב אלא העומשה יפמ םודמל; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 lines 49-51; 
see also there, 9-10 lines 97-105. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 36, with slight 
changes.  
553 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 lines 52-54. 
554 יניסמ וניבר השמ יפמ שיא יפמ שיא וקיתעהש ומכ; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 9 
lines 96-97. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 37, with slight changes. See also Hilkhot 
Mamrim, 5:2. 
555 See in detail, Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms,” 38-40; and below. 
556 Gregor Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam, trans. Uwe Vagelpohl and ed. James 
E. Montgomery (London: Routledge, 2006), 41-42; and Eerik Dickinson, The Development of Early 
Sunnite Ḥadīth Criticism: The Taqdima of Ibn Abī Ḥātim Al-Rāzī (240/854-327/938) (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 
107-109. 
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the Mishneh Torah, the Hebrew root ʿ-t-q is used to denote the transmission of Sinaitic 
materials557 and the sages are referred to as “the transmitters” (ha-maʿatiqim) or “the 
transmitters of aural tradition” (maʿatiqei ha-shemuʿah).558 
The Commentary on the Mishnah occasionally refers to large groups of people 
who transmitted the Oral Torah, and, at other times, to individuals who did so. 
Maimonides claimed, for example, that before Moses died, “the people” verified 
(saḥḥaḥū) the riwāya or tafsīr.559 On the other hand, Moses is said to have conveyed 
(ḥamala) the traditions to Joshua and the Elders (zeqeinim),560 and the first of ten closing 
chapters in the Introduction to the Commentary contains a list of 91 rabbis who 
transmitted Mosaic traditions and other laws.561 Transmissions by elites and by groups 
are conflated in Maimonides’ comment that mAv 1:1 proves “the veracity of the chain of 
authorities (ṣiḥḥat al-sanad) and the tradition (al-naql) – that it is authentic (or, sound; 
ṣaḥīḥ), the masses (or: community; al-kāffa) from the masses.”562 The same two types of 
                                                 
557 See Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 9 line 97; Hilkhot Tefilin u-Mezuzah ve-
Sefer Torah, 7:8; Hilkhot Shabbat, 27:1; and Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 2:15. Compare above, n267. 
558 See above, n531; and Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:9. See Bacher, “Zum sprachlichen Charakter,” 
288; and Henshke, “Le-Ṭaʿamah shel Halakhah,” 47n10. 
559 See above, n511. 
560 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328. 
Maimonides implied that some Elders received parts of the tradition independently of Joshua, a claim 
reminiscent of the assumption in ḥadīth literature that no single Companion received the entire tradition. 
561 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:50-52; Shailat did not include these chapters. 
R. Judah the Prince is the most celebrated figure; elsewhere, Maimonides enumerated his isnād to Moses; 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15-16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336. See the praise for R. 
Judah the Prince cited above, n399. Compare the second of these closing chapters, which lists 37 lesser 
figures who did not transmit tradition but were involved in various events, taught a moralistic statement 
(adab), or a derashah. 
562 הפאכלא ןע הפאכלא חיחצ הנא לקנלאו דנסלא החצ ךמלעיל; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 
1:29; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 345. Blau, Dictionary, 600 s.v. ّةفاك, preferred “community” here, 
but my sense is that Maimonides excluded the Jewish collective. Kafiḥ offered ḥaburah (group) and Shailat 
rabbim (many), Michael Schwarz has ṣibbur (community); Maimonides, Shemonah Peraqim: ve-hem 
Haqdamat ha-Rambam le-Feirusho le-Masekhet Avot, trans. Michael Schwarz, intro. Sara Klein-Braslavy 
(Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2011), 3n2. See also Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:221n6 
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transmission are also noted in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, which states that 
the Oral Torah passed from Moses, to Joshua, etc., and was also transmitted by the courts 
of certain individuals, such that “thousands and tens of thousands” were involved.563  
Maimonides was sensitive to the fact that the Mishnah’s naming of tradents 
weakened his assertion that its contents were of Sinaitic origin. Echoing claims found in 
Sherira’s Epistle, he explained that the original style of transmitting traditions – 
associated with Simeon the Just (fl. c. 200 BCE), whose statements are “brief, containing 
many matters”564 – proved adequate for earlier generations, but later ones required more 
detail.565 Moreover, according to Maimonides, certain legal positions which the Talmud 
ascribes to individual rabbis were actually matters of consensus, for the view of the one 
was accepted by others. Maimonides also asserted that the talmudic ascription of 
anonymous mishnaic passages to R. Meir (bʿEiruv 96b; bSan 86a) simply means that R. 
Meir was the tradition’s final transmitter. In most cases, claimed Maimonides, there was 
unanimity regarding these derived laws, or Moses himself was their transmitter.566 
                                                 
(mSan 11:2). This comment appears to relate to the idea of tawātur; see above, n222. Compare the 
comment that mAv 1:1 highlights a narrow group of transmitters; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 1:15-16; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335-36. See Blidstein, “Mishnah Avot 1:1,” 60-61. 
563 םהמ ועמשש תובברו םיפלא םהמעו; Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 1-9, at 9 lines 90-
91. For Maimonides’ explanation of the term “court,” see above, n514. 
564 הרי'תכ ןאעמ ילע אלמתשמ אזי'גו אמאלכ הנשמלא יפ ינעא היפ המאלכ לע'גו; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:33; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 348. See the repeated praise for Simeon the 
Just; idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:15, 1:50, 1:52; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 336; and 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:169 (mMen 13:10). Compare Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq 
le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem, Kitāb Kifāyat al-ʿAbidin (Part Two, Volume Two), ed. Nissim Dana (Ramat Gan: Bar 
Ilan University, 1989), 310:  יכאלמו הירכז יגח איבנאלא קיפר הלודגה תסנכ ירישמ םלע דק אמכ והו 'סלא 'לע קידצה ןועמש
ג ןהכ שמיש והו הריגוינש תיב לוא יפ לוד . On Simeon the Just in Abraham’s Kifāya, see Gerson Cohen “The 
Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” PAAJR 35 (1967): 96-98; 36 (1968): 40-44. 
565 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:33-34; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
348. See Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 8-9. 
566 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:55. Compare Sherira’s claim that R. Meir did 
not create anonymous mishnahs but received them from R. Aqivah, who received them from his teachers; 
Lewin, Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon, 26-27. 
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Post-Mosaic Legal Creativity 
According to Maimonides, leaders from Joshua until the close of the Talmud 
developed new laws in a consistent fashion. “What Joshua and Pinḥas did in the realm of 
speculation (maʿnā al-naẓar) and qiyās (here: reasoning),” he wrote, “is that which 
Ravina and Rav Ashi did.”567 The intellect – not prophecy – is the source of all post-
Mosaic laws.568 
In his characterization of the activities that resulted in expansion of the legal 
corpus, Maimonides used several verbs, whose meanings overlap considerably: istikhrāj 
                                                 
567 ישא ברו אניבר לעפי י'דלא וה סאיקלאו ר'טנלא ינעמ יפ סיחנפו עשוהי הלעפי אמ; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 329. 
568 תודמ הרשע שלשב עורפלא 'גאר'כתסאו הרותלא ריספת יפ ר'טנלא יפ הדיפמ ריג הובנלא; Maimonides, Mishnah 
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 329. Maimonides claimed that prophecy is 
only of use for temporary laws (horaʾat shaʿah); Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:12; Haqdamot ha-
Rambam, ed. Shailat, 334. See also Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:212 (mHul 7:6), and Hilkhot Yesodei 
ha-Torah, chap. 9. 
On the unique role of Mosaic prophecy for halakhic matters, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-
Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 37-38; idem, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-Foseq, 29; Twersky, Introduction to 
the Code of Maimonides, 455n239; Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 114-15; idem, “Masoret ve-
Samkhut Mosdit,” 12; idem, “Mi-Yesod ha-Nevuʾah,” 25-28; Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 
462-68; idem, ʿAl Derekh ha-Emet, 33-35; Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 129-34; idem, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-
Din’,” 252n74; idem, “Miṣvot ha-Avot u-Miṣvot Sinai: Parashat Gid ha-Nasheh ke-Fereq be-Tefisat ha-
Halakhah shel ha-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 2:619-46; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 
259-60, 486n17; Daniel Lasker “Maimonides’ Influence on Karaite Theories of Prophecy and Law,” 
Maimonidean Studies 1 (1990): 105n21; and Aviram Ravitsky, “Maduʿa Neʿerkhu Hilkhot Aveil be-Sefer 
‘Shoftim’? ʿAl Samkhuto shel Moshe be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” in Samkhut Ruḥanit: Maʾavaqim ʿal Koaḥ 
Tarbuti be-Hagut ha-Yehudit, eds. Howard Kreisel et al. (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University, 2010), 71-
82. On Mosaic prophecy in general, see the sources in Mor Altshuler, “Rabbi Joseph Karo and Sixteenth-
Century Messianic Maimonideanism,” in The Cultures of Maimonideanism, 198n35. Add Faur, ʿIyunim be-
Mishneh Torah, 13-18; Kalman Bland, “Moses and the Law According to Maimonides,” in Mystics, 
Philosophers, and Politicians: Essays in Jewish Intellectual History in Honor of Alexander Altmann, eds. 
Jehuda Reinharz et al. (Durham: Duke University Press, 1982), 49-66; Israel Yuval, “Moshe redivivus: Ha-
Rambam ke-‘ʿOzer le-Melekh’ ha-Mashiaḥ,” Ẓion 72, no. 2 (2007): 161-78; and Yidiel Waldman, 
“Maʿamadan shel Shevaʿ Miṣvot Benei Noaḥ Qodem Matan Torah be-Mishnat ha-Rambam,” Mesorah le-
Yosef 8 (2014): 443-75. Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 13n1, noted the emphasis on Mosaic prophecy in 
Maimonides’ father Maimon’s Igeret Neḥamah; see L.M. Simmons, “Maimun’s Letter of Consolation. 
Arabic Text,” JQR 2, no. 3 (o.s.) (1890): 5, 9. On the authorship of this text, see, however, David J. 
Wasserstein, “The Date and Authorship of the Letter of Consolation Attributed to Maymūn b. Yūsuf,” JSAI 
32 (2006): 410-18. 
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(to derive or deduce), tantīj (to infer or draw out), tafaqqah (“to treat the specifications 
and ramifications of a religious law”569), and occasionally, instinbāṭ (to draw out or 
extract).570 He also referred to legal “speculation” (naẓar), qiyās, and “deductions” 
(natāʾij) of furūʿ, i.e., branches, from uṣūl, i.e., roots.571 These terms echo usages among 
earlier Andalusian Rabbanites, especially Ibn Ghiyāth’s interpretation of “a sage is 
greater than a prophet,” discussed above, and in Qaraite writings.572 Maimonides called 
the rabbis “the people (ahl) of qiyās (reasoning)” and “the people of speculation 
(naẓar).”573 In the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah, he referred to non-Sinaitic law as 
having been “innovated” (ḥ-d-sh) or “ordained” (t-q-n) by various individuals.574  
Maimonides portrayed legal creativity as having begun immediately after Moses’ 
death, for Joshua and the Elders derived new laws through qiyās by means of the middot 
                                                 
569 Blau, Dictionary, 512 s.v. هقف; see the next note. 
570 On istikhrāj, see Sarah Stroumsa, “Ha-Im haya ha-Rambam Hogeh Muwaḥidi?” in ʿAlei 
ʿAshor: Divrei ha-Veʿidah ha-ʿAsirit shel ha-Ḥevrah le-Ḥeiqer ha-Tarbut ha-ʿAravit ha-Yehudit shel Yemei 
ha-Beinayim, eds. Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai and Daniel Lasker (Beʾer Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press, 
2008), 157; Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 470n23; on istikhrāj and instinbāṭ, see Ravitsky, 
“Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 212n5; and on many of these terms, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 264-67, 469-71. The verb tafaqqah is particularly important for Sefer ha-Miṣvot, though in 
that work, it is used differently than in the Commentary on the Mishnah; see below, below, nn921-944. 
Note also the use of tafaqqah, apparently to denote extracting new laws, in Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:417 (intro to mAv). 
571 See esp. Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4, 14-15, 20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, 
ed. Shailat, 329, 335-36, 339. On natāʾij, note the comment in Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 
213n7. 
572 Lasker, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-Rambam,” 150; idem, “Maimonides and the Karaites,” 
313; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 215. Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 137, wrote that 
Maimonides agreed with Qaraites on several theological matters. See also Blidstein, “Oral Law as 
Institution,” 171. 
573 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335; 
idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:609. Noted in Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 138. 
574 Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 6 line 50, 9 line 100, 65 line 509,. Maimonides 
termed these laws “clearly established judgments and rules” (mishpaṭim ve-dinim peliʾim); 10 line 102 
(following the reading found in the majority of manuscripts). See idem, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
89n1. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 37. This claim was central to Faur’s 
presentations; see “De-Orayta, de-Rabbanan ve-Dinim Muflaʾim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam,” Sinai 67 
(1970): 20-35. 
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(hermeneutical rules). These middot, he asserted, were Sinaitic.575 Some of the 
derivations were accepted by consensus (ijmāʿ); “the analogizers” (al-qiyāsīyīn) 
developed other derived laws through debate. Debates were resolved according to the 
majority, based on “Follow the majority” (Ex. 23:2), and each generation derived new 
furūʿ, branches, from received traditions.576 The Torah itself made it clear that the law 
could not be changed by any post-Mosaic developments; after all, wrote Maimonides, the 
phrase “it is not in the heavens” (Deut. 30:12) precludes later prophecy.577 In lieu of 
prophecy, Maimonides asserted, God “assigned us” (aḥālnā), that is, the post-Mosaic 
community, to sages, or “the people of qiyās,” alluded to in the biblical phrase, (Deut. 
17:9) “The judge in those days.”578 Subsequent generations treated laws derived by 
earlier ones as “principles” (uṣūl), extracting new rules from them.579 As Halbertal and 
Mordechai Cohen noted, these claims parallel the definition of “talmud” (or “gemara”) 
offered in Maimonides’ Mishneh Torah. Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 1:11, defines talmud as 
                                                 
575 Louis Finkelstein argued that Maimonides retracted the claim that the middot are Sinaitic; “Ha-
Deʿah ki 13 ha-Middot hen Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai,” in Sefer ha-Zikaron le-Rabbi Shaul Liberman, 
ed. Shamma Friedman (New York: Beit Midrash ha-Rabbanim de-America, 1993), 81-84, building on 
Elijah Alfandari, Seder Eliyahu Rabbah ve-Zuta (Constantinople, 1719), 69b. Finkelstein’s arguments are 
not convincing; see Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 89-90n154. Maimonides 
termed them thirteen qawānīn (canons or principles). On qawānīn, see Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 
132n61, 138n25; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 214. Maimonides intimated that even 
Moses derived laws; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two). He also posited that Moses originated 
several ordinances; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:22; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 340; 
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 14 line 165; Hilkhot Tefillah, 12:1, 13:8; and Hilkhot Aveil, 1:1. See 
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 111. 
576 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 328. 
The Maimonidean (and rabbinic) reading of Ex. 23:2 is, of course, acontextual. For background, see 
Ephraim Urbach, “ʿAl ha-Kelal ‘Aḥarei Rabbim le-Haṭot’,” in Meḥqarim be-Madaʿei ha-Yahadut, eds. 
Moshe David Herr and Yonah Frankel (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1998), 503-509. 
577 See above, n568. 
578 His reading of this verse is strikingly similar to that of Ibn Ghiyāth; see above, n472. I have not 
found this reading in rabbinic literature; see above, n551. 
579 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:14; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 335. 
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“deducing conclusions from premises, developing implications of statements, comparing 
dicta, and understanding the middot by which the Torah is interpreted.”580 
The relationship between qiyās and the middot in Maimonides’ writings is not 
entirely clear. In many places, Maimonides connected qiyās with the middot, but qiyās 
often has broader denotation.581 As Aviram Ravitsky noted, Maimonides compared legal 
qiyās to dialectical syllogisms (al-maqāyīs al-jadalīya), and he contrasted these with 
demonstrative syllogisms. Dialectical syllogisms are based on one or more mere 
conventions (mashhūrāt) and therefore subject to disagreement, but demonstrative 
syllogisms are based on perceptions, primary intellegibles, and experience. Conclusions 
from these syllogisms are apodictic (burhān).582 Disagreements in rabbinic literature are 
to be expected, according to Maimonides, because rabbinic derivations are akin to 
dialectical syllogisms.583 Maimonides cited as a paradigmatic example a rabbinic debate 
                                                 
580 ןהב תשרדנ הרותהש תודמב ןיביו רבדל רבד המדיו רבדמ רבד איצויו ותישארמ רבד 'ירחא ליכשיו ןיבי; Maimonides, 
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 179 lines 42-43. Translation follows Twersky, A Maimonides Reader, 
65, with slight changes. Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 470-71; and Cohen, Opening the Gates 
of Interpretation, 469. See also Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 489-500. Compare 
Sherira Gaon’s definition of “talmud,” analyzed in Fishman, Becoming the People of the Talmud, 23-28. 
581 See above, nn426-434. 
582 Translations based on Israel Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic (Maḳālah fi-Ṣinʿat al-
Manṭiḳ): The Original Arabic and Three Hebrew Translations,” PAAJR 8 (1937-1938): 47-48 (English 
pagination). Treatment in Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 198-200; and Arthur Hyman, 
“Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic Arguments in the Philosophy of Moses Maimonides,” in Moses 
Maimonides and his Time, ed. Eric L. Ormsby (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1989), 42-51. See also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 250-51, 268-69. On 
disagreements resulting from dialectical syllogisms, see Hyman, “Demonstrative, Dialectical, and Sophistic 
Arguments,” 41-43, citing Guide, I:31, II:22. On mashhūrāt, see Israel Efros, “Maimonides’ Arabic 
Treatise on Logic,” PAAJR 34 (1966): 22 (Hebrew pagination; chap. 8). For Aristotelian background, see 
Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 202. 
583 See Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:4; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
328. Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 203-205, 208n59; see also Arthur Hyman, “A Note on 
Maimonides’ Classification of Law,” PAAJR 46 (1979-1980): 335-38. On al-Fārābi as the source for the 
broad understanding of mashhūrāt, see Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 19 (English pagination); 
Kraemer, “Maimonides’ Use of (Aristotelian) Dialectic,” 128n20; and Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-
Hilkhatiyim,” 204n38. 
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(mBer 8:4) about whether to clean the house and then wash one’s hands, or the reverse. 
Asserting that Moses transmitted neither view, Maimonides labeled these and similar 
debates as “branches of the branches of the branches” (furūʿ furūʿ al-furūʿ).584 Ravitsky 
suggested that this debate is emblematic because it concerns, like dialectical syllogisms, a 
matter of convention.585 
One of Maimonides’ goals for his Commentary on the Mishnah was “the 
clarification of the reasons that a position was adopted and the occurrence of 
disagreement between the disputants.”586 One example, concerning cases of restitution, is 
the rabbinic debate (mGiṭ 5:1) over the meaning of the repayment from “the best of his 
field” (Ex. 22:4). Does “his” refer to the victim or to the offender? Maimonides classified 
this verse as an instance of “ḍamīr,” a term from qurʾānic exegesis (where it is usually 
                                                 
584 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. 
585 Ravitsky, “Ha-Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 207-208. 
586 ןיפלת'כמלא ןיב ףאלת'כאלא עקו אהל'גאל יתלא ללעלאו םאלכלא ךל'ד ע'צתא אהל'גאל יתלא ללעלא ראה'טאו; 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:48; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 358. On the 
passive meaning of eighth form verbs, see Joshua Blau, Diqduq ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit shel Yemei-ha-
Beinayim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1961), §84. Compare Maimonides’ comment about the Talmud’s goals 
when clarifying the Mishnah; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:34-35; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
349. 
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termed iḍmar; lit., ellipsis) meaning “incomplete” or “requiring a supplemental 
object,”587 and he often noted that other debates turn on similar questions.588 
In short, Maimonides understood that the purpose of rabbinic qiyās was to 
elucidate unclear statements and that many rabbinic disagreements had arisen while 
                                                 
587 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:221 (mGiṭ 5:1). On iḍmar, see C.H.M. 
Versteegh, Arabic Grammar and Qurʾanic Exegesis in Early Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1993), 146-51; Kinga 
Dévényi, “ʾIḍmar in the Maʿānī of al-Farrāʾ: A Grammatical Approach between Description and 
Explanation,” in Approaches to Arabic Linguistics: Presented to Kees Versteegh on the Occasion of his 
Sixtieth Birthday, eds. Everhard Ditters and Harald Motzki (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 45-65; and Michael C. 
Carter and Kees Versteegh, “ʾIḍmār,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic Linguistics, ed. Kees Versteegh (Leiden: 
Brill, 2006), 2:300-302. For similar uses of the term ḍamīr, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:415 
(mʿOrl 3:9), 5:50 (mZev 5:8), 5:85 (mZev 13:3), 6:275 (mOhal 7:2), 6:359 (mNeg 5:4); idem, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131), 279 (Neg. 199); idem, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 32 (I:21), 
326 (III:13); and below, n668. For one use in Saʿadya, see Meira Polliack and Marzena Zawanowska, 
“‘God Would not Give the Land, but to the Obedient’: Medieval Karaite Responses to the Curse of Canaan 
(Genesis 9:25),” in The Gift of the Land and the Fate of the Canaanites in Jewish Thought, eds. Katell 
Berthelot et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), 141n20. See also the references in Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 541. 
Compare Maimonides’ use of taqdīr (“restoring lost elements”) to translate the talmudic phrase 
ḥasorei miḥasra; see Ḥanokh Gamliel, “‘Ḥasorei Miḥasra’ – le-Darkho shel ha-Rambam be-Feirush ha-
Mishnah,” Neṭuʿim 8 (2002): 65-72. On taqdīr in Maimonides’ writings, see also Hadassa Shy, “Targumo 
shel ha-Rav Yosef Kafiḥ le-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David 
Kafiḥ, 148-54; idem, “Taqdīr and its Counterparts in Mediaeval Judaeo-Arabic,” in Genizah Research after 
Ninety Years, 149-50, 153; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 399-400, 401n48 
588 A similar disagreement arose concerning the requirement that “the congregation” (Lev. 4:10) 
offer a sin following communal transgression. Does “congregation” mean each tribe, the High Court, or 
both (mHor 1:6)? Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:475 (mHor 1:6). This type of 
explanation recurs in several other passages. Preliminary examination has uncovered: idem, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:18 (mBQ 3:9), 5:265 (mBek 7:6), 6:572 (mMiq 8:4); see also 5:353 (mKer 2:3). One 
fascinating example appears in a non-halakhic context. The Mishnah (mʿEd 8:7) records four views about 
Elijah’s role in the eschaton. R. Joshua states, “I received from Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai, who heard 
from his teacher, and his teacher from his teacher, as a halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai” that Elijah will 
distance those drawn close through violence and draw close those who were distanced by violence. 
Translation follows Herbert Danby, The Mishnah: Translated from the Hebrew, with Introduction and Brief 
Explanatory Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 436, with slight changes. R. Judah states that 
Elijah will bring close the distant; R. Simeon that he will remove disagreement; and the Sages that he will 
make peace. The phrase halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai presented a problem for Maimonides because he 
denied the possibility of debate about such dicta. He explained that the disputants did not hear this language 
(naṣṣ) from Moses, but simply that God will gather “outcasts at the ends of the world” (Deut. 30:4) and that 
Elijah will remove iniquities. The rabbis only disagreed about which iniquities Elijah will eradicate; 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:336-37 (mʿEd 8:7). Heschel, Torah min ha-Shamayim, 
2:232, called attention to this passage; see also Shlomi Adler, “Halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai,” Maʿaliyot 25 
(2005): 324-25. Compare the claim that debate only arises if there is no transmission (riwāya); Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. 
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interpreting ambiguous texts. This claim parallels the thesis set forth by Ibn Rushd (b. 
Cordoba, d. Marrākush; 1126-98) in the Introduction to his Bidāyat al-Mujtahid. Ibn 
Rushd explained that legal disagreements arose due to lexical ambiguity in revealed 
texts,589 and he attempted in this book to demonstrate this claim for every recorded 
disagreement among the jurists.590 As Ibn Rushd wrote the Bidāya between the late 1160s 
and 1188,591 this text could not have influenced the Commentary, which Maimonides 
completed in 1167/8.592 Nevertheless, there is no reason to assume that the elements of 
Almohad thought that shaped the perspective of Ibn Rushd did not also affect 
Maimonides’ Commentary on the Mishnah.593 
                                                 
589 Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rushd, Bidāyat al-Mujtahid wa-Nihāyat al-Muqtaṣid (Beirut: Dar 
al-Maʿrifa, 1982), 1:3-4; see the translation of this passage in Yasin Dutton, “The Introduction to Ibn 
Rushd’s ‘Bidāyat al-Mujtahid’,” Islamic Law and Society 1, no. 2 (1994): 200. 
590 Robert Brunschvig, “Averroès Juriste,” in Etudes d’orientalisme dédiées à la mémoire de Lévi-
Provençal, ed. Emilio García Gómez (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve et Larose, 1962), 1:36-37; and Dutton, 
“The Introduction to Ibn Rushd’s ‘Bidāyat al-Mujtahid’,” 191-92. 
591 Brunschvig, “Averroès Juriste,” 37; Maribel Fierro, “The Legal Policies of the Almohad 
Caliphs and Ibn Rushd’s Bidāyat Al-Mujtahid,” Journal of Islamic Studies 10, no. 3 (1999): 242, 244; and 
Dutton, “The Introduction to Ibn Rushd,” 191. 
592 Davidson, Maimonides, 147. See however Simon Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet 
Shabbat: Ṭiyuṭat ha-Peirush le-fi Qeṭaʿim Oṭografiyim me-Genizat Qahir (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2001), 
xix n37. Of course, Maimonides continued to edit the Commentary throughout his life.  
593 Fierro, “The Legal Policies of the Almohad Caliphs,” 245; idem, “Proto-Malikis, Malikis, and 
Reformed Malikis in al-Andalus,” in The Islamic School of Law, 74; Anna Akasoy, Philosophie und Mystik 
in der späten Almohadenzeit: die Sizilianischen Fragen des Ibn Sabʿīn (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 163-64; idem, 
“Ibn Sabʿīn’s Sicilian Questions: The Text, Its Sources, And Their Historical Context,” Al-Qanṭara 29, no. 
1 (2008): 141-42. See also the discussion of qiyās in the Bidāya in Abdel Magid Turki, “La Place 
d’Averroès juriste dans 1'histoire du mālikisme et de 1'Espagne musulmane,” in Multiples Averroès: Actes 
du Colloque Internationale organize à l’occasion du 850e anniversaire de la naissance d’Averroès, Paris 
20-23 septembre 1976, ed. J. Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 37-39. Comparisons of the Bidāya 
and the Mishneh Torah include David Gonzalo Maeso, “Averroes (1126-1198) y Maimonides (1135-1204), 
dos glorias de Cordoba (Paralelo),” Miscelanea de Estudios Árabes y Hebraicos 16, seccion hebreo (1967): 
153-54; Noah Feldman, “War and Reason in Maimonides & Averroes,” Journal of Islamic Law and 
Culture 9, no. 1 (2004): 65-86; and Stroumsa, Maimonides in His World, 68. On these and other grounds, 
the Commentary may be a better comparison. See also Libson, “Zikat ha-Rambam la-Halakhah ha-
Muslemit,” 1:264-67; Anna Akasoy, “Ibn Sabʿīn, Maimónides y la emigración andalusí,” in Maimónides y 
el pensamiento medieval: VIII Centenario de la muerte de Maimónides 9, 10 y 11 de diciembre de 2004, 
ed. José Luis Cantón Alonso (Córdoba: Universidad de Córdoba, 2007), 118-19; and compare Domnique 
Urvoy, “La pensée d’Ibn Tūmart,” Bulletin d’études orientales 27 (1974): 33-37. 
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Maimonides rejected the geonic-era claim that disputes in rabbinic literature arose 
due to lackadaisical students of Shammai and Hillel, writing that this assertion served to 
“besmirch the individuals who transmitted (ḥamalat) the law (al-sharīʿa).”594 Rereading 
the talmudic prooftext (bSan 88b) favored by the geonim, Maimonides claimed that 
Shammai and Hillel had very few disagreements, because they shared many principles 
(uṣūl) and their qiyās, reasoning, led to similar results. Their students argued more, 
however, because they were weaker in the discipline of qiyās. For Maimonides, such 
debates were not indicative of spiritual crisis. This perspective is a leitmotif of the 
Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah.595  
Maimonides’ distinction between revealed law and manmade law underlies his 
interpretation of the biblical prohibition against adding to, or subtracting from, the law 
(Deut. 4:2, 13:11), as Blidstein noted. While the Talmud and geonim understood this 
verse as prohibiting any change to revelation, Maimonides understood it differently: legal 
innovations that are not based in prophecy, he claimed, do not violate this prohibition.596 
 
                                                 
For comparisons of Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah and al-Fārābi’s claims about the 
development of religious law, see Ravitsky, “Ha-Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 218-22. 
594 העירשלא םהנע תלמח ןי'דלא ץא'כשאלא יפ ןעאטו ... לוקלא חיבק ןמ; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 339. On the geonic position, see above, nn286, 288. 
595 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:20-21; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
339. See Moshe Zucker, “Le-Vaʿayat ha-Maḥloqet be-Masoret,” 2:327; Twersky, “Maimonides and Eretz 
Yisrael,” 267-68n21; Blidstein, “Oral Law as Institution,” 171; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 14; 
idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 38; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 25-26; Halbertal, “Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 474; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 267-71. 
596 See especially Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 65-66 lines 509-520. Blidstein, 
“Oral Law as Institution,” 169; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 13; idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 159-62. 
See also Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 477. 
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Maimonides’ Presentation in Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
Though the first two Principles in Maimonides’ Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
explicitly draw on the Introduction to his Commentary on the Mishnah, the later work’s 
concise formulation made it the focal point of subsequent debates.597 Principles One and 
Two argue that non-Mosaic laws cannot constitute distinct commandments. Principle 
One focuses on post-Sinaitic enactments, such as Purim, Hanukah, and the festive Psalms 
recited liturgically on holidays (hallel). Principle Two disentangles midrashim that 
contain tafsīr marwī, i.e., a transmitted interpretation, from those midrashim that create 
new law. 
The overlapping categories of biblical law and enumerated commandments are 
central to this discussion. Sefer ha-Miṣvot often cites the term (mi)de-orayta (Aramaic for 
“from the Torah”) in rabbinic literature to identify laws that constitute distinct 
commandments. In Principle Two, Maimonides claimed that if the Talmud labels a law 
“de-orayta,” then it is a distinct commandment.598 The same is often true of the phrase 
“min ha-torah” (Hebrew for “from the Torah”),599 and he often contrasted min ha-torah 
with rabbinic law.600 The opening Principles likewise distinguish between laws that are 
                                                 
597 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two). Ḥananya ben Menaḥem Qazes’ 
conjectured that Naḥmanides was unaware of this Introduction because it had not yet been translated; Qinat 
Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 57 (Prin. Two); compare the critique of Solomon 
Luria, there, 77 (Prin. Two). On early use of the Commentary, see Kalman Kahana, “Peirush ha-Mishnah 
shel ha-Rambam be-Khtav yado?” Ha-Maʿayan 26, no. 1 (1986): 55-56; no. 2: 58; Yaʿaqov Ḥayim Sofer, 
“ʿAl Sefarim ve-Sofrim,” Ṣefunot 2, no. 3 (1990): 77-80; and Yaʿaqov Shmuel Spiegel, “Ha-Im Raʾu ha-
Rashba veha-Rav ha-Magid u-vaʿal Hagahot Maymoniyot et Peirush ha-Mishnayot le-Rambam?” Ṣefunot 
3, no. 1 (1991): 82-84; compare above, n422. 
598 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13, 15 (Prin. Two). 
599 E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 68 (Pos. 19), 162 (Pos. 203).  
600 This is explicit in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 87 (Pos. 56), 243 (Neg. 135), and 
implicit eleswhere, e.g., 121 (Pos. 122), 125 (Pos. 130), 276 (Neg. 193). Note that the signs of kosher birds 
are not mentioned min ha-torah but are “inferred through induction” (ḥuṣṣilat bil-istiqraʾ) from non-kosher 
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(mi)de-rabbanan (Aramaic for “[from] the rabbis”) or (mi-)divrei sofrim (Hebrew for 
“[from] the words of the scribes”), on the one hand, and biblical law and enumerated 
commandments, on the other.601 In the enumeration itself, Maimonides cited rabbinic use 
of the terms de-orayta or min ha-torah to indicate that a given law constitutes a distinct 
commandment; however in all but three cases, those laws are based on what he termed 
“clear” verses (see below; on the problem of combining discrete laws into larger 
“commandment-units,” see Chapter Four).602 
 
                                                 
birds; there, 133-34. As far as I can tell, Maimonides never used the word istiqraʾ to classify post-Mosaic 
legal derivations. It appears to be a term borrowed from formal logic for this type of intellectual activity. 
He used an identical phrase (ḥuṣṣil bi-ʾistiqrʾi) to describe the identification of the signs of kosher fish; 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:614 (mNid 6:10). See Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 9n6; and 
Joshua ben Abraham ha-Nagid, Teshuvot R. Yehoshua ha-Nagid: al-Masāʾil, ed. and trans. Yehuda 
Raṣhabi (Jerusalem: Mekhon Moshe, 1989), 109. In chap. 6 of the Treatise on Logic, he termed “induction” 
istiqraʾ. Compare Levinger’s claim that according to Maimonides, laws deduced from biblical laws are 
biblical; Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 38-39. This example seems more germane than the one 
adduced by Levinger. 
601 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8-14 passim (Prin. One and Two). For the 
enumeration, see there, 79 (Pos. 37), 240 (Neg. 131), 243 (Neg. 135). For (mi)de-rabbanan as rabbinic 
laws, see there, e.g., 100 (Pos. 78), 243 (Neg. 135), 290 (Neg. 230). 
602 Two of these are likely among the “three [or] four” exceptions to Principle Two that 
Maimonides mentioned in his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan (discussed at length below): the prohibitions 
against an uncircumcised priest consuming heave offerings (terumah) and against consuming wine used in 
idolatrous practices (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 242 [Neg. 135], 276 [Neg. 194]). The third example of 
a de-orayta law that is not based on an explicit verse is the obligation to mourn for one’s relatives, included 
in the commandment obligating priests to render themselves impure through involvement with the corpse 
of a deceased relative: ןושאר םוי תוליבא אתירואד  ...תוליבאלא םאזתלא ןא ןאב דקפ אתירואד  םויב ןכל השע תוצמ הנאו
טקפ ןושארה; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 79 (Pos 37). Compare Hilkhot Aveil, 1:1; see there, chaps. 1-2, 
where these prohibitions are closely intertwined. See Moritz Peritz, “Das Buch der Gesetze, nach seiner 
Anlage und seinem Inhalte untersuchht,” in Moses ben Maimon, 1:456n3; Friedberg, Crafting the 613 
Commandments, 123-25 (showing that Maimonides struggled with the source of the obligation to mourn in 
his later writings); Lawrence Kaplan, “The Unity of Maimonides’ Religious Thought: The Laws of 
Mourning as a Case Study,” in Judaism and Modernity: The Religious Philosophy of David Hartman, ed. 
Jonathan W. Malino (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 393-412. Compare Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 5:27 (mZev 2:1). 
In my view, Maimonides used the phrases min ha-torah and din torah to mean both “distinct, 
enumerated commandment” and “law of biblical status” in his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan; Igrot, ed. Shailat, 
2:453-54. I hope to expand on this elsewhere. 
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Principle One: To Exclude Rabbinic Commandments from the 
Enumeration 
The opening summary of Principle One reads: “It is inappropriate to enumerate in 
this grouping (jumla) the miṣvot that are rabbinic (mide-rabbanan).”603 Maimonides 
directed this Principle against earlier enumerators of the commandments, who, he 
reported, had caused him “pains” (ālām) in his youth.604 Though laws that Maimonides 
deemed rabbinic appear in all earlier enumerations,605 it may be possible to identify his 
specific target. It was probably not Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, whom Maimonides praised for 
counting only a few rabbinic laws.606 Rather, the focus of Maimonides’ criticism was 
probably Saʿadya Gaon. As Moshe Zucker demonstrated, Principle One’s attack on the 
claim that Moses prophesied about Hanukah quotes from Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ.607 
Indeed, later in this Principle, Maimonides asserted that the inclusion of rabbinic laws in 
the count of 613 is unacceptable, “no matter who said it.”608 Given the standing of 
Saʿadya in Maimonides’ world,609 Maimonides may well have been reticent to name the 
                                                 
603 ןנברדמ יה יתלא תוצמלא הלמ'גלא ה'דה יפ דעת ןא יגבני אל הנא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
8, 9 (Prin. One). The categorization of rabbinic laws as miṣvot is unusual; this term usually denotes biblical 
commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot (but not necessarily in the Mishneh Torah); see below, n952. Compare 
the discussion of miṣvot “instituted” (nitḥadshu) after revelation; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 
65 lines 505-506; see the full discussion, lines 509-513; and there, 73 line 133. 
604 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4, 5 (introduction). See above, n95.  
605 See above, nn189-193. 
606 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). Judah Ibn Bilʿam’s commentary on 
Deut. 30:2-6 may have been Maimonides’ source for knowledge of the otherwise lost part of this work; see 
above, n197.  
607 Zucker, “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 97-98. On Maimonides’ access to Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, 
see below, n631. 
608 הלאק ןמ הלאק; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two). 
609 See the Andalusian praise for Saʿadya in Malter, Saadia Gaon, 277-79. On Saʿadya’s influence 
on Maimonides, see Kreisel, “Judah Halevi’s Influence on Maimonides,” 98-99, 101; Robert Brody, 
“Hashpaʿat Ḥiburei ha-Halakhah shel Rav Saʿadya Gaon ʿal Mishneh Torah shel ha-Rambam,” in Ha-
Rambam: Shamranut, Meqoriyut, Mahapkhanut, 1:211-22; Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 
22-23, 33-34; and idem, “Maimonides’ Disagreement with ‘The Torah’ in his Interpretation of Job,” Zutot 
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offending enumerator. (He was similarly coy when he dismissed Saʿadya’s claims about 
the origin of the calendar.610) 
Noting that earlier enumerators were inconsistent in their inclusion of rabbinic 
laws, Maimonides suggested that they had been confused by the Talmud’s discussion 
(bSab 23a) of the benedictory formula in which God is said to have commanded the 
performance of rabbinically-ordained rituals. Maimonides acknowledged that the rabbis 
understood Deut. 17:11, “In accordance with the instruction given you,” as a passage 
demanding obedience to all decrees of the High Court. Still, he argued, if every rabbinic 
ordinance were included in the count, the sum would far exceed 613. Thus, he reasoned, 
the enumeration must only include biblical nuṣūṣ (texts or verses). In setting forth this 
position, Maimonides ignored the Saʿadyanic claim – that he had just quoted! – that the 
commandment to observe Hanukah was revealed by God to Moses.611 
Maimonides declared that laws created after the time of Moses were to be 
regarded as being of rabbinic status. This, he noted, is why the Talmud describes as 
“rabbinic” and “from the words/matters of the Scribes” laws instituted by King Solomon 
(see bSab 14b; bSab 34a; bʿEiruv 5b; mYad 3:2). On these grounds, he faulted earlier 
enumerators for counting laws established by post-Mosaic prophets, such as clothing the 
naked (claiming that their source was Isa. 58:7; “When you see the naked, clothe him”). 
                                                 
4, no. 1 (2004): 75-78; see also Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 28-30. Note 
Maimonides’ praise for Saʿadya in his Epistle to Yemen, in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:100. 
610 See above, n121. 
611 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10, 12 (Prin. One). On this last claim, see Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 287, 291-92, 306, 432. This rhetoric is typical; the Principles often 
manipulate geonic-era texts. Compare Maimonides’ presentation of this blessing in Hilkhot Berakhot, 6:2, 
11:3; see also Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 34n1. 
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Laws of this sort, wrote Maimonides, are “subsumed under” (dākhil taḥta) the 
pentateuchal charge to provide for the poor (Deut. 15:8).612 
Maimonides also identified pentateuchal sources for other post-Mosaic, scriptural 
commandments, such as Ezek. 44:20, which forbids a priest to enter the Temple with 
unkempt hair. Both the Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer ha-Miṣvot consider this 
prohibition subsidiary to the command that Aaron’s sons not mourn for their brothers 
(Lev. 10:6). In the latter work, Maimonides wrote that Ezek. 44:20 “clarified” (bayyana) 
the meaning of Lev. 10:6 (rosheikhem al tifraʿu; NJPS offers “do not bare your heads” 
and “do not dishevel your hair”).613 Maimonides also appears to have sought a 
                                                 
612 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10-11 (Prin. One). He emphasized that reading the 
Book of Esther is not de-orayta, perhaps because it is based on Est. 9:28 (see bMeg 2b). He added that it is 
as if “for them, the Talmud was compiled ‘In a stammering jargon and an alien tongue’ (Isa. 28:11)” ( ץנ
תרחא ןושלבו הפש יגעלב אפלומ אלואה דנע דומלתלא). In the Principles, dākhil taḥta denotes rabbinic law (see there, 
10, 11, 14), but biblical law in the enumeration (210, 286, 337; see 285-86n47). The Commentary does not 
use this phrase consistently to denote one type of law. On some of the challenges with Maimonides’ 
analysis of Deut. 15:8 and his criticism of laws “subsumed under” this verse that appear in earlier 
enumerations, see Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 297-98n41. On geonic-era understandings 
of laws found in the Prophets, see above, nn198-202. 
613 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:195 (mSan 9:6); idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 256 (Neg. 163). He was noncommittal, however, in the Mishneh Torah, initially citing Ezek. 44:20, 
but then equating this prohibition with the prohibition of serving with torn clothing, as both appear in Lev. 
10:6 (eḥad hu; Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 1:8, 1:14); note the parallel statement in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 257 (Neg. 164): דחאו םידגב יעורקו שאר יעורפ םכח. In addition to the standard commentaries; see 
Bacharach, Ḥavat Yair, 181a (§192, no. 48); Jacob Ettlinger, ʿArukh la-Ner Masekhet Sanhedrin 
(Jerusalem, 1931), 68b, s.v. u-faruʿei rosh (bSan 83b); Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:491-93, 3:171; 
and Isaac Simḥah Hurewitz, Sefer ha-Miṣvot ʿim Peirush Yad ha-Levi (Jerusalem, 1926), 225a §3. Others 
struggled with the relationship of Lev. 10:6 and Ezek. 44:20; see the sources in Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 137-38n25. Add the view of Rabad cited in Naḥmanides, Kitvei Rabbeinu Moshe ben 
Naḥman, ed. Charles Ber Chavel (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1963), 2:214 (Torat ha-Adam). The 
talmudic claim that these laws were transmitted orally from Moses to Ezekiel may have been compatible 
with Maimonides’ system, but he seems to have preferred Mosaic verses. Isaac Leon ben Eliezer ibn Ṣur 
Sefardi argued that Maimonides understood the Talmud’s claims, literally; Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 92 (Prin. Two). 
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pentateuchal source for the prohibition, found in Ezek. 44:9, against an uncircumcised 
priest from serving in the Temple.614 
Maimonides’ claims about rabbinic law influenced a ruling that he sent to the 
students of R. Ephraim of Tyre (d. before 1177).615 Ephraim (or his students) had 
inquired if a nazirite, who must abstain from wine (Num. 6:3), may drink wine for the 
sanctification of the Sabbath. Maimonides forbade this because the nazirite’s vow not to 
drink wine was biblical in origin, while the obligation to consecrate the Sabbath over 
wine is (merely) of rabbinic status.616 He explained, in a second responsum, that the 
mishnaic statement that Jews were “adjured from (the time of) Mount Sinai” (mShev 3:6) 
                                                 
614 The Mishneh Torah indicates that the prohibition forbidding an uncircumcised priest from 
serving in the Temple has biblical force (see Hilkhot Sanhedrin 19:4, no. 31; Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 
6:8; 9:15, no. 4; Hilkhot Ḥagigah, 2:1; Hilkhot Maʿaser Sheini ve-Netaʿ Ravʿai, 3:4; this law is absent from 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot). In the Commentary, Maimonides cited Ezek. 44:9 to show that an uncircumcised priest 
has the status (mazila) of an alien (ben nekhar) for the purpose of Temple service; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 5:29 (mZev 2:1). This comparison appears in the Mishneh Torah, where Maimonides added that 
one who violates this prohibition incurs lashes, “like a non-priest (zar) who serves” in the Temple (Hilkhot 
Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 6:8; based on Num. 1:51 etc.). However, the latter prohibition is a distinct 
commandment and a capital crime, but the prohibition of an uncircumcised priest serving in the Temple is 
neither. The role that Ezek. 44:9 played is unclear; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 220 (Neg. 
74); and Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 9:1. In addition to the standard commentaries; see David ibn Abi 
Zimra, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Radbaz (Jerusalem, 1882), 5:30 (§56 [§1459]); Bacharach, Ḥavat Yair, 
180b, 181a (§192, nos. 33, 49); Judah ben Manoaḥ Sayid, Ner Miṣvah (Salonika, 1810), 69a-69b; Ettlinger, 
ʿArukh la-Ner Masekhet Sanhedrin, 69a, s.v. be-Rashi d"h lo yavo (bSan 84a); Joseph ben Moses Babad, 
Sefer ha-Ḥinukh: ʿim beiʾur Minḥat Ḥinukh (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yeruahalayim, 1988-1991), 2:105-106; 
Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:425; Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 18n28; and Henshke, “Le-
Yesodei,” 123n61. 
615 Very little is known about Ephraim. His community appears in Benjamin of Tudela, The 
Itinerary of Benjamin of Tudela, Critical Text, Translation and Commentary, ed. and trans. Marcus Nathan 
Adler (London: H. Frowde, 1907), 18 (English), 20 (Hebrew). Scholars have debated if Ephraim was from 
Fusṭāṭ or southern France; see Avigdor Aptowitzer, Mavo le-Sefer Ravyah (Jerusalem: Sifrei Yahadut, 
1984), 325; Jacob Mann, The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fātimid Caliphs (New York: Ktav, 
1970), 2:325n7; Joshua Prawer, The History of the Jews in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 52-54; Kraemer, Maimonides, 134-35; Yosef ben Yiṣḥak Sambari, Sefer 
Divrei Yosef, ed. Shimon Shtober (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 1994), 218n366; Maimonides, Igrot, ed. 
Shailat, 1:90-92, 1:195, 1:203; and Abraham David, “Teshuvah Ḥadashah shel ha-Rambam el R. Ephraim 
ha-Dayan mi-Ṣur,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 14-15 (1988-1989): 107-111. On the exchange with 
Ephraim and his students, see Davidson, Maimonides, 204. 
616 Text appears in David, “Teshuvah Ḥadashah shel ha-Rambam,” 111-12. 
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to observe the law, applies only to biblical law.617 Accordingly, the nazirite’s vow, which 
is of biblical status, overrides the requirement to consume rabbinically-ordained wine for 
the consecration of the Sabbath.618 
 
Principle Two: To Exclude (Most) Derived Laws from the Enumeration  
Principle Two relies heavily upon Maimonides’ Introduction to the Commentary 
on the Mishnah in declaring that the enumeration of the 613 commandments excludes 
most laws that are not explicit in the Pentateuch. Because this claim depends on 
assumptions that flout centuries of Rabbanite thought, and according to many of 
Maimonides’ critics, even the Talmud itself, the interpretation of Principle Two has been 
the subject of robust debate since the thirteenth century. 
While other Principles in Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s Introduction address entire categories 
of law, Principle Two opens with the statement: “Not everything known through one of 
the thirteen middot (hermeneutical rules) by which the Torah is interpreted, or by a 
redundancy (ribbuy), is appropriate to count.”619 This formulation implies that some laws 
known through the middot do constitute distinct commandments. Invoking the 
Introduction to the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides wrote that most laws that 
                                                 
617 On this concept, see Tzvi Novick, What is Good, and What God Demands: Normative 
Structures in Tannaitic Literature (Leiden: Brill 2010), 83-85. 
618 Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:212-16 (§120). As far as I can tell, Allegri was the first to 
note the importance of this responsum; see Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 38-
40 (Prin. One). See also Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet, 81b-82b; and Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-
Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 120-22. In setting forth this argument, Maimonides deviated from a ruling of Ibn 
Migash, who wrote that the biblical command to follow the High Court (Deut. 17:11) dictates that no oath 
can preclude the observance of rabbinic laws; Meir ha-Levi Ibn Migash, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot, 23b (§148). 
619 הדדע וגבני יוברב וא ןהב תשרדנ הרותהש תודמ הרשע שלש ידחאב םלעתי אמ לכ סיל ןא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8, 12 (Prin. Two). Translation follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 288, 
with changes. 
 
172 
 
are derived from the middot are often, though not always, subject to debate.620 Thus, 
nothing about a law’s origin can be discerned from the presence of debate or from its 
linkage to the middot. Maimonides explained that many disagreements among the rabbis 
concern the precise scriptural passage that supports the tafsīr marwī (transmitted 
interpretation); he termed this “istidlāl,” adducing a proof, through the middot. 
Maimonides asserted that a non-explicit law is assumed to be rabbinic unless “the 
transmitters” (al-rāwīn) testify that it is “de-orayta” (biblical) or “guf torah” (essence of 
the Torah).621 Principle Two thus, primarily, identifies exceptions to Principle One’s 
assertion, that the enumeration consists entirely of Pentateuchal verses (al-jumla hiya 
kulliha nuṣūṣ torah).622  
Charging earlier enumerators with having misunderstood the conclusions outlined 
in Principle Two,623 Maimonides wrote: “Even worse” (ashadd) than counting middot-
based laws, they counted commandments derived from rabbinic derashot, violating the 
                                                 
620 On this statement, see Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 17. 
621 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12-13 (Prin. Two). It is not entirely clear if these laws 
constitute distinct commandments; I am inclined to think that they do. The term guf torah appears most 
prominently in mḤag 1:8; my translation follows Jaffee, Torah in the Mouth, 85. For background, see 
there, 85-87; Saul Lieberman, Tosefta ki-Feshutah: beiʾur Arokh la-Tosefta (New York: Beit ha-Midrash 
le-Rabbanim sheba-America, 1955-1973), 3:470; David Weiss Halivni, Meqorot u-Mesorot: Beiʾurim ba-
Talmud (Tel Aviv: Devir, 1968-), 2:591-93; and Michal Bar-Asher, “Mountains Hanging by a Strand? Re-
Reading Mishnah Hagiga 1:8,” Journal of Ancient Judaism 4, no. 2 (2013): 239-40. On the Arabic terms 
here, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 271-72, 276, 289-90. On the term de-orayta in the 
Talmud, see Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 30 (Prin. Two); Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 7n8; ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 
52 (Prin. Two); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, there, 52-54 (Prin. Two); Henshke, “Le-Havḥanat ha-Rambam,” 
208-210; and Gruber, “The Meaning of אתיירוא.” 
622 ןנברדמ יש אהיפ סיל הרות ץוצנ אהלכ יה הלמ'גלא ה'דה; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 
(Prin. One). Compare Maimonides’ statements that he would establish the enumeration based on the verses 
(nuṣūṣ) of the Torah and the sages’ statements in explaining it ( וצנב ךל'ד ילע לדתסאוותלא ץ םימכחלא ליואקאבו הר
אהריספת יפ), and that the commandments are all included in the Torah itself ( אהילע למתשי יתלא תוצמלא ֿהלמ'ג
הללא אנערש יתלא הרותה רפס תוצמ הרשע שלשו תואמ שש יה אהב ); ibid, 6, 7 (introduction.) 
623 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two). 
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rule (bSab 63a etc.) “a verse does not leave the realm of its peshaṭ.”624 In so doing, he 
claimed, these enumerators failed to acknowledge that these readings are actually 
“commentary” (sharḥ) or “inference” (istidlāl), and, thus, cannot constitute distinct 
commandments. According to Maimonides, a talmudic passage (bBQ 100a) that glosses 
each phrase in Ex. 18:20 as a distinct act625 misled his predecessors, causing them to 
enumerate, as distinct commandments, the requirements to visit the sick, bury the dead, 
and comfort the bereaved (the last-mentioned is not included in the talmudic passage). 
They failed to realize that all of these acts are “subsumed under” (dākhila taḥta) the 
commandment of “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev. 19:18).626 
It may be possible to identify the enumerators criticized in Principle Two, for in 
the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides chided the author of Halakhot Gedolot 
– whose enumeration spawned many offshoots627 – for counting as distinct 
commandments the acts of visiting the sick and comforting the bereaved.628 Principle 
Two also decried the identification of calendrical intercalation (ḥishuv tequfot) as a 
                                                 
624 On the term derashot, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 8-9, 99n39, 276-80, 
310-11; and James A. Diamond, “The Use of Midrash in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed: Decoding 
the Duality of the Text,” AJS Review 21, no. 1 (1996): 59-60. 
625 “Make known to them the way they are to go in and the practices they are to follow.” The 
talmudic glosses read: The way – this is deeds of loving-kindness; they are to go – this is visiting the sick; 
in – this is burying the dead; the practices – these are the laws (ha-dinim); they are to follow – this is 
exceeding the letter of the law (lifnim mi-shurat ha-din; וז ךרדה תא וז הב םילוח רוקב הז וכלי םידסח תולימג  תריבק
רשא ןינידה ולא השעמה תאו םיתמ ןידה תרושמ םינפל וז ןושעי ); text follows Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
14 (Prin. Two), which differs slightly from the printed text. See idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 8n15. 
626 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14-15 (Prin. Two). See Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 299-300; and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 297-98n41. On dākhila taḥta, 
see above n612. He added that many derived laws are “appended to” (muḍāfa ilā) larger commandments. 
This phrase is rare in Sefer ha-Miṣvot; see below, nn1006, 1056, 1068. 
627 See above, n55. 
628 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). He praised Ḥefeṣ for omitting these 
laws. 
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distinct commandment. According to Maimonides, the source for this claim was a 
rabbinic gloss on Deut. 4:6, “It will be proof of your wisdom and discernment to other 
peoples.” According to the Talmud (bSab 75a), the admiration of the nations is elicited 
by Israel’s system of intercalation.629 This passage, argued Maimonides, hardly supports 
the identification of calendrical intercalation as a distinct commandment.630 Since 
Naḥmanides, commentators have assumed that the target of Maimonides’ critique was the 
count in Halakhot Gedolot, but Kafiḥ suggested that the target was actually Saʿadya.631 
Anticipating criticism of Principle Two, Maimonides speculated that a reader 
might charge him with believing that derived laws are, by nature, “uncertain” (ghayr 
mutayaqqina), or that they are either “true” (or: authentic; ṣaḥīḥ) or “untrue.” Such a 
criticism would be incorrect, he countered, for laws of this category are actually branches 
(furūʿ) from the 613 roots (uṣūl). This claim is reminiscent of one made in his 
Commentary, that each generation extracted furūʿ from earlier uṣūl.632 He concluded by 
                                                 
629 The Talmud asks, “How do we know that it is a miṣvah for an individual to calculate the cycles 
and planetary courses?” (תולזמו תופוקת בשחל םדאה לע הוצמש ןינמ). This text appears in all manuscripts on the 
Lieberman database, but Baḥya had “obligated” (ḥayav) instead of miṣvah; Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
100 (2:3). 
630 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One), 14 (Prin. Two). 
631 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 14n10. Maimonides’ shift from the plural to the 
singular may indicate a specific target ( הנא ולו יגבני הנא םהויו א'דה ןמ ןיבא וה אמ דע ר'תכא וא דעי ןא ); Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two). Kafiḥ’s translation does not note this shift; Ibn Tibbon’s does. See 
however, Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:466-67. Sabbato, “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam,” claimed that 
Maimonides did not have access to Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ. Zucker “ʿIyunim ve-Heʿarot,” 97-98, and 
Stampfer, “Ha-Niṣtaveinu ba-Torah la-Ḥug et ha-Ḥanukkah,” 420-21, suggest otherwise. Maimonides 
interpreted Deut. 4:6 as a reference to the general wisdom of the Torah; see Twersky, Introduction to the 
Code of Maimonides, 385-86; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 180. Twersky (386n78) 
noted that Abraham Maimonides repeated this reading. Add now Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, 
ed. Dana, 152. 
632 Compare the similar statement in Maimonides’ Treatise on Resurrection; in Igrot, ed. Shailat, 
1:320-21; see Stroumsa, “Ha-Im haya ha-Rambam Hogeh Muwaḥidi,” 157n27; and Cohen, Opening the 
Gates of Interpretation, 246n12. On furūʿ, see Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 20n6; and Ravitsky, “Ha-
Rambam ve-al-Fārābi,” 212-13. This imagery is important in another way: labeling the opening Principles 
uṣūl implies that the 613 commandments are furūʿ of these Principles; compare below, n944. Halbertal 
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stating that only the tafsīr marwī, “known through tradition (naql) and not qiyās,” i.e., not 
through human derivations, may create distinct commandments. Rabbinic linkage of the 
tafsīr marwī to Scripture through qiyās or istidlāl simply makes manifest the “wisdom of 
Scripture.”633 In order to prove that post-Mosaic derivations cannot be enumerated, 
Maimonides cited an aggadic passage (bTem 16a) claiming that Israel forgot seventeen 
hundred a fortiori arguments (qalin ve-ḥamurin), analogies from verbal congruity 
(gezeirot shavot), and scribal specifications (diqduqei sofrim) after the death of Moses. 
He reasoned that if this volume of learning was lost, the total number of derived laws 
clearly exceeded 613; the need for consistency would have required that either all these 
laws, or none of them, be counted as commandments. Therefore, he insisted, no derived 
law may constitute a distinct commandment.634 
 
Applying Principle Two to the Enumeration of the Commandments 
Principle Two does not address one important question: If a middot-based law is 
not included in the enumeration of the commandments, is its source something other than 
tafsīr marwī? In other words, does Principle Two imply that any law omitted from the 
enumeration is the product of post-Sinaitic exegesis? I believe that the answer is no. As I 
read it, Principle Two only addresses distinct commandments that are created by tafsīr 
                                                 
linked this distinction to the process of interpretation; see “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 468-72; ʿAl 
Derekh ha-Emet, 47-52; and Maimonides, 120-23. I believe that it has more to do with the scope of 
revelation. See also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 44-46; and note Cohen’s insight that 
the Commentary does not explicitly state that only Scripture and transmitted interpretations produce 
biblical law; Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 288. 
633  ֿהמכח ראה'טאל תודמ הרשע שלש דחאב הילע לאלדתסאלאו היפ סאיקלא רכ'ד אמנאו סאיקלאב אל לקנלאב םלע
ץנלא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two); see above, n544. 
634 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 15 (Prin. Two). 
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marwī. Crucially, other laws of biblical status may be excluded from the enumeration 
despite Maimonides’ belief that their origin is revealed tafsīr. 
The centuries-long controversy over Principle Two was closely related to this 
question. Spanish jurists of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries adopted the view of 
Naḥmanides,635 who bitterly dismissed Principle Two and concluded that laws identified 
by midrash are biblical in status until proven otherwise.636 Declaring that the meaning of 
Principle Two “was revealed” (nitgaleh) to him,637 Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran (b. 
Majorca, d. Algiers; 1361-1444) argued that Principle Two only addressed middot-based 
laws that constitute distinct commandments. He further claimed that Principle Two uses 
                                                 
635 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 29-33, 78-79; and see above, n381. Add the novellae 
of R. Yom Tov ben Avraham Asevilli to bSuk 43a s.v. ve-iqka, which has Maimonides in mind. See also 
Harris, How do We Know This, 92-93; and the comments of Menaḥem ha-Meiri treated in Henshke, “Le-
Havḥanat ha-Rambam,” 207-208. 
636 Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 34; full comments appear there, 29-51 
(Prin. Two). For additional criticism of Principle Two, see there, 398-99, 400-401 (identified in Kassierer 
and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 45n44). My formulation of Naḥmanides’ position 
intentionally elides the question of whether Naḥmanides held that halakhic midrash creates or upholds law. 
For early treatment of this problem, see Zecharias Frankel, Darkhei ha-Mishnah (Leipzig, 1859), 17; Isaac 
Halevy, Dorot ha-Rishonim, 4:504-508; and Chaim Tchernowitz, Toldot ha-Halakhah (New York, 1949), 
1:49-50. For treatment, see Harris, How do We Know This, 190-202 (on Frankel), 233-34 (on Halevy); and 
Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 46-47n47. More recently, see Neubauer, Ha-
Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 160-63; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 11; Meyer S. Feldblum, 
Peirushim u-Meḥqarim ba-Talmud (New York: Yeshivah University Press, 1969), 5n9; Silman, “Torah 
Elohit she-‘Lo Bashamayim Hi’,” 274-75; idem, Qol Gadol ve-lo Yasaf, 108-109; Blidstein, “Oral Law as 
Institution,” 172-73; idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21; idem, Samkhut u-Meri, 275-85; Halbertal, 
“Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 471-74, 480; idem, People of the Book, 63-65, 84-85; idem, ʿAl Derekh ha-
Emet, 59-62; idem, Maimonides, 120-26; Harris, How do We Know This, 90-91; Avi Sagi, “Models of 
Authority and the Duty of Obedience in Halakhic Literature,” AJS Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 13-15; idem, 
“Halakhic Praxis,” 320-21; idem, “Ha-Ṭeqst ha-Miqraʾi ha-Qanoni veha-Etgar ha-Hermenuti: ʿIyun Biqorti 
be-ʿIqvot ha-Ramban,” Daʿat 50-52 (2003): 122-32; idem, “Baʿayat ha-Hakhraʿah ha-Hilkhatit veha-Emet 
ha-Hilkhatit: li-Qrat Filosofyah shel ha-Halakhah,” Dine Israel 15 (1989-1990): 31-37; idem, Elu ve-Elu, 
188-89, 209-210, 219-20; Feintuch, Sefer Piqudei Yesharim, 19-20; Elliot Wolfson, “By Way of Truth: 
Aspects of Nahmanides’ Kabbalistic Hermeneutic,” AJS Review, 14, no. 2 (1989): 128; Michael Abraham, 
“Indiqaṣiyah ve-Analogiyah be-Halakhah (ʿIyun be-Shoresh 2 shel ha-Rambam),” Ṣohar 15 (2003): 27-29; 
and Kassierer and Glicksberg, Mi-Sinai le-Lishkat ha-Gazit, 51, 92-93, 229-31. See there, 46-47, 51-52, 58-
59, 94-98, 140n268, 168-69, 192-94, for treatment of several of these views. 
637 Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 13 (introductory pagination; Prin. Two). 
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the terms “rabbinic” (mide-rabbanan) and “divrei sofrim” in a relative sense, because the 
middot-based laws in question are “details” of larger commandments. Though excluded 
from the count of 613, wrote Duran, such derived laws are actually biblical in status.638 
Jacob Neubauer’s Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim shows that most subsequent jurists 
accepted Duran’s approach.639 A group of early modern writers, chiefly Abraham Allegri 
(Constantinople, 1560-1652), reconsidered Duran’s position.640 Following Naḥmanides, 
these authors understood Principle Two to mean that all post-Sinaitic derivations are 
rabbinic in status, a position that is widely accepted in academic treatments.641 Among 
many challenges to Duran’s view, Neubauer noted that other Principles, and not Principle 
                                                 
638 Duran formulated this in a few places, see Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ (Jerusalem: Mekhon 
Yerushalayim, 2007), 1:18-19 (§1), 1:326-28 (§151); and Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 10-13 (introductory pagination; 
Prin. Two). He did not apply this approach to the prohibition not to eat a torn animal (ṭreifah), which seems 
to be an outcome of Principle Two, but instead followed Naḥmanides on this issue; Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ, 
1:153 (§67); idem, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 122 (Neg. §30); and Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. 
Chavel, 46-47 (Prin. Two). For treatment of Duran’s approach, see Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei 
Sofrim, 32-33, 53 and above, n381. 
639 Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 65 (Prin. Two), even 
erroneously guessed that de-rabbanan and divrei sofrim are mistranslations from the Judeo-Arabic. This 
claim is repeated in Malakhi ben Jacob ha-Kohen, Sefer Yad Malakhi (Livorno, 1767), 2:181b (kelalei ha-
Rambam, §22). See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 145n10; and Levinger, Darkhei ha-
Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 38n21. 
640 See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 57-61 (Prin. Two); 
and the influential comments of Jacob ben David Tam ibn Yaḥya, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Ohalei Tam: mi-
Tokh Qoveṣ Tumat Yesharim (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ketav, 1999) 168-69 (§83); treated in Neubauer, Ha-
Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 47-48, 51-59, 81. In addition, see Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet, 80a-85b, 
not mentioned by Neubauer. Ibn Ṣur Sefardi also reconsidered some of Duran’s claims; see Megillat 
Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 76 (Prin. Two). 
641 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 81-82; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-
Hilkhatit, 38-43, 86; Harris, How do We Know This, 88-89; Kafiḥ, “‘Mi-Divrei Sofrim’,” 251; and Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 264-70, 287-304. See also Blidstein, “Maimonides on ‘Oral Law’,” 
113 (“all mizvot were interpreted at Sinai, but not all interpretation is Sinaitic”); idem, “Where Do We 
Stand,” 13 (“midrash does not produce Torah-law …. It will produce rabbinic law, and it will confirm 
revealed interpretation”); idem, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 14; and Faur, ʿIyunim be-Mishneh Torah, 
30. For restatement of Duran’s approach, see Maimonides, Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 99, 102n20; 
idem, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-53; and Ben-Menaḥem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 20-25. 
 
178 
 
Two, address non-enumerated “details.”642 The thrust of the Commentary on the Mishnah 
and the use of furūʿ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot both support this interpretation. 
To my mind, the “radical” reading of Naḥmanides, Allegri, Neubauer, and others, 
comes closest to explaining Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic midrash. 
Nevertheless, I believe that Duran and his supporters were correct when they noted that, 
for Maimonides, numerous revealed laws did not count as distinct commandments, and 
that Maimonides overwhelmingly emphasized scriptural sources, as opposed to extra-
scriptural Sinaitic traditions, as the basis for enumerated commandments.643  
 
Non-Explicit and Non-Enumerated Laws of Sinaitic Status in Sefer ha-
Miṣvot 
In order to reconsider Duran’s claims, three elements in Sefer ha-Miṣvot must be 
closely analyzed: (1) the exceptions covered by Principle Two; (2) Maimonides’ use of 
qiyās to identify biblical prohibitions; and (3) a cluster of Arabic terms used by 
Maimonides to denote Sinaitic law. These investigations will lead to a culminating 
question: How did Maimonides determine which midrashim contain tafsīr marwī? 
                                                 
642 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 33. Neubauer specifically mentioned Principle Nine, 
but other Principles are more important. See also there, 8, 17-19, 85-86. I address this problem in Chapter 
Four. 
643 Of course, Naḥmanides and others well understood that an enumerated commandment may 
include numerous laws (see, e.g., Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 32; [Prin. 
Two]), but their reading of Principle Two largely focused on the question of whether or not middot-based 
laws are biblical or rabbinic in status. I believe that Principle Two deals primarily with exceptions to 
Principle One, i.e., those commandments that are not based on pentateuchal verses. On the problem of 
reducing Jewish law to 613 “commandment-units,” see Chapter Four. 
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In asking whether Maimonides regarded the product of halakhic midrash as 
biblical law or rabbinic law, interpreters of Principle Two usually assumed that 
Maimonides approached all midrashim in a uniform manner.644 Yet there is reason to 
think that he classified midrashim in a variety of ways; after all, he claimed that some 
midrashim create rabbinic law while others hint at Sinaitic law, and the Introduction to 
his Commentary on the Mishnah sets forth a five-fold classification of the Oral Torah.645 
 
The “Three or Four” Exceptions Addressed by Principle Two 
What may be Maimonides’ most important comment on Principle Two appears in 
his letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan: 
Not every matter derived by analogy (heqqesh), a fortiori argument (qal va-
ḥomer), analogy from verbal congruity (gezeirah shavah), or any of the thirteen 
middot by which the Torah is interpreted is biblical law (din torah), unless the 
Sages explicitly say that it is from the Torah (min ha-torah). … Nothing is 
biblical except for what is explicit (meforash) in the Torah, such as mixtures of 
linen and wool, intermixing of species, the Sabbath, and forbidden sexual unions, 
or something that the Sages said is from the Torah – and those are only three [or] 
four things.646 
                                                 
644 Harris also followed this approach; see How do We Know This, 86-89. 
645 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:19-22; Haqdamot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 
338-40. 
646  אוה ןהב תשרדנ הרותהש תודמ הרשע שלשמ הדמב וא הוש הרזגב וא רמחו לקב וא שקהב ותוא ןידמלש רבד לכ ןיאש
אלא הרותה ןמ םש ןיאו ... הרותה ןמ והש םימכח ורמאיש דע הרות ןיד  וא תוירעו תבשו םיאלכו זנטעש ןוכג הרותב שרפמ אוהש רבד
דבלב םירבד העברא השולש ומכ ןהו הרותה ןמ אוהש םימכח ורמאש רבד; some manuscripts read “העברא וא השולש;” 
Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:451-53. Translation mostly follows Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 7, with the notable change that he has “no matter,” where a more accurate translation is “not 
every matter.” On heqqesh, note the remark in Moses ben Joseph di Trani, Qiryat Sefer (Venice, 1551), 7b 
(§2), who called attention to Hilkhot Bekhorot, 7:5, and the comments of Abraham de Biton there (ed. 
Frankel, 7.2:121). 
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The assertion that all biblical laws are “explicit” demands explication. After all, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot regularly relies on the rabbis to determine Scripture’s meaning.647 The 
commandment to serve God constitutes a typical example; according to Maimonides, 
while several verses that command divine service (ʿ-v-d)648 appear to be broad (ʿāmma; 
or, unrestricted) instructions, which are excluded from the enumeration by Principle 
Four,649 a “specification” (takhṣīṣ) interprets these commands to require prayer, rendering 
them a distinct commandment with particular, not unrestricted, subject matter. 
Though Maimonides did not identify the “three [or] four” commandments that he 
mentioned in his letter to Pinhas ha-dayan, scholars have assumed that he was referring 
to Negative Commandment #135, which prohibits consumption of the heave offerings 
(terumah) by an uncircumcised priest; Negative Commandment #194, which prohibits 
consumption of wine used in idolatrous practices; and Negative Commandment #336, 
                                                 
647 Davidson, Maimonides, 183: “Even scriptural verses that might seem crystal clear and 
unproblematic are read through Oral Torah spectacles.” 
648 For the verses, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 60n32; ed. Heller, 36n18. 
649 That ʿāmma verses do not constitute distinct commandments; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four), 60-61 (Pos. 5). See Ettinger, “ʿAl Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 21-22; and 
Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 339-40. Despite this “specification,” I understand this is as a 
commandment to serve God, not only to pray. Compare the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #5 
(Maimonides, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 15 line 6), and Hilkhot Tefillah u-Virkat Kohanim, 1:1. 
Another typical example is the prohibition against imposing capital punishments on the Sabbath. 
Maimonides cited Ex. 35:3, “You shall kindle no fire in your settlements on the Sabbath day,” as the 
source, and numerous rabbinic texts to explain that this verse prohibits the court from implementing the 
capital punishment of (sreifah) on the Sabbath (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 330 [Neg. 322]; see also 51 
[Prin. Fourteen]). Maimonides could hardly have reached this conclusion without rabbinic interpretation. 
For treatment of this phenomenon, see Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 40; Ettinger, “ʿAl 
Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 21-25; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 335-40, who modified 
Ettinger’s approach. 
On takhṣīṣ in medieval Islamic texts; see Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, 191; David S. Powers, 
“On the Abrogation of the Bequest Verses,” Arabica, 29, no. 3 (1982): 262-64; Aron Zysow, The Economy 
of Certainty, 78-79, 243-54; idem, “Muʿtazilism and Māturīdism in Ḥanafi Legal Theory,” in Studies in 
Islamic Legal Theory, 248-51 (on “specialization of the cause”), 256n91 (on takhṣīṣ more generally); and 
Muḥammad Bin ʿĀrifīn, “The Principles of ʿUmūm and Takhṣīṣ,” (PhD diss., The University of Edinburgh, 
1988), chaps. 6-8. On ʿāmm as “unrestricted,” see Lowry, Early Islamic Legal Theory, 69n11. 
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which prohibits sexual relations between father and daughter.650 Of these, the last best 
displays the characteristics relevant to these three commandments. Maimonides noted 
that while there is no specific verse prohibiting sexual relations between father and 
daughter, they must be prohibited, because relations with a man’s granddaughter are 
forbidden. Though the Talmud (bKer 5a) based this prohibition on a double gezeirah 
shavah, i.e., two analogies based on verbal congruity,651 Maimonides emphasized that the 
Talmud explained that this prohibition is “taught” (limdah) by Scripture, and not “derived 
for us” (lemadnuha) by the rabbis. In his words, it is “a tradition from the messenger 
(naql ʿan al-rasūl) and a tafsīr marwī. … But Scripture refrained from mentioning it 
                                                 
650 Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 41; Davidson, Maimonides, 176n219; Fixler, 
“Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 288-90; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 340. Davidson 
and Fixler included Negative Commandment #76 (see below) and Levinger (41n35) mentioned it as a 
possibility. Levinger also suggested the commandment “to enter a marriage” because there is only a “hint” 
(tanbīh) to it. The word tanbīh, however, is common in this work, and frequently denotes laws known by 
tradition; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 45, 110, 137, 250; see also idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 4:263 (mShev 4:12). I have translated the phrase ʿaqd al-nikāḥ as “to enter a marriage,” but it may 
be more nuanced; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 167n11; Blau, Dictionary, 447 s.v. دقع; and 
Reinhart Dozy, Supplément aux Dictionnaires Arabes (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1881), 2:147 s.v. دقع. Compare the 
use of muṣāhara in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 208-209 (Neg. 53-55), and nikāḥ, 208, 332-34 (Neg. 52, 
330-37); the latter may be used specifically for forbidden marriages. For another suggesion, see Friedberg, 
Crafting the 613 Commandments, 125-26n68 (see above, n602). Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 127-28n76, 
argued that the “three or four” are found in the Mishneh Torah, a difficult position to maintain; see Fixler, 
“Ha-Munaḥim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 288n8. 
The approach in Avraham Feintuch, “Ha-Munaḥ ‘de-Orayta’ veha-Middot sheha-Torah Nidreshet 
ba-hen: ʿIyun Ḥozer be-Shoresh ha-Sheini,” Sinai 119 (1997): 154-60; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot le-
Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim, 1:38-40, 41-45, is similar to my own, but Feintuch conflated the 
term guf ha-torah with laws of biblical status, and therefore indentified more than “three or four” such 
prohibitions. 
651 “Never let a gezeirah shavah be insignificant in your eyes, for the prohibition of relations with 
one’s daughter is one of the gufei torah, but Scripture only taught (limdah) it through a gezeirah shavah: 
‘they are’ ‘they are’ (Lev. 18:10, 18:17), and ‘depravity’ ‘depravity’ (Lev. 18:17, 20:14); הוש הרזג יהת לא
המז המז איתא הנה הנה איתא הוש הרזגב אלא בותכה הדמל אלו הרות יפוגמ דחא ותב ירהש ךיניעב הלק. Text follows Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 330 (Neg. 336); translation based on Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 341. 
Several manuscripts add le-isura and le-sreifah to explain that the import of each gezeirah shavah. See also 
bYeb 3a. 
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because it may be learned (tataʿallam) from a gezeirah shavah.”652 Maimonides also 
suggested that the Talmud’s use of the term gufei torah, “essences of Torah,” marks this 
prohibition as an independent commandment.653 
Similar thinking pertains to the other “three [or] four” commandments to which 
Maimonides alluded. The Talmud’s exclusion of an uncircumcised priest from eating the 
heave offerings was based on a gezeirah shavah, but Maimonides highlighted the fact 
that the “transmitters” (nāqilīn) labeled this law de-ʿorayta (see bYev 72a).654 The 
prohibition against drinking wine used in idolatrous worship was derived, in the Talmud 
(bAZ 29b), from the biblical comparison of idolatrous offerings and libation wine in 
Deut. 32:38, but Maimonides asserted that the prohibition lacks a “plain, explicit verse” 
(naṣṣ jalī bi-bayān).655 He added that the Talmud (bAZ 73b) elsewhere lists this among 
biblical prohibitions (isurim sheba-torah), indicating that it is a distinct commandment.656 
                                                 
652 הוש הרגזב םלעתת ןא ןכמי אהנוכל אהרכ'ד ךע ץנלא תכס אמנאו ... יורמ ריספת יהו לוסרלא ןע לקנ אהלכ; 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 334 (Neg. 336). The argument that Scripture did not mention 
obvious prohibitions appears elsewhere, occasionally modifying earlier claims. Compare the following: (1) 
this passage; the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #336 (Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 63 
lines 464-66); and Hilkhot Isurei Biʾah, 2:6; (2) Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:244 (mOhal 1:9); 6:259 
(mOhal 2:4); and Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 1:2; (3) Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:735 (mʿUqṣ 3:9); Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 263-64 (Neg. 172); and Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:1; and (4) Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:300 (mQid 2:9), 5:361 (mKer 3:4); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272-73 (Neg. 187); 
and Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 9:2. See the partial treatment of some of the Mishneh Torah passages in 
Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 126-27 and n74. I hope to treat this subject elsewhere. 
653 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 333-34 (Neg. 336). See Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 340-42; and Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 73 (Prin. 
Two). 
654 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 242-43 (Neg. 194). Compare similar explanations in 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:32-33 (mYeb 8:1); the Short Enumeration, Negative 
Commandment #135 (idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 45 lines 183-85); and Hilkhot Terumot, 
7:10. See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 75 (Prin. Two). 
655 Compare the phrase naṣṣ jalī in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 328 (Neg. 318); and 
Abraham Maimonides in MS. Hunt. 185, 130a, 132b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6, 9 (§1). 
656 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276 (Neg. 194). Compare the use of Deut. 32:38 in 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:20 (intro. to Toharot). Note that in the Short Enumeration, Negative 
Commandment #194, he cited Deut. 32:38 without comment. He mentioned libation wine in Negative 
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In this case, he used talmudic terminology to count a revealed, yet not-explicit, 
prohibition as a distinct commandment.657 
If Maimonides was thinking of a fourth commandment within this grouping, it 
was probably Negative Commandment #76, which bars a priest from serving in the 
Temple if he is a ṭevul yom, that is, one who has ritually bathed but will only be fully 
purified at sunset. Maimonides cited Lev. 21:6 (“they [the priests] shall not profane the 
name of their God”) as the source for this commandment, but noted that this is not an 
“explicit verse” (naṣṣ bayyin); rather, this prohibition is taught by the tafsīr marwī.658 The 
Commentary on the Mishnah identifies this law as a naql, i.e., tradition, linked to 
(masnūd li-) Lev. 21:6,659 and the Mishneh Torah claims that it was relayed mi-pi ha-
shemuʿah, as an aural tradition interpreting that verse (Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 4:4).660 
Perhaps the dual sources for this commandment, Scripture and tradition, shed light on the 
tentative formulation “three or four.”661 
                                                 
Commandment #25 there, a claim that is absent from Sefer ha-Miṣvot; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 51 
line 273, 36 lines 33-34; see also Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 11:1-2. 
657 See Kafiḥ’s similar explanation; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 242-43n97. 
658 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221 (Neg. 76). Maimonides quoted “if it has no 
bearing on its own subject … apply it elsewhere” (im eino ʿinyan le-gufo … teneiho ʿinyan le-) in bSan 83b 
to identify the subject of this verse. Translation of this phrase follows Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 61-63. 
659 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:195 (mSan 9:6); see Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in 
idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 83 (Prin. Two). Masnūd li- could mean “proved by”; see above, n525. 
660 He cited this verse without qualification in the Short Enumeration; Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 40 line 106. 
661 See above, n650. Cohen (who only found three examples) suggested that Maimonides wrote 
this responsum from memory or that “three or four” means “a few”; Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 
340; see similarly Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei Yisharim, 1:45. 
The Short Enumeration merits careful examination; Maimonides usually identified a scriptural 
verse, but added exegetical comments or mi-pi ha-shemuʿah interpretations more than “three or four” 
times. See Feintuch, “Ha-Munaḥ ‘de-Orayta’,” 150-52; and idem, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush 
Piqudei Yisharim, 1:36-38. 
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If the above analysis is correct, it may not be a coincidence that the non-scriptural 
laws that constitute distinct commandments are all Negative Commandments, because 
Maimonides insisted that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the number of 
punishments a sinner incurs and the number of negative commandments that he violates 
(as will be seen in Chapter Five). As a result, the fact that the violation of each of these 
“three or four” commandments results in punishment662 may have motivated Maimonides 
to identify exceptions to the rule that all commandments are based on nuṣūṣ torah, 
pentateuchal verses. 
 
Prohibitions Identified Through Qiyās 
Following the rabbis, Maimonides identified a scriptural warning (azharah) and a 
penalty (ʿonesh) for every prohibition.663 Throughout his writings, he cited the rule 
“[Scripture] did not punish unless it warned” (bYom 81a, bSan 56b, etc.), labeling it an 
aṣl (principle).664 In an addendum to the Principles that comprise the Introduction to Sefer 
                                                 
662 For Negative Commandment #76, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221; for 
Negative Commandment #135, see Hilkhot Terumot, 7:10; for Negative Commandment #194, see 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276; and for Negative Commandment #336, see above n651. 
663 See, e.g., Sifra, ed. Weiss, 88b (parashat kedoshim, §2); bSan 54b, 60b. On this distinction, see 
Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. azharah, 1:418-19; P. Dykan, “ʿAnishah, Azharah, Hatraʾah,” Proceedings of 
the World Congress of Jewish Studies 4, no. 1 (1965): 195-96; and Devora Steinmetz, Punishment and 
Freedom: The Rabbinic Construction of Criminal Law (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2008), 16-17; note also Azzan Yadin, Scripture as Logos, 184n8. Scholars have debated if this distinction 
helped the rabbis account for duplicate verses or corresponds to the legal principle nullum crimen sine lege 
(“no crime without law”); see Jacob Z. Lauterbach, “A Significant Controversy Between the Sadduccees 
and the Pharisees,” HUCA 4 (1927): 182n8; repr. in Rabbinic Essays, 59-60n8; and Emmanuel Bulz, “Ha-
Hatraʾah be-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 6, vol. 3, div. C 
(1973): 42-43. See also below, n881. 
664 ריהזה ןכ םא אלא ]בותכה[ שנע אל; see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:236 (mMak 
3:1); Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor, 1:4; Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 18:4; Hilkhot Mamrim, 5:4, 5:8, 7:1; and, 
e.g., idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 193 (Neg. 26), 227 (Neg. 90), 328 (Neg. 318), 329 (Neg. 319), 336-
37 (Neg. 347). Compare there, 211 (Neg. 60), and the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #60; 
Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 39 line 83-86. The Talmud also finds “warnings” through the middot 
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ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides explained that “legal qiyās”665 may be the source of a warning 
when a punishment appears in Scripture and when its derivation (istikhrāj) accords with 
the rule “[Scripture] did not punish unless it warned.” In cases like this, qiyās does not 
create new law; rather, it clarifies the “warning” for a prohibition that is already 
known.666 
Maimonides made such an argument regarding Negative Commandment #132, 
which forbids sacrificing an animal while intending to eat it after its appointed time 
(piggul). While the warning against piggul is scriptural,667 he wrote, the punishment for it 
is not. Though the Talmud (bKer 5a) derived the punishment of excision (karet) from a 
gezeirah shavah, Maimonides described this as “a tradition [that] reached us as an 
interpretation of this verse.” Quoting the talmudic admonition (bKer 5a) not to take 
lightly an analogy based on verbal congruity (gezeirah shavah), he asserted that the 
                                                 
(e.g., bKer 3a). An earlier version of this phrase appears to be in jYeb 11:2 (12b;  אלא שנוע ה'בקה ןיאש דמלמ
ריהזה ןכ םא). Maimonides’ extensive use of such rabbinic dicta and the appellation aṣl deserve attention; for 
now, see Dror Fixler, “Lashon ve-Signon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 217-
40; and Yuval, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 243. 
665 Maimonides called this qiyās min al-maqāyīs al-fiqhīhi. On qiyās fiqhī, see Ravitsky, “Ha-
Heqqeshim ha-Hilkhatiyim,” 197-205; see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 268n97. For 
this term in al-Fārābī, see Joep Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics: Greek Theory and Islamic 
Practice (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 233-58.  
666 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 54-55; in standard editions, this addendum is part of 
Principle Fourteen. See ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 82-
84 (Prin. Two); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, there, 77-79 (Prin. Two); and Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, there, 89 (Prin. 
Two). See also Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 70-72 (§65). The only scholarly treatment 
that I know of is Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14; and Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’,” 250-
51. Maimonides explained that his conclusion does not violate the rule “a warning cannot be ascertained 
through logic” (ein mazhirin min ha-din; bMak 5b, etc.) because the punishment is evidence of the 
existence of a prohibition and rabbinic qiyās only identifies the prohibiting verse. On post-talmudic use of 
the latter rule, see Henshke, “‘Ein Neharagin min ha-Din’.” Naḥmanides was surprised that Maimonides 
cited rabbinic derivations in order to identify scriptural warnings, arguing that this flew in the face of 
Maimonides’ claim that midrash does not generate law of biblical status; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, 
ed. Chavel, 43-44 (Prin. Two), 337-38 (Neg. 195). 
667 Maimonides appears to have misquoted Ex. 29:33; see Hilkhot Pesulei ha-Muqdashin, 18:10; 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 128n7; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240n71; Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 13:117; 
and Shapiro, Studies in Maimonides, 41. 
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prohibition of piggul is one of the “essences of Torah” (gufei torah) known only by a 
gezeirah shavah. This claim establishes the existence of a prohibition in the case of 
Negative Commandment #336; here, it relates only to the nature of the punishment.668 
In his enumeration of the commandments, Maimonides invoked Principle Two 
only once, with regard to three commandments pertaining to priestly impurity: (1) A 
regular priest may not touch the corpse of non-family members; (2) the High Priest may 
not enter the tent of a corpse; (3) and the High Priest may not touch a corpse.669 Citing 
Principle Two, he explained that there is no distinct commandment that prohibits a 
regular priest from entering the tent of a corpse, because this law is derived by a gezeirah 
shavah.670 (This prohibition appears to be rabbinic, but the Mishneh Torah is unclear 
about its status.671) This passing reference to Principle Two underscores Maimonides’ 
                                                 
668 קוספלא ה'דה ריספת יפ לקנלא אנא'ג; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240-41 (Neg. 132). 
Strikingly, regarding the third example in bKer 5a, the prohibition against leaving sacrificial meat beyond 
its proscribed time (notar), Maimonides cited a verse that requires supplemental interpretation (ḍamīr) and 
not the gezeirah shavah; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131). On ḍamīr, see above, n587. He did 
not cite the last example in bKer 5a (gezeirah shavahs that identify stoning as the mode of punishment). 
See however the comment that the tafsīr marwī identifies some capital punishments; idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 50 (Principle Fourteen). 
669 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 259-60 (Neg. 168). He based the prohibitions 
pertaining to the High Priest on Lev. 21:11: “He [the High Priest] shall not go in where there is any dead 
body; he shall not defile himself even for his father or mother.” He argued that “he shall not defile himself” 
is not an “explanation” (tabyīn) of “he shall not go in” but a distinct prohibition because the Sifra (ed. 
Weiss, 94b [parashat emor, §2]) explains that the High Priest is “guilty” (ḥayav; see below, n1115) for 
both actions. In the Short Enumeration, Negative Commandment #168, he labeled this derivation mi-pi ha-
shemuʿah; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 49 lines 241; compare Hilkhot Aveil, 3:6. On tabyīn in 
qurʾānic exegesis, see Jonathan Owens, Early Arabic Grammatical Theory: Heterogeneity and 
Standardization (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), 127, 130, 131; and Jaroslav Stetkevych, “Arabic 
Hermeneutical Terminology: Paradox and the Production of Meaning,” Journal of Near Eastern Studies 48, 
no. 2 (1989): 90-92. 
670 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 260 (Neg. 168). The Sifra (Ibid.) derived these from a 
gezeirah shavah. Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 282 (Neg. 208); and Hilkhot Nezirut, 
5:18. 
671 Hilkhot Aveil, 3:1-3, 3:6, subsumes the prohibitions against a regular priest and the High Priest 
entering the tent of a corpse into one. The status of this law is unclear; see Judah ben Samuel Rosanes, 
Derekh Miṣvotekha (Warsaw, 1930), 9b-10a; and Elyaqim ben Yiṣḥaq Gaṭinyo, Beit Yisḥaq (Salonika, 
1792), 144b. 
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conviction that a law derived through a gezeirah shavah is different from a law set forth 
in explicit biblical verses, and that Maimonides’ enumeration centered on 
commandments based on those verses. 
 
Tafsīr Marwī and Naql in Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
For Maimonides, the terms naql, tradition, and tafsīr marwī, transmitted 
interpretation (or simply tafsīr and less frequently, marwī), are often equivalent. For 
example, Maimonides read five phrases in Deut. 12:17 as ones that prohibit the eating of 
five types of sacrifices outside of Jerusalem. In so doing, he followed the rabbis and 
variously ascribed this interpretation to the Sifrei, tafsīr (twice), and naql (twice).672 
Likewise, where the rabbis offer the same gloss on Deut. 7:2, Maimonides referred to it 
as naql and tafsīr.673 Nevertheless, the term naql occasionally carries broader 
signification; he used it, at times, to denote traditions that are not explanations of 
scriptural terms.674 
                                                 
672 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 246-48 (Neg. 144-48). These are: “You may not 
partake in your settlements of … (1) of the firstlings of your herds (2) and flocks, (3) or of any votive 
offerings that you vow, (4) or of your freewill offerings, (5) or of your contributions.” 
673 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 206-207 (Neg. 50). The second instance does not 
mention Deut. 7:2. In Hilkhot ʿAvodat Kokhavim ve-Ḥuqqot ha-Goyim, 10:1, 10:4, Deut. 7:2 is the basis for 
both. He labeled the second interpretation a naql in Mishnah ʿim Peirush ed. Kafiḥ, 1:152 (mDem 6:2), 
4:341 (mAZ 1:8). See Maimonides, Tiqun Mishnah: Hashlamot ve-Tiqunim le-Feirush ha-Mishnah 
Mahadurat ha-Rav Y. Kafiḥ, Masekhtot ʿAvodah Zarah ve-Horayot, ed. and trans. Isaac Shailat (Jerusalem: 
Maʿaliyot, 2002), 37. For other examples, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 137 (Pos. 153), 241 (Neg. 
132), 334 (Neg. 336). 
674 I count more than fifty appearances of tafsīr and almost thirty of naql in the enumeration. This 
misses some uses because (1) Maimonides commented that a series of commandments are based on the 
tafsīr (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 141 [Pos. 159]) and (2) the first example in this paragraph shows that he 
considered rabbinic interpretations tafsīr or naql without using these terms. The word marwī appears 
without a modifier there, 2 (introduction), 325 (Neg. 312). Maimonides also labeled the rabbis the 
“transmitters” (rāwīn; 2, 163), “transmitters of the interpretation” (ruwāt al-tafsīr; 244 [Neg. 137], 260 
[Neg. 168]), and “transmitters of the transmissions” (rāwī al-rāwiyāt; 1). See the term “the carriers of 
tradition” (al-nāqilīn; e.g., 27 [Prin. Eight], 243 [Neg. 157], 325 [Neg. 312]). Less frequently, the verbs b-
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In several places in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides ascribed “details” of 
commandments to naql and tafsīr. These remarks suggest that, for Maimonides, 
revelation consisted of more than 613 “laws” even if such were to be part of larger 
“commandment-units.”675 He wrote, for example, that the commandment not to eat on 
Yom Kippur includes prohibitions of washing, anointing, wearing shoes, and marital 
relations on that day; each of the aforementioned are known by tradition (naql), and were 
not created by the rabbis. By the same token, the Commentary on the Mishnah refers to 
talmudic derivations for these prohibitions (bYom 76a-77b) as “hints and prooftexts” 
(ishārāt wa-isnādāt), and the Mishneh Torah refers to these prohibitions as ones that are 
known mi-pi ha-shemuʿah, from aural tradition (Hilkhot Shevitat ʿEsor, 1:5).676 
According to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, the commandment pertaining to the nullification of vows 
                                                 
y-n (to clarify or explain) and sh-r-ḥ (to interpret) describe Sinaitic material; see there 77 (Pos. 34), 162-63 
(b-y-n; Pos. 205), 182 (Neg. 4), 297 (sh-r-ḥ; Neg. 245). Note the phrase “by way of interpretation” (fī 
sharḥ) to describe rabbinic exegesis (69 [Pos. 20], 173 [Pos. 334], 299 [Neg.247]), and “interpreters” 
(shārihīn) to denote the rabbis (33 [Prin. Nine; twice]). See the designation of Targum Onqelos as “the 
interpreter of tradition” (al-shāriḥ lil-naql; 238 [Neg. 128]). On the Targumim in Maimonides’ writings, 
see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 58n92; Rafael Binyamin Posen, “Targum Onqelos 
be-Khitvei ha-Rambam,” in Sefer Zikaron le-Rav Yosef ben David Kafiḥ, 240-56; and Fixler, “Lashon ve-
Signon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 205-209. 
675 Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14, termed the commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot “mizvah-
units”; see chap. four. Consider the enumeration’s silence about some explicit laws: The commandment to 
take palm branches obviously includes all four species listed in Lev. 23:40, though only the palm branches 
are mentioned in the enumeration; the Mishneh Torah explains that all four are “one commandment” 
(miṣvah aḥat; Hilkhot Shofar, ve-Sukkah, ve-Lulav, 7:5; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 144-
45 [Pos. 169]. In Principle Eleven, he described this as “miṣvat lulav, which is four species” [ יתלא בלול תוצמ
ןינימ העברא; ed. Kafiḥ, 43].). In the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #169, he also only 
mentioned the palm branches; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 28 lines 226-27. See similarly the heading 
of Hilkhot Shofar ve-Sukkah ve-Lulav. I would suggest, perhaps, that lulav constitutes what Maimonides 
called in Principle Seven “the base commandment” (aṣl al-miṣvah); see below, n946.  
676 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 143 (Pos. 164); and idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 2:262-63 (mYom 8:1). Compare Maimonides’ deployment of these derivations, there. These 
prohibitions do not appear in the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #164; idem, Mishneh Torah, 
eds. Cohen et al., 28 line 221. In the Commentary, he originally wrote that violation incurs lashes, but later 
explained that these are rabbinic lashes (makat mardut); ed. Kafiḥ, 2:263n10. This may constitute evidence 
that non-explicit prohibitions receive different punishments than explicit prohibitions; see Henshke, “Lavin 
she-Ein Loqin ʿalehem.” 
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(hafarat nedarim) includes a naql-based teaching that a sage may facilitate release from 
vows (hatarat nedarim).677 The Commentary refers to this in the same manner, adding, 
“there is no evidence for this [tradition] in Scripture” (lā shāhid lahu fī al-naṣṣ),678 and 
Maimonides asserted in the Mishneh Torah that “Moses our teacher taught this law mi-pi 
ha-qabbalah (from tradition)” (see Hilkhot Shevuʿot, 6:1-2). Along the same lines, he 
described the law prohibiting a priest from serving in the Temple without proper clothing 
as one that has “arrived by way of (lit., in) the tafsīr” (jāʾ fī al-tafsīr). Pointedly diverging 
from talmudic claims, he wrote that this law lacks a substantiating verse (naṣṣ).679 
On occasion, Maimonides considered glosses of biblical passages to be Sinaitic 
“details” of larger commandments. For example, he cited Deut. 17:15, “You shall set a 
king over yourself,” as the basis of the commandment to appoint a king, adding that a 
revealed tafsīr glosses the word “yourself” to indicate that subjects should fear the 
                                                 
677 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 110 (Pos. 95). 
678 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:152 (mNed 10:8); similarly 3:180 (mNaz 4:7); 
compare 4:173 (mSan 6:7), 5:210 (mḤul 6:7). Joshua ha-Nagid identified anti-Qaraite animus behind these 
claims; Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 108. Maimonides’ discussion of “heresy” (minut) regarding hatarat nedarim 
supports this; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:152 (mNed 10:8); and Hilkhot Shevuʿot, 12:12. In 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he read the claim that the hatarat nedarim “flies in the air” (porḥin be-avir; i.e., lacks 
scriptural support [mḤag 1:8]) to mean that it is based on “the sound tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ; ed. Kafiḥ, 
110 [Pos. 95]). I have not found this claim in the Commentary; see esp. his comments on mNed 10:8 
(3:151-53) and mḤag 1:8 (2:376). For Qaraite views, see Revel, The Karaite Halakah, 81; and Lewin, Oṣar 
ha-Geonim, Masekhet Nedarim, 9-11. Lawrence Schiffman, “The Laws of Vows and Oaths (Num. 30, 1-
16) in the Zadokite Fragments and the Temple Scroll,” Revue de Qumran 15 (1991): 203n17, treated some 
of the Maimonidean passages. Note also Abraham Maimonides’ formulations; see below, n781. 
679 The Talmud derives this prohibition from Ex. 29:9, “And wind turbans upon them … and so 
they shall have priesthood” (bSan 83b; bZev 17b), asserting that without proper clothing, a priest is 
equivalent to a non-priest (zar). Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33); see similarly Hilkhot 
Kelei ha-Miqdash, 10:4. This rabbinic interpretation appears in Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:194-95 
(mSan 9:6); it is a naql there, 5:27 (mZev 2:1); see also Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 5:2; and Hilkhot 
Sanhedrin, 19:2. For the prohibition against a zar serving in the Temple, see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
220 (Neg. 74). The only other capital punishment in the Positive Commandments that I have found is for 
violating the commandment that a priest wash his hands and face before entering the Temple (Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 72 [Pos. 24]); rabbinic literature associates this law with the commandment of priestly 
garments; see bZev 19b and Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 5:2. Compare also below, n1091. 
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king.680 Regarding the commandment to set apart one who is afflicted with ṣaraʿat 
(usually translated as leprosy), Maimonides noted that a supplemental naql obligates 
setting apart all impure individuals.681 He also asserted, based on tafsīr and naql, that the 
consecration of new months is effective even if the court errs regarding the date of the 
new moon’s appearance.682 
These examples show that Maimonides understood Sinaitic law as a category that 
was broader than the sum of the enumerated commandments. His attempt to identify the 
613 commandments, and to organize the law around them, made it necessary for him to 
include many details under the rubrics of larger commandment-units. This observation 
corroborates Duran’s claim that, for Maimonides, non-explicit biblical “details” often do 
not constitute distinct commandments. It also indicates that Principle Two primarily 
addresses a limited group of enumerated commandments that lack “clear” scriptural 
support and does not primarly focus on the question of whether or not midrash creates 
law of biblical or rabbinic status. Finally, it affirms the tension that Blidstein noted, when 
                                                 
680 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 146 (Pos. 173). This appears in Sifrei, ed. Finkelstein, 
209 (§157); and bSan 20b. Maimonides labeled it a naql in the Commentary; Tiqun Mishnah, ed. Shailat, 
163 (mHor 3:8). He also referred to it as a “principle” (aṣl); Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:269-70 
(mSoṭ 7:6). See also Hilkhot Melakhim, 2:1. 
681 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 118 (Pos. 112); compare Hilkhot Tumat Ṣaraʿat, 10:8, 
and the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #112; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 24 lines 
150-52. The source is Sifra, ed. Weiss, 67b (parashat tazriʿa, §12). 
682 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 137 (Pos. 153). Maimonides cited different verses for 
this; see there, 135 (Pos. 153); the Short Enumeration, Positive Commandment #153 (Mishneh Torah, eds. 
Cohen et al., 27 lines 207-208); and Hilkhot Qiddush ha-Ḥodesh, 1:1, 1:7. Many rabbinic texts state that 
sanctification is valid even if the court acted willfully incorrectly, but Qaraite criticisms may have 
encouraged self-censorship. See Lieberman, Tosefta ke-Feshutah, 5:1037 line 2; and Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 73n15. See the Qaraite texts in Tirosh-Becker, Ginzei Ḥazal, 2:999, 1001, 1002. 
Compare Saul Lieberman, Sheqiʿin: Devarim Aḥadim ʿal Agadot, Minhagim u-Meqorot Sifrutiyim shel ha-
Yehudim she-Nishtaqʿu be-Sifrei ha-Qaraʾim veha-Noṣrim (Jerusalem: Wahrman, 1970), 52-72; and 
Aharon Shweke, “Luḥot ha-Even, ha-Torah veha-Miṣvah,” Tarbiẓ 81, no. 1-4 (2013): 346-48. 
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he juxtaposed Maimonides’ claim that “most rules of the law” (akthar aḥkām al-sharīʿa) 
are derived by way of the middot, in Principle Two, with his ubiquitous use of mi-pi ha-
shemuʿah, from aural tradition, in the Mishneh Torah.683 By using the categories of tafsīr 
marwī and naql, Maimonides was able to categorize as “Sinaitic” many non-scriptural 
laws that appear in halakhic midrash.  
In short, the question, “does midrash produce biblical or rabbinic law?” is 
misconceived, driven, in part, by readings that flatten or ignore the subtleties of 
Maimonides’ terminology. Rather, Maimonides asked each midrash: does this midrash 
create law or uphold law?684 I now turn to the difficulties in determining how 
Maimonides answered this question. 
 
Identifying Tafsīr Marwī in Midrash Halakhah 
Maimonides’ failure to provide guidelines for the identification of Sinaitic 
traditions within rabbinic midrash bothered several scholars.685 Neubauer conjectured 
that when “peshaṭ is against a particular interpretation, it seems that this interpretation 
must be received,” and he suggested that Maimonides used “logic and hermeneutics” in 
determining which midrashim contained Sinaitic law.686 Shimshon Ettinger took a 
                                                 
683 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12 (Prin. Two); and Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut 
Mosdit,” 17. Examination of the Commentary on the Mishnah would undoubtedly reveal a similar 
phenomenon. 
684 Some have hinted at this distinction, but it has not received adequate treatment; see Neubauer, 
Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 85-87; Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42; Blidstein’s 
comments cited above, n641; and Rabinovitch, ʿIyunim be-Mishnato shel ha-Rambam, 132-35. 
685 See Zvi Karl, “‘Sefer ha-Miṣvot’ leha-Rambam,” Moznayim 3 (1935): 463; Neubauer, Ha-
Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 88; and Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42; see also above, 
n437. Maimonides’ tendency to transform rabbinic midrash into tafsīr marwī was perhaps first noted by 
Guttman (see above, n541). 
686 Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 89.  
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different view, writing that Sinaitic traditions, for Maimonides, are based on “clear … 
logic and common sense” and “the plain meaning of the text.” On the other hand, wrote 
Ettinger, if a “teaching appears remote from this simple meaning” it is “an allusion 
(asmakhta) only” and merely rabbinic.687 According to Mordechai Cohen, Maimonides 
“adhere[d] as closely as possible to the principles of philological-contextual analysis.”688 
As is evident from the preceding excursus, none of these general statements adequately 
accounts for Maimonides’ perspectives on halakhic midrash.  
For Maimonides, the presence or absence of received traditions was marked by 
certain features. The existence of a biblical punishment was the most direct evidence of a 
biblical commandment.689 In one letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, Maimonides cited the biblical 
prescription of flogging as evidence of a biblical prohibition,690 and in the letter to Pinḥas 
ha-dayan, he invoked biblically imposed punishments in asserting that marriages 
transacted through a legal document (shṭar) are of biblical status. Relying on the rabbinic 
                                                 
687 Ettinger, “ʿAl Meqomah shel ha-Sevarah,” 19-20; trans. in idem, “On the Place of Logic 
(Svara) in Maimonides’ Code,” in Authority, Process and Method: Studies in Jewish Law, eds. Ḥanina 
Ben-Menaḥem and Neil S. Hecht (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1998), 155. See similarly 
Meyer S. Feldblum, “Criteria for Designating Laws Traditions, Derivations from Biblical Exegesis, and 
Legislative Enactments,” in Maimonides as Codifier of Jewish Law, ed. Nahum Rakover (Jerusalem: 
Library of Jewish Law, 1987), 48: “any rabbinic interpretation of a Torah verse that results in a law must be 
philologically defensible, even if it is derived by the 13 hermeneutical principles.” 
688 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 431. Cohen added that Maimonides used 
“halakhic evidence” to isolate received traditions. I am not sure what this term means; see there, 417, 424; 
see also 434, and below, n690. Compare ibn Ṣur Sefardi, Megillat Esther, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Hellman, 76 (Prin. Two). 
689 See Qazes, Qinat Sofrim, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 55 (Prin. Two). 
690 Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:574 (§310); treated in Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 388-89. The example is flogging for travelling beyond the Sabbath boundaries (see bʿEiruv 
17b). Maimonides cited this statement in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 188 (Neg. 10); and in another letter to 
Samuel; Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:571 (§309). Elsewhere, Cohen explained that Maimonides considered a law 
that “is assumed in the Mishnah to be de-orayta” to be based on a “transmitted interpretation” (425). This 
“assumption” is based on the fact that violating this law incurs excision, as noted in Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, 
in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 62 (Prin. Two). 
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reading of the word “possesses her” (baʿalah; Deut. 24:1) to mean coition (biʾah; bQid 
4b, 9b), he asserted that marriages enacted by intercourse are of biblical status. Though it 
might have been assumed that marriages contracted through legal documents and the 
exchange of money are of rabbinic status (mi-diverehem) because they are derived “from 
logic” (min ha-din), Maimonides came to a different conclusion. The Talmud’s 
imposition of capital punishment for adultery with a maiden (naʿarah meʾurasah)691 
betrothed through a legal document (bQid 9b) indicated to him that such a marriage must 
be of biblical status, because capital punishments are only incurred for violation of a 
biblical prohibition.692 Sefer ha-Miṣvot also deems laws “biblical” if their violation incurs 
biblical punishment, even in cases where the prohibition in question has no supporting 
verse.693 Maimonides even cited the inclusion of a particular prohibition on a rabbinic list 
of sins whose violation incurs capital punishment to prove that it is an independent 
commandment.694 By the same token, when a ritually pure nazirite is exposed to a type of 
impurity that would compel him to begin his period of nazirism anew, this impurity must 
ipso facto be biblical in nature.695 Maimonides similarly wrote that a specific prohibition 
                                                 
691 Rabbinic law limits this status to a girl between the ages of twelve and twelve and a half. 
692 Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 2:454. 
693 E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33; see above, n679), 221 (Neg. 76). 
See the similar usage there, 243. He cited lists in mKer 1:1, bMak 22b, and bSan 83a. See Allegri, Leiv 
Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 70-71 (Prin. Two). Compare also Hilkhot 
Sanhedrin, chap. 19. Maimonides’ usage differed from geonic-era usage; see Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 
16-18, 20-21. De-orayta mandated lashes evince a biblical prohibition; e.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 208 (Neg. 52), 285 (Neg. 215), 286 (Neg. 216). 
694 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 337 (Neg. 349). This may be his argument elsewhere; 
there, 225 (twice; Neg. 86-87), 324 (Neg. 309). Abraham Maimonides used these lists similarly; see n754. 
695 This case and its attendant details are quite complex; see Isaac Bekhor David, Divrei Emet, 
84a-85b; Henshke, “ʿAl ha-Meṣiʾut ha-Mishpaṭit,” 236-37; idem, “Sheniyot le-‘Divrei Sofrim’,” 58-63; 
idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 114-18; and Ettinger, “Shetei Heʿarot,” 238-42. The details of this rule troubled 
Maimonides throughout his life; Abraham Karelitz claimed that Maimonides was “undecided” about 
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is rabbinic in status because it is neither included in these lists nor learned from the 
peshaṭeh di-qera.696 
Maimonides often inferred a law’s rabbinic status from the Sages’ explicit use of 
the middot.697 Yet the fact that he regarded certain middot-derived laws as biblical in 
status698 suggests that he alone ultimately determined – based on the criteria suggested 
above and other possible factors – which midrashim created laws, and which upheld 
received laws,699 citing accordingly the rabbinic texts that best matched his conclusions. 
 
Conclusion 
A number of dichotomies populate Maimonides’ conception of revelation: 
Sinaitic and post-Sinaitic law; written and oral revelation; Moses and subsequent leaders; 
and the transmission of legal material and its creation. Maimonides drew on Andalusian 
depictions of rabbinic legal creativity and he mobilized geonic, Andalusian, and Islamic 
thinking about Scripture and revelation in order to decisively reject geonic presentations 
                                                 
several applications of this principle (merafya ha-davar be-yado); Sefer Ḥazon Ish: Toharot (Benei Brak, 
1974), 73b (mOha 10:8); noted in Henshke, “Le-Yesodei,” 118. 
696 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 16-17 (Prin. Three). Compare my reading to Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 327-28 (see there, n136), 333. 
697 For example, on ribbuy, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two); and note 
the comparison of ribbuy with qiyās in idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:397 (mʿOrl 1:2), and with 
naẓar and qiyās, 4:256 (mShev 3:6). In one place, the principle rubbuy aḥar ribbuy teaches a naql; 2:357 
(mMeg 4:3). On gezeirah shavah, see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 243 (Neg. 135); and above n670. 
Several appearances of this term in the Commentary denote biblical law, e.g., Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 4:242 (mMak 3:5), 6:672 (mZav 3:1). See the equation of middot and naql there, 5:150-51 (mMen 
9:7); see similarly 6:53-55 (mKel 2:1). The Commentary may be less careful than Sefer ha-Miṣvot about 
these terms; in one passage, Maimonides insisted that he did not intend to fully explicate the middot in the 
Commentary (mʿOrl 1:2, noted in Sinai, “Peirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” 212-13n52). I hope to treat the 
Commentary’s use of the middot in a future study. 
698 See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 42-43. 
699 Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 306, reached a similar conclusion. Compare the 
comments in Naftali Zvi Yehuda Berlin, Haʿamek Sheʾeilah (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1999), 1:6, 
regarding the term halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai. 
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of the Oral Torah’s origins. An array of Arabic and Hebrew terms helped Maimonides 
navigate the realms of revelation, received tradition, and rabbinic law. Nevertheless, the 
search for precisely 613 commandments occasionally led Maimonides to blur his own 
neat definitions and conceptual boundaries. 
Further research could explore how Maimonides applied his system and the extent 
to which he worked out his ideas between writing the Commentary on the Mishnah and 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Integrating these works, along with the Mishneh Torah and 
Maimonides’ responsa into studies of Maimonides’ intellectual development may help to 
clarify his reformulation of ideas when challenged by new agendas, such as enumerating 
the commandments, formulating a legal compendium, or various interlocutors. 
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Chapter Three: Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on the Oral 
Torah 
Introduction 
The early thirteenth-century debate between Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli and 
Abraham Maimonides constitutes the first controversy over Maimonides’ approach to the 
Oral Torah. Less than three folios in the lone manuscript, Daniel’s challenges to 
Principles One and Two of Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot demonstrate that Maimonides’ 
views were influential, even for those who rejected his conclusions. Daniel’s approach to 
the Oral Torah – at least as can be inferred from his criticism of Maimonides – integrated 
elements of geonic and Maimonidean thought. Abraham Maimonides, for his part, 
staunchly defended his father, and, in his later writings, upheld and expanded upon 
Maimonides’ understanding of the Oral Torah in the service of his own pietistic program. 
This chapter begins with Daniel and Abraham’s debate in order to underscore the 
(continuing) importance of reflections on the Oral Torah among Judeo-Arabic writers. I 
then turn to Abraham’s later writings, especially his Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn (The Sufficient 
Guide for the Servants of God) and responsa. Analysis of these texts, augmented by brief 
treatment of Abraham’s biblical commentary, uncovers the ways that Abraham 
championed and applied his father’s system. 
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Daniel ha-Bavli’s Criticism of Principles One and Two 
In his query to Abraham Maimonides, Daniel ben Saʿadya ha-Bavli grouped his 
criticisms of Principles One and Two into one question,700 implicitly adopting the 
assumption of many modern treatments that regard Principles One and Two as intimately 
connected.701 
 
The Scope of Revelation and the Enumeration of the Commandments 
Daniel began his comments on Principle One, which excludes “rabbinic 
commandments” from the enumeration of the commandments, by explaining that 
Maimonides only enumerated material based on faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ, an express scriptural 
passage.702 Daniel, however, considered all “revealed” material – so identified in rabbinic 
literature – to be of equal status for the purpose of enumeration. Therefore, while he 
accepted Maimonides’ claim that the description of the 613 commandments as “said to 
Moses at Sinai” (bMak 23b) precludes the enumeration of rabbinic enactments,703 he 
rejected the idea that the Written Torah is of special importance for the enumeration. 
                                                 
700 This is clear from internal evidence; Daniel transitioned from Principle One to Principle Two 
with wa-kadhālika (“and likewise”; MS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4; §1). There is no reason to 
think that the copyist of this manuscript from the (lost) original combined what were originally two 
questions. 
701 E.g., the work of Blidstein, Halbertal, Harris, and Kassierer and Glicksburg. 
702 Translation follows Blau, Dictionary, 505, s.v. ّّصنلا حيصف. This phrase does not appear in 
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, nor, as far as I can tell, elsewhere in his writings. For geonic usage, see 
Yehuda Raṣhabi, “Seridim mi-Peirush R. Saʿadya le-Megillat Esther,” Sinai 104, no. 1 (1989): 207; 
Wechsler, The Book of Conviviality in Exile, 564 line 13; Saʿadya, Kitāb al-Amānāt wal-Iʿtiqādāt, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 220; and Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni, 216 (Gen. 44:1). Two Qaraite 
biblical commentators use this phrase; see Yevr.-Arab. I 25, 40a, published in Ḥaggai Ben-Shammai, Kitvei 
ha-Yad be-ʿAravit-Yehudit be-Osfei Firqoviṣ: Yefet ben ʿEli al-Baṣri, Peirush Bereishit, Qatalog le-
Dugmah, Meqorot u-Meḥqarim (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2000), 29; and Yevr.-Arab. I 2131 (from Jeshua 
ben Judah). 
703 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One); see above, n190. 
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After all, he noted, the Talmud does not state, “Moses wrote for us 613 commandments 
in the Torah.” For this reason, asserted Daniel, one may criticize geonic-era enumerations 
for counting rabbinic ordinances and decrees (gezeirot and taqqanot), but not for 
counting laws based on extra-scriptural Sinaitic traditions.704  
Daniel turned to the two scriptural prohibitions pertaining to priests serving in the 
Temple found in Ezekiel (44:9, 20).705 According to the Talmud, these prohibitions were 
orally transmitted from Moses long before Ezekiel wrote them down (bTan 17b, etc.).706 
For Daniel, this talmudic claim demonstrates that extra-scriptural traditions are 
equivalent to explicit biblical passages for the purpose of enumeration. Given their 
Sinaitic origin, Daniel asserted that Maimonides erred in excluding these laws from the 
enumeration.707 
Daniel used this line of reasoning to respond to Maimonides’ claim that geonic-
era enumerators had mistakenly counted commandments to clothe the naked, visit the 
sick, and comfort the bereaved. Where Maimonides claimed that these enumerators 
                                                 
704 MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2. He wrote that bMak 23b includes anything that is a 
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai: קתלא אלא טקסי םלו יניסמ השמל הכלה וה אמ לכ לוקלא א'דה יוח דקפ יתלא תורזגלאו תונ
םידיו ןיבוריע ל'תמ תבתר; MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2 (§1). I believe that the phrase halakhah le-
Moshe mi-Sinai here refers to all unwritten, revealed laws, not just laws that receive this designation in 
rabbinic literature (see below, nn707, 724), as Daniel contrasted halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai with 
“ordinances and decrees.” See also MS. Hunt. 185, 128b-129a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1): ידייקמ ריג אננא ילעו ן
ץוצנמ ריג ןאכ ןאו חיצפ בותכמ ןאכ ןא יניסמ השמ לבק אמל וה דדעלא ןאל לוקלא םדקת דק אמכ ץוצנלא חיצפב תוצמ ג"ירת דדע יפ. 
705 The prohibitions against an uncircumcised priest serving in the Temple and a priest entering the 
Temple with unkempt hair. The latter example is curious, because it appears in surviving texts of Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, as Abraham Maimonides noted; see MS. Hunt. 185, 120a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1). For the 
suggestion that Daniel’s version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot omitted this commandment, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 25 (introductory pagination), 118n13; see also below, n1044. 
706 For background in rabbinic literature and geonic-era use of these texts, see above, nn200, 202. 
707 Daniel assumed that Maimonides accepted the talmudic claim that these laws were transmitted 
orally from Sinai; MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2-3 (§1). On Maimonides’ view, see above, 
nn613-614. Daniel labeled these laws halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, which the Talmud did not (writing: 
יניסמ השמל הכלה לב ץוצנ תסיל אהנכל; MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2; §1); see above, n704, and 
below, n723. 
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considered “When you see the naked, clothe him” (Isa. 58:7) to be the source of the 
obligation to clothe the naked, but their true source to be the pentateuchal command to 
provide for the poor (“Sufficient for what he needs”; Deut. 15:8), Daniel inverted 
Maimonides’ argument and likened these laws to those found in Ezekiel. Daniel thus 
described the verse in Isaiah as a “transmitted interpretation” (sharḥ manqūl), elaborating 
on Deut. 15:8, writing that the later prophet had “stated expressly” (faṣaḥa bihā), i.e., in a 
more elaborate form, the Sinaitic charges.708 Similarly, where Maimonides had asserted 
that talmudic glosses (bBQ 100a) to each phrase in Ex. 18:20 (“Make known to them the 
way they are to go in and the practices they are to follow”) misled earlier enumerators to 
count visiting the sick and comforting the bereaved as separate commandments,709 Daniel 
labeled each of these glosses a “narrated interpretation (sharḥ marwī) from the messenger 
(i.e., Moses).”710 
 
Particular Manifestations of General Scriptural Commands 
Daniel ha-Bavli next turned to two other laws excluded by Maimonides, the 
requirement to recite the Hallel prayer, which is comprised of Pss. 113-18 and is recited 
on festive days, and the celebration of the post-biblical festival of Hanukah. Earlier 
enumerators had listed both as commandments, but Maimonides deemed them rabbinic in 
status.711 In order to prove the “biblical” status of these requirements, Daniel argued that 
                                                 
708 MS. Hunt. 185, 127a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). For Maimonides’ view, see above, n612. On 
faṣaḥa (or faṣṣaḥa) bihā, see Blau, Dictionary, 505, s.v. حصف I, II. 
709 See above, nn625-626; see also above, n198. 
710 לוסרלא ןע יורמ חרש; MS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). 
711 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9-10 (Prin. One); and above, n607. 
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discrete manifestations of general scriptural commands may be counted as distinct 
commandments. Turning to Hallel, he claimed that the rabbis had “stated expressly 
(faṣīḥ) that [the recitation of Hallel] is biblical in status (de-orayta) on eighteen days.”712 
(This is actually an inference from bTaʿan 28a, which lists these eighteen days in order to 
prove that the requirement to recite Hallel on the first day of new months – days not 
counted among the eighteen – is not biblical in status.713) Daniel next cited a baraita that 
addresses the origin of Hallel (bPes 117a): 
Who recited this Hallel? R. Yosi says: “My son Eleazar says: ‘Moses and all 
Israel said it at the moment that they ascended from the sea.’ But his colleagues 
disagree with him, saying ‘David [the presumed author of Psalms] said it.’ His 
view appears preferable to theirs: is it possible that Israel slaughtered their paschal 
sacrifices and did not recite song?”714 
While Daniel accepted the first view, he asserted that, even according to the second view, 
“it is not impossible that the command (amr) [ordains] general praise (tasbīḥ stam), not 
necessarily with these designated words. Rather, [God] obligated the recitation of songs 
and praises during these festivals (mawāsim) – with any words.”715 
                                                 
712 םימי 'ח'יב אתירואד אהנא חיצפ ל"ז ולאק דקפ; i.e., eight days of each of Sukkot and Hanukah and the 
first days of Passover and Shavuʿot; bTaʿan 28b, bʿErkh 10a; see also jSuk 54c (4:5). 
713 Daniel’s text of bTaʿan 28a accords with most manuscripts, which differ slightly from the 
printed edition. See also MS. Hunt. 91b; Birkat Avraham, 51 (§38; the numbering differs in the 
manuscript). 
714  רמול ויריבח וילע ןיקולחו םיה ןמ ולעש העשב והורמא לארשי לכו השמ 'מוא ינב רזעלא רמוא יסוי 'ר ורמא ימ הז ללה
.הריש ורמא אלו ןהיחספ וטחש לארשי רשפא םהירבדמ וירבד ןיארנו ורמא דוד This is Daniel’s text; manuscripts, with the 
exception of Vatican 109, record few variants. On the texts of Bavli Pesaḥim, see below, n1225. Rashi, s.v. 
efshar, explained that R. Yosi’s rhetorical question asks: did Israel not recite Hallel when they slaughtered 
their paschal sacrifices between the time of the Exodus and that of King David? 
715  'טאפלאלא ה'דהב ןוכי ןא םזלי םל םתס חיבסתלאב רמאלא ןוכי ןא ענתמי אל ורמא דוד לוקי ןמ יאר ילע יתחו
איהת 'טפל יאב םסאומלא ה'דה יפ תוחבשותו תוריש ולוקי ןא 'עת ב'גוא לב הניעמלא; MS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 3 (§1). 
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Daniel suggested that “Sing to the Lord, for He has triumphed gloriously” (Ex. 
15:21) constitutes the source for the obligation to recite Hallel.716 “It is clear,” he wrote, 
“that all of the festivals commemorate the Exodus from Egypt. It is obligatory from this 
that we thank and praise Him every time He makes His power and deliverance manifest 
(yuẓhir) to us.”717 Daniel asserted that since God’s power was manifest during the 
Maccabean revolt, the recitation of Hallel on Hanukah constitutes a biblical obligation, 
even though “the days of Hanukah are not explicitly stated (manṣūṣa) in the Torah.” 718 
Claiming that the recitation of Hallel also fulfills the commandment to “publicize a 
miracle” (pirsumei nisa; see bSab 23b etc.), he invoked the rabbinic comment “it is 
inferred (mi-mashmaʿ) from ‘Do not desecrate’ – sanctify,” describing the obligation to 
publicize a miracle as “supported by” (mustanida ilā) the verse “Do not desecrate the 
name of your God” (Lev. 18:21).719 
                                                 
716 Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. Hallel, does not list anybody else who cited this verse as the 
source for the obligation to recite Hallel. 
717  ןמ ב'גוו םירצמ תאיציל רכז אהלכ םידעומלא ןאב ןאב דקו האג האג יכ יויל וריש ה"ע לוסרלא לוק וה ךל'דב רמאלאו
.התרצנו התרדק אנל רה'טי תקו לכ יפ החבסנו 'עת הרכשנ אנא א'ציא ךל'ד Daniel may have relied on the prayer book for 
the claim that all holidays commemorate the exodus; alternatively, Uri Melamed (personal communication) 
noted this claim in Saul Lieberman, ed., Midrash Devarim Rabbah (Jerusalem: Shaleim, 1992), 17 (§18). 
718 הרותלא יפ הצוצנמ הכונחלא םאיא ןא אל; MS. Hunt. 185, 127b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Standard 
commentators on the enumeration in the Halakhot Gedolot have concluded that this enumeration counted 
the eighteen days as eighteen, not one, commandments; Shaul ben Musah ha-Kohen, Netiv Miṣvotekha 
(Livorno, 1841), 45a-45b; and Mordecai Sluṣqi, Azharot le-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot: Mevuʾar be-sheim Hidur 
Zaqein (Warsaw, 1900), 9-11; see also Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 81. Daniel’s 
position on this question is unclear. 
719 שדק רמא ללחת אל 'אנש עמשממ; MS. Hunt. 185, 127b-128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Daniel quoted 
Lev. 18:21; surviving editions of the Sifra link this gloss to Lev. 22:32 (“You shall not desecrate My holy 
name”); noted in Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:515; see Sifra, ed. Weiss, 99b (parashat emor, §9). 
Daniel described this interpretation as offered “by way of interpretation” (fī sharḥ), perhaps hinting that 
such interpretations have the status of biblical law. On the phrase fī sharḥ in Maimonides’ writings, see 
above, n674. Daniel also suggested that the recitation of Hallel is not the only possible way to publicize a 
miracle. 
 
202 
 
This conclusion facilitated Daniel’s response to the Maimonidean claim about the 
Talmud’s assertion (bSab 23a) that the requirement to light Hanukah candles has the 
same basis as all rabbinic decrees (“In accordance with the instruction given you”; Deut. 
17:11).720 Daniel agreed that the requirement to light Hanukah candles is rabbinic in 
origin, but saw this as different from the recitation of Hallel, which, he claimed, fulfills 
the “biblical” commandment to observe Hanukah. Whereas Maimonides interpreted the 
talmudic query, “where were we commanded to light Hanukah candles?” to mean, “what 
is the scriptural basis for Hanukah?” Daniel understood it as, “why was Hanukah singled 
out with the lighting of candles?”721 Thus, in Daniel’s view, specific manifestations of 
general biblical commands – in this case, the recitation of Hallel and the celebration of 
Hanukah – may constitute distinct commandments. 
 
Laws Derived Through the Middot 
Daniel ha-Bavli began his rebuttal of Principle Two by attacking Maimonides’ 
insistence that the vast majority of laws derived from the middot (hermeneutical rules) 
are neither enumerated nor of biblical status.722 Incredulous, Daniel exclaimed that 
Maimonides could not possibly deny that the thirteen middot and that which is “deduced 
by means of them” (al-mustafād bi-ṭarīqihā) is of Sinaitic origin; he termed that which 
                                                 
720 See above, n611; see also above, n345. 
721 Daniel asserted that lighting Hanukah candles is “a commandment (miṣvah) to listen to the 
sages from ‘You shall not deviate [from the verdict that they announce to you]’ (Deut. 17:11;  באו'גלא ןאכפ
רוסת אלמ םימכח ירבד עומשל הוצמ ןאל); MS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 3 (§1). Manuscripts of bSab 23a 
only quote Deut. 17:11, not the phrase “a commandment to listen to the sages.” In Principle One, 
Maimonides quoted this phrase from bḤul 106a, linking it to Deut. 17:11 (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 10). 
It is likely that Daniel imputed this phrase due to Maimonides’ comments. 
722 See above, n621. 
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was derived in this manner halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai; i.e., law given to Moses at 
Sinai.723 Daniel, for his part, insisted that the label de-orayta (of biblical status) may be 
applied to any law derived from the middot, writing: “That which is verified for us [as 
having] its basis (isnādahu) in one of the middot, we term it de-orayta.” On the other 
hand, he explained, “That which is not verified for us [as having] its basis in one of the 
middot, we term it halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, meaning, merely a halakhah (here: 
tradition).”724 
Because Daniel equated scriptural laws with laws derived through the middot, he 
asserted that a law in either category may be the basis of a distinct commandment if it 
constitutes not merely “part” (juzʾ) of a commandment, but a “guf miṣvah,” lit., “body of 
a commandment”; i.e., a self-contained or discrete commandment.725 He therefore agreed 
with Maimonides that geonic-era enumerators had been wrong to count as a distinct 
                                                 
723 יניסמ השמל הכלה אהקירטב דאפתסמלא ריאסו יניסמ השמל הכלה תודמ הרשע שלש ןא רכני אל ל"ז הנוכ עמ; others 
have read this sentence not as an expression of astonishment but as Daniel’s attempt to interpret 
Maimonides, claiming that Daniel felt that Maimonides held that laws derived by the middot are biblical in 
status; Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 1:19; Neubauer, Ha-Rambam ʿal Divrei Sofrim, 152; and 
Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 209n7. This reading fails to account for the fact that Daniel 
also quoted Maimonides’ assertion that if the Talmud did not identify a derived law as de-orayta or guf ha-
torah, the law in question is rabbinic in status. How could Daniel’s supposed interpretation of Maimonides 
contradict the passage that he immediately quoted? Perla and Friedberg even suggested that Daniel 
anticipated Simeon ben Ṣemaḥ Duran’s claim that the terms “biblical” and “rabbinic” in Principle Two 
distinguish between enumerated and non-enumerated laws. 
724  הכלה הימסנפ תודמלא דחאב הדאנסא אנל חצי אל אמו אתירואד הימסנ תודמלא דחאב הדאנסא אנל חצי אמ ןכל
טקפ הכלה ינענ יניסמ השמל; MS. Hunt. 185, 128a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1). Daniel appears to use the phrase 
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai in two different senses in this passage; see also above, nn704, 707. 
725 Daniel used this term twice here, and elsewhere contrasted it with acts done to complete a 
commandment (tashlumei miṣvah; MS. Hunt. 185, 173b-174a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 60; §5). I have uncovered 
no rabbinic or geonic usage of this phrase. My guess is that it relates to the mishnaic terms kol ha-guf (an 
entire principle [mHor 1:3]; see below, n848) and guf torah (essence of the Torah [mḤag 1:8]; see above, 
n621). Note Joseph ben Abraham Gikatilla, Kelalei ha-Miṣvot, ed. Barukh Avigdor Ḥeifeṣ (Safed, 1992), 
198:  תוצמ יפוג ראש ו"ק רועיש הל ןיא םידסח תולימג יפנעמ 'א ףנע אלא תוצמ ג"ירתמ תדחוימ הוצמ ףוג הניאש היולה םאו
הרותבש. See also Arieh Goldschmidt, ed., Maḥzor Vitry le-Rabbeinu Simḥah mi-Vitry, Talmid Rashi 
(Jerusalem: Oṣar ha-Posqim, 2003), 3:941: 'ר ברהו  ןהש םיטפשמה הלא תוצמ רוכבו םיקוחו תוצמ 'יפ לאננח 'רב ןהכ םייח
וינידו תוצמ יפוג. 
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commandment the obligation to fear sages. But while Maimonides excluded this on the 
grounds that it is derived from a lexical redundancy (ribbuy) and was not explicit in the 
Pentateuch, Daniel argued that fear of the sages is a biblical “part” of the commandment 
to fear God (both are based on Deut. 6:13).726 
Daniel also used his equation of explicit laws with those based on the middot to 
reject Maimonides’ claim that derived laws constitute “branches” (furūʿ) of Sinaitic 
“roots” (uṣūl);727 he argued that the enumeration should include any “guf miṣvah” that the 
rabbis “derived” (istakhrajū) through the middot. For Daniel, such a commandment 
would be both “derived” and Sinaitic – and it could not be mapped onto the distinction 
between “roots” and “branches.” Daniel exploited this argument to reject Maimonides’ 
conclusion from the legend that the Israelites forgot seventeen hundred derived laws after 
Moses’ death (bTem 16a). Maimonides had cited this tradition in order to exclude most 
derived laws from the enumeration; after all, he reasoned, the number of derived laws 
clearly exceeds 613 and consistency dictates that either all of them be counted or none of 
them.728 Daniel explained that these forgotten derivations are Sinaitic “branches of 
commandments (miṣvot), parts, and specifications (fiqh) of explicit commandments 
                                                 
726 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two); MS. Hunt. 185, 128a-128b; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 4 (§1); see bPes 22b. For similar positions, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. yirat ha-sheim, 
25:88nn161-62. Daniel described this law as “supported” (musnad) by Deut. 6:13. Maimonides’ position 
may be more complex than Principle Two suggests; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 164-66 (Pos. 209); 
Hilkhot Talmud Torah, 5:1; di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 11b-12a (Hilkhot Talmud Torah, chap. 5); and 
Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 315n72, 324-25. 
727 See above, nn632-633. 
728 See above, n634. 
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(sharāʾiʿ manṣūṣa); one commandment can entail (taḥtamil) numerous branches.” Hence, 
such derivations are not enumerated because they do not constitute a “guf miṣvah.”729 
The assertion that all laws that are “derived” through the middot were in fact 
given at Sinai730 also led Daniel to challenge another assertion, in which Maimonides 
claimed that the talmudic term guf torah (“essence of the Torah”) denotes a select set of 
unwritten, Sinaitic laws that constitute distinct commandments. As evidence, 
Maimonides had pointed to the Talmud’s (bKer 5a) application of the term guf torah to a 
few non-explicit laws, and to its warning about them: “Do not take a gezeirah shavah 
(analogy based on verbal congruity) lightly.”731 Daniel, however, rejected Maimonides’ 
assumption that the term guf torah is relevant for the enumeration of the commandments. 
Instead, he inferred a general rule from this passage and claimed that any law learned 
from a gezeirah shavah can be considered a guf torah, whether or not the rabbis used this 
term.732 However, a law labeled guf torah may only be counted in the enumeration if it 
constitutes a “whole” commandment (i.e., what Daniel called a guf miṣvah). 
Daniel concluded by claiming that Maimonides had inconsistently applied his 
own rules when he counted the prohibition against a priest who has ritually bathed but 
will only be fully purified with sunset (ṭevul yom) serving in the Temple, which the 
Talmud (bSan 83b, bZev 17a) learns from a scriptural “hint” (remez) in Lev. 21:6. After 
                                                 
729 הדידע עורפ הדחאולא העירשלא למתחת הצוצנמ עיארש הקפו אז'גאו תוצמ עורפ ה'דה לצאח ןאל; MS. Hunt. 185, 
128b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1). On the meaning of the term fiqh here, see above, n570, and below, nn921-
944; see below, nn998-999, for Daniel’s use of this term. 
730 See the text cited above, n723. 
731 See above, nn651-653, 668. Maimonides, of course, used several criteria to identify such 
commandments. 
732 MS. Hunt. 185, 128b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4 (§1). 
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all, he noted, Maimonides had asserted that the only non-scriptural laws that constitute 
distinct commandments are those designated de-orayta or guf torah in rabbinic 
literature.733 Daniel also drew attention to Maimonides’ comment, elsewhere, that another 
law could not constitute a distinct commandment because it is derived from a “hint,” and 
not from the peshaṭeh di-qera.734 As rabbinic literature labeled neither law of de-orayta 
status or a guf torah, Daniel observed, they should be identical for purposes of the 
enumeration.735 
 
Other Maimonidean Claims about the Oral Torah 
The comments about revelation and rabbinic tradition that appear throughout 
Daniel’s queries demonstrate that he sensed, at least in part, the breadth of Maimonides’ 
claims about the Oral Torah. One case pertains to a law that the Talmud (bSan 83b) 
linked to Ex. 29:9, but that in Maimonides’ opinion, was based on a revealed tafsīr, rather 
than an explicit verse (naṣṣ).736 Daniel agreed with Maimonides, writing “there is no 
doubt that without the halakhah that arrived from Sinai … it would have been impossible 
                                                 
733 See the references above, n731. Maimonides identified the tafsīr marwī as the source of this 
law. Daniel added that, in his view, the Sifra’s reading of Lev. 21:6 (ed. Weiss, 91a [parashat emor, §1), 
constitutes the peshaṭeh di-qera of this verse. 
734 I.e., the prohibition against stealing a libation vessel (qisvah); bSan 81b. See Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 16-17 (Prin. Three). On this passage, see above, n696. 
735 MS. Hunt. 185, 129a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 4-5 (§1); Sifra, ed. Weiss, 94ab (parashat emor, §1). 
Elsewhere, Daniel wrote the rabbis considered this “hint” a ribbuy; MS. Hunt. 185, 140a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 
19 (§3). 
736 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 76 (Pos. 33), concerning the prohibition against an 
improperly dressed priest (meḥusar begadim) serving in the Temple. In Hilkhot Kelei ha-Miqdash, 10:4, 
Maimonides cited Ex. 29:9, but no extra-scriptural interpretation of this verse (e.g., mi-pi ha-shemuʿah or 
mi-pi ha-qabbalah). 
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to derive it (istakhrājuhu) from this verse.”737 Another comment by Daniel relates to a 
debate over the phrase “the seventh day” in the verse “On the seventh day you shall rest; 
you shall rest from plowing and harvesting” (Ex. 34:21): does this refer to the Sabbatical 
year or to the weekly Sabbath (bMK 3b-4a)?738 Despite the fact that the talmudic sugya 
appears to accept the latter view, Daniel noted that Maimonides cited this verse, among 
others, as the basis for the commandment to refrain from farming during the Sabbatical 
year.739 
Daniel was also among the early critics to claim that Maimonides was wrong 
when (in Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2, 3:20) he categorized the effectuation of marriage through the 
exchange of money as a law of divrei sofrim status (words or matters of the scribes). Was 
it possible, asked Daniel, that the obligation to marry, categorized by Maimonides (in 
Hilkhot Ishut, 1:2) as a biblical law (shel torah), could be fulfilled through a rabbinically-
ordained mechanism? Indeed, asked Daniel, if a woman who is married through the 
exchange of money enters into a second marriage through a biblically-ordained 
mechanism, does the second marriage override the first? Daniel further wondered what 
reason Maimonides had for distinguishing between the effectuation of marriage through 
money, which is derived from a gezeirah shavah (bQid 2a), and its effectuation through 
                                                 
737 ץנלא א'דה ןמ ה'גאר'כתסא ןכמא אמל ... יניסמ הדראולא הכלהלא אלול ןא ההבש אלו; MS. Hunt. 185, 140b; 
Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). On this passage, see also below, n1041. 
738 The first view asserts that this verse extends the prohibitions against plowing and harvesting to 
a period before and after the Sabbatical year, based on the assumption that there is no reason to single out 
plowing and harvesting among the labors prohibited on the Sabbath. The second holds that only optional 
plowing and harvesting are forbidden on the Sabbath, but such actions are permitted when fulfilling a 
commandment (i.e., for the purposes of the ʿomer sacrifice); for treatment see David Henshke, “‘Be-Ḥarish 
uve-Qaṣir Tishbot’ – Eḥad Miqra u-Shenayim Midrash,” Sidra 15 (1999): 13-29. 
739 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 127 (Pos. 135); MS. Hunt. 185, 195b-196a; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 88 (§9). 
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legal documents, which is derived through a scriptural “analogy” (heqqesh; bQid 5a); 
neither mechanism, he wrote, is explicit in Scripture.740 
 
Daniel ha-Bavli’s Use of Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
Daniel ha-Bavli’s criticism of Principles One and Two highlights the controversy 
over Maimonides’ portrayals of revelation and of laws derived through the middot. In 
asserting the divine basis of much of Jewish law (and not only that which is explicit in 
the Torah), Daniel occasionally went further than talmudic claims. One such case is his 
declaration that laws identified by Isaiah are Sinaitic – in keeping with the talmudic claim 
regarding laws mentioned by Ezekiel. Daniel’s description of the middot using Arabic 
roots such as kh-r-j, h-ṣ-l, and f-y-d, which denote derivation or deduction, differed from 
the Saʿadyanic model, which saw the middot as “matching” Scripture with received 
tradition.741 This choice of terminology suggests the influence of Maimonides’ portrayal, 
and understanding, of rabbinic activity.742 
                                                 
740 MS. Hunt. 185, 114b-115b; Birkat Avraham, 61-62 (§44). For Maimonides’ view, see above, 
n692. For Daniel’s challenge to a law that Maimonides labeled mi-pi ha-shemuʿah (Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 
9:3), see MS. Hunt. 185, 28a-28b; Birkat Avraham, 14 (§8). 
741 See above, n244. 
742 Compare below, n828. Feldblum, Peirushim u-Meḥqarim, 5n9, astutely noted that 
Naḥmanides’ position that (some? see above, n636) halakhic midrash creates laws of biblical status 
fundamentally accepts Maimonides’ position that halakhic midrash (when not based on tafsīr marwī) 
generates law; see also Blidstein, “Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21; and idem, “Oral Law as Institution in 
Maimonides,” 181n141, writing: “[Naḥmanides] also learns from Maimonides. … His own view of 
rabbinic midrash is that it in fact creates law with Scriptural status. This carries beyond Maimonides, but it 
may also reflect the permission granted by Maimonides to see the rabbi [sic] as creative” (there, 172-73). 
Compare Wolfson, “By Way of Truth,” 128. 
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The fact that Daniel did not respond to all of the criticisms that Maimonides 
leveled against geonic-era enumerators743 suggests that he may have lacked either the 
interest or ability to defend them. 
 
Abraham Maimonides’ Responses to Daniel ha-Bavli 
The perspectives of Maimonides cast an overwhelming shadow over the 
presentations of his son Abraham, not only because Abraham sought to defend his father, 
but also because he employed his father’s theories in his later works in order to bolster 
his own pietistic reforms. Abraham’s responses to Daniel (which most likely constitute 
his first written reflections on the Oral Torah) focus primarily on the taxonomic status of 
a distinct commandment. Abraham also offered rejoinders to Daniel’s claims about 
specific commandments; these rebuttals shed light on Abraham’s applications and 
extensions of his father’s system. 
  
Revelation and the 613 Commandments 
The first part of Abraham’s answer challenged Daniel’s claim that the 
enumeration may include any revealed law, even laws not found in Scripture. Abraham 
asserted that Daniel’s position “does not allow for the ability to differentiate (or, to make 
into parts; tabʿīḍ), but necessitates … enumerating every law whose basis is transmission 
                                                 
743 Of the “commandments” counted by geonic-era enumerators rejected in Principles One and 
Two, Daniel did not mention observing the festival of Purim, reciting one hundred blessings a day, 
intercalating the calendar, and burying the dead (though this relates to his treatment of Lev. 19:18). He also 
accepted Maimonides’ claims that fear of the sages does not constitute a distinct commandment and that 
geonic-era enumerators erred by counting rabbinic decrees. 
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from the master, the messenger (i.e., Moses).”744 He suggested that the talmudic phrase 
“613 commandments were said to Moses at Sinai” may refer to: (1) express scriptural 
passages (manṣūṣ) and what is “entailed by” (yalḥaq) them; (2) transmitted (manqūl) 
material only and not scriptural passages; or (3) express scriptural passages and what is 
“entailed by it” as well as to other transmitted material. Abraham declared that nobody 
with a “sound ability to conceptualize” (taṣawwur sālim) could accept the second option, 
and the third, which he identified as Daniel’s view, necessitates counting more than 613 
commandments. Therefore, only the first – in Abraham’s mind, his father’s approach – is 
viable.745 In his words, this is “an established argument (qiyās) and conclusive proof.”746 
Abraham did not explain the distinction between extra-scriptural traditions that 
are “entailed by” Scripture and other revealed material. I am not aware of any relevant 
Maimonidean usage of the term “entailed by” (yalḥaq); this term may refer to the “three 
[or] four” exceptions to Principle Two747 or to the tafsīr marwī, the interpretation 
transmitted from Sinai.  
Two of Abraham’s comments imply that he, like his father, accepted that some 
rabbinic dicta constitute Sinaitic traditions but do not qualify as distinct commandments. 
He explained that an “interpretation” of revelation may not qualify as a distinct 
commandment, even though it may be “a verse (naṣṣ) of the Torah, a verse stated (naṣṣ 
                                                 
744 'סלא 'לע לוסרלא דיסלא ןע לוקנמ הלצא םכח לכ דדע 'ץרפלא א'דה ילע םזלי לב 'ץיעבתלא חצי אל; MS. Hunt. 
185, 129b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 5 (§1). 
745 MS. Hunt. 185, 129b-130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 5-6 (§1). 
746 אהירדיו סייאקמלא םהפי ןמל עטאק לילדו לקתסמ סאיק א'דהו; MS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 
(§1). For this meaning of mustaqill, see Blau, Dictionary, 560, s.v. للق X. 
747 While Abraham evinced no knowledge of the letter that mentions these exceptions (see below, 
n762), Principle Two does mention them. 
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kalām) [by] a prophet, a transmitted interpretation (tafsīr marwī), or derived (mustanbaṭ) 
through qiyās.”748 Similarly, he wrote that a particular rabbinic gloss should not be 
enumerated as a distinct commandment, even “if it is conceded (idhā sullima) that it is a 
verified interpretation (sharḥ muḥaqqaq), and not [a conclusion made merely] on the 
basis of its support (isnād).”749  
 
Deflections of Daniel ha-Bavli’s Claims 
In the remainder of his response, Abraham focused on two matters raised by 
Daniel: the question of whether to include in the enumeration the observance of Hanukah 
and the prohibition pertaining to a priest who must wait until sunset to become pure 
(ṭevul yom). In Abraham’s view, Daniel’s argument that Hanukah constitutes a 
manifestation of a general command to express gratitude for God’s deliverance would 
preclude the “ability to differentiate” (tabʿīḍ), and would necessitate the inclusion of 
several other post-biblical festivals in the enumeration of the commandments.750 
                                                 
748 סאיקב טבנתסמ וא יורמ ריספת וא יבנ םאלכ ץנ וא הרות]לא[ ץנ תנאכ קרפ אל אהדדע יגבני אלפ; MS. Hunt. 185, 
130b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7 (§1). Compare the threefold division between laws that are “written, transmitted, 
or derived through qiyās” (סאיקב א'גר'כתסמ וא אלוקנמ וא אצוצנמ); MS. Hunt. 185, 142b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 22 
(§3). See also below, nn784-788. 
749 דאנסאלא םכח ילע אל קקחמ חרש הנא םלס א'דא; MS. Hunt. 185, 130b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7 (§1). These 
“verified interpretations” may not be transmitted from Moses, but just philologically sound readings of 
Scripture. On the term isnād, see above, n525. 
750 MS. Hunt. 185, 130b-131b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 7-8 (§1). He noted that the rabbis annulled the 
observance of the festivals listed in Megillat Taʿanit (bRH 19b), an ancient work that listed a number of 
victories and other joyous events. How could they do so, he asked, if their observance is biblically 
mandated? Abraham also used various textual arguments to dismiss Daniel’s claim that reciting Hallel 
constitutes a biblical commandment. On the recitation of Hallel, note Abraham’s comments introducing his 
responses to Daniel’s questions about Sefer ha-Miṣvot; MS. Hunt. 185, 126b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 1-2 
(introduction). 
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Abraham asserted that the law prohibiting a priest from serving in the Temple 
prior to sunset on the day of his purification was of biblical status (min ha-torah). Though 
he admitted that this prohibition is “derived through a hint (remez) from a verse whose 
manifest sense (ẓāhirihi) concerns another matter,” Abraham nonetheless affirmed its 
biblical status, because the “transmitters” (nāqilīn) had “expressly” included it among 
sins that incur the death penalty (bSan 83a).751 This, he asserted, was equivalent to 
rabbinic usage of the term guf torah. Furthermore, he wrote, despite the lack of a “clear 
verse” (naṣṣ jalī), the tafsīr marwī, transmitted interpretation, qualifies it as a distinct 
commandment.752 Abraham also cautioned that “one must accurately consider 
[Maimonides’] statements before hurriedly and loudly raising doubts against him.”753 
Had Daniel paid close attention, Abraham wrote, he would have noticed Maimonides’ 
remarks on another law derived from a “hint,” the prohibition against stealing a libation 
vessel. According to Maimonides, this prohibition does not qualify as an enumerated 
commandment because its violation does not incur capital punishment and it is not based 
on the peshaṭei di-qera.754 This particular defense of Sefer ha-Miṣvot supports the 
hypothesis, offered in Chapter Two, that the presence or absence of biblically imposed 
punishments helped Maimonides determine if a “derived” law was based on the tafsīr 
marwī and a distinct commandment or on a post-Sinaitic extrapolation. 
                                                 
751 התימ יבייוחמ הלמ'ג ןמ הנאב היפ ןילקאנלא חירצת ךל'ד ריג יפ הרהא'ט ץנ ןמ זמרב 'גר'כתסמ הנוכל; violation of 
rabbinic law, Abraham wrote, cannot incur capital punishment. For ẓāhir as “manifest sense” in 
Maimonides’ writings, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 93-96. 
752 On the term naṣṣ jalī, see above, n655. This also supports the suggestion that this prohibition 
constituted one of the “three [or] four” exceptions to Principle Two; see above, n661. 
753 .הילע ךיכשתלל תפאהתלאו הרדאבמלא לבק ל"ז הליואקא רירחת למאתת 
754 MS. Hunt. 185, 132a-132b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 8-9 (§1). Abraham used these lists similarly 
elsewhere; see MS. Hunt. 143b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 23 (§3). 
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Abraham also drew on other elements of his father’s system in his responses to 
Daniel’s queries. For example, he claimed that the presence of rabbinic debate (ikhtilāf) 
concerning the meaning of “You shall rest from plowing and harvesting” (Ex. 34:21) 
shows that the meaning of this verse is neither apparent (ẓāhir) nor transmitted 
(manqūla).755 He suggested that his father had quoted additional verses as the basis of 
this law in Sefer ha-Miṣvot because of the debate over the verse’s meaning; in this case, 
he wrote, Maimonides may have relied on the reading of this verse found in the Mekhilta 
de-Rashbi.756 
Abraham’s use of Principle Two elsewhere in his responses to Daniel is of 
particular interest. In one case, he explained that his father omitted certain laws derived 
by qiyās from the enumeration of 613 because they are neither “explicit” (mafṣūḥ) nor 
labeled by the rabbis as “guf torah.”757 Daniel’s assertion that distinct laws should be 
counted in cases where the rabbis used the same verses to teach several laws led 
                                                 
755 Compare the similar statement that particular rules (awḍāʿ) pertaining to slaughter are matters 
of tradition (naql) that lack any debate (khilāf); MS. Hunt. 185, 203b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 97 (§10). Abraham 
claimed elsewhere that a matter of debate cannot be a Mosaic tradition; see Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 96 
(§78); and Elazar Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam: 
Sarid mi-tokh ha-Maqor ha-ʿAravi she-nitgalah be-genizat Qahir,” in Joshua Finkel Festschrift, eds. Sidney 
B. Hoenig and Leon D. Stitskin (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 1974), 150; repr. in idem, “Maʾamar 
ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal le-Rabbeinu Avraham ben ha-Rambam: Sarid min ha-Maqor be-ʿAravit-Yehudit 
mi-Genizat Qahir,” in Seridim mi-Toratan shel Geonim ve-Rishonim mi-Genizat Qahir, vol. 2 (New York: 
Yeshiva University Press, 1989); references will be to the earlier edition. On this manuscript of the 
Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal, see Moritz Steinschneider, Die arabische Literatur der Juden 
(Frankfurt, 1902), 221-22; and Cohen, “The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 35n91. 
756 MS. Hunt. 185, 196b-197b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 89-90 (§9). On scriptural repetition, see Chapter 
Five. See Mekhilta de-Rabbi Shimon ben Yoḥai, ed. Epstein, 223 (see there, n11); and Menaḥem Kasher, 
Ha-Rambam veha-Mekhilta de-Rashbi (New York, 1980), 86-88. On Maimonides’ view, see his Mishnah 
ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:221-22 (mShev 1:1); and Hilkhot Shemiṭah ve-Yovel, 1:1; note the comments of 
Joseph Korkos there, cited in above, n435. 
757 MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80 (§7). This use of Principle Two seems to comport 
with Maimonides’ presentation; see below, n1009. 
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Abraham to claim that his father’s statements in Principle Two reaffirm the view that “a 
biblical verse does not leave the realm of its peshaṭ” (bSab 63a etc.).758 
Another important comment by Abraham was occasioned by Daniel’s suggestion 
that the requirement to “Slaughter … as I have instructed you” (Deut. 12:21) might imply 
that eating improperly slaughtered meat violates a positive commandment, given the rule 
that “a prohibition implied from a command constitutes a command (or, positive 
commandment)” (lav ha-ba mi-khlal ʿaseh, ʿaseh; bPes 41b etc.).759 Abraham rejected 
this suggestion, because the rabbis did not offer such a reading of this verse. At the same 
time, Abraham’s admission that reasoning (qiyās) could mandate such a conclusion,760 
might be read as rejecting the possibility of deriving laws from Scripture after the 
rabbinic period. (This would fly in the face of Maimonidean claims.761) 
Lastly, Abraham reported that while his father had originally asserted the rabbinic 
status (de-rabbanan) of the exchange of money to effectuate marriage, Maimonides later 
reconsidered this. Abraham reported that he possessed a corrected text of Hilkhot Ishut, 
                                                 
758 MS. Hunt. 185, 163b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 48 (§4). See below, n1245. This may relate to 
Abraham’s claim that the enumeration consists primarily of express scriptural passages and what is 
“entailed by” them. Maimonides, however, appears to have allowed for the possibility that such rabbinic 
teachings may impart distinct commandments; see below, n1086. 
759 See MS. Hunt. 185, 200b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 94 (§10). Daniel pointed out that although 
Maimonides did not list such a prohibition, he did list similar ones. On this rule, see Encyclopedia 
Talmudit, 35:289-314, s.v. lav ha-ba mi-khlal ʿaseh. For Maimonides’ discussion, see Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:237 (mMak 3:1); he termed it a “principle” (aṣl) there, 5:95 (mZev 14:9), 5:204 
(mḤul 5:1), and in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108 (Pos. 92), 226 (Neg. 89), 263 (Neg. 172). Maimonides 
mentioned this rule a number of other times in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the Mishneh Torah. 
760 MS. Hunt. 185, 203a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 97 (§10). 
761 Namely, Hilkhot Mamrim 2:1; see Blidstein, Samkhut u-Meri, 79-91. 
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1:2, written in his father’s own handwriting (be-khtav yado), which designated this mode 
of acquiring a wife as a mechanism of biblical status (din torah).762 
 
Abraham Maimonides’ Later Writings 
Studies of Abraham Maimonides’ approach to the Oral Torah have largely 
focused on his Commentary on Genesis and Exodus; less attention has been paid to his 
responsa and Kifāya. This section summarizes the conclusions of these earlier studies and 
seeks to fill this lacuna. 
Abraham’s Commentary contains no methodological discussion of the role that 
oral traditions play in biblical interpretation.763 Seeking to induce principles from this 
work, scholars have noted the author’s “predilection for plain and simple exegesis” and 
his “thrust towards the plain sense of the text.”764 Abraham also frequently evaluated 
                                                 
762 MS. Hunt. 185, 115b-116b; Birkat Avraham, 62 (§44). Twersky, incorrectly, wrote that 
Abraham “maintained that a careless scribe was at fault here … and his father never upheld such a view”; 
Rabad of Posquières, 136n16. Abraham evinced no knowledge of the relevant letter to Pinḥas ha-dayan; as 
noted in Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. A.H. Freimann (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei Nirdamim, 1934), 
162n17; see also idem, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:633n21. He was apparently ignorant of other responsa penned 
by his father; see Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim,” 261n69; and idem, 
“ʿAsarah Baṭlanim shebe-Veit ha-Keneset be-Mishnat ha-Rambam veha-Raʾavam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 
2:813n129. Daniel and Abraham also debated the status of the prohibition against travelling on the 
Sabbath; see MS. Hunt. 185, 38a-40b, 206a-206b; Birkat Avraham, 19-21 (§12); Maʿaseh Nissim, 100-101 
(§112). On Abraham’s view, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 390, citing Abraham 
Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 289 (Ex. 16:29). Maimonides and Samuel ben ʿEli, Daniel’s 
teacher, debated this issue as well; see above, n387.  
763 Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 58. 
764 Abraham Maimonides, The High Ways to Perfection of Abraham Maimonides, vol. 1, ed. and 
trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1927), 1:115; and Paul Fenton, “The 
Post-Maimonidean Schools of Exegesis in the East: Abraham Maimonides, the Pietists, Tanḥûm ha-
Yərušalmi and the Yemenite school,” in Hebrew Bible/Old Testament: The History of Its Interpretation, 
vol. 1, part 2: The Middle Ages, ed. Magne Saebø (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000), 436. See 
similarly S.D. Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and His Pietist Circle,” in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance 
Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967), 148-49: “[Abraham’s] 
explications of the Bible and the Talmud are so graceful, so lucid, so persuasive that one is almost 
convinced that his derāsh is peshāṭ, that his moralistic and pietist interpretation constitutes the literal 
meaning of the text.” See also Yehoshafat Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,” 
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midrashim, both halakhic and aggadic, rejecting those that, in his words, reflect “neither 
the intent (qaṣd) of Scripture nor its purpose (gharaḍahu).”765 On the other hand, he was 
willing to accept those traditions that he deemed “authentic.” Regarding one midrash 
that, in his estimation, lacked “scriptural proof” (dalīl naṣṣī), Abraham cited the mishnaic 
statement: “if it is a tradition, we accept it, but if it is an inference, there is a rebuttal” 
(mYeb 8:3, mKer 3:9).766 
Abraham, of course, professed allegiance to received tradition; in one case, he 
clarified the “ẓāhir” of “Do not follow the majority to do wrong” (Ex. 23:2), but 
proceeded to write that “the explanation of the tradition (sharḥ al-naql) [explains] 
otherwise – on it we depend (wuqūfunā) and rely.”767 Abraham also felt comfortable 
                                                 
Sinai 113 (1994): 233-35; Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 58-64; and Ezra Labaton, “A Comprehensive 
Analysis of Rabenu Abraham Maimuni’s Biblical Commentary,” (PhD diss., Brandeis University, 2012), 
244-55. Abraham, of course, was not averse to reading anthropomorphic verses against their apparent 
(ẓāhir) meaning; see, e.g., Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 5 (Gen. 1:26); and Labaton, “A Comprehensive 
Analysis,” 251, 252n670. On Abraham’s use of earlier commentators, particularly Abraham Ibn Ezra, see 
Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 252; and Fenton, “The Post-Maimonidean Schools,” 436. 
765 ה'צרג אלו ץנלא דצק ]ןכי[ אל ןאו; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 89 (Gen. 28:22); 
mentioned in Eppenstein, Abraham Maimuni, 39n2. For treatment, see there, 39-40, 70; Abraham 
Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 1:115-19; Navo, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 234-35; Amnon 
Bazak, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam la-Torah,” in Teshurah le-ʿAmos: Asupat Meḥqarim 
be-Farshanut ha-Miqra mugeshet le-ʿAmos Ḥakham, eds. Moshe Bar-Asher et al. (Alon Shvut: Tevunot, 
2007), 117-18; and Labaton, “A Comprehensive Analysis,” 255-60. The terms qaṣd and gharaḍ in this 
sense appear throughout the Commentary. For a similar claim, see Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. 
Freimann, 44-45 (§39). Compare the phrase “among the best explanations” (min ghurrar al-tafāsīr) used to 
describe rabbinic interpretations; idem, The High Ways to Perfection of Abraham Maimonides, vol. 2, ed. 
and trans. Samuel Rosenblatt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1938), 2:348. This phrase appears in 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:404 (intro. to mSan, chap. 8). 
766 הבושת שי ןידל םאו לבקנ הכלה םא; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 223-25 (Ex. 
2:1; see similarly there, 179 [Gen. 46:27]), concerning the midrash that Yokheved was born at the precise 
moment Jacob’s family entered Egypt; mentioned in Bazak, “Peirusho shel R. Avraham,” 118. Abraham 
also cited this phrase in Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 557 (Ex. 32:27), concerning the midrash that certain 
letters that were carved in the stone tablets of the Ten Commandments were miraculously supported 
(writing: רבכא ל"ז ןולאקנלאו); and Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 299:  ןאו בא ןיב הלוק ל'תמ ךל'ד ןא ארקד היטאשפ ןאכ
לבקנ הכלה םא ֿהלובקמ ֿהלוקנמ רומאלאפ ותבל; see also below, n782. 
767 אניאהתנא הילאו אנפוקו העמו ךל'ד ריג לקנלא חרש ןכל; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 
359 (Ex. 23:2); see Ilan, “Hanaḥot Teʾologiyot,” 64-65. On Ex. 23:2, see above, n576. He also wrote that 
the translation of Targum Onqelos is based on manqūl, transmitted material; see below, n792. Note the 
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contrasting Scripture’s peshaṭ or ẓāhir (literal or “plain” meaning) with the interpretation 
suggested by “tradition” (naql). Regarding “You shall not steal” (Ex. 20:13), for example, 
he explained, “the transmitters restrict (yukhaṣṣiṣūn) this prohibition to the kidnapping of 
a Jew (see bSan 86a) … but, nevertheless, a biblical verse does not leave the realm of its 
peshaṭ.”768 Similar comments led two contemporary scholars to conclude that Abraham 
allowed for a “dual hermeneutic” of Scripture, accepting both a philological-contextual 
reading and a reading guided by received tradition.769  
 
Scripture and Tradition in Abraham Maimonides’ Kifāya and Responsa 
Neither the responsa of Abraham Maimonides nor his Kifāya are preserved in 
their totality, and though the Kifāya predominantly treats ethical and pietistic subjects and 
only a fraction of its halakhic discussions are extant,770 what remains of these writings 
                                                 
comment that “the explanation of the translator (i.e., Onqelos) in this … is built on derived interpretation or 
transmitted [material]; so too the interpretations of the Sages regarding it” ( ר'תכא יפו ךל'ד יפ ם'גרתמלא חרשו
תוכרבלא ה'דה אהיפ 'ל'ז םימכחלא חורש ךל'דכו לוקנמ וא ]טבנתסמ[ ליואת ילע ינבמ ); Abraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. 
Wiesenberg, 195 [Gen. 49:3]; see there, n16; noted in Labaton, “A Comprehensive Analysis,” 248. 
768  ידימ אצוי ארקמ ןיא ךל'ד עמו ... לארשימ שפנ בנוגב יהנלא ןוצצ'כי 'ל'ז ןולקאנלאו ... הקרס לכ ןע יהנ ארקד היטשפ
וטושפ; Abraham Maimonides, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 219-21 (Ex. 20:13); noted in Labaton, “A 
Comprehensive Analysis,” 250. 
769 Harris, How do We Know This, 292n51; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 
380n93, 390, 433n4, 445n3, 446n34, 467n29. According to both Harris and Cohen, this is closer to geonic 
and earlier Andalusian approaches than to Maimonides’ approach. Both also focus on legal traditions; 
Abraham in fact accepted received tradition in non-halakhic areas as well (see, e.g., above, n766). See also 
Halivni, Peshat and Derash, 200-201n75. Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 390n39 (see also 
401n48), argued that the fact that Abraham did not define peshaṭ as the ẓāhir sense of Scripture as rendered 
by the halakhic tradition (i.e., Cohen’s understanding of Maimonides’ use of the term peshaṭ) led Abraham 
to use the words peshaṭ and ẓāhir interchangeably; see above, n444. 
770 Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and His Pietist Circle,” 147, estimated the size of the Kifāya at 
2500 pages of Judeo-Arabic text, a claim repeated in Daniel Frank, “Review of Nissim Dana, Rabbi 
Abraham Ben Moshe Ben Maimon: Sefer ha-Maspik le-ʿOvdey ha-Shem,” JJS 40, no. 2 (1989): 254; and 
Paul Fenton, “En marge du Kitâb Kifâyat al-ʿÂbidîn «La provision suffisante des serviteurs» de rabbi 
Abraham ben Moïse Maïmonide,” REJ 150, no. 3-4 (1991): 386. Large parts of two of the original ten 
sections of this work survive, published by Rosenblatt and Dana; Paul Fenton, “Dana’s Edition of Abraham 
Maimuni’s Kifāyat al-ʿĀbidīn,” JQR 82, no. 1-2 (1991): 194. Several pieces of other sections survive, the 
best known is a translation of the so-called Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal; on this section, see Cohen, 
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include numerous discussions of the Oral Torah. Surviving texts provide at least a 
tentative picture of Abraham’s views of revelation and the development of Jewish law. 
In these texts, Abraham repeated conventional Rabbanite statements affirming 
that extra-scriptural traditions determines the meaning of scriptural passages. Clear 
statements to this effect appear in two responsa, written to the same correspondent, 
regarding his father’s Sefer ha-Miṣvot.771 The first concerns the charge “Walk in His 
ways” (Deut. 28:9), which Maimonides had counted as a distinct commandment. The 
correspondent had suggested that this should have been excluded from the enumeration 
by Maimonides’ own Principle Four, which precludes broad (ʿāmm; or, unrestricted) 
verses from the count of 613.772 In his programmatic response, Abraham invoked what he 
called the: 
Great principle of the law (sharīʿa), through which we distinguish ourselves, the 
community of the Rabbanites, from the position (or, school; madhhab) of the 
Qaraites.773 This principle is that we do not rely on what the verse alone 
                                                 
“The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 35-36; Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 139-40; 
and Yaʿakov Elbaum, Le-Havin Divrei Ḥakhamim: Mivḥar Divrei Mavo la-Aggadah vela-Midrash, mi-shel 
Ḥakhmei Yemei ha-Beinayim (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 2000), 146-48. I also utilize Avraham Harkavy, 
Ḥadashim Gam Yeshanim (Jerusalem: Karmiel, 1970), 202-203; Yeḥezkel David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim mi-
Sefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’ le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” Sinai 132 (2003): 3-38; Ḥayim 
Sabbato, “Qeṭaʿ Ḥadash mi-Sefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’ le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” 
Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 22-30; idem, “Qeṭaʿ be-ʿInyanei Hashavat Aveidah mi-Sefer ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-
Shem shel Rabbi Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” in Mi-Birkat Moshe, 1:3-11; and Paul Fenton, “Torat ha-
Devequt be-Mishnato shel R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam: Qeṭaʿim mi-tokh ha-Heleq ha-Avud shel ha-
Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem,” Daʿat 50-52 (2003): 107-119 (which only includes a translation). Friedman 
estimated that the Genizah contains over 60 unpublished responsa from Abraham’s pen; “Responsa of R. 
Abraham Maimonides,” 31; and idem, “ʿAl Shut ha-Raʿavam u-Vnei Doro she-min ha-Genizah,” Bar Ilan 
Annual 26-27 (1995): 260. 
771 Abraham praised the author of these questions; see Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, xiv, 72. 
772 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four), 62-63 (Pos. 8); and Abraham 
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 65-66 (§63). On Principle Four, see above, n649. 
773 This reference to Qaraites appears incongruous, as there is no evidence that his interlocutor had 
Qaraite inclinations. 
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(mujarrad al-naṣṣ) indicates, but on what the verse and tradition, together, 
indicate.774  
Abraham explained that even if the “apparent meaning” (ẓāhirihi) of “Walk in His ways” 
were an exhortation that pertains to the entire law, “it would then be incumbent upon us 
to believe” that it is a “restricted command” (amr khāṣṣ), because the “tradition clarified” 
that the verse ordains specific deeds, i.e., the imitation of God’s traits.775 In the other 
responsum, Abraham repeated the claim that Rabbanites do not “draw inferences” (lā 
nastadill) solely from the “unaccompanied verse,” but from both Scripture and tradition 
together. Abraham described this rule as “the sound principle … in legal matters” and a 
“pillar upon which everything depends and a peg upon which everything hangs.”776 
Like his father, Abraham maintained that hints to unwritten tradition could be 
found in Scripture.777 He asserted, for example, that the singular word ot (sign) for the 
arm phylactery and the plural ṭoṭafot (“frontlets”)778 for the head phylactery (Ex. 13:16) 
shows that the former contains one compartment and the latter, multiple compartments, 
                                                 
774  ילע דמעתנ אל אננא וה לצאלא ךל'דו ןייארקלא בה'דמ ןמ ןינאברלא העאמ'ג ןחנ לצפננ הבו העירשלא יפ םי'טע לצא
ץנלא הילע לדי אמ ילע לב ץנלא דר'גמ הילע לדי אמ אעימ'ג לקנלאו ; on the term mujarrad, see below, n1142. 
775  רמא הנא היפ דקתענ ןא אנמזלל ֿהעירשלא ֿהלמ'ג לא'תתמא הב דצקלא ןא ילע אעטק הרהא'ט לדי ץנלא א'דה ןא ולפ
'וכו ןונח ארקינ אוה המ היפ לקנלא ןיב אמל ץא'כ; Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 66-67 (§63). He 
clarified that this verse ordains imitating God in “matters that pertain to character, as the tradition made 
clear” (לקנלא חרצ אמכ קאל'כאב הקלעתמ אישא). On the midrash cited here, see there, 67n13; and Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 37n18. This responsum is treated briefly in Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 343n168; and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 155n137; see also there, 294n36. 
There is extensive literature on Maimonides’ understanding of this verse, see Howard Kreisel, “Imitatio 
Dei in Maimonides’ Guide of the Perplexed,” AJS Review 19, no. 2 (1994): 169-211; and the literature 
cited there. On ʿāmm and khāṣṣ in Islamic legal literature, see above, n221; for use in geonic-era literature, 
see above, nn280, 282, 289; see also above, n649. 
776  י'דלא וה חיחצלא לצאלא א'דה ןאפ אעימ'ג לקנלאו ץנלא לדי אמ]ב[ לב ץנלא דר'גמ הילע לדי אמב לדתסנ אל אנא
וב יולת לכהש דתיו וילע ןעשנ לכהש דומע הקפלא יפ הנאל האסנת אלפ ץוצנלא יפ ֿהיראטלא אהלכ לב ךוכשלא ל'ג הב עפתרת (the 
printed text reads אמכ); Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 72 (§65). On the place of tradition, 
note also David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 (discussing the signs of kosher and non-kosher animals). 
777 For Maimonides’ approach, see above, nn538, 544, 633. 
778 The meaning of this word is uncertain; see Yehudah B. Cohn, Tangled Up in Text: Tefillin and 
the Ancient World (Providence: Brown Judaic Studies, 2008), 38 esp. nn34-37. 
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“as the tradition explained” (ka-mā bayyana al-naql).779 Yet in the Kifāya, as in the 
Commentary, Abraham recognized that some traditions contradict Scripture’s ẓāhir or 
peshaṭ.780 For this reason, like his father, Abraham wrote that a sage’s ability to release 
vows is based solely on “the sound tradition” (al-naql al-ṣaḥīḥ); he described the 
scriptural support (asmakhta) for this law as “very weak” (ḍaʿīf bi-marra).781 
In one noteworthy passage, Abraham asserted that a law may follow Scripture’s 
“literal” meaning, notwithstanding received tradition. Noting that the “ẓāhir” meaning of 
the prohibition against overcharging (onaʾah; Lev.25:14) is not limited to one type of 
property, he observed that “the tradition explained and restricted” this prohibition (al-
naql sharaḥahu wa-khaṣṣaṣahu) to moveable property (see mBM 4:9). In this case, he 
cautioned his readers not to rely solely on the rabbinic reading (drash), but to consider 
Scripture’s ẓāhir meaning and avoid any sort of overcharging. He wrote, “if it is a 
tradition, we accept it,”782 but also cited the adage “a biblical verse does not leave the 
realm of its peshaṭ,” arguing that one cannot overlook a verse’s ẓāhir meaning, despite 
the “transmitted or derived interpretations” (tafāsīr manqūla aw mustakhraja).783 
                                                 
779 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 261; see also, e.g., 260, 269, 273, 297, 299. 
780 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 262, 299, 302; see above, nn768-767. 
781 אתכמסא ה'דה ול ןילחומ םירחא לבא לחומ וניא אוה ורבד לחי אל ינעא ֿהרמב ףיע'צ ץנלל הדאנסאו לוקנמ רמא א'דהו
הנשמלא התצנ אמ רמאלא ֿהקיקחו ֿהפיע'צ וכמסיש המ לע םהל ןיאו ריואב ןיחרופ תועובשו םירדנ רתה ; Abraham Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 303. See Blau, Dictionary, 655, s.v. ةّرَم. For similar usage of the term 
asmakhta; see there, 299; idem, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 1:176 (describing an aggadic tradition); and 
idem, Peirush, ed. Wiesenberg, 347 (Ex. 22:4). At least one usage of this term may denote a matter that is 
not received tradition; there, 263 (Ex. 12:17). For Maimonides’ view, see above, n674. 
782 Compare above, n766. 
783 Harkavy, Ḥadashim Gam Yeshanim, 202-203. Harkavy (204) inferred from this claim that 
Abraham felt that the law should follow Scripture’s peshaṭ, irrespective of the Oral Torah. Rejecting this 
interpretation, Carmiel Cohen, “ʿAl Odot Sefer ‘ha-Maspiq le-ʿOvdei ha-Shem’,” Maʿaliyot 25 (2005): 
33n11, noted Abraham’s frequent deference to rabbinic tradition. While this is certainly correct, Cohen did 
not fully account for this passage. On the term derashot, see below, n793. 
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The Scope of Revelation and the Role of the Rabbis  
Abraham’s understanding of the scope of revelation and of the role of rabbinic 
legal activity must be inferred from passing comments in unrelated discussions. Several 
times in the Kifāya, Abraham listed the elements that, in his view, constitute authoritative 
legal sources.784 He occasionally cited the familiar division between written Scripture and 
its transmitted interpretation;785 elsewhere, he was more expansive, writing, twice, that 
“the text of the Pentateuch, the texts of the prophets, … and the statements of the sages 
… prove” a particular argument,786 and referring in another place to “what the Pentateuch 
commanded and [what] the practices (siyar) of the prophets and traditions of the 
transmitters (āthār al-naqala) prove.”787 In another passage, Abraham added another 
element, writing, “there is no controversy regarding this matter because qiyās (here: 
reasoning) demands it, the express passages (nuṣūṣ) of the sages obligate it, and the 
express passages of the prophets – nay, the express passages of the Pentateuch – prove 
it.”788 Proofs from post-Mosaic prophets constitute the most unusual component in these 
                                                 
784 This paragraph benefits from the argument in Lowry, “Does Shāfiʿī Have a Theory of ‘Four 
Sources’ of Law?” 31-33. Compare the statements quoted above, n748. 
785 E.g., אהלקנ יפ ריספתלא הנמ'צת אמו אהצנ יפ דרו אמו הרומו ררוס ןב ֿהעירש למאת א'דאו; Abraham 
Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:218. 
786 ל"ז םימכחלא ליואקאו 'סלא 'ע איבנאלא ץוצנו הרותלא ץנ א'ציא ךל'ד ילע לדיפ; Abraham Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 139, 141. 
787 'סלא 'לע ֿהלקנלא רא'תאו איבנאלא ריס הילע תלדו הרותלא הב תרמא אמו; Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Maspiq, ed. Dana, 155. Similarly:  ה'דה ץנ יפ תינב הילע י'דלא הרותלא ץנ יפ לב האניב י'דלא איבנאלא ץנ יפ לב אתירבלא
אתירבלא ה'דה; there, 99 (Joseph Lowry suggested that האניב here should perhaps be אהניב). Abraham appears 
– at least rhetorically – to distinguish between āthār and naql (tradition); ה'דה  אהתקו אהב רומאמלא םינהכ תכרב
ץנלא הילע לדו ר'תאלא הנמ'צתו לקנלא הב דהש אמ ילע; there, 211. For the equation of prophetic and rabbinic āthār, 
see there, 104. 
788 הילע לדת הרותלא ץוצנ לב איבנאלא ץוצנו הב'גות ל"ז םימכחלא ץוצנו הי'צקי סאיקלא ןאל היפ עאזנ אל; Abraham 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 168. I discuss Abraham’s use of the term qiyās below. Similarly: 
סאיקב אלו ץנב הילע דהשתסי אממ ךל'ד אמפ (there, 133); and םימכחלא ץנו איבנאלא ץנל ףלא'כמ הנאלפ (there, 94). 
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lists, as Rabbanites did not usually derive law from the Prophets or Writings.789 One 
recent study has argued that Abraham turned to prophetic dictates because they – more 
than the Pentateuch or rabbinic literature – corroborated his innovative, pietistic 
practices.790 
Passages from surviving texts of the Kifāya do not define the scope of Sinaitic, 
extra-scriptural tradition. The Kifāya uses terms like naql (tradition) and tafsīr 
(interpretation) to mark what the author regarded as Sinaitic traditions.791 Of particular 
interest is Abraham’s reliance on Targum Onqelos, which in his view, and in that of his 
father, contains numerous Sinaitic traditions.792 
Abraham offered several tools to interpret rabbinic traditions that he labeled 
“derashot” in the so-called Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal (Statement Concerning 
                                                 
789 For talmudic and Rabbanite views, see Urbach, “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah,” 12-21 (compare, 
however, there, 8n65, with Shweke, “Luḥot ha-Even,” 350-51); and Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Lo ba-Shamayim Hi,” 
in Yad le-Gilat: Asupat Maʾamarim shel Yiṣḥaq Dov Gilat, eds. Israel Ta-Shma and Israel Gilat (Jerusalem: 
Bialik, 2002), 140-44. For Maimonides’ view, see above, nn455, 506, 533, 538, 567, 577, 596, 612. For 
Qaraite views, see Klar, Meḥqarim ve-ʿIyunim, 303-304; Aharon Dotan, “Ha-Omnam haya Ben-Asher 
Qaraʾi?” Sinai 41 (1957): 287-88; Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim ve-Sifrutah, 121; Lasker “Maimonides’ 
Influence on Karaite Theories of Prophecy and Law,” 100n4, 106-113; idem, “Hashpaʿat ha-Qaraʾut ʿal ha-
Rambam,” 155n53; and Yoram Erder and Meira Polliack, “Ha-Qanon ha-Qaraʾi be-Meʾot ha-teshiʿit ʿad 
ha-aḥat ʿesreh le-Sefirat ha-Noṣrim,” Teʿudah 23 (2009): 197-210. 
790 Elisha Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt: A Study of 
Abraham Maimonides and His Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 79. 
791 See e.g., David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14 lines 7-8 (based on bRH 17a, cited in Maimonides’ 
Hilkhot Teshuvah, 3:6), 15 lines 14-15 (based on bSan 59b); and Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, 
ed. Dana, 218 (based on bSoṭ 38a), 274 (based on bRH 17b?). See also idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 41 
(§34). Abraham even reported that the geonim transmit a tradition (yanqulūn), which may or may not be 
Sinaitic, about the status of a particular food; David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 lines 7-8. Maimonides’ 
Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 1:19, was undoubtedly the source for this claim (םהידיב תרוסמש םינואגה ורמא). 
792 See, e.g., Abraham Maimonides, ed. Rosenblatt, High Ways, 2:52, 2:390. Abraham relied on 
Targum Onqelos extensively in his Commentary; see above, n767. On Maimonides’ use of Onqelos, see 
above, n674. He appears to use the phrase “by way of interpretation” (fī sharḥ), like his father, to denote 
Sinaitic tradition; see Abraham Maimonides, ed. Rosenblatt, High Ways, 1:174, 1:176, 2:42, 2:348; idem, 
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 174; idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 131 (§85), 139 (§95); Sabbato, “Qeṭaʿ 
Ḥadash,” 5; idem, “Qeṭaʿ be-ʿInyanei Hashavat Aveidah,” 28; and David, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 12 line 13. 
This phrase also appears throughout his Commentary. 
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Midrash of the Rabbis).793 Abraham described many derashot as “poetical conceits” 
(nawādir al-shiʿrīya),794 and asserted that the authors of such midrashim would admit 
that their creations did not relay the “true” meaning of Scripture. As evidence, he cited 
the adage “Scripture stands alone and midrash stands alone” (miqra le-ḥud u-midrash le-
ḥud). (Though he ascribed this to the rabbis, this saying does not appear in surviving 
rabbinic literature.795) Abraham also warned readers not to assume that all of “the 
interpretation of the verses” (sharḥ al-nuṣūṣ) are matters of tradition (naql); this would be 
akin to the error of those who assume that “just as the principles of the law and the 
traditions are transmitted, so too all of their [i.e., the rabbis] statements are transmitted.” 
He explained that the comments made by rabbinic interpretations, both legal and non-
legal, addressed Scripture from many subtle perspectives: “[Regarding] their 
interpretations of verses that are not connected (mutaʿalliqa) to the law (fiqh) and the 
rules (aḥkām) – some of them are in the form of deduction (istinbāṭ) and weighing 
alternatives (tarjīḥ), and some of them are in the form of rhetorical flourish (tanaddur) 
and juristic preference (istiḥsān).”796 
                                                 
793 This text is primarily preserved in a medieval Hebrew translation, which the anonymous 
translator reported was part of the Kifāya. A large part of the Judeo-Arabic original survives; see above, 
n755. The term derashot has a narrow denotation in Maimonides’ writings, see above, n624. 
794 In Guide, III:43, upon which Abraham based these comments, Maimonides explained that 
some people consider midrashim to have the status of “poetical conceits” (  ֿהרוצ ילע הירעשלא רדאונלא ); Dalālat 
al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 419; translation follows The Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Pines, 573. 
795 Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 149 lines 67-70. Hurvitz, 159n70, cited a similar 
phrase in bḤul 137b and bʿAZ 45b; see however Shraga Abramson, Mi-pi Baʿalei Leshonot (Jerusalem: 
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1988), 238. The text Abramson cited now appears in Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 127. 
796  לוצא אמכ ןא רירחתלאל אולצי אל העאמ'ג ן'טי אמכ םהידיאב לקנ וה ץוצנלא חרש יפ ל"ז הלוקי לוק לכ ןא ן'טת אלו
 םאכחאלאו הקפלאב הקלעתמ ריגלא ץוצנלל םהחורש ןא םלעא לב הלוקנמ ל"ז םהליואקא לכ ךל'דכ הלוקנמ תאיאורלאו הקפלא
גרתלאו טאבנתסאלא םכח ילע אה'צעב'ןאסחתסאלאו רדנתלא םכח ילע אה'צעבו חי ; Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot 
Ḥazal,” 149-50 lines 76-83. It is difficult to know how far to take this implied affirmation of the divine 
basis of all extra-scriptural legal traditions. 
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Singling out a prototypical example of a non-revealed interpretation, the rabbinic 
debate concerning the content of what “Jethro heard” (Ex. 18:1), Abraham asserted that 
the very existence of disagreement demonstrates that the rabbis’ suggestions could not 
have been received tradition (naql).797 
Passing remarks in the Kifāya also affirm Abraham’s conviction that humans 
possess the authority to interpret revelation. In using words like qiyās (reasoning) and 
istidlāl (drawing inferences) to characterize rabbinic activity, Abraham implied that the 
rabbis had derived law by means of their intellects.798 His equation of a gezeirah shavah 
with qiyās in one non-legal passage suggests that he may have regarded some, or all, such 
derivations as post-Sinaitic.799 Abraham also unabashedly described the rabbis as the 
source of particular laws,800 and he used the phrase (mi-)divrei sofrim (words or matters 
of the scribes) to describe rabbinic enactments.801 
 
Post-Talmudic Legal Development 
Abraham frequently considered post-talmudic legal development in his responsa 
and in the Kifāya. In several responsa, he utilized the terms uṣūl, principles or roots, and 
                                                 
797 Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 150 lines 86-94; for rabbinic sources, see there, 
161n86. The last claim builds on Maimonidean arguments; see above, nn414, 417, 537. 
798 For qiyās, see e.g., Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 92, 190; for istidlāl, 
there, 65, 118, 318; for istimdād, there, 110, 317 (for geonic istimdād, there, 137); for istinbāṭ, there, 190. 
799 Hurvitz, “Maʾamar ʿal Odot Derashot Ḥazal,” 149 lines 51-52. Compare above, n697. 
800 E.g., Abraham Maimonides, High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:116, 2:162, 2:352. 
801 E.g., Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 83, 227, 234, 271; idem, High Ways, 
ed. Rosenblatt, 2:358; and idem, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 4, 8. Like his father, Abraham argued that despite 
the fact that the Talmud identifies a scriptural source for the requirement to recite one hundred blessings a 
day, this is a rabbinic obligation; Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 247; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 9 (Prin. One); Hilkhot Tefillah, 7:14. 
 
225 
 
furūʿ, details or branches, to describe the relationship of texts and their interpretation.802 
Thus, he wrote: 
The judge (ḥākim) who only follows what is written (masṭūr) and explicit 
(manṣūṣ) in his rulings is deficient and weak. [Acting] accordingly, he abolishes 
their [i.e., the rabbis’] statement “a judge (dayan) only has what his eyes see” 
(bSan 6b inter alia.). The matter is not like this. Rather, the written matters are the 
principle (aṣl), and it behooves the judge (ḥākim) or jurisconsult (muftī) [treating] 
them to exercise discretion (yataṣarraf), in accordance with each and every case, 
and to compare (yaqīs) the law to its equivalent, and to bring forth details (yuntij 
furūʿ) from these principles.803 
In another context, Abraham described rabbinic statements as “the principle from which 
all later [jurists] derive (istamadd) after them.”804 
What may be Abraham’s most important remarks on post-talmudic legal 
development appear in his attempts to preempt challenges to one of his pietistic reforms, 
the increased use of prostration in prayer.805 Given the staunch opposition to Abraham’s 
                                                 
802 On these terms, see below, n899. 
803  ןיידל ןיא םהלוק טקסי ךל'ד בסחבו לכו ז'גע טקפ ץוצנמלאו רוטסמלא אלא המאכחא יפ עבתי אל ןאכ יתמ םכאחלא
רומאלא לב ךל'דכ רמאלא סילו תואור ויניעש המ אלא או בסחב אהיפ ףרצתי ןא יתפמלא וא םכאחלל יגבניו לצאלא יה ֿהרוטסמלא ֿהעק
נל םכחלא סיקיו ֿהעקאולוצאלא ךלת ןמ עורפ 'גתניו הרי'ט ; Abraham Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 96 (§78); 
see the lengthy deployment of uṣūl and furūʿ in that responsum, 98-101. Maimonides cited this adage in 
Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 23:9; and Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 1:1 (§1), 2:640 (§365); see also Hilkhot Sheʾeilah u-
Fiqadon, 6:4 (וילע תכמוס ותעדש המ אלא ןיידל ול ןיאו). 
804 םהדעב ר'כאתמ לכ הנמ דמתסא י'דלא לצאלא יה יתלא ל"ז וניתובר לוק ןמ דהאושלא דצקיו; Abraham 
Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 115 (§82); similar statements appear there, 96 (§78), 172 (§104; 
though the editors noted that the text of the relevant manuscript is unclear). On the first of these responsa, 
see Friedman, “Responsa of R. Abraham Maimonides,” 35-40; idem, “ʿAl Shut ha-Raʿavam,” 261-62; and 
idem, “Masa u-Matan bein Ḥakham mi-Teiman le-R. Avraham ben ha-Rambam ʿal Kesef ha-Ketubah ve-
ʿal Samkhut ha-Masoret,” Teʿudah 14 (2008): 139-65.  
805 On Abraham Maimonides’ prayer reforms, see Naphtali Wieder, Hashpaʿot Islamiyot ʿal ha-
Pulḥan ha-Yehudi (Oxford: Sifriyat Mizraḥ u-Maʿarav, 1947), passim; Goitein, “Abraham Maimonides and 
His Pietist Circle,” 162-64; Friedman, “Abraham Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms,” 139-54; idem, “Maḥloqet 
le-Sheim Shamayim,” 245-98; Elisha Russ-Fishbane, “The Maimonidean Legacy in the East: A Study of 
Father and Son,” JQR 102, no. 2 (2012): 190-223; and idem, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval 
Egypt, 158-84. On bowing specifically, see also Y. Tzvi Langermann, “From Private Devotion to 
Communal Prayer New Light on Abraham Maimonides’ Synagogue Reforms,” Ginzei Qedem 1 (2005): 
31-49. 
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pietistic program, it is unlikely that this was a theoretical exercise.806 Abraham claimed 
that he was simply restoring biblical and rabbinic practice, but his opponents charged him 
with imitating contemporary Muslims, in violation of the prohibition against imitating 
gentiles (Lev. 20:23).807 
The first charge that Abraham anticipated was that his proposed innovations 
violated the mishnaic (mPes 4:1) exhortation to refrain from observing customs808 that 
are at variance with local practice lest disputes arise. The obligation to maintain accepted 
practice, he suggested, might be particularly acute because earlier scholars had tacitly 
endorsed the status quo by not opposing it.809 Abraham sought to pre-empt such a charge 
in two ways. In the first (echoed in the [lost] Introduction to the Kifāya), he argued that 
there is no obligation to uphold accepted practice in the face of evidence proving its 
deficiency, even if the practice is widespread or ancient. He explained that later scholars, 
                                                 
806 In addition to the sources in the previous and next notes, see S.D. Goitein, “A Treatise in 
Defence of the Pietists by Abraham Maimonides,” JJS 16, no. 3-4 (1965): 108-114; idem, “New 
Documents from the Cairo Geniza,” in Homenaje a Millas-Vallicrosa, ed. Roberto Almagià (Barcelona: 
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1954), 1:707-713; Cohen, “The Soteriology of R. 
Abraham Maimuni,” 76-78; Obadiah ben Abraham Maimonides, The Treatise of the Pool (al-Maqāla al-
Ḥawḍiyya), ed. Paul Fenton (London: Octagon Press, 1981), 12-19; Paul Fenton, Deux traités de mystique 
juive (Paris: Lagrasse, 1987), 81-89; idem, “Tefillah baʿad ha-Rashut u-Reshut baʿad ha-Tefillah: Zuṭot 
min ha-Genizah,” Mi-Mizraḥ umi-Maʿarav: Qoveṣ Meḥqarim be-Toldot ha-Yehudim be-Mizraḥ uve-
Maghreb 4 (1984): 17-21; Mordechai Akiva Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah ule-Minhagei Tefillah Ereṣ-
Yisraeliyim be-Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot she-min ha-Genizah,” in Keneset Ezra: Sifrut ve-Ḥayim be-Veit ha-
Keneset, Asupat Maʾamarim Mugeshet le-Ezra Fleischer, eds. Shulamit Elizur et al. (Jerusalem: Yad Ben-
Ẓvi, 1994), 71-85; and idem, “Abraham Maimonides on His Leadership,” 500-510. See also below, n809. 
807 On Abraham’s response to this charge, see Wieder, Hashpaʿot Islamiyot, 55-57; Cohen “The 
Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 85-86; Paul Fenton, “Deux écoles piétistes: les hasidei Ashkenaz et 
les soufis juifs d’Égypte,” in La société juive à travers l'histoire, ed. Shmuel Trigano (Paris: Fayard, 
1992), 221; idem, “Abraham Maimonides (1186-1237): Founding a Mystical Dynasty,” in Jewish Mystical 
Leaders and Leadership in the 13th Century, ed. Moshe Idel (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1998), 151; 
and Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 76-85. 
808 He used the Hebrew minhag and the Arabic ʿāda (and their plurals) interchangeably to denote 
“custom.” 
809 Both of these claims also appear in R. Joseph rosh ha-seder’s responsum regarding the attempt 
on the part of Babylonian Rabbanites to alter the practices of the Palestinian Rabbanite community in 
Fusṭāṭ; see Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 88 line 9, 89 line 2.  
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at times, clarified matters that were opaque to earlier ones by “improving what had not 
been improved and deriving (yastanbiṭ) what had not been derived, because the earlier 
ones were engaged in other matters.”810 In Abraham’s view, this explains why all accept 
the post-talmudic principle that the law follows later authorities (hilkheta ke-batrai), 
notwithstanding the talmudic statement (bYom 9b) “the fingernails of the earlier ones are 
larger than the stomachs of the later ones.”811 This, he wrote, is not due to the perfection 
(kamāl) of later ones but due to the fact that later authorities “examine (yanẓuru fī) the 
statements of the earlier ones, build upon them, take from them, and bring forth (yuntij) 
conclusions according to the rules of reasoning (qawānīn al-qiyās).”812 Abraham made a 
similar point in the first of his seven preambles to the Kifāya (now lost), which addressed 
the development of Jewish law. He argued, there, that later generations may be superior 
to earlier ones in certain respects and, for this reason, might be qualified to alter 
particular religious practices.813 
Abraham thus argued that it would be illogical to reject a novel legal opinion 
solely because it was not held by earlier generations. Indeed, he noted, the history of 
post-talmudic legal discourse proves this: Later geonim challenged earlier geonim, Alfasi 
challenged his predecessors Hayya Gaon and Nissim of Qayrawān, and Ibn Migash 
                                                 
810 .האוסב הלאגתשאל םדקתמלא ךא'ד הטבנתסי םל אמ טבנתסיו החקני םל אמ חיקנתל גרפתיו  
811 םינורחאלש ןסירכמ רתי םינושארלש ןנרפצ לודג; Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177. 
Most manuscripts of bYom 9b have “better” (ṭovah) rather than larger (gadol); MS. Vatican 134 has 
gedolah. On this post-talmudic principle, see Stampfer, “‘Hilkheta ke-Batrai’,” 417-25; compare above, 
n265.  
812 'גיאתנ סאיקלא ןינאוקב אהיפ 'גתניו אהנמ 'ד'כאיו אהילע ינביו ןימדקתמלא ליואקא יפ ר'טני ר'כאתמלא; Abraham 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 176-77. 
813 See Abraham’s discussion of this preamble in Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177, 183. For an 
outline of the contents of the Kifāya, see Cohen, “The Soteriology of R. Abraham Maimuni,” 89-96, 33-40; 
and Fenton, “Dana’s Edition,” 197-99. 
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challenged his teacher Alfasi. And though Maimonides called these figures (Alfasi and 
Ibn Migash?814) “my teachers” (rabbotai) in the Mishneh Torah, he disagreed with them 
in a number of places.815 Abraham insisted that scholars, unlike ignoramuses, recognize 
that such disagreements do not constitute censure (intiqād), but are the expected outcome 
of intellectual discourse.816 
The other way in which Abraham sought to pre-empt criticisms of his innovations 
was by narrowing the scope of practices covered by the mishnaic injunction cited above. 
According to Abraham, the exhortation to uphold local custom applies exclusively to 
customs that lack either a textual or logical basis, to customs that qiyās ([textual] 
reasoning) neither supports nor rejects, and to customs that are based on local business 
practice.817 In such cases, he explained, “custom overrides (lit., abolishes) law” (minhag 
mevaṭel halakhah; jYeb 12:1 [12c]; jBM 7:1 [11b]). Abraham asserted, however, that 
accepted practice has no say regarding matters that are “religiously mandated” (wājiba fī 
al-dīn). He did not offer a detailed definition of this last category, but implied that either 
text (naṣṣ) or reasoning (qiyās) might impose obligations that would result in the 
overturning of custom by law.818 
                                                 
814 The referent of the phrase “these figures” is not entirely clear. 
815 For disagreements with “rabbotai,” see Hilkhot Geirushin, 9:31; Hilkhot Mekhirah, 29:17; 
Hilkhot Zekhiyah u-Matanah, 3:8; Hilkhot Shluḥin ve-Shutafin, 6:4-5; Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh, 27:1; and 
Hilkhot Ṭoʿen ve-Niṭʿan, 3:2, 3:7. Abraham added that Maimonides even disagreed with his own father; see 
Hilkhot Sheḥitah, 11:10. 
816 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 177-78. 
817 In the first category, he offered the example in mPes 4:1 of not performing labor before noon 
on the eve of Passover; in the second, lighting candles for the Day of Atonement; and in the third, quoted 
the statement that “everything follows local practice” (ha-kol ke-minhag ha-medinah) in financial matters 
(mKet 6:4; mBB 1:1). 
818 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 178-79; see similarly there, 98. In the 
remainder of this section, he vociferously criticized the appointment of prayer leaders who, in his view, are 
unfit and, citing his father, certain customs observed in the Palestinian synagogue in Fusṭāṭ (179-81). See 
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Abraham was also concerned to forestall the charge that additional prostrations 
during prayer cannot be required, even if the need for them is derived using qiyās, 
because the practice lacks explicit rabbinic support. Abraham offered both a “general” 
(kullī) and “particular” (juzʾī) answer in anticipation of this challenge. The general 
answer (which he reportedly discussed, as well, in the [lost] Introduction to the Kifāya) 
divided rabbinic law regarding acts of divine worship (ʿibādāt) into three classes: 
explicitly forbidden acts, explicitly mandated acts, and acts neither forbidden nor 
required.819 In his words, those in the last category are: 
Left to the form of that which reasoning establishes (ʿalā mā yuʿṭīhi al-qiyās)820 
and to that which the verses of [holy] writings (nuṣūṣ al-kutub), the traditions of 
the transmitters (āthār al-nāqilīn), and rules of reasoning (qawānīn al-qiyās) 
indicate (yadullu) regarding their obligation or rejection. Therefore, we have 
discussed them using speculative reason and evidence.821 
Abraham acknowledged that strong evidence from rabbinic literature might lead his 
conclusions to be overturned. Short of that, he would rebuff unpersuasive arguments with 
reasoning and evidence.822 
                                                 
Friedman, “Maḥloqet le-Sheim Shamayim,” 256-76 (for earlier scholarship, see there, 259nn61-62); idem, 
“Abraham Maimuni’s Prayer Reforms,” 144-48; idem, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 74-76; Ezra Fleischer, 
Tefillah u-Minhagei Tefillah Ereṣ-Yisraeliyim bi-Tequfat ha-Genizah (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1988), 215-29; 
and Russ-Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 16. For Maimonides’ position on 
piyuṭ, which formed part of this controversy, see below, n856. On the place of custom, see also Abraham 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 92:  וא סאיקלא וא ץנלא לב הילע דמתעי ןא ב'גי י'דלא לצאלא וה גהנמלא סילו
יג ילע ד'גו ןאו הילע רמתסא ב'גאולא ילע אינבמ גהנמלא ד'גו ןאפ אהעומ'גמב'גאולא ילא הנע ע'גר ב'גאולא ר . 
819 Examples in the first category include reciting an unnecessary blessing and changing the text 
(maṭbeiʿa) of blessings; the second, praying three times a day and reciting the blessings surrounding the 
shmaʿ. For the third, see what follows. 
820 See Blau, Dictionary, 443, s.v. وطع IV. 
821  וא אהבא'גיא ןמ סאיקלא ןינאוקו ןילקאנלא רא'תאו בתכלא ץוצנ אהילע לדיו סאיקלא היטעי אמ ֿהרוצ ילע ֿהיקאב יהפ
.לילדלאו ר'טנלאב אהאנלואנת ךל'דלו אהראכנא 
822 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 181-82. For R. Joseph rosh ha-seder’s 
similar claim, also made in the context of pietistic prayer reform, see Friedman, “Hitnagdut le-Tefillah,” 91 
lines 17-18. 
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In the more “particular” answer, Abraham pointed readers to his detailed 
discussion of prostration.823 He added that other prayer practices, like the reading of Ps. 
92 on the Sabbath and of 1 Chron. 16:8-36 and selections from Psalms each morning, 
similarly lack any basis in rabbinic literature, but no “gaon, sage (ḥakham), or 
jurisconsult (muftī)” ever criticized their recitation. The fact that the blessings of barukh 
she-amar and yishtabaḥ (recited before and after these passages) do not appear in the 
Talmud, wrote Abraham, constitutes even more compelling proof for the permissibility of 
adding to divine worship.824 (This endorsement of these two post-talmudic blessings 
appears to be in tension with the Kifāya’s criticism, elsewhere, of the “blessing of 
virginity.” There, Abraham noted that this blessing lacks talmudic support and asserted 
that post-talmudic authorities may not institute a new blessing that uses the standard 
blessing formula.825) 
Abraham’s conviction that jurists in the post-talmudic period must use reasoning 
and textual arguments to reach legal conclusions is expressed in the Kifāya and in his 
responsa, but is most elaborately presented in his defense of pietistic prayer reforms. 
                                                 
823 See Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 117-47. 
824 Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 182-83. 
825 I.e., be-sheim u-malkhut, mentioning God’s name and sovereignty; Abraham Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 232. See the similar tension discussed in Robert Brody, “Saadya Gaon on the 
Limits of Liturgical Flexibility,” in Genizah Research after Ninety Years, 41-43. On this blessing and 
Maimonides’ opposition to it, see A. Marmorstein, “The Jewish ‘Blessing of Virginity’,” JJS 1 (1948): 33-
34; Israel Ta-Shma, “Teshuvat ha-Rambam be-ʿInyan Birkat Betulim,” Maimonidean Studies 2 (1992): 9-
15; repr. in idem, Ha-Tefillah ha-Ashkenazit ha-Qedumah: Peraqim be-Ofyah uve-Toldoteha (Jerusalem: 
Magnes, 2003), 181-87; idem, Minhag Ashkenaz ha-Qadmon, 44n90; Gerald Blidstein, Ha-Tefillah be-
Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam (Jerusalem: Bialik, 1994), 126, 132, 135; Ruth Langer, “The Birkat 
Betulim: A Study of the Jewish Celebration of Bridal Virginity,” PAAJR 61 (1995): 53-94; idem, To 
Worship God Properly: Tensions Between Liturgical Custom and Halakhah in Judaism (Cincinnati: 
Hebrew Union College Press, 1998), 60-73; and Anat Kutner, “Birkat Asher Ṣag: Gilgulei Berakhah she-
Neʿelamah,” Granot 3 (2003): 179-87. 
 
231 
 
Abraham’s remarks on this topic rely heavily upon perspectives expressed by his father; 
namely, Maimonides’ cognizance of the inherent ambiguities of textual interpretation and 
his valorization of human reasoning in the evolution of law.826 
 
Conclusion 
Maimonides’ revolutionary attempt to limit the scope of revelation and to broaden 
the purview of post-Sinaitic contributions to Jewish law evoked considerable anxiety; an 
early testimony to this is the criticisms that Daniel ha-Bavli leveled against Principles 
One and Two in Maimonides’ Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. The tone of Daniel’s 
comments and his assertion that all middot-based laws were, in fact, revealed at Sinai, 
suggest that Maimonides’ claims offended Daniel’s “religious sensibility;”827 Daniel 
simply could not countenance the idea that the vast preponderance of Jewish law is man-
made. The above analysis shows, however, that Maimonides influenced Daniel’s 
understanding of the geonim, and, at least terminologically, his description of rabbinic 
activity.828 While Daniel understood that Maimonides had successfully demolished the 
geonic-era approach to revelation, he rejected the Maimonidean system, as it unduly 
minimized God’s role in the creation of Jewish law. 
                                                 
826 On Maimonides’ view, in addition to the discussion in Chapter Two, see Cohen, “Ha-Biṭuy 
‘Bāb/Abwāb al-Taʾwīl’,” 174-75. 
827 In seeking to explain the bitterness of Naḥmanides reaction to Principle Two in Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, Blidstein asked if Naḥmanides was concerned that Maimonides’ system fails to account for the 
“academic dialectics of the Talmud” or if Maimonides’ approach offended Naḥmanides’ “religious 
sensibility”; “Oral Law as Institution,” 172. In the English version of this article, he left this as an open 
question, but in the Hebrew version (“Masoret ve-Samkhut Mosdit,” 21), he preferred the first option. 
828 As Harry Wolfson noted, “beliefs and ideas ride on the back of terms”; The Philosophy of the 
Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 70-71; see Lobel, Between Mysticism and 
Philosophy, 6, 183n14. 
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In defending his father’s understanding of the Oral Torah, Abraham Maimonides 
forcefully rebuffed all of Daniel’s criticisms. By contrast, Abraham’s reactions to 
Daniel’s critique of other Principles were often more measured. (These will be treated in 
Chapters Four and Five of this dissertation.) Abraham’s assertions are frequently difficult 
to parse, however; the polemical nature of his exchange with Daniel may have led him to 
make sweeping or ambiguous statements in order to vindicate Maimonides. He may also 
have recognized problems with his father’s depiction of revelation and of the rabbis, but 
preferred not to acknowledge them. 
Abraham’s later writings evince sustained interest in the mechanics of the Oral 
Torah and a strong commitment to his father’s understanding of the scope of revelation 
and rabbinic tradition. He employed Maimonides’ arguments to great effect in many of 
his writings, particularly when justifying his own pietistic reforms.  
Subsequent research may explore the ways in which Abraham used rabbinic 
traditions, in both legal and non-legal discussions, in the Commentary and in the Kifāya. 
Further analysis might also clarify how differences of emphasis and framing between 
Maimonides and Abraham reflect the commonalities and divergences in their respective 
corpora. 
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Chapter Four: Creating Commandment-Units 
Introduction 
The challenge of selecting those laws that comprise the list of the 613 
commandments was one of the most enduring problems of enumeration. Those who 
attempted to list 613 commandments encountered numerous difficulties, for there is 
apparent arbitrariness to the number 613, rabbinic literature offers no guidance,829 and the 
Talmud seems to assume that innumerable laws are biblical in status.830 These and other 
challenges motivated one Rabbanite to suggest that 613 is “an approximation” (ʿala sabīl 
al-taqrīb),831 and another to write that “the number is roughly (naḥwa) 613 
commandments (sharīʿa).”832 Such a perspective is implicit in lists that contain fewer 
than 613 entries,833 among them, perhaps, the earliest attempt at enumeration.834 This 
chapter, however, focuses on the methodologies of those who attempted to identify 
                                                 
829 As Naḥmanides noted at length; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel 1-7 (Prin. One); see 
similarly Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 225 (concluding remarks). See also below, n907. Blidstein, “Where Do 
We Stand,” 25: “the Talmud, needless to say, does not really consider the problem of what a mizvah is for 
[the purpose of enumeration].” 
830 The importance of this problem for Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot is noted in Peritz, “Das Buch 
der Gesetze,” 1:440-42; and Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 461-62. Bloch, “Les 613 Lois,” 198-
200, noted the general challenges of enumeration. 
831 Fuchs, Studien über Abu Zakaria Jachja, xxiii; and Perez, “Commentary on Numbers & 
Deuteronomy,” 63. See also Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 225 (concluding remarks). 
832 העירש ג"ירת וחנ דדעלא; Baḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23 (introduction); note Kafiḥ’s 
attempt to reread this, there, 23n12. Elsewhere, Baḥya did not qualify this number; 137 (2:3), 427 (10:7). 
See similarly Gersonides, Peirushei ha-Torah le-Rabbeinu Levi ben Gershom, ed. Yaʿaqov Leib Levi 
(Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1992-1998), 2:76 (Ex. 12). 
833 Avraham Oḥayon, “Ha-Omnam Taryag Miṣvot?” Shaʾanan: Shenaton ha-Mikhlalah ha-Datit 
le-Ḥinukh 14 (2009): 94, pointed out that Eliezar ben Samuel of Metz’s Sefer Yireʾim counts 417 
commandments, and that it is difficult to imagine that Isaac of Corbeil, who listed 320 commandments for 
the post-Temple era in his Sefer Miṣvot Qatan, could have found 293 Temple-era commandments.  
834 The piyuṭ titled Atah hinḥalta; see Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 36 (introductory pagination). 
Saʿadya already noticed this; see above, n60. Ephraim of Bonn (1132-97) made a similar complaint; see 
Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 42n150. Compare Maimonides’ statement that “nobody who 
enumerated the commandments ever doubted the number 613” ( ינעא תוצמלא דע ןמ לכ ןמ דחא הלה'גי אל אמ א'דהו
אהדדע א'דה אהנא; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 7 [introduction]; emphasis added). 
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exactly 613 commandments. While central to any enumeration project, this problem is 
irrelevant to applied law. 
Enumerators faced the problem of identifying what constitutes a 
“commandment.” To take two examples (treated below), the Pentateuch (Num. 9:4-13) 
provides an opportunity for those unable to offer the paschal sacrifice at its designated 
time to do so one month later. Is this law, known in rabbinic literature as pesaḥ sheini, the 
second paschal sacrifice (see mPes chaps. 8-9), a distinct commandment, or is it part of 
the commandment to offer the paschal sacrifice in its time (Ex. 12:6)? Are the head and 
arm phylacteries to be counted as one or as two commandments? According to Moses 
ben Joseph di Trani (Salonika, Safed; 1505-85), the “vast majority” (rov kol) of the 
debates between Maimonides and Naḥmanides over the enumeration of the 
commandments turn on the question of when a specific “law” constitutes a distinct 
commandment.835 Gerald Blidstein termed the groups of laws listed as “commandments” 
in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot “mizvah-units”836 (“commandment-units”), and I use 
this term throughout this chapter. 
Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem pointed to a similarity between the challenge of reducing 
Jewish law to 613 commandments and a concept in legal theory known as 
“individuation,” which divides a legal system into distinct laws.837 The philosopher and 
jurist, Jeremy Bentham (England; 1748-1832), was the first to reflect on the individuation 
                                                 
835 di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 9a (introduction, §6). 
836 Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 14. 
837 See Ḥanina Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel Ḥuqqim,” 95-97; idem, “Maimonides’ 
Fourteen Roots,” 3-7; and idem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 179-80, 188. Friedberg drew on this concept 
in his study of Sefer ha-Miṣvot; Crafting the 613 Commandments, 50-52. See also Michael Abraham, 
“Kelalav shel ha-Rambam le-Minyan ha-Miṣvot,” 1:146-49. 
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of laws. Bentham had a longstanding interest in the determination of what constitutes a 
“whole law.”838 In his earliest work, he attacked the compiler of English Common Law, 
William Blackstone (1723-80), for having failed to distinguish between “one law” and its 
constituent parts.839 Bentham sought to replace Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws 
of England with a more progressive code, called the “Pannomion.”840 This never-
completed work was to be organized around distinct laws, so that “the precise number … 
might be counted, were it to answer any purpose.”841 Bentham struggled at length to 
identify “a compleat law,”842 but, as one prominent modern reader noted, never presented 
a clear way to do so.843 Still, in broad terms, Bentham’s search for a “whole law” may be 
analogous to the problem of identifying distinct commandment-units.844 
                                                 
838 Jeremy Bentham, Of the Limits of the Penal Branch of Jurisprudence, ed. Philip Schofield 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010), 168. 
839 Jeremy Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and A Fragment on Government, eds. J.H. 
Burns and H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2008), 72 (emphasis in original). On Bentham’s attack 
on Blackstone, see Richard A. Posner, “Blackstone and Bentham,” Journal of Law and Economics 19, no. 
3 (1976): 569-71; and David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in 
Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 257-62. 
840 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, eds. J.H. Burns 
and H.L.A. Hart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 305; see David Lieberman, “From Bentham to 
Benthamism,” The Historical Journal 28, no. 1 (1985): 205. On Bentham’s penchant for neologisms, see 
H.F. Pitkin, “Slippery Bentham: Some Neglected Cracks in the Foundation of Utilitarianism,” Political 
Theory 18, no. 1 (1990): 105. 
841 Bentham, Limits, 269. Bentham similarly wrote that “the number and description, then, of the 
several laws of which the system is composed being once given, the whole code will be given likewise: the 
parts or contents of it will be an object of arithmetic” (Limits, 222). David Lieberman argued that Bentham 
was interested in what constitutes a “whole law” in order to provide “the proper means for comprehending 
the nature of the legal system as a whole and for evaluating the merits of its parts” (The Province of 
Legislation Determined, 277). For alternative interpretations, see M.H. James, “Bentham on the 
Individuation of Laws,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 24, no. 3 (1973): 357-70; and A.M. Honoré, 
“Real Laws,” in Law, Morality, and Society: Essays in Honour of H.L.A. Hart, eds. P.M.S. Hacker and 
Joseph Raz (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 102-103; and below, n844. 
842 See Bentham, Limits, 168-97, 268-70. 
843 H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1982), 107, 125; and idem, “Bentham on Legal Powers,” The Yale Law Journal 81, no. 5 
(1972): 814n44, 815, 819. 
844 Joseph Raz used the concept of individuation to solve problems in legal philosophy, arguing 
that the perennial question “what is law?” is unintelligible without first understanding what comprises a 
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This chapter begins with a brief review of passages and terms in rabbinic 
literature that are germane to the question of what constitutes a “complete law,” although 
there is little discussion of these texts in medieval reflections on the enumeration of the 
commandments. I then turn to the surviving pre-Maimonidean discussions of what 
constitutes a “commandment.” Next, I analyze Maimonides’ system for the identification 
of the 613 commandment-units through philological examination of Principles Seven, 
Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen in the Introduction to his Sefer ha-Miṣvot. I 
conclude with the relevant discussions from the exchange between Daniel ha-Bavli and 
Abraham Maimonides. 
Throughout this chapter, I use words like “law” and “rule” to denote part of a 
“commandment-unit.” I am aware that this leaves open the question of what constitutes a 
distinct “law,” but am unable, at present, to find better terms for conveying this concept. 
 
Background in Rabbinic Literature 
Though the idea that God gave 613 commandments appears in the Talmud (bMak 
23b), nowhere does the Talmud discuss how these commandments are to be identified.845 
Several talmudic concepts pertain to the division of laws into distinct units, however. 
Ben-Menaḥem drew attention to mHor 1:3, where the Mishnah discusses cases in which 
                                                 
complete law; “Legal Principles and the Limits of the Law,” The Yale Law Journal 81, no. 5 (1972): 823-
32; and idem, The Concept of a Legal System: An Introduction to the Theory of a Legal System, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 70-91, 141-46. See the criticism in Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1977), 71-80. In applying individuation to 
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Ben-Menaḥem followed Raz and claimed that individuation is a “purely 
theoretical” endeavor that “proffers a mode of dividing the totality of material constituting a legal system 
into separate units”; “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 3-4. 
845 See above, n829. 
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the court erroneously rules against laws that the rabbis considered to be biblical in 
status.846 It reads: 
If the [members of the] court gave a decision uprooting an entire principle (kol 
ha-guf): if they said, “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning the 
menstruant,” [or] “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning the Sabbath,” 
[or] “There is nothing in the Pentateuch concerning idolatry,” they are not 
culpable. If they gave a decision that in part annulled and in part sustained [a 
biblical law], they are culpable. How? If they said, “Laws concerning the 
menstruant are in the Pentateuch, but if a man has intercourse with a woman who 
awaits day against day (shomeret yom ke-neged yom)847 he is not culpable”; [or if 
they said,] “Laws concerning the Sabbath are in the Pentateuch, but if a man 
carries from a private domain to a public domain he is not culpable;” [or if they 
said,] “Laws concerning idolatry are in the Pentateuch, but if a man bows [before 
an idol], he is not culpable,” they [i.e., members of the court] are culpable, for it is 
written “if something is hidden” (Lev. 4:13) [offer an atoning sacrifice] – 
“something,” but not an entire principle.848 
This Mishnah assumes that an “entire principle” can be distinguished from its parts. As 
Ben-Menaḥem noted, the broad themes of menstruation, the Sabbath, and idolatry contain 
many discrete rules. He added that the Tosefta and Jerusalem Talmud seem to define “an 
entire principle” differently than the Mishnah.849 
A second relevant concept in rabbinic literature is the idea that laws can be part of 
one topic (sheim eḥad).850 In two debates (mKer 3:6, 4:4), one view holds that two sin 
                                                 
846 Note that not all of the examples in this Mishnah are explicit in the Pentateuch; see 
Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:472-73 (mHor 1:3). 
847 A woman who has the status of shomeret yom ke-neged yom has experienced flow during the 
eleven days that follow her seven prescribed days of uncleanness (Lev. 15:19), and awaits a complete day 
of cleanness. 
848  ורוה ןירוטפ ולא ירה הרותב הרז הדובע ןיא הרותב תבש ןיא הרותב הדנ ןיא ורמא ףוגה לכ תא רוקעל ןיד תיב ורוה
 לבא הרותב תבש שי רוטפ םוי דגנכ םוי תרמוש לע אבה לבא הרותב הדנ שי ורמא דציכ ןיבייח ולא ירה תצקמ םייקלו תצקמ לטבל
 הרז הדובע שי רוטפ םיברה תושרל דיחיה תושרמ איצומה לכ אלו רבד רבד םלענו רמאנש ןיבייח ולא ירה רוטפ הוחתשמה לבא הרותב
ףוגה; translation based on Danby, The Mishnah, 462, with slight changes. 
849 See tHor 1:7 and jHor 1:3 (45d). Ben-Menaḥem, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel Ḥuqqim,” 101-103; and 
idem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 11-13. One could divide the laws of the Sabbath according to the 39 
labors and the laws of idolatry according to methods of worship (see bSab 71a-72a and bSan 82a). 
850 The concept of sheim eḥad appears to be related to the rabbinic division between avot and 
toladot (principle and derivative categories); see Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 107-108. On sheim eḥad, 
see there, 103-107, 144-59. Compare the general comments about tractate Keritot in Federico Dal Bo, 
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offerings are incurred for the simultaneous violation of two laws, but another view posits 
that the inadvertent sinner needs to bring only one sacrifice because the laws fall into the 
same category. The second view relies on some method to include discrete laws in one 
category. 
An Amoraic question of whether multiple prohibitions may come together in a 
single situation (isur ḥal ʿal isur)851 presupposes that discrete laws can be included in one 
category. According to some interpretations, this problem concerns the number of 
punishments incurred for violating multiple prohibitions in a single act. For example, the 
Talmud (bQid 77a) wonders if a High Priest who marries a woman who is both a 
divorcée and a widow (see Lev. 21:14) is punished once or twice.852 This issue turns, in 
part, on the classification of prohibitions and the identification of distinct laws. 
In setting forth his enumeration of the commandments, Maimonides was 
concerned with the multivalent term miṣvah (lit., commandment). This term has many 
meanings in rabbinic literature, but it does not seem to mean “discrete commandment.”853 
                                                 
“‘Women to Think With’: Sexual Transgressions as Heuristics in bKeritot 17a-20a,” in A Feminist 
Commentary on the Babylonian Talmud V: Introduction to Seder Qodashim, eds. Tal Ilan et al. (Tübingen: 
Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 241. See also below, n1107. 
851 For treatment, see de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 60-68; and Encyclopedia 
Talmudit, s.v. ein isur ḥal ʿal isur, 1:581-91.  
852 See Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. ein isur ḥal ʿal isur, 1:581-82. 
853 In fact, I have found no evidence of this usage. On this term, see Zvi Hirsch Chajes comments 
to bBer 4b s.v. af ʿal pi; Zvi Pereṣ Chayes, “Hagahot le-Masekhet Berakhot,” in Festschrift zu Israel 
Lewy’s siebzigstem Geburtstag, eds. M. Brann and J. Elbogen (Breslau, 1911), 174 (Hebrew section); Saul 
Lieberman, “Tiqunei Yerushalmi,” 6, no. 1 (1934): 97-99; Gedaliah Alon, “Shevut, Reshut, Miṣvah,” 
Tarbiẓ 7, no. 3 (1936): 135-42; de Vries, Toldot ha-Halakhah ha-Talmudit, 50-59; Simon Greenberg, “The 
Multiplication of the Mitzvot,” in Mordecai Kaplan Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his Seventieth 
Birthday, ed. Moshe Davis (New York: Jewish Theological Seminary, 1953), 384-89 (esp. Louis 
Ginzberg’s comments cited there, 388n37); Urbach, Ḥazal, 297-301, esp. 297n77; Marc Hirschman, 
“Miṣvah u-Sekharah be-Mishnah uve-Tosefta: le-Darkhah shel Maḥshevet Ḥazal,” Proceedings of the 
World Congress of Jewish Studies, 10, Division C Vol. 1: Jewish Thought and Literature (1989): 54-60; 
Robert Goldenberg, “Law and Spirit in Talmudic Religion,” in Jewish Spirituality from the Bible through 
the Middle Ages, ed. Arthur Green (New York: Crossroad, 1986-1987), 1:236; Aharon Shemesh, “Le-
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In his Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides frequently argued that a specific law constitutes a 
distinct commandment because the rabbis termed it a “miṣvah” (see below). However, 
this claim is difficult to maintain, as many have pointed out.854 
 
Pre-Maimonidean Attempts to Create Commandment-Units 
Early Liturgical Enumerations 
The authors of azharot (“warnings”), liturgical poems that enumerate the 
commandments, appear to have been the first to list the 613 commandments.855 In the 
introduction to his Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides described these authors as “poets, not 
jurists,”856 even though at least two, Saʿadya ben Joseph Gaon and Isaac ben Reuben al-
Bargeloni (c. 1043 - c. 1113), were certainly “jurists.”857 Many traditional commentators 
have struggled to identify 613 commandments in these poems,858 and because the 
                                                 
Toldot Mashmaʿam shel ha-Musagim Miṣvot ʿAseh u-Miṣvot lo Taʿaseh,” Tarbiẓ 72, no. 1-2 (2003): 133-
50; Novick, What is Good and What God Demands, 26-34, 39-60, 89-107; and idem, “Blessings over 
Miṣvot: The Origins of a Category,” HUCA 79 (2008): 76-78. Compare Sherira Gaon’s definition 
(mentioned by Urbach) in Joel Müller, Teshuvot Geonei Mizraḥ u-Maʿarav (Berlin, 1888), 34 (§141): 
הבוח ןוהנמ ןאיוה יפנא ןירת תוצמד  ןאמד תושר ןוהנמו ןועב םיאק הל דיבע אלד ןאמדיבעד(ר]ד[) רכש היל תיא הל . 
854 See Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments treated below; Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, 
ed. Chavel, 128-30 (Prin. Eleven); and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 36-46, 61-64. 
855 On this genre, see above, n44. 
856 אהקפ אלו ארעש; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 5 (introduction). See Twersky, 
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 250-51n29. On Maimonides’ objections to piyuṭ, see Jacob I. 
Dienstag, “The Prayer Book of Maimonides,” in The Leo Jung Jubilee Volume: On the Occasion of his 
Seventieth Birthday, eds. Menaḥem M. Kasher et al. (New York: The Jewish Center, 1962), 62-63; 
Blidstein, Ha-Tefillah be-Mishnato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 134-39; idem, “Maimonides’ Taqqanah 
Concerning Public Prayer,” Maimonidean Studies 3 (1995): 24-25; Yosef Yahalom, “Ha-Rambam veha-
Meliṣah ha-ʿIvrit,” Peʿamim 81 (1999): 4-18; Edwin Seroussi, “More on Maimonides on Music,” Zutot 2 
(2002): 126-135; and Hopkins, “The Languages of Maimonides,” 95n42.  
857 Contrast Moses Ibn Ezra’s description of al-Bargeloni as “among the master jurisprudents and 
its teachers” (םהמאלעאו אהקפלא רודצ ןמ); Sefer ha-ʿIyunim veha-Diyunim, ed. Halkin, 75 line 88. 
858 On the enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot, see Avraham Shimon Ṭraub, Sefer Halakhot 
Gedolot: Meḥubar u-Meyusad le-Halakhot ke-fi Seder Shata Sidrei Talmud ha-Bavli (Warsaw, 1874); and 
Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot.” On one of Saʿadya’s enumerations, see Perla, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-Rasag; and Shimon Halperin, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag: ʿim beiʾur Qaṣar u-Maspiq (Jerusalem, 
1930). On Isaac ben Reuben al-Bargeloni’s azharot, see Shaul ben Musah, Netiv Miṣvotekha. On Solomon 
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authors, with one exception, did not number the commandments, it is almost impossible 
to do so with certainty.859 The liturgical setting for these works leads one to wonder if 
commentators committed a category error by relating to them as juridical texts. It may be 
fruitful, however, to contrast these poems with later, more jurisprudentially inclined 
enumerations in order to consider how later enumerators “thought with” earlier liturgical 
lists. 
Several of these enumerations contain terms used for grouping numerous laws 
under one heading. For example, the author of the piyuṭ titled Atah hinḥalta, which may 
be the earliest surviving enumeration, used the synonyms “din” and “mishpaṭ” (law) to 
collect groups of laws.860 Saʿadya followed this style, using the words “datei” and 
“ḥuqqei” for the same purpose, and al-Bargeloni used the word “torat,”861 all of which 
are nouns in the construct state that mean “laws of.” In addition, several lists count the 
                                                 
Ibn Gabirol’s azharot, see Abraham Israel, “Peirush Rabbi Moshe Ibn Tibbon le-Azharot she-Ḥiber R. 
Shlomo Ibn Gabirol” (MA thesis, Ben Gurion University, 2007); Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa; and Shaul ben 
Musah, Netiv Miṣvotekha; Neubauer published parts of Moses Ibn Tibbon’s commentary in “Miscellanea 
Liturgica,” 699-703. On Elijah ha-Zaqein’s azharot, see Mordecai Sluṣqi, Azharot le-Ḥag ha-Shavuʿot; 
Israel Issar Shapiro, Azharot Eliyahu ha-Zaqein: Kolel Taryag Miṣvot ʿim beiʾur raḥav ṣefunot yigaleh 
niqra be-sheim Meteq Azharot (Jerusalem, 1972); Ephraim Kupfer, “Peirush Azharot de-Rabbana Eliyahu 
ha-Zaqein bar Menaḥem mi-Mans me-et Ḥakham eḥad mi-ḥug shel Rabbeinu Ḥayim bar Ḥananel ha-
Kohen,” Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 11, no. 2 (23) (1989): 109-207; and Abraham Grossman, Ḥakhmei Ṣarfat ha-
Rishonim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1995), 98-99.  
859 See Hildesheimer’s comments in “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 15-18 (introductory 
pagination); add Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 15-17. 
860 Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 622 line 48. 
861 Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 163 line 74, 164 line 80; 
and Isaac ben Reuben al-Bargeloni, Azharot (Jerusalem: Mekhon Ben Yissakhar, 1992), 17a. 
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collected rites of the Day of Atonement as one unit.862 These authors, however, were far 
from consistent when grouping laws.863 
 
The Term Parshiyot & Punishments as Commandments 
Though the Talmud divides the 613 commandments into 248 positive and 365 
negative commandments, many early enumerators divided the commandments into four 
categories, positive and negative commandments, and two categories that do not appear 
in the Talmud, parshiyot (sing., parasha) and punishments (ʿonashim). Though the 
author of Atah hinḥalta864 did not use these latter groupings in his enumeration, they 
appear in the list in Halakhot Gedolot and several other enumerations.865 Both of these 
post-talmudic classifications may be relevant to the discussion of how to create 
commandment-units. 
                                                 
862 E.g., Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 623 line 55; and Isaac ben Reuben, Azharot, 8b; see the 
comments in Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 37. Note also the general commandments in the list in Halakhot 
Gedolot, e.g., to bring a sin-offering and seek forgiveness (ןברקבו םינונחחתב רפכתהל אטחו), and the grouping 
of valuations (ʿeirekhin) as one commandment (Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 90, 
101). 
863 Kafiḥ guessed that Maimonides had Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ in mind when he criticized an 
anonymous enumerator for counting as distinct commandments eleven laws of one afflicted by ṣaraʿat; 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25n17. These laws do not appear in surviving fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s work; 
Maimonides may (also?) have been referring to Atah hinḥalta (Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 624-25 lines 65-
79), or even to a list by Saʿadya (though this is unclear; see Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:805-806). 
See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit, 79. 
864 This piyuṭ does use the phrases parashat soṭah, parashat ʿeglah ʿarufah, and parashat ha-
melekh, all of which appear in mSot 7:1-2; Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 617 line 17 and 629 line 98. The 
author did not use this term to group laws that do not appear in this Mishnah. 
865 For Saʿadya’s usage, see below, nn869-872. See Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot 
Gedolot,” 12, 25-26 (introductory pagination), for discussion of those who included these four classes of 
laws; add Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥaq Ibn Gikatilla,” 174 lines 314 (parshiyot), 173 line 195 (punishments); 
Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 35-37, 43-44; and Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 41-42 (introductory 
pagination). Solomon Ibn Gabirol’s lists are another exception, see Dov Yarden, Shirei ha-Qodesh le-Rabbi 
Shlomo Ibn Gabirol (Jerusalem, 1972), 414; and Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 26 
(introductory pagination). Enumerations based on the Ten Commandments obviously did not use this 
system; see Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 13n42. 
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The meaning of the word parshiyot is subject to dispute. The simplest 
interpretation is that parshiyot are units of laws grouped together for the purpose of the 
enumeration, e.g., the parashah of oaths or the parashah of inheritance laws. This is how 
the term was understood by Abraham Ibn Ezra, Maimonides, Naḥmanides, and Simeon 
ben Ṣemaḥ Duran; this view may find support in a rabbinic text adduced by Michael 
Guttman.866 However, several medieval readers noticed that the enumeration in Halakhot 
Gedolot is inconsistent in its use of this term: some commandments listed as parshiyot 
appear elsewhere in that count, while certain laws listed as distinct commandments seem 
as if they should be grouped together.867 
Several researchers have attempted to explain why these enumerators labeled 
some laws parshiyot, while listing others as positive or negative commandments. The 
most widespread interpretation is that parshiyot are rules that obligate the community, 
and not the individual. This view, adopted by Guttman and Yeruḥam Fischel Perla, 
appears in one manuscript of Halakhot Gedolot and in Baḥya ibn Paqudah’s Duties of the 
Heart; a number of liturgical enumerations also hint at it.868 
                                                 
866 תחא לכו הרותב השמ ונל בתכ תוישרפ שלש יחוי ןב 'עמש 'ר םשב ןנחוי 'ר רמד  תוצמ םישש םיששמ הב שי תחאו
וליאו ןה שרפ' םיחספ תשרפו םיקיזנ פותשר םישודק ר' יול םשב ר' הליש רפכד התרמת םיעבשמ םיעבש א"ר המוחנת אלו ןיגילפ ןמ 
דבעד םיחספ םיעבש לולכ המיע שרפ' ןיליפת ןמ דבעד תשרפ ןיקיזנ םיעבש לולכ המע תשרפ הטימש ןמ דבעד תשרפ םישודק םיעבש 
לולכ המע שרפ' הלרע ; Pesiqta de-Rav Kahana: ʿal pi ketav yad Oqsford (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-
Rabbanim sheba-America, 1987), ed. Bernard Mandelbaum, 1:99 lines 2-8 (pisqa 5 s.v. ha-ḥodesh ha-zeh, 
§10). See Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 22. It is not clear that parshiyot here means a group of laws. As the 
editor pointed out, the idea that the parashah of phylacteries includes 10 commandments may be based on 
the fact that that one of the relevant sections of the Pentateuch contains ten verses (Ex. 13:1-10). See also 
Novick, What is Good and What God Demands, 95-96n14. 
867 Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora, eds. Cohen and Simon, 102 (2:1); Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven), 43 (Prin. Eleven; note his use of this term, 52 [Prin. Fourteen]); 
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 62 (Prin. Three), 127 (Prin. Ten); Duran, Zohar 
ha-Raqiʿa, 18 (introductory pagination; Prin. Seven). See ibn Zimra, Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, 6:22 (§2111). 
868 Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot: ʿal pi Ketav-yad Romi, 14 ( םיטפשמו םיקח תוישרפ ןה וליאו
רוביצל םירוסמה); Baḥya, Ḥovot ha-Levavot, ed. Kafiḥ, 427 ( ץיארפ 'ה"ס יהו דארפאלא םזלת אל רוהמ'גלא םזלת העירש ); 
Zulai, “Azharot R. Yiṣḥak Ibn Gikatilla,” 174 line 314 (יִתָדֲעַל ת  ורוּסְמַה ת  ויִשָרָפ ש ֵּמָחְו םיִשִש); and Elijah ha-
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It is possible that Saʿadya offered this interpretation too, though Moshe Zucker 
felt that his position was more complex. At the outset of one of his liturgical 
enumerations, Saʿadya described the parshiyot as “65 laws established for cases that 
occur.”869 In the introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the Commandments), he 
added a few important words, defining the parshiyot as “65 laws established for cases 
that occur concerning the community” (fī ḥukm al-jamāʿa [fī]ha). Zucker, however, 
transcribed the last phrase “fa-yaḥkum al-jamāʿa [fī]ha,” meaning that the community is 
to rule on these laws (i.e., they are laws entrusted to the courts). Zucker based his 
interpretation on a division in one of Saʿadya’s liturgical enumerations, between the first 
forty parshiyot and the remaining twenty-five,870 claiming that Saʿadya distinguished 
between commandments entrusted to the court and commandments that obligate the 
community. However, Zucker incorrectly transcribed the manuscript of the introduction 
to Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ;871 moreover, the second group of parshiyot in Saʿadya’s liturgical 
enumeration contains laws other than those enforced by the courts.872 It seems more 
                                                 
Zaqein’s azharot in Frankel, Maḥzor Shavuʿot, 669 line 136 (ךָיֶק ֵּבְד רוּבִצ י ֵּקוֻח ת  ויִשָרָפ וּמַּת). Benjamin ben 
Samuel’s enumeration seems to hint at this as well, though it is unclear because the entire text is not 
preserved; see Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 47 lines 50-51 (  ָכ י ֵּרֲה םיִשיִשְו ש ֵּמָח ןא\  ה ֵּשֳע ת  ווְצמ ךְֶר ֵּע
הָד ֵּע י ֵּטפְשִמוּ). Guttman, Beḥinat ha-Miṣvot, 23, 38; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:10, 3:205-208. 
Compare the distinction in Islamic law between individual and communal obligations (farḍ al-ʿayn and 
farḍ al-kifāya). 
869 הס 'תדחת 'תדאוחל העו'צומ םאכחאו; Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 156 lines 
22-23. 
870 Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 182 line 244 (ת וְצִמ םיִעָבְראַ םוּכְס). 
871 The fragment is ENA 2674.10, which reads:  העאמגלא םכח יפ 'תדחת 'תדאוחל העו'צומ םכח ןיתסו הסמכ
אה]יפ[. See the transcription in David Sklare, “The Religious and Legal Thought,” 2:192 lines 3-5. 
872 See Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 11; see also idem, “Miluʾim,” 386, quoting oral 
communication with Saul Lieberman. Neither Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:205-208) nor the editors 
of Saʿadya’s Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt (eds. Davidson et al., 179) agreed with Zucker’s interpretation. 
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likely, then, that Saʿadya viewed the parshiyot as laws that obligate the community as a 
whole. 
Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ may have claimed that earlier writers distinguished between 
parshiyot that contain laws entrusted to the courts and parshiyot that do not. In the 
Introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, he wrote that some writers distinguished between 
commandments that do not depend on the discretion of the judge (laysa muʿallaq bi-
naẓar al-ḥākim), and those that do. Zucker suggested that this refers to the parshiyot.873 
Ezriel Hildesheimer, the most recent editor of Halakhot Gedolot, proposed a third 
interpretation; he suggested that the term parshiyot is based on the verb f-r-sh (to 
interpret or explain), and refers not to “units” of laws but to “interpreted laws.” The 
primary evidence for this theory is a passage in the homiletical introduction to the 
enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot: 
The sages taught 65 parshiyot, which are the essence of the Torah (gufah shel 
Torah). Each and every parashah was explained by the sages of Israel.874 
Based on this passage, Hildesheimer contended that the term “parshiyot” designates 
commandments that the sages explicated, and not commandments that obligate the 
community or involve the court.875 In the end, however, no single explanation has been 
able to account for all of the laws termed parshiyot in enumerations of the 613 
commandments.876 
                                                 
873 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 11-12, 14. 
874 לארשי ימכח הושריפ השרפו השרפ לכו הרותלש הפוג תוישרפ םיששו השמח םימכח ונשו; Hildesheimer, ed., 
“Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 19 lines 32-33. 
875 Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 94n421. 
876 Compare Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:196-200. The exception may be one of Saʿadya’s 
enumerations, see there, 3:205-206, and Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 1:95. 
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The label “punishments” may also reflect thinking about the ways that laws can 
be grouped into commandment-units.877 Maimonides vociferously attacked enumerators 
who counted “punishments” as a category distinct from negative commandments; he 
described this as “confusion that requires no rebuttal.”878 One apologist suggested that 
enumerators who included “punishments” did so in lieu of listing these prohibitions 
among the negative commandments,879 but the overlap between the punishments and the 
negative commandments undercuts this explanation.880 Perla suggested that the negative 
commandments are prohibitions, and that punishments designate the court’s penal 
obligations. Such a reading suggests that some enumerators divided laws according to 
their respective performers. 881 According to Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ, the inclusion of excision 
(karet) among the punishments that make up the count of 613 serves as a reminder of the 
role that God plays in the Jewish legal system.882 
 
                                                 
877 For background, see Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 12-14 (introductory 
pagination). 
878 דר הילע 'גאתחא אל טיל'כת; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 52 (Prin. Fourteen).  
879 Ṭraub, Sefer Halakhot Gedolot, 14 (§31). Compare Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-
Rambam, ed. Chavel, 140-42 (Prin. Fourteen). 
880 As Maimonides noticed; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 52-53 (Prin. Fourteen). 
881 Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:4. Compare Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries, 72: 
“In the directory part [the law] bids, in the sanctional part it prophecies. In the remedial part … it bids other 
men than him whom it bade and prophesied to before, to fulfill such a prophecy … upon the first man in 
case of his disobedience”; and idem, An Introduction to the Principles, 302: “A law confining itself to the 
creation of an offence, and a law commanding a punishment to be administered … are two distinct laws; 
not parts … of one and the same law. The acts they command are altogether different; the persons they are 
addressed to are altogether different.” On azharah and ʿonesh, see above, n663. 
882 This is not preserved in the surviving fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s work, but Maimonides quoted it; 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 53 (Prin. Fourteen); see Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 54, 107-108. 
Note Saʿadya’s inclusion of excision among the seven methods of punishment; Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, 
eds. Davidson et al., 174 line 180. Compare Abraham Ibn Ezra’s comment to Lev. 18:29 that excision is 
preformed either by the court or God (םתירכא ינא רתסב םאו םותימתש איסהרפב "תשעה תושפנה ותרכנו"); Peirushei 
ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:59; treated in Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah,” 191. On 
this issue, see also Mubashshir ha-Levi’s discussion in Kitāb Istidrāk, ed. Zucker, 57-58. 
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Pre-Maimonidean Reflections on Creating Commandment-Units  
As mentioned in the Introduction, Saʿadya counted the commandments numerous 
times, in several liturgical poems and in his more juristic Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book of the 
Commandments), which is only partially preserved.883 (Nevertheless, he asserted that he 
did not regard enumeration itself as particularly important.884) Like others, Saʿadya 
recognized that commandment-units contain numerous laws; in one poem, he wrote: 
Many acts are found in one commandment / 
Like flaying and cutting burnt offerings.885 
Saʿadya surmised that the obligations to flay and cut a burnt offering (ʿolah; Lev. 1:6) 
constitute one commandment, not two.886 Likewise, he wrote: 
An illustration of no negative [commandment] in it / 
Upon consideration they are one commandment / 
Like “give his [wage] in the day” (Lev. 19:13), without “[his] leaving” (Deut. 
24:15) / 
This and that are one commandment.887 
Saʿadya combined Leviticus’ prohibition against withholding a day laborer’s wages until 
the day following his work with Deuteronomy’s directive to pay him before sunset; he 
chose not to count them as separate positive and negative commandments.888 
                                                 
883 See above, n61-62. 
884 See above, n60. 
885 ת ול  וע ךֶר ֵּעְב ַחוּתיִנְו ט ֵּשְפֶהְכ \ ת  ולּוֻעְפ ת  ובַר תַחאַ הָוְצמְב יוּצָמ; Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244 
lines 49-50. 
886 According to Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244n, Saʿadya hinted to this in his 
azharot; see Saʿadya, Kitāb Jāmiʿ al-Ṣalawāt, eds. Davidson et al., 161 line 49, 174 line 113. 
887 בוּשָק דָחֶא הֶזָו הֶז רֶשֲא \ בוּשָו ךְ ֵּל יִלְב ן ֵּתִת  ומ  ויְבִכ \ בוּשָח דָחֶא דוּקיִפ םֶהי ֵּתְש \ בוּשִּיְב ומָב ןי ֵּא םִא רוּיִצ; Tobi, 
“Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 247 lines 69-72 (see Prov. 3:28). In the next few lines (247-48 lines 73-
76), Saʿadya grouped another two acts as one commandment. 
888 On overlapping positive and negative commandments, see Neubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica,” 
707; Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 22-23, 86-87; Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav 
Saʿadya,” 380-81; and Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 247 lines 73-76. Compare Sklare, Samuel 
ben Ḥofni Gaon, 167-68n7, 197, 238, 285-86, 290; Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 60-73; and Hallaq, 
A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 48-56. I hope to expand on this parallel elsewhere. 
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Another effort by Saʿadya to combine various biblically-prescribed acts as 
commandment-units is mentioned in Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Arabic translation of Saʿadya’s 
introduction (reshut) to one liturgical enumeration.889 Samuel mentioned various 
divisions that Saʿadya proposed for the commandments, including: 
Section Sixteen: Commandments that depend on a group of actions (afʿāl jamāʿa) 
but comprise a single commandment. This is like the flaying and the cutting (Lev. 
1:6), and breaking the neck of the heifer (Deut. 21:1-9).890 
This section also apparently discussed the combination of rules as commandment-units. 
Sa’adya often grouped together acts as commandment-units in his enumerations.891 It is 
difficult, however, to identify any principles underlying his methodology. At the outset of 
his voluminous commentary on one of Saʿadya’s liturgical enumerations, Perla compared 
it, anachronistically, to Maimonides’ Fourteen Principles in the Introduction to Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, and considered the extent to which Saʿadya “agreed” with them. While Perla’s 
arguments are often compelling, it is hard to know which of his speculative 
reconstructions are correct.892 
As discussed in the Introduction, Samuel ben Ḥofni’s Kitāb fī al-Sharāʾiʿ (Book 
on the Commandments) placed commandments in overlapping categories; Samuel was 
                                                 
889 On the authorship of this text, see Baneth, “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” 371n33, 
citing earlier scholarship; Assaf, “Mi-Shiyarei,” 27; and Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 30. For the impact 
of this commentary on Samuel’s division of the commandments, see there, 184n43. 
890  חותינלאו טשפהלאכ ה'דהו הדחאו הוצמ יהו העאמ'ג לאעפא אהנמ הדחאולב קלעתת יתלא תוצמלא וילא םסקלאו
תולגעלא יפ ףרעלאו; Neubauer, “Miscellanea Liturgica,” 706. A parallel fragment appears in Schechter, 
Saadyana, 43. See Baneth’s attempt to reorganize this text; “Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” 
379-80nn18-19. Tobi, “Shivata Sheniyah le-Shavuʿot,” 244n, suggested that “breaking the neck of the 
heifer” (al-ʿeref fī al-ʿagalot) should read “setting the burnt offerings” (al-ʿeirekh fī al-ʿolot).  
891 For example, see the selections of Saʿadya’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ in Sklare, “The Religious and 
Legal Thought,” 2:197 lines 1-3, 2:199 lines 1-5, 2:201 lines 1-8. 
892 See Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:22-24, 1:31-33, 1:40-46. Compare Halperin, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot le-Rasag, 6-15; see Abraham Hirsch Rabinowitz, Ha-Miṣvah veha-Miqra: ʿim beiʾur Binah be-
Miṣvah (Jerusalem: ʿAtir, 1988), 29-30. 
 
248 
 
therefore less interested in classifying laws as single commandment-units.893 
Nevertheless, there are instances in which Samuel implicitly addressed the problem of 
identifying such units.894 He noted, for example, that there are two kinds (ḍarbayn) of 
prohibitions that forbid priests to touch dead bodies: the first categorically prohibits the 
High Priest from any contact with the dead, while the second prohibits regular priests 
from such contact with certain exceptions.895 Samuel apparently regarded these as two 
manifestations of one commandment; elsewhere, he referred to commandments 
regulating the conduct of the High Priest and of regular priests as two expressions of a 
single commandment.896 In situations where the Pentateuch indicates that one can choose 
one of two acts – e.g., entrance into a levirate marriage, or refusal to do so (Deut. 25:5-
10), or redeeming a firstborn donkey, or breaking its neck (Ex. 13:13, 34:20) – Samuel 
seems to have counted both of the acts as a single commandment.897 If so, this would 
have been in sharp contrast to the adamantly-held position taken, later, by Maimonides 
(this is detailed below). 
Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ explicitly addressed the problem of distinguishing between a 
commandment and its parts. In the Introduction to his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ, he noted that his 
predecessors had enumerated the commandments in different ways. He criticized some of 
                                                 
893 See above, n73. 
894 All of the following examples come from the fragments of Part Two of Samuel’s Kitāb fī al-
Sharāʾiʿ; Sklare did not translate this part of the text; see Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 176-77. 
895 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 20 lines 609-620 (Hebrew pagination); 21, lines 673-74. See 
similarly 21 lines 666-67. Maimonides counted this as two; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 259 (Neg. 166, 
168).  
896 See Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 20 lines 620-23, 22 lines 679-821 (Hebrew pagination). 
Similar examples appear elsewhere, such as the meal offerings brought by the High Priest in the morning 
and evening (Lev. 6:13) constitute one commandment, and there are ten commandments (sharāʾiʿ) related 
to the Temple and its vessels; idem, 21 lines 671-72, 25-26 lines 820-30 (Hebrew pagination). 
897 Sklare, Samuel ben Ḥofni Gaon, 34 lines 1125-31 (Hebrew pagination). 
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them for confusing commandments (which he termed uṣūl; i.e., roots or principles) with 
details (here furūʿ; i.e., branches or details).898 The distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ is 
widespread in Islamic law.899 Ḥefeṣ wrote that in order to arrive at an accurate count, this 
confusion was in need of resolution: 
With thorough scrutiny you find more than a thousand commandments (sharīʿa). 
However, those among them that exceed [the count of] 613 have the status of 
branches (furūʿ) that extend900 from the roots (uṣūl), which are 613; they are not 
[true] roots (lā li-annahā uṣūlan [sic] kal-uṣūl). For example, the components 
(fuṣūl) of making [the] Tabernacle: each one of them is a single commandment 
(sharīʿa wāḥida), from which stem branches and regulations (qawānīn). 
Similarly, the components of the sacrifices and components of other[ law]s.901 
While Ḥefeṣ highlighted the alleged errors of his predecessors, none of the 
published fragments of his Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ sets forth a methodology for distinguishing 
commandments from details. Not unlike Perla, in his study of Saʿadya, Benzion Halper, 
the first compiler of Ḥefeṣ’s work, attempted to deduce the author’s system by comparing 
the lists of commandments drawn up by Ḥefeṣ and Maimonides. Of course, this referral 
to a later scholar is anachronistic; moreover, Halper was mistaken to assume that because 
Ḥefeṣ included a commandment that Maimonides excluded on the basis of a particular 
                                                 
898 אלוצא עורפלא ]'ץעבו[ אעורפ לוצאלא 'ץעב לע'גי ןמ םהנמו; Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14. See Cohen, 
Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 284-85, 302, 438. 
899 Islamic legal theorists used the distinction between uṣūl and furūʿ to illustrate the link between 
sources of the law and its branches or applications; furūʿ can also mean substantive laws; see above, n480. 
900 Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14, read inbaṣaṭat, following a correction of a later scribe (the 
manuscript is T.-S. Ar. 18(1).22). The first scribe wrote inḍabaṭat, a less common word, which would mean 
“established” by the 613 uṣūl (on this meaning, see Dozy, Dictionnaires Arabes, 2:2; and Blau, Dictionary, 
382, s.v. طبض). I thank Marina Rustow for her help with this manuscript. 
901  עורפ תלזנמ אהתלזנמ ג"ירת ילע הדאיז וה אהנמ יתלא ןכל העירש ףלא ילע דיאז ד'גתפ אצקתסמ לא חפצת דנעו
 העירש ילע יוחתי אהנמ דחאו לכ 'דאפ ןכשמ השעמ לוצפ ךל'ד ןמ לוצאלאכ אלוצא אהנאל אל ג"ירת יה יתלא לוצאלא ןמ תטצבנא
אהע'צאומ יפ אהרכ'דנס אמכ א'דה ריג א'ציא ר'כא לוצפו ןיבארקלא לוצפ ךא'דכו ןינאוקו אעורפ אהנמ ערפתי לוקלא העסאו הדחאו; 
Zucker, “Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 14-15. Translation based on Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 
302, with changes. 
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Principle, Ḥefeṣ necessarily rejected the relevant Principle.902 Yet some of Halper’s 
conclusions are quite suggestive. As the underappreciated Ḥefeṣ certainly influenced 
Maimonides,903 it is likely that Maimonides had the earlier work in mind when shaping 
some of his Principles.  
Halper collected thirty commandments that appear in both Maimonides’ Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, and in the fragments of Ḥefeṣ’s Kitāb al-Sharāʾiʿ to which he had access, and he 
contrasted these with twenty-one commandments on Ḥefeṣ’s list that were omitted by 
Maimonides. Of the twenty-one commandments that are not on Maimonides’ list, sixteen 
are excluded on the basis of Principle Seven, four on the basis of Principle Twelve, and 
one on the basis of Principle Nine.904 Halper therefore asserted that Maimonides’ 
Principle Seven, which eliminates instantiations (see below) of a commandment from the 
enumeration even when they are explicit in the Pentateuch, was “chiefly directed” against 
Ḥefeṣ.905 
Abraham Ibn Ezra dedicated the second chapter of his Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah 
(The Foundation of Reverence and the Secret of the Torah) to the difficulties of 
                                                 
902 See Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 61-88, see below, n905. 
903 In one responsum, Maimonides ascribed what he later considered to be an error to reliance on 
Ḥefeṣ; Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:383 (§217); Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:295. For treatment of Maimonides’ 
relationship to Ḥefeṣ, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16, 247-48, 253. 
904 Ḥefeṣ counted the prohibition against using money of a prostitute or dog for the altar (Deut. 
23:18) as two commandments; Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 85, ascribed Maimonides’ 
counting them as one to his “inconsistency”; see also there, 70. On Maimonides’ view, see below, n1184. 
905 Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 86. To my mind, Halper was premature to imply that 
Ḥefeṣ thought about the problems Principle Seven poses in Maimonidean terms when he concluded that 
Ḥefeṣ followed scriptural formulations but that Maimonides was “guided by logical principles in the 
system of enumerating the commandments”; A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 87-88; see also 57-58. See 
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 247; and Baron, SRHJ2, 6:95-96. On this issue, note 
Eliezer of Metz’s statement that he did not follow the organization of the Pentateuch in arranging the 
commandments (דחא ללכב דבל דחייא דחא ןוימדב תוללכנה תווצמ לכ יכ תוארקמה רדסב אלו; Sefer Yireiʿim, 7a, 
mentioned by Twersky). 
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enumerating the commandments.906 Unlike the above authors, he argued that the search 
for an accurate enumeration is futile.907 Like Ḥefeṣ, he noted that earlier enumerators 
employed different schemes to list the commandments. And echoing Ḥefeṣ’s complaint 
about the confusion of uṣūl and furūʿ, Ibn Ezra wrote that some counted general 
principles (kelalim) and details (peraṭim) separately, but others mixed them together.908 
He added that the problem of determining which general principles consititute distinct 
commandments is compounded by the fact that an “overarching principle” (kelal 
gavohah) may impose numerous obligations.909 
Abraham Ibn Ezra offered an example that would highlight the arbitrary nature of 
enumerations. According to the rabbis, the three verses prohibiting the cooking of a kid in 
its mother’s milk (Ex. 23:19, 34:26, and Deut. 14:21) teach three separate prohibitions: 
benefiting from, eating, and cooking mixtures of milk and meat.910 Abraham Ibn Ezra 
noted that some enumerators listed this prohibition once, and others, three times.911 
                                                 
906 According to some manuscripts, this work was originally called Sefer ha-Miṣvot; M. 
Friedländer, “Ibn Ezra in England,” Transactions of the Jewish Historical Society of England 2 (1894-
1895): 48n3; and Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 179n12. 
907 “In truth, the number of commandments is endless” (תוצמה רפסמל ץק ןיא תמאה רקחמ ךרד לעו); Ibn 
Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 92 (2:4); see the treatment there, 28-29, 88.  
908 םדבל םיטרפה םעפו םדבל םיללכה םעפ םירפוסש שיו םיטרפהו םיללכה רופסיש ימ שיו; Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora 
ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 92 (2:3). 
909  השע הוצמ לכ תוללוכ םכיהלא 'ה תא םתדבעו תלמו השעת אלו השע ללוכ 'ה תוצמ לכ תא רומשל ומכ הובג ללכ שי
ירקע םהש השעמבו הפבו בלב םהש'  ֵּז וא ֶכו םהל רהשע תלמב האצי איהו השעת אל תוצמ לכ תללוכ 'ה תא האריל תלמ ; Ibn Ezra, 
Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 93 (2:6). Compare idem, Sefer ha-ʿIbur, ed. Solomon 
Zalman Ḥayim Halberstam (Lyck, 1874), 11b, where he categorized commandments as principles (ʿiqarim) 
and remembrances thereto (zekher la-hem).  
910 See Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. basar be-ḥalav, 4:694-95. 
911 הככ תוברו םושרד ונימכחו 'ימעפ שלש בתכנש דגנכ תווצמ שלשב ורפסש שיו תחא םעפ ידג לושב רפסש םהמ שי; Ibn 
Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 91-92 (2:3); see the notes for earlier positions. Ibn 
Ezra reiterated this problem throughout this chapter; see 94 (2:6), 98 (2:9), 99 (2:9), 106 (2:15). Some of 
his methodological comments are treated in Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah,” 186-
88. For a proposed parallel between Ibn Ezra’s statement and Maimonides’ Principle Seven, see Avraham 
I. Bromberg, “Haqbalot be-Rabaʿ uve-Rambam,” Sinai 55 (1963): 44. 
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* * * 
 
Creating Commandment-Units in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
Like his predecessors, Maimonides recognized the challenge of separating 
commandments from details of commandments; he declared Principle Eleven, which 
asserts that parts of a commandment are not distinct commandments, “extremely difficult 
to understand” (ʿawīṣ al-fahm jiddan).912 Maimonides’ system for distinguishing 
commandments from details has not been subject to thorough investigation.913 Jacob 
Levinger suggested that when Maimonides described certain laws in the Mishneh Torah 
as “included” in (be-khlal) others, he may have referred to the activity of grouping laws 
under larger headings.914 However, Levinger mostly focused on a few examples in the 
Mishneh Torah while examining the creation of commandment-units, though this work is 
                                                 
Though beyond the scope of this chapter, note Moses Ibn Tibbon’s statement that some made 
principles (shorashim; the same word he used to translate Maimonides’ term aṣl) into branches (porot; 
Ezek. 17:10), while others, branches into roots ( םישרושה ןמ םישועו םירחא םיטרפ תווצמה רפסמב םינומ םיבר שי
םישרש תוראפה ןמו תוראפ; Israel, “Peirush Rabbi Moshe Ibn Tibbon,” 32). Porot clearly relates to the term 
furūʿ. 
912 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 44 (Prin. Seven). See also the end of Principle Seven: 
“understand this Principle; it is the central pillar (ʿamud ha-tavekh) for our topic” ( הנא לצאלא א'דה םהפאפ
דומע הליבסב ןחנ אמ יפ ךותה ; there, 26). As Bloch and Joshua ha-Nagid noted, this could refer to the fact that 
this Principle is in the middle of the Principles or to the importance of its subject matter; Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 26n4; and Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 100; I prefer the second option. 
913 Duran (Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 6-32, introductory pagination) may have been the first to comment on 
all of the Principles. More recently, Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:17-46) penned the most systematic 
examination.  
914 See, e.g., Hilkhot Yesodei ha-Torah, 5:11: “there are other matters included in the prohibition 
against desecrating God” (םשה לוליח ללכב םירחא םירבד שי); Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit 
shel ha-Rambam, 78-80. The author of Sefer ha-Ḥinukh used the phrase “included in this commandment” 
(וז הוצמ ללכב) for a similar purpose. On the term be-khlal in the Mishneh Torah, see Shoḥetman, “Le-
Sheʾelat ha-Yaḥas,” 37n19; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 309, 310n86, noting that be-
khlal may refer to rabbinic laws that are “included” in a larger commandment-unit. 
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of secondary importance to this problem. He did not explore the relevant Principles in 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot at length, and in one instance, he failed to distinguish between laws 
excluded by Principle Seven and those excluded by Principle Eleven.915  
In his attempt to determine which of Maimonides’ Principles addressed the 
challenge of reducing Jewish law to 613 units, Ben-Menaḥem divided the Fourteen 
Principles into “exclusionary rules” and “rules of individuation.” Ben-Menaḥem further 
subdivided the “exclusionary rules” into “rules of identification” (Principles One, Two, 
and Three) and “rules of interpretation” (Principles Five, Eight, and Ten), and the “rules 
of individuation” into “analytical rules” (Principles Seven, Eleven, and Twelve) and 
“rules of individuation proper” (Principles Four, Six, Nine, Thirteen, and Fourteen). Ben-
Menaḥem claimed that the “analytical rules” and the “rules of individuation proper” were 
those that address “individuation.”916 
                                                 
915 See Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 81n39, treating Hilkhot 
Shabbat, 29:1, and Positive Commandment #145. On the apparent contradiction between these passages, 
see also Binyamin Zeʾev Benedikt, Ha-Rambam le-lo Sṭiyah min ha-Talmud (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav 
Kook, 1985), 112-16. 
916 Ben-Menaḥem, “Maimonides’ Fourteen Roots,” 17-29; see ibid, “Individuʾaṣiyah shel 
Ḥuqqim,” 103-106, for an earlier presentation; see above, n844. This analysis is helpful, but ignores the 
order of the Principles. (I cannot entirely explain the order of the Principles, but there appears to be some 
logical arrangement; see n918.) Another problem is that Ben-Menaḥem described the “rules of 
individuation proper” as “rules that stipulate how the laws are actually to be individuated.” I do not see why 
this covers Principles Four (not to count instructions that cover the entire law) and Six (to count 
overlapping positive and negative commandments as two commandments), but excludes Principle Eleven 
(not to count parts of a law). Why is Principle Six in the same category as Principle Four? How is Principle 
Eleven not a “rule of individuation proper”? On Ben-Menaḥem’s proposal, see also Friedberg, Crafting the 
613 Commandments, 52. Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 461n8, claimed that Principles Nine to 
Fourteen deal with the details of the law; and Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush Piqudei 
Yisharim, 1:69, considered Principles Seven, Ten, Eleven, and Twelve to address the question of when 
scriptural laws are grouped together under the heading of one commandment. 
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In my view, five Principles in the Introduction to Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
address the distinction between commandments and details of commandments.917 
Principle Seven asserts that the fiqh (here: instantiations) of a commandment are not to be 
counted in the enumeration; Principle Eleven asserts that parts of a commandment are not 
to be counted; Principle Twelve asserts that parts used to assemble a commandment are 
not to be counted; and, Principle Thirteen asserts that if an act is required over a number 
of days, it is only counted once. In short, Principles Seven, Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen 
deal with two types of acts that form one commandment-unit: Principle Seven addresses 
different ways a single commandment is manifest, while Principles Eleven, Twelve, and 
Thirteen focus on parts of a commandment-unit that must (or should) come together or 
appear in a series.918 Lastly, Principle Fourteen considers the extent to which the 
requirement to impose punishments (iqāmat al-ḥudūd) results in the creation of distinct 
commandments. Maimonides also addressed the creation of “commandment-units” in his 
enumeration, raising potential objections and dismissing them.919  
                                                 
917 See Blidstein, “Where Do We Stand,” 26: “the massive issue handled by Maimonides 
piecemeal in Principles 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, and in a sense, 8 as well: how to identify single norms, norms that 
are composed of many aspects or components or actions.” I understand Principle Eight to be concerned 
with linguistic matters. 
918 If Principles Seven, Eleven, Twelve, Thirteen, and Fourteen deal with creating commandment-
units, why is Principle Seven separated from the others? This relates to the larger question of whether there 
is an order to the Principles. Maimonides likely did not group Principle Seven with the other relevant 
Principles because Principle Seven deals with unique manifestations of one law, but the others treat parts of 
one law that are (usually) present simultaneously. (Compare Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 139 [Prin. Seven]; Allegri’s claims are largely compelling, but because he read 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot in translation, he occasionally asked questions that the Arabic shows are unnecessary.) 
919 E.g., “a skeptic could be skeptical and say” (לוקיו יילע ךכשי ןא ךכשמלל יגבני אנהו), and “one could 
challenge me and say” (לוקיו ינ'צרתעי ןא 'ץרתעמללו); Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 88 (Pos. 57), 
102 (Pos. 83). 
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Principles Nine and Ten, which relate to the creation of commandment-units but 
do not deal with it directly, are excluded from this analysis. Principle Nine focuses on the 
relationship between the Pentateuch and the enumeration of the commandments (see 
Chapter Five). And according to Principle Ten, a commandment’s preliminary steps 
(tauṭiʾāt) are not to be counted as separate commandments.920 Technically speaking, 
these prefatory steps are not details but preliminary actions needed for a commandment’s 
performance. An example would be the need to “take choice flour” (Lev. 24:5) in order 
to prepare the showbread. 
 
Principle Seven 
In Principle Seven, Maimonides claimed that an instantiation (fiqh) of a 
commandment is not a distinct commandment. Use of the word fiqh in this sense is 
decidedly uncommon.921 In the early Islamic period, the term fiqh referred to theology in 
general or to theological conclusions that were not the product of revelation.922 By the 
ninth century, fiqh came to refer solely to jurisprudence,923 and not only for Muslim 
writers. Judeo-Arabic writers, Maimonides among them, also used the term fiqh to denote 
law or jurisprudence. But what did Maimonides mean in the heading of Principle Seven 
                                                 
920 See Blau, Dictionary, 770, s.v. أطو. Kafiḥ and Ibn Tibbon translated this word as haqdamot 
(preliminaries [?]). 
921 First noticed, as far as I know, in Ignaz Goldziher, “Das arabische Original von Maimuni’s 
Sêfer Hammiṣewôt,” Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morganlandes 3 (1889): 81-82. See also Israel 
Friedlaender, Arabisch-deutsches Lexikon zum Sprachgebrauch des Maimonides: Ein Nachtrag zu den 
arabischen Lexicis (Frankfurt: J. Kauffmann, 1902), 88, s.v. هقف; Goldberg’s comments in Maʿaseh Nissim, 
16 (§3); and Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 78. 
922 van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft, 1:209; and A.J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed: Its Genesis 
and Historical Development (London: Frank Cass, 1965), 110-11. 
923 Baber Johansen, Contingency in a Sacred Law: Legal and Ethical Norms in the Muslim Fiqh 
(Leiden: Brill, 1999), 2-3. 
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when he wrote, “it is inappropriate to count the fiqh of a commandment”?924 In his 
Hebrew translation of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Moses Ibn Tibbon rendered fiqh al-sharīʿa (the 
fiqh of a commandment) as diqduqei ha-miṣvah (the specifics of a commandment),925 and 
in his, Kafiḥ suggested peraṭei hilkhot ha-miṣvah (the details of the laws of a 
commandment) and mishpaṭei ha-miṣvah (the rules of a commandment).926 These 
translations are not particularly helpful in understanding the term fiqh. Jon Bloomberg 
suggested that Maimonides may have used the word fiqh as a calque of the Hebrew word 
halakhah in Principle Seven.927 How, then, did he distinguish the fiqh of a commandment 
from its parts (ajzāʾ, sing., juzʾ)?928 (These parts were excluded from the enumeration by 
Principle Eleven.) 
At the outset of Principle Seven, Maimonides wrote: “Know that a single 
commandment (al-sharīʿa al-wāḥida) is an accepted proposition (qaḍīya mā musallama), 
and this premise (muqaddima) necessitates (yalzam) many commands and prohibitions 
(awāmir wa-nawāhī) that are the fiqh of a commandment.”929 This sentence is full of 
                                                 
924 העירשלא הקפ דעי ןא יגבני אל הנא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 21 (Prin. Seven). 
925 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 13 (Prin. Seven). Compare the phrase diqduqei 
nezirut (from mNaz 1:2; Hilkhot Nezirut, 1:9, 2:14, 2:22, 4:12, 6:2), which denotes distinct commandments. 
926 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21 (Prin. Seven); see also there, 2n13. Note the term 
mishpaṭei miṣvah in the Introduction to the Mishneh Torah; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 14 line 171. 
See also below, n934. 
927 “This use of fiqh would appear to be a calque, inasmuch as the Hebrew hălakhah has a twofold 
connotation, referring to Jewish law in general on the one hand, and to a specific norm of Jewish law on the 
other”; Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 8. 
928 Both Ibn Tibbon (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 24) and Kafiḥ (ed. Kafiḥ, 43; Prin. 
Eleven) translated ajzāʾ al-sharīʿa (the parts of a commandment) as ḥelqei ha-miṣvah. See below, n961, 
and Allegri’s explanation of the difference between Principles Seven and Eleven mentioned above, n918. 
929 העירשלא הקפ יפ הרי'תכ יהאונו רמאוא המקדמלא ךלת ןע םזליו המלסמ אמ 'הי'צק יה הדחאולא העירשלא; 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21 (Prin. Seven). My translation is based on Michael Schwarz, 
“‘Al-Fiqh’, A Term Borrowed from Islam used by Maimonides for a Jewish Concept in His Sefer ha-
Mitzwoth and in His Guide of the Perplexed,” in Adaptations and Innovations: Studies on the Interaction 
between Jewish and Islamic Thought and Literature from the Early Middle Ages to the Late Twentieth 
Century, eds. Y. Tzvi Langermann and Josef Stern (Paris: Peeters, 2007), 352, with some changes. 
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terms borrowed from the science of logic;930 these are not captured by the Hebrew 
translations of Ibn Tibbon or Kafiḥ.931 
                                                 
930 As far as I know, Joshua ha-Nagid was the only pre-modern reader to notice this; see Teshuvot, 
ed. Raṣhabi, 99. Schwarz’s translation shows that he was aware of the parallels, though he did not explicate 
them. Kafiḥ translated the sentence as: “One commandment is a totally complete unit, and that introduction 
obligates many commands and prohibitions in the laws (halakhot) of the commandment” ( איה תחאה הוצמה
הוצמה תוכלהב םיבר תורהזאו םיווצ המדקהה התואמ םיבייחתמו ,המלש תמייוסמ הדיחי). Both Ibn Tibbon (Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 13) and Kafiḥ (idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 21; Prin. Seven) translated 
“muqaddima” as “haqdamah” (introduction); compare above, n920. Kafiḥ’s explanation shows the 
difficultly of this translation ( ונאש םעפ לכ ונירבד חתפב ותוא םיגיצמ ונאש הוצמה לש שבוגמהו רדגומה יללכה םשה רמולכ
תמייוסמ הוצמ לע רבדל םיאב; there, 21n87). In the logical sciences, muqaddima refers to each of the first two 
parts of a syllogism. For Maimonides’ use, see Efros, “Maimonides’ Arabic Treatise on Logic,” 16 line 19 
(Hebrew pagination). Similarly, the word qaḍīya means premise or proposition. Maimonides’ use of the 
root l-z-m also hints at the logical sciences. In formal logic, the verb l-z-m means “necessitates,” as in a 
proof or deduction, and in legal contexts it means “obligates.” On Solomon ibn Ayyub’s translation of the 
verb l-z-m, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 6 (introductory pagination). On this verb in 
Avicenna’s logical writings, see Robert Wisnovsky, Avicenna’s Metaphysics in Context (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003), 217.  
Scholars have adduced further examples of the relationship of the Treatise on Logic and Sefer ha-
Miṣvot. See Halbertal, “Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rambam,” 471, 475n32; and Daniel Sinclair, “Ḥashivah 
Mishpaṭit be-Mishnatam shel ha-Rambam veha-Ramban,” in Sefer ha-Yovel Minḥah le-Ish: Qoveṣ 
Maʾamarim Mugash be-Hoqarah leha-Rav Avraham Yishayahu Dolgin be-Melot lo Shivʿim ve-Ḥameish 
Shanah, ed. Itamar Warhaftig (Jerusalem: Beit Kenesset Beit Yaʿaqov, 1991), 350. Principle Eight also 
relies on concepts from Greek logic; see also Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 24n81. Note 
Abraham Ibn Ezra’s call for the use of logic in the enumeration; Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and 
Simon, 88-91 (2:1-2; see Ben-Menaḥem, “Ha-Sod shel Yesod Mora,” 183-84; and Cohen, Opening the 
Gates of Interpretation, 302n69); and Abraham Maimonides’ censure of Daniel ha-Bavli for the latter’s 
alleged ignorance of logic treated below. 
Herbert Davidson rejected the ascription of the Treatise on Logic to Maimonides, but several 
scholars have challenged this; see his “The Authenticity of Works Attributed to Maimonides,” in Meiʾah 
Sheʿarim: Studies in Medieval Jewish Spiritual Life, in Memory of Isadore Twersky, eds. Ezra Fleischer et 
al. (Jerusalem: Magnes, 2001), 118-25; idem, Maimonides, 313-22; idem, “Ibn al-Qifṭī’s Statement 
Regarding Maimonides’ Early Study of Science,” Aleph 14, no. 1 (2014): 245-58; Ahmad Hasnawi, 
“Réflexions sur la terminologie logique de Maïmonide et son contexte farabien: Le Guide des perplexes et 
le Traité de logique,” in Maïmonide: Philosophe et Savant (1138-1204), eds. Tony Lévy and Rushdī 
Rāshid (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 69-78; Mordechai Cohen, “Dimyon ve-Higayon, Emet ve-Sheqer: 
Gishotehem shel Rambaʿ ve-Rambam le-Meṭaforah ha-Miqraʾit le-Or ha-Poʾetiqah veha-Filosofyahh ha-
ʿIvrit,” Tarbiẓ 73, no. 3 (2004): 420-21; Y. Tzvi Langermann, “Igeret shel ha-Rambam le-R. Ḥisdai: ʿEd 
Ḥadash le-Nusaḥ ve-Hagigim Nosafim ʿal Yeḥuso le-Rambam,” in Ta Shma, 2:536; and Sarah Stroumsa, 
“On Maimonides and Logic,” Aleph 14, no. 1 (2014): 259-63. See also Joseph A. Buijs, “Maimonides’ Use 
of Logic in The Guide of the Perplexed,” in Judaic Logic, ed. Andrew Schumann (Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias 
Press, 2010), 47-76. 
931 Wael Hallaq ascribed the introduction of Greek syllogisms into uṣūl al-fiqh to al-Ghazālī and 
described some of the ramifications and receptions of formal logic in Sunni uṣūl al-fiqh; see his “The 
Development of Logical Structure in Sunnī Legal Theory,” Der Islam 64 (1987): 58-65; idem, “Non-
Analogical Arguments,” 300-306; idem, “Logic, Formal Arguments and Formalization of Arguments in 
Sunnī Jurisprudence,” Arabica 37, no. 3 (1990): 315-21; and idem; A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 
137-42. This engendered a sharp response from Ibn Taymiyya; see idem, Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek 
Logicians (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), xiv-xxiv. See also Felicitas Meta Maria Opwis, Maṣlaḥah and 
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Several times in Principle Seven, Maimonides connected the word fiqh with the 
word “stipulation” (sharṭ or ishtirāṭ), for example: “Scripture completed the fiqh of the 
law of this punishment (qiṣāṣ) and provided several stipulations (ishtirāṭāt).”932 He also 
contrasted the fiqh of a commandment with its overarching principle (aṣl).933 I think that 
the best translation of the term fiqh in this and similar contexts is “instantiation,” 
“manifestation,” or “application.”934 This accounts for many appearances elsewhere in 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot and for the examples in Principle Seven of its Introduction.935 In 
addition, Maimonides used the fifth form of the root f-q-h to denote “detailing of the 
law.” For instance, in the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, he wrote, “it is not my 
intention in this treatise to detail any of the commandments (al-tafaqquh fī miṣvah min al-
                                                 
the Purpose of the Law: Islamic Discourse on Legal Change from the 4th/10th to the 8th/14th Century 
(Leiden: Brill, 2010), 90-96. Sobhi Rayan argued that while Ibn Taymiyya rejected Aristotelian syllogisms, 
he used Aristotelian logic more generally; “Ibn Taymiyya’s Criticism of the Syllogism,” Der Islam 86, no. 
1 (2001): 93-121. 
932 תאטארתשא היפ טרתשאו ץאצקלא א'דה םכח הקפ באתכלא םמת ם'ת; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 23 
(Prin. Seven). Note also the rare plural fiqhīyāt; there, 26; adduced by Blau, Dictionary, 512, s.v. تاّيهقف. 
933 אהטורש וא אההקפל אלו הוצמלא לצאל למאת ריג ןמ דעי בותכמ ד'גוי אמ לכ ןאל; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22 (Prin. Seven). 
934 Halper wrote that Principle Seven addresses “the various ramifications and hypothetical cases 
of a certain group of laws,”; A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 85. Peritz wrote that Principle Seven is 
concerned with “Rechtsverfahren” (legal procedures) or “verschieden Bestimmungen” (various regulations 
or provisions); “Das Buch der Gesetze,” 1:451n3. Schwarz, “Al-Fiqh,” 351-53, offered “detailed rules 
pertaining to the law” for fiqh. I prefer “instantiations” because it accounts for the fact that the 
commandment manifests itself differently in different circumstances. See Bloch’s comment in Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, xxviii, that the translation that Naḥmanides used consistently translated fiqh as 
diqduqim (compare above, n925), but that Ibn Tibbon chose din or mishpaṭ for fiqh and ḥukm (rule). 
935 See below. Schwarz, “Al-Fiqh,” 351-53, wrote that there are 29 appearances fiqh and its 
derivatives in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 28 with this usage. A search on the Friedberg Judeo-Arabic Project returns 
over 50 appearances of the words (al-)fiqh and (al-)tafaqquh. Among Muslim jurists, tafaqquh denoted 
studying or applying oneself to the study of law; Makdisi, The Rise of Colleges, 99-100, 103, 114, 172-73. 
Jonathan Owens’ definition of a technical term is useful here: “When a term is consistently used to 
represent a constant extensional class or a fixed process it can be taken as a technical term. Very often such 
terms are represented as a derivational set”; Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, 11. See also Versteegh, 
Arabic Grammar, 1-2. 
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miṣvot); rather, solely to count them.”936 In the course of identifying the location of the 
primary talmudic discussion of each law, he often mentioned the fiqh or aḥkām (rules) of 
a commandment. At times, he seems to have chosen the word fiqh because of the broad 
nature of the commandment in question. However, I cannot explain every case.937 
In Maimonides’ other writings, the word fiqh can refer either to jurisprudence in 
general or to the details or instantiations of a law. Michael Schwarz showed that in the 
Guide of the Perplexed, fiqh usually means jurisprudence but can occasionally mean 
specific rules.938 In the Treatise on Resurrection, Maimonides described the Mishneh 
Torah as “compilations of the law (tawālīf fiqh al-sharīʿa) and exposition of its statutes 
(aḥkāmuhā);”939 he elsewhere categorized the Mishnah as a “book of law” (kitāb fiqh).940 
In one responsum, he distinguished between the fiqh and the uṣūl (roots) of a law.941 
Abraham Maimonides frequently said that the fiqh of a given subject is detailed in a 
                                                 
936 טקפ אהדדע לב תוצמלא ןמ הוצמ יפ הקפתלא הלאקמלא ה'דה יפ י'צרג סילו; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 6 (introduction). See Bloomberg, “Arabic Legal Terms in Maimonides,” 8-9; Blau, Dictionary, 
512, s.v. هقف; and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 266n88, 469. Compare the formulation in one 
letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, that the intent of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is not to discuss the fiqh of the commandments 
(sharāʾiʿ), only the basic contours thereof ( באתכלא ךל'ד 'ץרג סיל אהאנעמ הפרעמ לב ]עיאר[שלא ךלת הקפ רכ'ד [טקפ] ); 
Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:378. On this line in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see also Abraham Maimonides’ 
comments in MS. Hunt. 185, 213a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 106-107 (§13). 
937 For example, “din shor” (“the law of oxen”) is one commandment and the “fiqh of this law” 
(fiqh hādhā din) appear in the third chapter of Bava Qamma (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 174; 
Pos. 337). See the description of the commandment to redeem a Jewish slavegirl, which contains “rules and 
stipulations, and there are many fiqh therein” ( אהל הידפלא ה'דהו רי'תכ הקפ אהיפו טורשו םאכחא ; ibid, 173). 
938 See Schwarz, “Al-fiqh,” 351. 
939 אהמאכחא ןייבתו העירשלא הקפ יפ ףילאותלא; Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 1:319 lines 21-22. 
Translation based on David Hartman, Crisis and Leadership: Epistles of Maimonides, trans. Abraham S. 
Halkin (Philadelphia: JPS, 1985), 211. Some manuscripts have the singular taʾalīf. On this line, see 
Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 45, 257. 
940 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:122 (mMen 4:1). See Twersky, Introduction to 
the Code of Maimonides, 168n203, 235-36. 
941 םאכחאלא לוצא ילע הקפ וה אמנא הלכ ךל'דו; Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 1:237 (§129). 
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particular section of the Mishneh Torah.942 Tanḥum ben Joseph ha-Yerushalmi (d. 1291), 
a supporter of Maimonides who wrote al-Murshid al-Kāfī (The Sufficient Guide), a 
Judeo-Arabic dictionary of difficult words in the Mishneh Torah, occasionally used the 
word fiqh in ways that are found in Principle Seven.943 
Maimonides’ use of the word fiqh is all the more striking when compared with the 
use of the word furūʿ (branches) and its Hebrew synonyms by others who reflected on the 
enumeration of the commandments. Maimonides did use the word furūʿ in Principle Two, 
but there it describes rabbinic law, not the (biblical) instantiations considered in 
Principles Seven, or the parts of commandments discussed in other Principles.944 
 
Collecting Fiqh al-Miṣvah into Commandment-Units 
The primary goal of Principle Seven, like the other Principles of Maimonides’ 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot treated in this chapter, is to group several laws into one commandment-
unit. According to Maimonides, the author of the count in the Halakhot Gedolot was 
aware of the need to do this and therefore listed parshiyot that collected vows, oaths, and 
inheritance laws. But, in Maimonides’ opinion, this earlier enumerator had failed to fully 
grasp this problem, listing many laws as individual commandments solely because they 
                                                 
942 See Abraham Maimonides, Peirush Rabbeinu Avraham, ed. Wiesenberg, 345 (see also 341); 
idem, Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 123, 131; on the word fiqh in this work, see there, 51. See also idem, 
Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 68, 97, 132. 
943 See Tanḥum ben Joseph ha-Yerushalmi, Al-Murshid al-Kāfī: Milono shel Tanḥum ha-
Yerushalmi le-Mishneh Torah le-Rambam, ed. Hadassa Shy (Jerusalem: ha-Aqademyah ha-Leʾumit ha-
Yisraelit le-Madaʿim, 2005), 2, 6. The fifteenth-century Qaraite Samuel ben Moses al-Maghrebī also used 
fiqh this way in his Kitāb al-Murshid; see Joshua Blau, Ha-Sifrut ha-ʿArvit ha-Yehudit: Peraqim Nivḥarim 
(Jerusalem: Magnes, 1980), 266n94. 
944 On the term furūʿ in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the Commentary on the Mishnah, see above, n632. On 
the root f-q-h in the latter work, see above, nn415, 569-570. As far as I can tell, this root invariably denotes 
laws of biblical status in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, but can refer to laws of rabbinic status in the Commentary. 
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are mentioned in the Pentateuch.945 According to Maimonides, the enumeration of the 
commandments should only list the “principle” or “base” commandment (aṣl al-miṣvah), 
and not “its instantiations or stipulations” (fiqhihā ʾaw shurūtihā), even if these are 
explicitly set forth in the Pentateuch.946 
Determining the aṣl al-miṣvah was not a simple task, however, and in Principle 
Seven, Maimonides did not offer a clear way to identify it. Most of Principle Seven 
consists of criticism of his predecessors, and of examples. Four of the five examples are 
laws that are collected as one commandment, though they vary considerably in 
application. For example: the permissibility of entering a levirate marriage depends on 
the widow’s relationships to the family of her deceased husband; the nature of a 
particular sin-offering varies according to the wealth of the sinner (Lev. 5:6-11); and the 
personal status of an adulteress determines her punishment.947 
In his fifth example, Maimonides stated that the rules pertaining to accidental 
homicide comprise one commandment: the “law” (din) of unintentional homicide.948 He 
used the term fiqh here to refer to the ways that unintentional homicide may occur. Even 
though these details are set forth in the Pentateuch (Num. 35:16-23), they are not distinct 
commandments. However, some laws that Maimonides called fiqh are better rendered 
“details” or “provisions”; one example is the requirement that the unintentional killer flee 
                                                 
945  והו הדדע הל םדקת דק אמ תוישרפלא ךלת יפ דע ךל'דלו הל לצחת אלו לאמכלא ילע ינעמלא א'דה הל ץ'כלתי םל הנכל
רעשי אל; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven). See above, n867. 
946  וא הוצמלא ךלת הקפ ןייב באתכלא ןוכב סיל ןאל הדדע יגבני אל הרותלא ץנ ןאכ א'דא א'ציא הוצמלא הקפ ןאפ
תשאלאלכ ןחנ דענ אהיפ יתלא תאטאר דקו הוצמב הייהקפ ה'צרפ לכ וא טרש בותכמ ד'גוי אמ לכ ןאל רי'תכ א'דה יפ טלג  ריג ןמ דעי
אההקפל אלו הוצמלא לצאל למאת אהטורש וא ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22 (Prin. Seven). 
947 I.e., whether she is the daughter of a priest, a betrothed girl between the age of twelve and 
twelve and a half (naʿarah ha-meʾurasah), or lacks either of these statuses; see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. 
eshet ish, 2:291.  
948 הגגשב שפנ הכמ ןיד והפ הדודעמלא הוצמלא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 24 (Prin. Seven). 
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to a city of refuge (Num. 35:15). Maimonides was clearly aware that this case differs 
from the others in Principle Seven, for he wrote only that examples one to four are “of the 
same type” (wa-min hādhā al-qabīl), but did not use this phrase to introduce the fifth 
example. Maimonides added that the fact that the Pentateuch calls these rules mishpaṭim 
(ordinances; Num. 35:24), and not miṣvot, is further evidence that they are not distinct 
commandments.949 
From the examples in Principle Seven, it seems that Maimonides primarily looked 
for conceptual connections when searching for the aṣl al-miṣvah, which he occasionally 
called “the enumerated commandment” (al-miṣvah al-maʿdūda) or just the “miṣvah.” In 
the enumeration itself, he identified different types of evidence to distinguish between the 
fiqh and the enumerated commandment. According to Maimonides, the fact that the 
Mishnah (mBek 1:7) uses the word miṣvah to describe both levirate marriage and the 
levir’s release of the widow (ḥaliṣah) shows that these are distinct commandments.950 
And although qiyās (here: analogy or logic) dictates that redeeming a firstborn calf or 
breaking its neck should be treated as fiqh of a commandment, the same Mishnah terms 
each of these acts a miṣvah, which indicates that they are two commandments.951 Albert 
Friedberg showed that Maimonides was inconsistent in citing the phrase “commandment-
                                                 
949 Note the various words that Maimonides used to classify these commandments in the 
enumeration. He referred to the components of levirate marriage, variable sin offerings, and unintentional 
homicide as aḥkām (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 95 [Pos. 72], 169 [317], 171 [Pos. 226], 319 [Neg. 295]), 
used the root f-q-h to describe vows and sacrifices for unintentional sins (the other example in this 
Principle; 93 [Pos. 70], 110 [Pos. 95]), classified the statuses of an adulteress as tafṣīl (detail or component, 
see below; 23 [Prin. Seven], 336 [Neg. 347]), and called the inheritance laws “dinei naḥalot” (177 [Pos. 
248]). Note the same phrase in the Short Enumeration in the Mishneh Torah; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. 
Cohen et al., 34 line 317. 
950 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 102 (Pos. 82), 168-69 (Pos. 216-17). 
951 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 102 (Pos. 82), and above, n897. 
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x” (miṣvat-x) as evidence for a distinct commandment and that there are many examples 
in rabbinic literature that Maimonides ignored.952 Unstated evidence and conceptual 
factors appear to have led Maimonides to rely only selectively on this phrase. 
In Principle Seven, Maimonides also used the root f-ṣ-l (to divide or separate) and 
the verbal noun tafṣīl (making divisions or dividing) to denote part of a commandment-
unit.953 In one instance, he associated the tafṣīl of a commandment with its “stipulations,” 
(ishtirāṭ),954 and in four places in the enumeration, he used this root in relationship to 
punishments imposed for similar acts.955 In Principle Nine, Maimonides employed this 
root to tease apart individual prohibitions that are part of overarching negative 
commandments (lav shebe-khlalot).956 Maimonides also used the word tafṣīl to denote a 
component of the Temple, similar to Ḥefeṣ’s description of the Tabernacle.957 
Another kind of evidence appears in Maimonides’ discussion of pesaḥ sheini (the 
second paschal sacrifice), an arrangement which makes it possible for those unable to 
                                                 
952 Above, n854. One problematic example (cited by Friedberg) is mSuk 4:3, which describes 
taking the willow-branch as a miṣvah, but Maimonides, following the Talmud (bSuk 44a), called this a 
halakhah le-Moshe mi-Sinai, both in the Commentary on the Mishnah (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 
2:182) and Hilkhot Lulav, 7:20-21. Note Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108 (Pos. 93), where Maimonides 
cited a passage from the Sifra (Parashat Meṣoraʿ, §2:6, ed. Weiss, 71b) that designated three instructions 
to shave a miṣvah. Maimonides counted two of these (Pos. 93 and 111), but the third is a temporary 
commandment excluded from the enumeration by Principle Three.  
Modern readers of the Mishneh Torah have argued that Maimonides used the term miṣvah in that 
work differently than he did in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. See Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 173-206, 
271-326, and the literature cited there. See also Michael Chernick, “Ha-Hevdel bein Miṣvah ve-Halakhah 
be-Torato shel ha-Rambam,” CCAR Journal (Special issue, 1997) 113-17. 
953 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23, 25 (Prin. Seven). 
954 תאטארתשא אהנאל אהדע יגבני אלפ רוהט וא אמט אהב ןוכי יתלא אישאלא ליצפת אמא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 25 (Prin. Seven). 
955 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 186 (Neg. 9), 208 (Neg. 52), 219 (Neg. 73), 336 (Neg. 
347). 
956 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33, 37 (Prin. Nine). 
957 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 70 (Pos. 21); see also there, 99 (Pos. 77). For Ḥefeṣ’s 
use, see above, n901; compare above, n896. 
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bring the paschal sacrifice in its time to do so one month later. According to Maimonides, 
one could have thought that this second occasion for a paschal sacrifice is a fiqh of the 
commandment to bring the paschal sacrifice at the first opportunity. He claimed that this 
question is at issue in a talmudic debate (bPes 93a) about the number of punishments 
incurred for failing to offer the paschal sacrifice. Maimonides cited the view of R. Judah 
the Prince, who had claimed that one who fails to bring the paschal sacrifice at either 
time incurs two punishments because pesaḥ sheini is an “independent festival” (regel be-
fnei ʿaṣmo). This shows, in Maimonides’ view, that the second paschal sacrifice does not 
constitute a fiqh but is a distinct commandment.958 
Maimonides also struggled to determine when acts in a series comprise one 
commandment-unit. Two examples of this problem appear in Sefer ha-Miṣvot: the acts 
that mark the end of one’s status as a nazirite (Num. 6:13-21), namely sacrifices and 
shaving, and these same acts when used to purify one afflicted by ṣaraʿat (Lev. 14:9-10). 
He wrote that the acts marking the end of one’s status as a nazirite are fiqh of a single 
commandment because both are required to permit the former nazirite to drink wine.959 
But in the case of one afflicted by ṣaraʿat, the acts of shaving and of sacrifice have 
different goals (ghāya). After bringing the sacrifices, this individual is in an intermediate 
state of purification (known as meḥusar kaparah; see, e.g., bNaz 45a); he is only 
completely pure after shaving.960 Therefore, argued Maimonides, the acts of shaving and 
                                                 
958 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 88 (Pos. 57); see below, n1001. 
959 Maimonides described these acts as the fiqh of this miṣvah twice in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and one 
time used the fifth form verb f-q-h to describe them; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 108-109 (Pos. 93), 117 
(Pos. 111). Note the careful use of the terms fiqh and juzʾ (part) there, 117 (Pos. 111); on the latter term, see 
below.  
960 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 116-17 (Pos. 111). 
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of sacrifice comprise a single commandment for the former nazirite, but two 
commandments for one who had been afflicted by ṣaraʿat. 
 
Principles Eleven and Twelve 
In Principles Eleven and Twelve, Maimonides argued that “parts” of a 
commandment form a single commandment-unit. In both Principles, he used the same 
Arabic word for “part” (juzʾ, pl., ajzāʾ). Indeed, the terminological similarity suggests 
that Maimonides could have combined Principles Eleven and Twelve.961 While these 
Principles are very similar, they differ in that Principle Eleven groups different objects or 
acts and Principle Twelve is concerned with different components that comprise a larger, 
manufactured object. 
Principle Eleven states that parts of a commandment-unit can be combined in two 
ways. The first requires the presence of a number of objects or acts. In the case of the 
commandment to take the four species (Lev. 23:20), several objects must come together. 
In order to set apart the individual afflicted by ṣaraʿat (ʿamāzat al-meṣoraʿ; Lev. 13-14), 
a series of actions must be performed. Maimonides wrote that the latter case consists of 
six “characteristics” (ṣifāt); each act (fiʿl) cannot possibly be a distinct commandment 
(miṣvah be-fnei ʿaṣmah). Using words from the root j-m-ʿ (to combine) to describe the 
                                                 
961 Note Kafiḥ’s recognition of this and his decision to use the Hebrew words ḥeileq in Principle 
Eleven and peraṭ in Principle Twelve; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45n84. 
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relationship of the parts, he wrote that the desired outcome cannot be attained (al-ghāya 
al-maṭluba lam tuḥaṣṣal) with only one “part.”962 
Maimonides claimed that the second way that parts of a commandment-unit can 
be combined is “extremely difficult to understand.”963 The difficulty arises when the 
absence of one of the needed components does not inhibit fulfillment of the 
commandment (einan meʿaqvin zeh et zeh). He cited the blue (tekheilet) and white fringes 
of a four-cornered garment (Num. 15:38) to illustrate the complexity of this problem. 
Lest “one imagine” (yasbiq lil-khāṭir)964 that the two colors refer to two commandments, 
Maimonides cited a halakhic midrash:  
Perhaps they are two commandments (miṣvot), the commandment of blue and the 
commandment of white? Therefore it says “it will be for you as fringes” (Num. 
15:39); “it” is one commandment and not two commandments.965 
Maimonides drew a general rule from this midrash:  
This clarifies for you that even if the absence of the parts of a commandment does 
not inhibit its fulfillment, [the parts] may nevertheless constitute one 
commandment (miṣvah aḥat) if they are one concept (or, meaning; al-maʿnā 
wāḥid). Since the purpose (qaṣd) of the fringes is “to remember [all of the 
commandments]” (Num. 15:40), and all of the prescribed matter (al-shayʾ al-
mūjab) is to remember, it is counted as one commandment. [Consequently,] for 
the enumeration of the commandments we ignore their [i.e., the rabbis’] 
statements about parts of a commandment whose absence inhibit the fulfillment 
                                                 
962 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 43-44 (Prin. Eleven); see also 117-18 (Pos. 112), 144-
45 (Pos. 169). 
963 See above, n912. 
964 This phrase is exclusively a pejorative; Blau, Dictionary, 286, s.v. قبس. 
965 תוצמ יתש ןניאו איה תחא הוצמ תיציצל םכל היהו רמול דומלת ןבל תוצמו תלכת תוצמ תוצמ יתש ןהש לוכי; he 
cited this midrash here as the Mekihlta but elsewhere as the Sifrei (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 [Prin. 
Eleven], 66 [Pos. 14]). Naḥmanides cited this as the Mekhilta. Heller noted that this midrash is known 
today as Sifrei Zuta; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 26n10; and Sifrei Zuṭa, ed. Zeʾev 
Joskowicz (Lodz, 1929), 2:367. See Louis Finkelstein, “Maimonides and the Tannaitic Midrashim,” JQR 
25, no. 4 (1935): 475-76, 477n15; and Jacob Dienstag, “The Relationship of Maimonides to his 
Predecessors: Part I, Midrashic Literature,” Jewish Law Annual 1 (1978): 57-58. 
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of other parts. Rather, [we consider] only the concept: Is it one concept or many 
concepts?966 
Maimonides here identified an additional way to bring acts into the framework of a single 
commandment-unit. Apart from the relationship of the acts, the enumeration may depend 
on the meaning or goal of the commandment, as in the case of fringes, whose goal – 
remembrance – is stated in the Pentateuch. It is unclear how Maimonides would have 
identified the maʿnā (concept or meaning) of the vast majority of commandments whose 
intentions are not specified. His use of the term maʿnā may resemble its use in some 
kalām texts.967 
Many readers of Sefer ha-Miṣvot have noticed that Maimonides’ approach to the 
(single) commandment of fringes seems to be in tension with his enumeration of the head 
and arm phylacteries as two distinct commandments.968 The Talmud (bMen 44a) rejects 
                                                 
966  דצקלא ןאל דחאו ינעמלא ןאכ א'דא תחא הוצמ ןוכת דק הז תא הז ןיבכעמ ןניא יתלא אז'גאלא ולו ןא ךל ןאב דקפ
גפ ורכזת ןעמל תיציצלאב'ישלא ֿהלמ גומלא'דלל ב'יקבי םלפ דעני תחא הוצמ רכ דא'םהלוקל תוצמלא דדע יפ תפתלנ ןא א  ןניאו ןיבכעמ
לה טקפ ינעמלל לב ןיבכעמ תכ ינאעמ וא דחאו ינעמ וה'הרי ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Prin. 
Eleven). Apparently based on this discussion, Maimonides added a similar passage to the Commentary on 
the Mishnah, writing: “the commandment of fringes includes two precepts” (miṣvat ṣiṣit mushtamil ʿala 
farīḍatayn; Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:121n7 [mMen 4:1]; note that miṣvah and farīḍ are often 
synonyms in Judeo-Arabic. Here the term miṣvah denotes one of the 613 commandments. For some reason, 
Joshua ha-Nagid was unaware that this was a correction to the Commentary on the Mishnah; see Teshuvot, 
ed. Raṣhabi, 95. See also Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16n21; and Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 28-31 [Prin. Eight].) Maimonides formulated this somewhat differently in Hilkhot Ṣiṣit, 1:4: 
ת ול ןיאש ירה דציכ תלכתה תא בכעמ וניא ןבלהו ןבלה תא בכעמ וניא תלכתהו קספנו תלכתו ןבל השע םא ןכו ודבל ןבל השוע תלכ
רשכ ודבל תלכתה ראשנו ףנכה דע טעמתנו ןבלה. See Fixler, “Ha-Biṭuy ‘Ḥakhamim/Ḥasidim Rishonim’,” 60-61. 
967 On the term maʿnā in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Chapter Five, esp. nn1108-1115. In the enumeration 
of the commandments, I think that it is unlikely that Maimonides had in mind the medieval project of 
identifying reasons for the commandments. In some works on Islamic legal theory, the term maʿnā is 
interchangeable with ʿilla (ratio legis), the basis for juridical qiyās. See Zysow, The Economy of Certainty, 
160n3, 193; Shehaby, “ʿIlla and Qiyās in Early Islamic Legal Theory,” 27-46; and Hallaq, A History of 
Islamic Legal Theories, 23. On early use of this term, see Versteegh, Arabic Grammar, 96-99. See also 
Richard Frank, “Al-Maʿnà: Some Reflections on the Technical Meanings of the Term in the Kalâm and its 
Use in the Physics of Muʿammar,” JAOS 87, no. 3 (1967): 250-52. 
968 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 65-66 (Pos. 12-13). See Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 129-30 (Prin. Eleven); Isaac ben Sheshet, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot ha-Rivash 
(Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1993), 1:145-46 (§137); Duran, Teshuvot ha-Tashbeṣ, 3:146-47 
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the position that one should avoid wearing only one phylactery,969 asking: “Should one 
who lacks two commandments (miṣvot) not perform one?”970 Based on the Talmud’s use 
of the word miṣvah, Maimonides saw in this passage evidence (dalīl) that these are two 
commandments.971 
One exception to Maimonides’ understanding of rabbinic use of the term miṣvah 
is the biblical requirement to count the days from Passover to Pentecost (Lev. 23:15). 
While the Talmud (bMen 66a and parallels) says, “it is a commandment (miṣvah) to 
count the days and a commandment to count the weeks,”972 Maimonides claimed that the 
counting of days and the counting of weeks are two parts (ajzāʾ) of a single 
commandment. Reading the rabbinic phrase, he wrote, “if one says ‘you must (yalzam) 
do such-and-such,’ this statement does not mean that the act (al-fiʿl) must be an 
independent commandment.”973 He further argued that use of a lone blessing indicates 
that the counting of days and of weeks constitutes a single commandment.974 
                                                 
(§137); Jacob ben Joseph Reisher, Shevut Yaʿaqov (Metz, 1789), 3:2a (§3:4); and Daniel ha-Bavli’s claims, 
treated below. See also Faur, ʿIyunim ba-Mishneh Torah, 142-43. 
969 Maimonides originally accepted this position; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:121n7 
(mMen 4:1); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 65-66n60. Compare Abraham Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Maspiq, ed. Dana, 261-62. 
970 דיבעל אל אדח תוצמ יתש היל תילד ןאמ; this version differs from some manuscripts. 
971 See above, n952. As mentioned, he did not cite this term consistently; in two places the 
Mekhilta de-Rabbi Ishmael uses the phrase miṣvat tefillin (the commandment of phylacteries) to describe 
both phylacteries; see Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 67 line 13 (masekhta de-fasḥa 
§17), 74 line 8 (masekhta de-fasḥa §18). 
972 .יעובש ינממל הוצמו ימוי ינממל הוצמ 
973 המצע ינפב הוצמ לעפלא ךל'ד ןא לוקלא א'דה ןמ םזלי סילפ אד'כו אד'כ לעפי ןא םזלי תלק א'דא; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 142 (Pos. 161). 
974 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 142 (Pos. 161). See Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 61 
(Neg. §53). Note that the prohibitions against shaving the corners of a man’s face and beard contain 
numerous parts (ajzāʾ; the four corners of a face and the five prohibited parts of a beard); Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 202-203 (Neg. 43-44). 
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Principle Twelve considers material parts used to manufacture (ajzāʾ ṣināʿa) a 
single object.975 Maimonides explained that occasionally: 
It is known that a particular act is legislated for us, then the scriptural (or, explicit; 
naṣṣ) text confirms the explanation of how to perform that act and explains the 
term (ism, lit., noun) which it had mentioned and states what it encompasses.976 
But what, for Maimonides, constitutes an ism (which I have translated as “term”)?977 This 
word appears two more times in Principle Twelve, where it refers to the commandment-
unit of offering a meal offering (Lev. 2; Maimonides also called this “torat ha-
minḥah”).978 Though the word “ism” in Sefer ha-Miṣvot frequently means “name,” it 
sometimes appears to have a more technical meaning. For example, Maimonides twice 
stated that the goal of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is only to “explain the ism” (sharḥ al-ism) of the 
commandments.979  
Maimonides’ Principle Twelve frames the vessels and other objects in the Temple 
as one commandment-unit; the collection of the parts is termed (yatasammā; from the 
same root as ism) the Temple (miqdash).980 Each sacrifice is also a single procedure, 
                                                 
975 הדארפנא ילע ז'ג לכ אהלמעב רומאמ אמ ֿהענצ אז'גא דעת ןא יגבני אל הנא רשע ינא'תלא לצאלא; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Prin. Twelve). 
976  רכ'ד י'דלא םסאלא חרשיו למעלא ךל'ד היפיכ ןייבת יפ ץנלא ד'כאי ם'ת למעאלא ןמ אמ למעב ערשנ דק אנא םולעמ
למתשי אמ ילע לוקיו; this is Bloch’s text, which I have followed for ease of translation; see Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 47 (Prin. Twelve); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45n24. 
977 Following Israel Efros’ translation of the Treatise on Logic; “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 
47 (English pagination). On the range of meanings of this word, see Almog Kasher, “The Term Ism in 
Medieval Arabic Grammatical Tradition: A Hyponym of Itself,” JSS 54, no. 2 (2009): 459-74. 
978 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 48 (Prin. Thirteen). 
979 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 7 (introduction), 55 (supplemental introduction). On 
this phrase, see Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, Mishneh Torah ʿim Peirush Yad Peshuṭah: Zemanim 1 
(Maʿaliyot: Maʿaleh Adumim, 2007), 687 (intro. to Hilkhot Shabbat, chap. 27). Compare the statement in 
his letter to Samuel ben ʿEli, cited above, n936. See below, n1107. 
980 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45-46 (Prin. Twelve), 69 (Pos. 20). See also 
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 168-69 (Neg. 33). 
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involving numerous steps.981 By the same token, the separation of each of the tithes and 
their transferences constitute single commandments.982 
 
Principle Thirteen 
Maimonides’ Principle Thirteen is “the straightforward rule” (al-qānūn al-
mustaqīm), according to which acts that repeat over time, whether over the course of a 
year, or continuously (muttaṣila), constitute a single commandment-unit. For example, 
the tamid sacrifice offered each morning and night (Num. 28:3-8) is counted once, as are 
sacrifices of new months (Num. 28:11-15). In language reminiscent of Principle Eleven, 
Maimonides claimed that the count depends on “al-maʿnā al-maʾamūr” (“the 
commanded concept”). Maimonides further asserted that this Principle should be 
obvious, except for the “enormous and repulsive mistake” (ghalṭa ʿaẓīma wa-shanīʿa) 
made by earlier enumerators who counted all of the additional sacrifices of festivals 
(mussafin) once, rather than counting the sacrifices of each holiday independently.983 
How does one discern and identify cases that have one, as opposed to two, 
“concepts”? Maimonides’ division between commandments and parts, while far from 
                                                 
981 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 46-47 (Prin. Twelve). Maimonides stated that general 
requirements for all sacrifices are exceptions and are counted as distinct commandments (Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 48). Note that in one instance, he described commandment-units of this type as a “ritual” (rutba; 
see Blau, Dictionary, 238, s.v. ةبتر). Kafiḥ noticed that the word ṣināʿa impacted the title of the relevant 
section in the Mishneh Torah (i.e., Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 46n90. This 
makes sense in light of Maimonides’ emphasis of the importance of Principle Twelve for the enumeration 
of sacrifices.  
982 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 47 (Prin. Twelve). See Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 134-37 (Prin. Twelve); and Isaac de Leon’s suggestion that Maimonides 
changed his mind about some of the applications of this argument (Megillat Esther, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Hellman, 190; Prin. Twelve). 
983 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 48-49 (Prin. Thirteen). 
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capricious, is certainly subject to debate.984 Noting some arbitrariness in the applications 
of Principle Thirteen, Avraham Feintuch observed that Maimonides counted the 
additional sacrifices of the seven days of Passover as a single commandment, while he 
regarded the injunction to rest on the first and seventh days of Passover as separate 
commandments.985 
 
Principle Fourteen 
In Principle Fourteen, Maimonides turned to the question of whether or not 
punishments constitute distinct commandments. In his view, his predecessors had 
inconsistently counted punishments as distinct commandments.986 By contrast, 
Maimonides argued that the requirement to enact each type of punishment constitutes a 
distinct commandment, but that the same punishment meted out for different sins only 
constitutes a single commandment. As evidence, he cited the rabbinic designation of each 
of the four types of capital punishment as “commandment-x” (miṣvat-x), and analogized 
from these designations to the other types of punishment (e.g., lashes and each sacrifice 
offered to atone for a sin). If the punishment for each sin was counted as a distinct 
commandment, he argued, the number of positive commandments would exceed four 
hundred!987 Maimonides does not seem to have considered the other extreme, that 
                                                 
984 See, e.g., below, n1092. 
985 Avraham Feintuch, “Minyan ha-Miṣvot shel ha-Rambam u-Qedushat ha-Moʿadim,” Sinai 116 
(1995): 218-19. Regarding Principle Thirteen, Friedberg wrote: “we see here that the individuating criteria 
are not firmly set and can vary almost whimsically” (Crafting the 613 Commandments, 58; see also 78-80, 
88-90). 
986 See above, n878. 
987 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 51-52 (Prin. Fourteen); on this number, see there, n33. 
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imposition of all of the punishments might constitute a single commandment;988 it may be 
that the rabbinic phrase miṣvat-x precluded this option. 
 
The Root t-b-ʿ to Describe a Component of a Commandment-Unit 
In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, words derived from the root t-b-ʿ (to follow or be subordinate) 
describe a subordinate element of a commandment-unit. Maimonides used this root to 
categorize the requirement to eat bitter herbs with the paschal sacrifice. It is not clear 
which Principle – if any – relates to this situation; perhaps the closest analogue is 
Principle Eleven, which stipulates that parts of a commandment are not counted 
separately. Maimonides, however, did not depict bitter herbs as “part” of the 
commandment to eat the paschal sacrifice, but as an auxiliary to it. The root t-b-ʿ does not 
appear frequently in Sefer ha-Miṣvot to describe the relationship of two laws, so it is hard 
to clarify how Maimonides used this term. In Principle Four, which stipulates that 
commands (awāmir) that include (taʿumm) all of the commandments (sharāʿiʾ) are not 
counted, Maimonides cited “you shall be a holy people to Me” (Ex. 22:30) and referred to 
the Mekhilta’s comment: “When God establishes (meḥadesh) a commandment for Israel, 
He adds sanctity to them.”989 From Maimonides’ perspective, this broad understanding of 
“you shall be holy” indicates that this phrase does not constitute an independent 
commandment, but that Ex. 22:30 is “subordinate (tābiʿ) to the commandment that is 
                                                 
988 This is Naḥmanides’ view; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 142 (Prin. Fourteen). 
989 The version in Sefer ha-Miṣvot reads: השודק ןהל ףיסומ אוה לארשיל הוצמ שדחמ ה"בקהשכ; preserved 
with slight variants in Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 320 lines 11-12. 
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instructed.”990 (In at least two places in the Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides 
stated that some rituals are appurtenances of others.991) 
In one place, the Pentateuch (Num. 9:11) instructs that the paschal sacrifice be 
eaten with unleavened bread and bitter herbs, yet elsewhere (Ex. 12:18) it mentions the 
requirement to eat unleavened bread independently.992 Maimonides cited this latter verse 
as the source for an independent commandment to eat unleavened bread.993 In his view, 
the consumption of bitter herbs constitutes a “subordinate” (tābiʿ) act, or an 
“appurtenance”994 (tābiʿa) of the paschal sacrifice; it is thus part of the commandment-
unit to consume the paschal sacrifice. Citing a Mekhilta passage stating that neither 
unleavened bread nor bitter herbs are considered a “miṣvah” independent of the paschal 
sacrifice,995 and a talmudic statement (bPes 120a) describing the consumption of bitter 
herbs on Passover as rabbinically ordained (de-rabbanan) in post-Temple times (be-
zeman ha-zeh), Maimonides claimed that the requirement to consume bitter herbs is 
secondary to the paschal sacrifice.996 
 
                                                 
990 אהיב רומאמלא הוצמלל עבאת; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 18-19 (Prin. Four). Note 
throughout Principle Four the words that Maimonides used to avoid the word miṣvah. 
991 One of which may have ramifications for the enumeration; see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim 
Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:97 (intro. to mMen), 5:109 (mMen 2:3); and compare idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 82 (Pos. 46). 
992 The rabbinic reading is a decontextualized interpretation of this verse: “In the first of the 
month, from the fourteenth of the month at evening, you shall eat unleavened bread until the twenty-first of 
the month, at evening.” 
993 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 140 (Pos. 158). Maimonides further cited the talmudic 
description of this as an “obligation” (ha-katuv qevaʿo ḥova; bPes 120a and parallels).  
994 Translation in Blau, Dictionary, 61-62, s.v. ةعبات; see also Friedlaender, Arabisch-deutsches 
Lexikon, 13, s.v. ةعبات. Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86-87 (Pos. 56). 
995 Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horovitz and Rabin, 19-20. Horovitz preferred an alternative 
version of this text (see below, n1014); see his notes and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 51n6. 
996 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86-87 (Pos. 56). 
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* * * 
 
Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on Creating Commandment-Units 
Given the centrality of creating commandment-units in Sefer ha-Miṣvot and the 
occasional inconsistencies in Maimonides’ arguments, it is not surprising that many of 
Daniel ha-Bavli’s queries focused on the identification of parts of commandments and of 
whole commandments. Five of Daniel’s thirteen questions on Sefer ha-Miṣvot tackled 
this problem, two addressed Principles Seven and Eleven, and three pertained to the 
enumeration itself. Several of the difficulties noted by Daniel coincided with passages in 
which Maimonides himself had struggled to clarify his views.997 Whatever their source, 
Daniel’s queries demonstrate his careful consideration of Maimonides’ grounds for 
enumeration. 
In at least two places, Daniel borrowed Maimonides’ use of the root f-q-h to 
describe the relationship of various laws. He rejected Maimonides’ claim that despite the 
different punishments imposed for committing adultery with women of different statuses, 
there is nevertheless only one Negative Commandment prohibiting adultery. Daniel 
wrote that the enumeration of the commandments should actually include every instance 
in which Scripture “details the fiqh” (tafaqqahat al-naṣṣ) of a commandment.998 Daniel 
                                                 
997 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86 (Pos. 56), 88 (Pos. 57), 116-17 (Pos. 111). 
Similarly, Maimonides mentioned the difficulties that Daniel raised against Principle Three; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 153-54; MS. Hunt. 138a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 9-12 (§2). Daniel’s insistence 
that the enumeration should reflect Scriptural statements may also also build on Maimonides’ presentation 
of his predecessors’ views. 
998 MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3); Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 23-24 
(Prin. Seven); see above, n947. 
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also labeled the second paschal sacrifice one of the “commandments of restitution” 
(miṣvot hashlamah) that are “fiqh” of another commandment, and therefore excluded it 
from the enumeration.999 In both cases, Daniel used the word fiqh in the way that 
Maimonides had stipulated, but came to different conclusions. 
 
Abraham Maimonides’ Rejoinders to Daniel ha-Bavli 
Daniel’s questions elicited strong reactions from Maimonides’ son Abraham, 
which ranged from harsh critique to warm compliment.1000 Three themes deserve 
attention. (1) In some cases, Abraham claimed that Maimonides had already considered 
the arguments made by Daniel, and had adjusted later works accordingly. (2) In others, 
Abraham explained Sefer ha-Miṣvot by resorting to arguments that do not appear in that 
work. (3) In yet other cases, Abraham affirmed his own reliance on the claims of 
logicians and dialectians, or as he put it, on one who is “a proponent of speculative 
reasoning” (dhū al-naẓar). 
Twice in these five responsa to Daniel, Abraham claimed that his father had 
already considered Daniel’s arguments, integrated them into the Mishneh Torah, and 
(silently) disclaimed his earlier assertions in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Describing the Mishneh 
Torah as ṣaḥīḥ (reliable or authentic) and the repository of his father’s authoritative 
statements, Abraham claimed that his father had disavowed the position set forth in Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot regarding pesaḥ sheini (the second paschal sacrifice; Abraham labeled the 
                                                 
999 MS. Hunt. 185, 187b-188a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 78 (§7). 
1000 See above, n108. 
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earlier view “objectionable” [muʿtariḍ]).1001 In response to Daniel’s claim that shaving is 
not required to remove the nazirite prohibitions, Abraham similarly explained that his 
father had, in fact, ruled accordingly in the Mishneh Torah (against Sefer ha-Miṣvot).1002 
In insisting that the Mishneh Torah reflects his father’s final views and in calling that 
work ṣaḥīḥ, Abraham echoed Maimonides’ claim that the Mishneh Torah is ṣaḥīḥ 
relative to his Commentary on the Mishnah.1003 
                                                 
1001 MS. Hunt. 185, 190a-190b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 81-82 (§7). For the earlier view, see above, n958. 
In Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 5:2, Maimonides did not explicitly contradict his earlier position, but did imply 
as much; see Korkos there (ed. Frankel, 7.2:39); and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 52n3. In the 
Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides seems to have concurred with the ruling in the Mishneh Torah; 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 2:197 (mPes 9:1). Maimonides’ descendant Joshua ha-Nagid was unaware 
of any change in Maimonides’ view; Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 106. The language in Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 
1:2, seems to echo Sefer ha-Miṣvot. For the suggestion that different goals of the Mishneh Torah and Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot explains contradictions, see Benedikt, Ha-Rambam le-lo Sṭiyah min ha-Talmud, 26, 127; and 
idem, Asupat Maʾamarim, 135n14; based on the passage in Maimonides, Igrot, ed. Shailat, 378 lines 16-17. 
See also Levinger, Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam, 86, and below, n1003.  
1002 For the earlier view, see above, n959. In the later work, Maimonides wrote that shaving the 
nazirite is “meritorious, but does not preclude” drinking wine (le-miṣvah ve-lo le-ʿaqev; Hilkhot Nezirut, 
8:5); see also Hilkhot Maʿaseh ha-Qorbanot, 14:17. Maimonides changed the Commentary to agree with 
the Mishneh Torah; see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:189n35 (mNez 6:8). Abraham 
repeated this elsewhere; see MS. Hunt. 185, 205b-206a, 206a-206b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 99-100 (§11), 100-
101 (§12); and below. 
1003 See Maimonides, Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:383 (§217), and the notes there. Abraham also wrote 
that the Mishneh Torah is “more careful” (ha-meduqdaq) than the Commentary; Teshuvot, ed. Freimann, 
106-107 (§81). Compare there, 69-70 (§64): באתכלא לאח יפ והס תוצמ רפס יפ י'דלא ֿה ץנלא א'דהב ןאלא התחלצא דקו . 
Maimonides edited the Mishneh Torah and Commentary on the Mishnah throughout his life, but Sefer ha-
Miṣvot appears not to have been finalized, at least in surviving copies. For background, see Twersky, 
Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 16-17nn21-22; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 11-14 
(introductory pagination); Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet Shabbat, xxi-xxiii; and idem, 
“Tiqunei Lashon ve-Hagbahat Signon be-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Rambam,” in Ḥiqrei ʿEver va-ʿArav, 254-
55. On edits to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 23-25 (introductory 
pagination), 23n78, 24n6, 118n13; David Henshke, “Seridei Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rambam be-Mishneh 
Torah,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies 1, div.10, division C, no. 1 (1989): 180-86; 
idem, “Le-Gilguleha shel Shiṭat ha-Rambam ʿal Sheviʿit be-Zeman ha-Zeh,” Asufot 8 (1994): 182, 184; 
idem, “Le-Yesodei,” 145-46; idem, “Le-Ḥashivato ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam,” 1:144-45n90; and idem, 
“Ke-Maʿayan ha-Mitgaber: ‘Sefer ha-Miṣvot’ le-Rambam ke-Biṭuy le-Hitpatḥut Ḥashivato ha-Hilkhatit,” in 
ʿAl Pi ha-Beʾer: Meḥqarim be-Hagut Yehudit uve-Maḥshevet Yisrael mugashim le-Yaʿaqov Blidstein, eds. 
Uri Ehrlich et al. (Beʾer-Shevaʿ: Ben Gurion University Press, 2008), 151-82, esp. 152n7. To the 
premodern testimonies there, add Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 410 
(“forgotten” negative commandments); and Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 231-33 (concluding remarks). See 
also Yuval Sinai, “Setirot Penimiyot,” 1:179-81; below, nn1044-1045; and the discussions in Chapter Five. 
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In other cases, Abraham explained Maimonides’ positions by invoking criteria 
absent from Sefer ha-Miṣvot. For example, Abraham admitted that his father’s attempt to 
combine blue and white fringes into a single commandment because they share a concept 
(maʿnā) may “be misleading” (muwahhim); he acknowledged that hesitation 
(mutawaqqif) regarding this claim was appropriate.1004 Yet he regarded Daniel’s claim 
that all of the commandments connected with remembrance of the Exodus should be 
counted as one (see below) as excessive. According to Abraham, Daniel’s reasoning 
could be used to argue that all forbidden foods are subsumed under the commandment to 
be holy (Lev. 11:44-45; this statement appears at the end of a list of prohibited foods), or 
that all religious law could be subsumed under two overarching commandments, to love 
God and to fear God (Deut. 28:48, 11:22). As this could not possibly have been 
Maimonides’ intent, Abraham introduced new terms to distinguish phylacteries, which 
constitute two commandments, from fringes, which constitute one. The two phylacteries, 
he wrote, are “distinct” (mutabāyin), but blue and white fringes are “mutually entailing” 
(mutalāzima).1005 
Abraham also twice described a subsidiary law of a larger commandment-unit as 
an “appendage” (iḍāfa) in cases where Maimonides had not used this term.1006 In one 
instance, he contrasted this “appendage” with the “essence” (nafs) of a 
                                                 
1004 MS. Hunt. 177a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 64 (§5). 
1005 MS. Hunt. 177a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 64-65 (§5). 
1006 I have only found one instance of this term in Maimonides’ enumeration of the 
commandments and two in the Principles; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 13 (Prin. Two), 19 (Prin. Four), 91 
(Pos. 66). 
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commandment.1007 He did admit that Maimonides may not have intended a particular 
“interpretation” (taʾwīl) of Sefer ha-Miṣvot that Abraham offered, and that there may be 
“room to disagree” (wajh lil-muʿāraḍa) with some of his father’s proofs.1008 Appealing to 
Principle Two, Abraham also explained decisions that his father had made by 
emphasizing that Maimonides had enumerated only explicit (mafṣūḥ) laws, and not laws 
derived from qiyās that are not guf ha-torah (essence of the Torah).1009 
Finally, Abraham repeatedly cited terms and concepts from logic and dialectics to 
dismiss Daniel’s arguments. He referred to “a proponent of speculative reasoning” (dhū 
al-naẓar) twice, apparently somebody trained in logic or dialectics, and to a dialectician’s 
postulate: If one of two contradictory views is disproved, then the other must remain. 
Applying this to the circumstances at hand, Abraham declared that if Daniel was refuted, 
Maimonides must emerge victorious.1010 Elsewhere, Abraham conceded that even a dhū 
al-naẓar might fail to grasp the difference between phylacteries and the four species, or 
the talmudic claim (bMen 44a) that the wearing of one phylactery in the absence of the 
other fulfills a commandment, while the taking of three species in the absence of the 
fourth is not. Abraham accepted that one might also be confused by another teaching of 
                                                 
1007 MS. Hunt. 185, 181a, 193b-194a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6), 85-86 (§8). Nafs can also mean 
independent; see Blau, Dictionary, 708, s.v. سفن. 
1008 MS. Hunt. 185, 194b-195b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 86-88 (§8). On Abraham’s disagreements with 
his father in halakhic matters, see Carmiel Cohen, “Moreshet Av be-Khtivato ha-Hilkhatit shel Rabbi 
Avraham ben ha-Rambam,” Meʿaliyot 25 (2005): 188-98. 
1009 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 12-13 (Prin. Two); MS. Hunt. 185, 188a-189b; 
Maʿaseh Nissim, 78-80 (§7). I have not found any evidence that Maimonides applied Principle Two to the 
case at hand. 
1010 MS. Hunt. 141b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 21 (§3). This argument is reminiscent of qiyās al-khulf; see 
below n1012. Formal dialectics remains an understudied field; see Larry Benjamin Miller, “Islamic 
Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth 
Centuries,” (PhD. Diss, Princeton University, 1985). 
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Maimonides: the claim that if the absence of one act precludes the fulfillment of another, 
then the two acts constitute one commandment, but when one act does not preclude the 
fulfillment of another, these two acts are not necessarily two commandments. He insisted 
that this “subtle” (daqīq) distinction requires careful consideration.1011 
Abraham even argued that only a person who is not trained in qiyās could read a 
Mekhilta passage as Daniel did. Abraham claimed that his own interpretation follows 
what “the masters of the art of comparison” (arbāb ṣināʿat al-maqāyīs) term an 
“apagogic syllogism” (qiyās al-khulf).1012 Any possessor1013 of “comprehension” (afhām) 
who regarded this a weak argument was, in his opinion, similar to a “proponent of the 
kalām” whose incomplete knowledge leads him to dismiss “definitive apodictic 
demonstrations” (al-barāhīn al-qaṭʿīya).1014 
                                                 
1011 MS. Hunt. 176a-176b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 63-64 (§5). 
1012 Goldberg (Maʿaseh Nissim, 71; §6) translated maqāyīs as higayon (logic), probably what 
Abraham had in mind. Translation of qiyās al-khulf follows Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 45-46 
(English pagination); see Marvin Fox, Interpreting Maimonides: Studies in Methodology, Metaphysics, and 
Moral Philosophy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 73. On this term (which could be 
vocalized qiyās al-khalf), see also Kwame Gyekye, “Al-Farabi on the Logic of the Arguments of the 
Muslim Philosophical Theologians,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 27, no. 1 (1989): 136-37; and 
Lameer, Al-Fārābī and Aristotelian Syllogistics, 74. For use in legal contexts, see Wael Hallaq, “Logic of 
Legal Reasoning in Religious and Non-Religious Cultures: The Case of Islamic Law and the Common 
Law,” Cleveland State Law Review 34 (1985-1986): 84. Qiyās al-khulf also appears in James Robinson, 
Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 
2007), 218. 
1013 MS. Hunt. 185, 182b, does not include the word dhū, but Goldberg (Maʿaseh Nissim, 71; §6) 
plausibly suggested that it should be there. 
1014 MS. Hunt. 185, 181b-182b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70-71 (§6). The text at hand reads:  ןד התא ירה
השע תוצמ רורמו השע תוצמ חספהו ליאוה (Mekhilta de-Rabbi Yishmael, eds. Horowitz and Rabin, 20 lines 3-4 
(see the notes there); Maʾagarim does not preserve any alternative readings). Abraham argued that the 
phrase miṣvat ʿaseh indicates that unleavened bread and bitter herbs are one commandment because this 
phrase is singular and the Mekhilta always mentions unleavened bread before the bitter herbs. Neither 
claim is particularly convincing; the word miṣvat could be vocalized as miṣvot, and it is hard to make much 
of the order of unleavened bread and bitter herbs in this text. 
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Abraham also claimed that Daniel’s comparison between the second opportunity 
to bring the paschal sacrifice and the opportunity to bring a sacrifice on the intermediate 
days of a festival (see below) violates basic logic. Similar deductions (natāʾij), wrote 
Abraham, may result from different premises (muqaddimāt). Though both the second 
opportunity to bring the paschal sacrifice and the opportunity to bring a sacrifice on the 
intermediate days of a festival are opportunities to remedy failure, they are dissimilar for 
the purpose of the enumeration.1015 
 
Substantive Disagreements about the Creation of Commandment-Units 
Throughout the responsa that address the creation of commandment-units, both 
Abraham and Daniel focused on terminological and conceptual themes that were central 
to Maimonides’ attempts to identify 613 distinct commandments. It is clear from their 
discussions of five issues that both scholars were aware of problems with Maimonides’ 
methodological postulates, and recognized that these could not yield an unassailable 
enumeration of the commandments. 
(1) Daniel ha-Bavli called attention to Maimonides’ reliance on rabbinic use of 
the term miṣvah. Citing two appearances of this word, Daniel asserted that acts that 
Maimonides had combined into a single commandment-unit were actually distinct 
commandments. First, Daniel claimed that in the Mekhilta passage cited by Maimonides, 
bitter herbs and unleavened bread both share the same status; each is described as a 
“miṣvah.”1016 Therefore, bitter herbs are a distinct commandment, asserted Daniel, and 
                                                 
1015 MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80 (§7).  
1016 MS. Hunt. 185, 178b-179a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 66 (§6). For the Mekhilta text, see above n1014. 
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not merely subordinate to the paschal sacrifice. Moreover, wrote Daniel, the talmudic 
phrase the “commandment of shaving” (miṣvat giluaḥ, e.g., bNed 4a) indicates that 
shaving is a distinct commandment for the nazirite, against the view of Maimonides, who 
counted shaving and sacrifice as one commandment.1017 
Elsewhere, Daniel asserted that the term miṣvah cannot possibly denote a distinct 
commandment. Though the Talmud (bSuk 37b) described the four species (Lev. 23:40) 
as four “miṣvot,” he noted, nobody counts these as constituting four commandments. This 
alone would undermine Maimonides’ claim that the phylacteries count as two 
commandments since the term miṣvah applies to each phylactery.1018 Daniel suggested 
that the rabbis may have used the term miṣvah for each phylactery in the way that they 
had referred to the four species, with each miṣvah denoting part of the commandment.1019 
Daniel’s understanding of the Mekhilta elicited Abraham’s above-cited sharp 
comments about his interlocutor’s ignorance of the ways of qiyās. In order to defend his 
father’s reading, Abraham wrote that, as Daniel recognized that the rabbinic term miṣvah 
could refer to parts (ajzāʾ) of a commandment, Daniel should acknowledge that the 
“miṣvah” of consuming bitter herbs need hardly be a distinct commandment.1020 Abraham 
made the same claim to deflect Daniel’s argument about concluding a period of 
                                                 
1017 MS. Hunt. 185, 192b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 83 (§8); see above, n959. 
1018 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 144-45 (Pos. 169). Perla repeatedly insisted that 
nobody could possibly think that the four species constitute four commandments (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-
Rasag, 1:13, 1:160, 1:468, 1:582). Benjamin bar Samuel indicated that the four species are four 
commandments; see Fleischer, “Azharot le-R. Binyamin,” 46 (see there, 37); and Frankel, Maḥzor 
Shavuʿot, 698 line 27. 
1019 MS. Hunt. 185, 174b-175a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 61-62 (§5). See similarly Daniel’s criticism of 
Maimonides’ use of the word miṣvah in MS. Hunt. 185, 198a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 91 (§10). 
1020 MS. Hunt. 185, 184b-185a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 74 (§6). The transcription should read  בלוללא
תוצמ העברא (not יוצמ). 
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naziriteship.1021 In neither case did Abraham attempt to reconcile his own position with 
his father’s claims. 
(2) Daniel also challenged Maimonides’ search for conceptual links that would 
result in the creation of commandment-units. Were this line of reasoning correct, Daniel 
claimed, laws pertaining to tithes, or firstborn sons and firstborn animals would constitute 
a single commandment, because each shares a name or appears to be based on similar 
concepts.1022 Maimonides had argued that blue and white fringes share a common 
meaning (maʿnā) because the Pentateuch states that they are affixed to garments “in 
order (le-maʿan) to remember all of the commandments” (Num. 15:40), but he had 
suggested that the head and arm phylacteries do not share a common goal. Daniel 
asserted that if so, all of the commandments which are linked to the requirement to 
remember the Exodus would have needed to be counted as one. He concluded that the 
singular word “it shall be” (ve-haya; Ex. 13:9, Num. 15:39) indicates that phylacteries 
and fringes are each a single commandment.1023 Noting that the Pentateuch uses the word 
“le-maʿan” (“in order to”; Ex. 13:9, Num. 15:40) with respect to both fringes and 
phylacteries, Daniel further claimed that they share a single goal (gharaḍ). This was the 
contention that led Abraham to admit that the arguments of his father may have been 
“misleading” – though Abraham attempted to defend him. 
 
                                                 
1021 MS. Hunt. 185, 193b-194a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 85-86 (§7). 
1022 I.e., tithes are maʿaser rishon, maʿaser sheini, etc., and require a portion of produce be given 
away, and both firstborn sons and first born animals, known as bekhor adam and bekhor beheimah, grant a 
priest the firstborn (though the former is subsequently “redeemed”); MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 
18 (§3). 
1023 MS. Hunt. 185, 174b-175b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 61-62 (§5). 
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The Role of Scripture in Identifying Distinct Commandments 
(3) Daniel disagreed with Maimonides’ claims about the role of Scripture in the 
enumeration of the commandments. He did recognize that the “umbrella” of a larger 
commandment-unit frequently subsumes numerous laws. A commandment might contain 
numerous sub-commandments (farḍāt)1024 whose rules (aḥkām) differ,1025 wrote Daniel; 
although the divisions (aqsām) of one commandment (sharīʿa) may vary, they are 
nevertheless one unit. This is a “truth about which there is no disagreement,”1026 he 
wrote. Daniel also accepted that scriptural divisions, parts (ajzāʾ), or aspects (wujūh) of a 
commandment are not always enumerated separately.1027 Nonetheless, he argued that the 
enumeration should hew more closely to scriptural divisions than to conceptual 
classifications. In Daniel’s view, this perspective helps explain several claims made by 
“the ancients” (al-qudman) whose enumerations Maimonides had dismissed.1028 
In setting forth his theory, Daniel invoked a talmudic passage (bSab 73b-74a) that 
asks why the Mishnah (mSab chap. 7) lists prohibited Sabbath labors that are similar to 
one another, such as threshing and winnowing: Could one prohibition not be derived 
from the other? The answer offered in the Talmud is that the list of prohibited labors 
accords with the acts performed in the Tabernacle: “everything that was in the 
Tabernacle: even though there is [something] similar to it, it counts.”1029 Mirroring this 
                                                 
1024 This word is related to farīḍa (pl., farāʾiḍ), a common Judeo-Arabic term for miṣvah, but is 
uncommon; see Blau, Dictionary, 497, s.v. ةضرف.  
1025 אהפאלתכאב אהיפ םאכחאלא ףלתכת הדידע תא'צרפ אהיפ ו'צרפאו אמהיפ ל"ז םימכחלא הקפת דק; MS. Hunt. 
185, 138a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§3). 
1026 היפ ףאלכ אל קח; MS. Hunt. 185, 138a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§1). 
1027 MS. Hunt. 185, 138a-138b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 16 (§1). 
1028 MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3). 
1029 הל בישח הל אימדד אכיאד ג"עא ןכשמב יוהד אתלימ לכ; this is Daniel’s text; others vary slightly. 
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language, Daniel wrote, “everything that is written in the Pentateuch: even if there is 
[something] similar to it, it counts as a commandment.”1030 According to Daniel, this 
explains why earlier enumerations had counted the three punishments for adultery as 
three commandments, despite the fact that they are all “fiqh” of a single prohibition.1031 
Daniel highlighted an incongruity in Principle Seven in order to demonstrate his 
approach. Maimonides had claimed that the sacrifice offered by an inadvertent sinner 
constitutes a single miṣvah, even though the sacrifice varies according to the status of the 
sinner (e.g., head of the court [nasi], High Priest, or neither). He compared this to the 
single commandment obligating an atonement sacrifice for the sin of entering the Temple 
while impure, for here, too, the sacrifice was related to one’s status. While the rich sinner 
might bring a lamb or goat (Lev. 5:6), noted Maimonides, these, and the sacrifices of 
poorer sinners, constitute “without doubt a [single] positive commandment” and its 
fiqh.1032 Daniel claimed that Maimonides was wrong to equate these laws, for there is 
great disparity in the sacrificial rites demanded of inadvertent sinners of different 
statuses;1033 they are quite unlike the option of the wealthy man to bring a lamb or a goat 
to atone for having entered the Temple in a state of impurity. 
Daniel compared the option to sacrifice a lamb or a goat to another situation that 
involved choice. Maimonides had written that, were it not for the fact that the Mishnah 
                                                 
1030 הל בישח אק הוצמ הל אימדד אכיאד ג"עא אתיירואב ביתכד אתלמ לכ; see the strikingly similar argument in 
di Trani, Qiryat Sefer, 9a (introduction, §6). 
1031 MS. Hunt. 185, 139b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3). 
1032 ךש אלב השע תוצמ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 22; see there, 22-23 (Prin. Seven); 
and Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 81-83. 
1033 I.e., their blood is sprinkled in different places and they are offered on different altars; MS. 
Hunt. 185, 138b-139a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 17-18 (§3). 
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described as “commandments” both the redemption of a firstborn donkey and the 
breaking of its neck, qiyās would dictate that each is a fiqh of a single commandment.1034 
This disturbed Daniel: “We cannot say,” he exclaimed, “that they [i.e., the rabbis …] 
were ignorant of the ways of qiyās!”1035 Rather, he wrote, the enumeration must follow 
rabbinic “qiyās”; in cases where the Pentateuch offers a choice, both options constitute 
distinct commandments.1036 Daniel wrote that “whenever Scripture (or, the explicit text; 
naṣṣ) rules that something be divided, and distinguishes … between those aspects of it 
that are subject to division, it is [to be considered] distinct in regard to the 
enumeration.”1037 
Abraham Maimonides responded by pointing out an ambiguity in Daniel’s 
argument regarding the atoning sacrifices for inadvertent sinners. According to Abraham, 
choice is irrelevant to the enumeration; the count of commandments only increases when 
laws differ depending on their performers (he ignored the role that choice apparently 
plays in the commandments of the firstborn donkey and levirate marriage).1038 Daniel’s 
indignation at Maimonides’ dismissal of rabbinic “qiyās” also irritated Abraham. The 
rabbis knew on the basis of a divine tradition (naql) that redeeming a firstborn donkey 
                                                 
1034 See above, n951. 
1035 סאיקלא קרטב ןילהא'ג אונאכ ס"לאלע םהנא לוקנ אנא אננכמי אלו; MS. Hunt. 185, 139a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 
18 (§3). 
1036 Daniel wrote that the choice to enter a levirate marriage is similar. In his view, the choice of 
lamb or goat is one commandment, however, apparently because only the animal varies, but levirate 
marriages and firstborn donkeys entail different actions. Compare Perla’s comment that “nobody could 
possibly think that the [choice of] lamb or goat is two commandments” ( תעד לע הלע אלו  הבשכד רמאיש םדא םוש
תווצמ יתש הריעשו); Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:584. 
1037 דדעלא יפ קרתפמ והפ םיסקתלא הוגו ןיב המכח יפ קרפו המיסקת יפ ץנלא םכחת אמ לכ; MS. Hunt. 185, 138a-
138b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18 (§3). 
1038 MS. Hunt. 140b-141a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19-20 (§3). See however above, n1036. 
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and breaking its neck are distinct commandments, he wrote, but general principles of 
enumeration of the commandments cannot be extracted from such statements.1039 
(4) When Daniel claimed that Maimonides had focused inconsistently on explicit 
and non-explicit laws, he argued that Maimonides had included certain details (here: 
furūʿ) of a single commandment (here: aṣl) in his enumeration, despite the fact that these 
details are not explicit in the Pentateuch (ghayr mafṣūḥ; ghayr manṣūṣa) and that their 
laws do not differ fundamentally (laysat mukhālif fī al-ḥukm) from one another. In one 
such case, claimed Daniel, Maimonides had misclassified the commandment which 
prohibits an improperly dressed priest from serving in the Temple, for he included this 
within the positive commandment of donning priestly garments.1040 From Daniel’s 
perspective, this prohibition should be seen as one offshoot (farʿ min furūʿ) of the 
commandment that prohibits a non-priest (zar) from serving in the Temple.1041 Daniel set 
forth similar perspectives with regard to three negative commandments that prohibit an 
impure priest from serving in the Temple: the general prohibition; the case of a priest 
who has taken a ritual bath but remains unclean until sunset (ṭevul yom); and that of the 
priest who has not completed the rituals of atonement and remains in an intermediate 
state of impurity (meḥusar kaparah).1042 
                                                 
1039 MS. Hunt. 142b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 22 (§3). 
1040 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 75-76 (Pos. 33). See also above, nn736-737. 
1041 MS. Hunt. 185, 140a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). Daniel’s assumption is not entirely fair, 
as Maimonides listed this law as part of the commandment that priests wear specific clothing. See Sayid, 
Ner Miṣvah, 1:48a; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot la-Rasag, 2:424-25, 3:60-62; see also Duran, Zohar ha-
Raqiʿa, 232 (concluding remarks). Note Abraham Maimonides’ reformulation of this prohibition; MS. 
Hunt. 185, 143b-144a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 23 (§3). 
1042 MS. Hunt. 185, 140a-140b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 18-19 (§3). 
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There is reason to conjecture that this particular challenge is one to which 
Maimonides himself was sensitive because, curiously, Daniel’s third example does not 
appear in surviving manuscripts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot. In his rebuttal, Abraham 
Maimonides did not claim that Daniel possessed an erroneous text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, as 
he did when Daniel cited another passage that is absent from surviving versions of Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot.1043 Ḥayim Heller, however, surmised that Daniel had an earlier version of 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and suggested that Naḥmanides’ version of this work also included this 
prohibition.1044 (There are also indications in the Mishneh Torah that Maimonides 
rethought aspects of this prohibition.1045) Whatever the state of Daniel’s text of Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, he regarded these prohibitions as furūʿ of a single umbrella commandment 
prohibiting impure priests from serving in the Temple. Rejecting Maimonides’ claims, 
Daniel argued that if the three prohibitions pertaining to impure priests constitute three 
commandments, despite the fact that they are not explicit in Scripture, then the existence 
of three different punishments for adultery, which are based on express scriptural 
passages (faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ), should definitely evince the presence of three 
commandments.1046 
 
                                                 
1043 See MS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1). 
1044 See above, n705. 
1045 See the sources in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 45n8; and Hilkhot Biʾat ha-
Miqdash, 3:9, 4:4, 9:11; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:194 (mSan 9:6); Menaḥem ha-
Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal Masekhet Sanhedrin, ed. Abraham Sofer (Jerusalem: Qedem, 1971), 301 (bSan 
83b); Sayid, Ner Miṣvah, 1:36a; and Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 3:57. 
1046 MS. Hunt. 185, 140a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 19 (§3). Regarding these commandments, see also MS. 
Hunt. 185, 126b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 2 (introduction). On the term faṣīḥ al-naṣṣ, see above, n702. 
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The Relationship between “Parts” and “Umbrella” Commandments 
(5) Daniel ha-Bavli also challenged a number of Maimonides’ decisions that 
aggregated individual laws into larger commandment-units. Daniel began his critique of 
Principle Eleven with one of his favorite tactics, by claiming that Maimonides had 
contradicted himself. The first part of Principle Eleven posits that if the absence of any 
component of a ritual prevents its fulfillment, then all components collectively comprise 
one commandment.1047 According to Daniel, Maimonides had contradicted this by 
counting, as separate commandments, the injunctions to slaughter the paschal sacrifice 
and to eat it.1048 Daniel pointed to a talmudic debate (bPes 78b-79a) about the 
relationship of these laws, in which the minority does not regard failure to eat the paschal 
sacrifice as a barrier to fulfillment of the commandment of sacrifice (akhila lo meʿaqva). 
Though the Talmud does not say as much, Daniel inferred that the majority position was 
that failure to eat the paschal sacrifice does render the sacrifice invalid. If Maimonides, in 
fact, followed the majority position, argued Daniel, why had he counted the slaughtering 
and eating of the paschal sacrifice as two commandments?1049 Daniel posited that these 
acts constitute a single commandment. In his view, eating the paschal sacrifice completes 
                                                 
1047 See above, n962. 
1048 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 86 (Pos. 56). 
1049 See Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 2:14, 4:2. The Talmud does not actually say that the majority hold 
that failure to eat the paschal sacrifice renders it invalid; see Korkos to Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 4:2 (ed. 
Frankel, 7.2:32); and Avraham Teʾomim, Ḥesed le-Avraham, Mahadurah Tinyana (Lvov, 1898), 2:26 
(Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 8:1). Maimonides therefore need not have accepted Daniel’s inference; see Perla, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:423-25. 
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the sacrifice (he termed it tashlumei miṣvah) and is not, by itself, a distinct commandment 
(guf miṣvah).1050 
In his responses, Abraham Maimonides asserted that there is an “enormous 
difference” (farq kabīr) between saying that two objects are indispensible to one another 
(meʿaqvin zeh et zeh), and saying that the absence of one object precludes the fulfillment 
of the other (davar ploni meʿaqev davar ploni).1051 Therefore, the majority position that 
failure to eat the paschal sacrifice precludes fulfillment of the sacrifice need not mean 
that slaughtering and eating the paschal sacrifice constitute a single commandment. 
Abraham also added a more convincing argument: These acts are two commandments 
because slaughtering the paschal sacrifice and eating it are done at different times; 
excision is only incurred by failure to do the latter.1052 
In his challenges to Maimonides’ claim that bitter herbs are merely an 
“appurtenance” to the paschal sacrifice and not an independent commandment, Daniel 
attacked the evidence from the Mekhilta,1053 and proposed an interesting interpretation of 
bPes 120a. In this passage, Rava claims that since the destruction of the Temple (be-
zeman ha-zeh), the injunction to consume unleavened bread on Passover would have the 
force of biblical law, but the injunction to consume bitter herbs, only that of rabbinic law. 
The Talmud explains that the verse “they shall eat it with unleavened bread and bitter 
herbs” (Num. 9:11) obligates eating bitter herbs and unleavened bread only when the 
                                                 
1050 MS. Hunt. 173a-174a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 59-60 (§4). As evidence, Daniel cited the Talmud’s 
statement that eating the paschal sacrifice is of secondary importance (le-miṣvah be-ʿalma). On the term guf 
miṣvah, see above, n725. 
1051 As Perla noted, Abraham’s “enormous difference” is certainly debatable and does not account 
for similar passages; Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:426. 
1052 MS. Hunt. 175b-176a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 62-63 (§5). 
1053 Above, n1016. 
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paschal sacrifice is offered (be-zeman de-ika pesaḥ). Rava claimed that a verse that does 
not mention bitter herbs, “at evening you shall eat unleavened bread” (Ex. 12:18), 
obligates eating unleavened bread even when the paschal sacrifice is not offered (be-
zeman de-leika pesaḥ). An opposing view cited in the Talmud describes the consumption 
of both bitter herbs and unleavened bread as rabbinically mandated laws in the absence of 
the Temple.1054 Rava responded by arguing from the case of an uncircumcised person 
who cannot bring a paschal sacrifice: “No uncircumcised person may eat of it” (Ex. 
12:48) – “it” (i.e., the paschal sacrifice) he may not consume, but he must consume 
unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Daniel adduced this passage to argue that the 
consumption of bitter herbs on Passover is a biblical obligation that is independent of the 
paschal sacrifice, and consequently (?), an independent commandment.1055 
                                                 
1054 This position holds that Ex. 12:18 obligates one who does not offer the paschal sacrifice 
during the Temple period to eat unleavened bread and bitter herbs. Although Ex. 12:18 only mentions 
unleavened bread, the Talmud twice says that this verse imposes an obligation to eat bitter herbs as well 
(bPes 28b and 120a). All of the manuscripts on the Lieberman Institute website share this reading. Some 
commentators viewed the appearance of bitter herbs in this statement as “imprecise”; see, e.g., David of 
Bonafed, Ḥidushei Rabbeinu David, ed. Zevulun Shoshanah (Jerusalem: Mekhon Yerushalayim, 1997), 
150-51 (bPes 28b); and Nissim ben Reuven of Gerona, Ḥidushei ha-Ran, Masekhet Pesaḥim, ed. Eliyahu 
Lichtenstein (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1991), 166 (bPes 28b). See also Rashi, bPes 28b, s.v. le-
ṭamei; and Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal Masekhet Pesaḥim, ed. Joseph Klein (Jerusalem: 
Mekhon ha-Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shaleim, 1966), 84 (bPes 28b). 
1055 MS. Hunt. 185, 178a-180b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 66-69 (§6). See similarly Tosafot, bYeb 71a, s.v. 
bo. Maimonides apparently agreed with Daniel’s reading (see Hilkhot Qorban Pesaḥ, 9:8) but not about the 
impact on the enumeration. See Korkos there (ed. Frankel, 7.2:61); Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah ʿal 
Masekhet Yevamot, ed. Shmuel Dickman (Jerusalem: Mekhon ha-Talmud ha-Yisraeli ha-Shaleim, 
1962), 262 (bYeb 71a); Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:434-35; and Babad, Minḥat Ḥinukh, 1:96. By 
distinguishing between those who do not offer the sacrifice when the Temple stood (be-zeman de-leika 
pesaḥ) and the post-Temple period (be-zeman ha-zeh). Daniel appears to have read the word zeman in this 
passage to denote both “situation” and “period.” In Daniel’s view, Ex. 12:48 mandates that the former eat 
both bitter herbs and unleavened bread but Ex. 12:18 mandates that the latter eat only unleavened bread. 
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This argument elicited a strident response from Abraham, who insisted that bitter 
herbs are merely an “appendage” (iḍāfa) to the paschal sacrifice.1056 He nevertheless 
concurred with Daniel’s distinction between the obligations after the Temple period and 
those that were in force while it stood. According to Abraham, the Talmud needed to 
clarify that those who did not bring the paschal sacrifice while the Temple stood were 
nevertheless obligated to eat bitter herbs precisely because they are merely an 
“appurtenance” (tābiʿa, as his father had written), and one might have thought that there 
was no requirement to eat them. 
Abraham suggested that Daniel misunderstood this for one of two reasons: Either 
the entire Talmud was a “sealed document” (Isa. 29:11) for Daniel, or due to the bias (al-
hawī)1057 that Daniel felt against Maimonides. Otherwise, wrote Abraham, Daniel would 
surely not have interpreted bPes 120a as he did.1058 These remarks also appear to subtly 
evoke Maimonides’ battles with Daniel’s teacher, Samuel ben ʿEli.1059 Abraham further 
cautioned Daniel that scholars (ʿulamāʾ) do not needlessly quote clear texts, as it is 
beneath their honor.1060 
                                                 
1056 MS. Hunt. 185, 181a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6). This is a reformulation of Maimonides’ claim, 
as Maimonides did not use this word to describe the relationship of bitter herbs and the paschal sacrifice. 
For use of the passive participle muḍāf(a) in this sense, see above, n1007. 
1057 Goldberg has אהלא but the manuscript reads יוהלא; MS. Hunt. 185, 184b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 74 
(§6). 
1058 MS. Hunt. 185, 184a-185a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 73-74 (§6). 
1059 Abraham sardonically asked Daniel, “Is it a great thing to read verses?” (יקוספ ירקימל אתובר; 
MS. Hunt. 185, 181a-181b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70; §6). In one letter, Maimonides similarly castigated 
Samuel for quoting texts that Samuel allegedly misunderstood, adding this remark. Though this expression 
sounds like a quote from rabbinic literature, I have not found a source for this line, and neither have the 
most recent editors of Maimonides’ letter to Samuel. See Maimonides, Teshuvot ha-Rambam, ed. Blau, 
2:573 (§310); and Igrot ha-Rambam, ed. Shailat, 1:378, 1:383n36. This phrase also appears in a responsum 
of R. Isaac ben R. Mordecai Qimḥi (Provence, late 13th c.); see Abraham Schreiber, ed., Teshuvot Ḥakhmei 
Provanṣiya (Jerusalem, 1967), 374 (dinei shutafut, §20). 
1060 MS. Hunt. 185, 181a-181b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 70 (§6). 
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In another passage, Daniel disagreed with Maimonides’ claim that the designation 
of the second paschal sacrifice as “regel bi-fnei ʿaṣmo” (“independent festival”) indicates 
that it is a discrete commandment. Daniel compared the second paschal sacrifice to the 
compensatory sacrifice brought throughout the festival’s duration when one is unable to 
bring the ḥagigah sacrifice (Ex. 23:14) on the first day (see bḤag 9a-9b). This, noted 
Daniel, is not a distinct commandment.1061 (This argument is slightly problematic 
because the Talmud labels compensatory festival offerings a restitution [tashlumin] and 
Maimonides had rejected the notion that the second paschal sacrifice was an opportunity 
for restitution.) Daniel also described Maimonides surprising claim – that because it is an 
“independent festival,” one who willfully ignores the first opportunity to offer the paschal 
sacrifice but offered it in the second incurrs the punishment of excision1062 – as “very 
difficult” (ṣaʿb jiddan).1063 Maimonides had written that This view is indeed surprising, 
as one would have thought that the Pentateuch had provided the supplementary 
opportunity in order to avoid punishment! Daniel concluded that “commandments of 
restitution” (miṣvot hashlamah) are “fiqh” of a commandment and they should be 
excluded from the count.1064 
Lastly, Daniel challenged the distinction that Maimonides had drawn between the 
rites performed at the end of one’s nazirite period and the rites of purification for one 
afflicted by ṣaraʿat. In the latter case, Maimonides had counted the two-step purification 
                                                 
1061 MS. Hunt. 185, 185a-186b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 75-76 (§7). 
1062 See above, n958. 
1063 MS. Hunt. 185, 186b-187a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 75-78 (§7). 
1064 MS. Hunt. 185, 187b-188a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 78 (§7). Daniel also addressed the second 
paschal sacrifice in one of his queries about the Mishneh Torah; see MS. Hunt. 185, 18b-19a; Birkat 
Avraham, 9 (§4). 
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process (sacrifices and shaving) as two commandments, noting that each act achieves a 
separate goal (ghāya). Though concluding nazirite status involves the same requirements, 
Maimonides declared these acts “connected” (murtabiṭ), and thus, one commandment.1065 
Yet Daniel pointed to the majority position in the relevant talmudic discussion (bNaz 
46a), which stated that the nazirite prohibitions are revoked once the nazirite offers the 
requisite sacrifices. This being the case, he wrote, the sacrifices achieve “the desired 
goal” (al-ghāya al-maṭlūba), and the requirement to shave is unrelated to the 
sacrifices.1066 
Abraham commended Daniel on both points, but insisted that his father had 
changed his mind. He also asked whether Daniel would not consider the Eighth Day of 
Assembly (Lev. 23:36) a distinct commandment, given the Talmud’s (bSuk 47a and 
parallels) reference to it as an “independent festival”?1067 Abraham further argued that 
shaving is the “essence” (nafs) of the commandment to conclude nazirite status, while the 
sacrifices are merely an “appendage” (iḍāfa) to the commandment.1068 In the end, 
however, wrote Abraham, Maimonides had already noticed these challenges. Although 
he failed to amend Sefer ha-Miṣvot, his new conclusions appear in the Mishneh Torah.1069 
 
                                                 
1065 See above, nn959-960. 
1066 MS. Hunt. 185, 191a-193b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 82-85 (§8). 
1067 MS. Hunt. 185, 189b-190a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 80-81 (§7). Maimonides relied on this statement 
as a evidence (dalīl) that the sacrifices for the Eighth Day of Assembly are a distinct commandment; Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 83-84 (Pos. 51). At the end of this section (MS. Hunt. 185, 189a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 
80; §7), Abraham claimed that his father’s furūʿ “flow” (muṭṭarid) from his uṣūl. Abraham did not use the 
term furūʿ in the way that it is used in Sefer ha-Miṣvot (see above, n632), but rather to refer to the 
enumeration as a whole. See similarly MS. Hunt. 185, 130a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 6 (§1), where Abraham 
wrote: ןאלטב דמתסת לצאלא א'דה ןמו אהעורפו לוצאלא ךלת ילע הב ת'צרתעא אמ ר'תכא וא לכ . 
1068 See above, n1007. 
1069 See above, nn1001-1003. 
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Conclusion 
Grouping laws as commandment-units was one of the central difficulties that any 
enumerator of the commandments faced. While many individual decisions can be 
justified, exceptions to programmatic postulates are inevitable. This project may have 
been doomed from the outset by the arbitrary nature of the number 613, but as medieval 
enumerators struggled to identify exactly 613 commandments, they crafted nuanced 
arguments that integrated the Bible, rabbinic literature, and occasionally, ideas from 
beyond the standard rabbinic corpus (such as dialectics, logic, and uṣūl al-fiqh). In this 
way, the enumeration of the commandments was “good to think with” and gave 
Rabbanite jurists a vehicle to reflect on the law as a whole.1070 
Maimonides appears to have been the first to outline a systematic methodology 
for the enumeration of the commandments, and he used his scheme to criticize unnamed 
predecessors who, in his estimation, had violated these “rules.” These enumerators were 
bound to fail the test that he devised, as the Principles in the Introduction to Sefer ha-
Miṣvot were, on occasion, shaped by the “blunders” of predecessors. 
Shortly after Maimonides’ death, Daniel ha-Bavli engaged in a careful and 
reasoned criticism of Maimonides’ methodology. While Daniel learned much from 
Maimonides, he ultimately demonstrated the frailty of Maimonides’ system and the 
problems endemic to his (and perhaps any) attempt to identify precisely 613 
commandments. Daniel was the first reader – and the only reader of the Judeo-Arabic 
                                                 
1070 Compare A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 3-4, arguing that Muslims engaged theoretical 
problems as an entry point into “delicate” or “sensitive” topics that were “too disturbing or unnerving” to 
address directly. I believe that the jurists who engaged the material treated in this chapter (and the next), in 
part, did have larger concerns in mind, such as portraying Jewish law as well-organized and coherent. 
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text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot – to demonstrate that Sefer ha-Miṣvot is occasionally arbitrary 
and always vulnerable to criticism. 
Daniel’s queries were so piercing that Abraham Maimonides’ responses 
frequently seem flimsy by comparison. In fact, Abraham admitted that his father had 
silently disclaimed positions in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, as could be discerned in his later work, 
the Mishneh Torah. Some of Abraham’s disagreements with Daniel were due to genuine 
differences in interpretation, and there is little doubt that Daniel was motivated by the 
“bias” that Abraham identified. Nevertheless, many of Abraham’s retorts seem to have 
been driven by the impulse to defend his father against a robust, studied evaluation. 
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Chapter Five: The Pentateuch and the Enumeration of the Commandments 
Introduction 
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot asserts that there is an intimate relationship 
between the Pentateuch and the 613 commandments. It hardly needs to be stated that 
there is no inkling of the notion of 613 commandments in the Pentateuch itself; likewise, 
rabbinic literature and, apparently, earlier enumerators of the commandments, did not 
consider the relationship between the Pentateuch and the enumeration in any substantive 
way. Maimonides’ attempt to connect the enumeration with the Pentateuch has received 
scant scholarly attention, but is one of the most ambitious and creative elements of Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot. It exhibits his careful readings of Scripture and rabbinic literature, his reliance 
on Rabbanite lexicographic works, and his innovative suggestions for classification. 
Scrutiny of his ideas also uncovers an important chapter in the development of 
Maimonidean halakhah and in the writing process that produced Sefer ha-Miṣvot. 
Maimonides presented his theory regarding the connection between Scripture and 
the 613 commandments in Principle Nine of his Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. This 
Principle presented Maimonides with a monumental challenge, and he rethought several 
related claims throughout his life. Principle Nine may also have been, for him, the most 
important, as he cited it more than any other,1071 writing at its conclusion, “Place this 
                                                 
1071 Maimonides cited Principle Nine ten times in his enumeration, and it is the only Principle 
mentioned in another Principle; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 45 (Principle Eleven), 211 (Neg. 60), 229-30 
(Neg. 94), 231 (Neg. 98), 238 (Neg. 125), 275 (Neg. 191), 277 (Neg. 195), 292 (Neg. 235), 309 (Neg. 272), 
325 (Neg. 311), 338 (Neg. 350). Principle Twelve also references Principle Nine, though not by name; 
there, 49. For references to Principle Two, see there, 260 (Neg. 168; treated in above, n670); Principle 
Four, 60 (Pos. 5), 193 (Neg. 26); Principle Seven, 88 (Pos. 57), 102 (Pos. 82; and the “supplemental 
introduction” appended to Principle Fourteen, 193 (Neg. 26), 211 (twice; Neg. 60), 227 (Neg. 90), 242 
(Neg. 133), 277 (Neg. 195). He did not refer to any other Principle in the enumeration. 
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Principle in its entirety opposite your eyes at all times; it is a very important key for the 
verification of (li-taḥqīq) the enumeration of the commandments.”1072 
Principle Nine seeks to link every scriptural do and do not with a distinct 
commandment. Maimonides used the Hebrew words ʿaseh and lav1073 and the Arabic 
amr and nahy to denote “do” and “do not,” verbs in the imperative and prohibitive (or 
“vetitive”) moods, respectively. Accordingly, “do X” constitutes an ʿaseh or amr, and 
“do not do X,” a lav or nahy. (In this chapter, I frequently use “command” and 
“prohibition” to denote scriptural dos and do nots in order to avoid the bulky translation 
“verb in the imperative/prohibitive mood.”1074) 
The first part of Principle Nine argues that each commandment is a stand-alone 
“concept” (usually maʿnā, sometimes shayʾ, “thing”) and that repeated scriptural 
commands (Heb. ʿaseh;1075 Ar. awāmir) and prohibitions (Heb. lavin; Ar. nawāhī) that 
                                                 
1072 תוצמלא דדע קיקחתל אד'ג ריבכ חאתפמ הנאפ אמיאד ךיניע א'דח התלמ'גב לצאלא א'דה לע'גאו; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine). Some texts read faṣl (section) instead of aṣl (Principle) in this 
statement; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 44; ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine); see also ed. Heller, 
24n108. While faṣl may be preferable according to the principle of lectio difficilior, Maimonides referred to 
this unit “in its entirety,” in contrast with the previous sentence, which only discusses the second part of 
Principle Nine. The term faṣl may also refer to the entirety of Principle Nine. Compare Naḥmanides’ 
comment that in this Principle, Maimonides “decrees many decrees, … and they are a large key for him in 
the enumeration of the commandments” (תוצמה ןינמב לודג חתפמ ול םהו תובר תוריזג ל"ז ברה וב רוזגי); Sefer ha-
Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 97 (Prin. Nine). See also ibn Abi Zimra, Teshuvot ha-Radbaz, 5:4a 
(leshonot ha-Rambam, §15): רוש ותואב ןייעודימת והרכזו תלעותה בר אוה יכ ש . 
1073 According to Yoḥanan Breuer, “Ḥidushim Miloniyim be-Lashon ha-Amoraʾim,” Lĕšonénu 69, 
no. 1-2 (2007): 56, the singular lav denoting “a negative commandment” is a Babylonian innovation, and 
Tannaitic literature uses the term lo taʿaseh to denote “a single negative commandment.” 
1074 Note that the scope of a command or prohibition does not correspond to the division of 
Scripture into verses; one verse may contain several dos and one do may extend over several verses. 
Maimonides treated the definition of nahy in Principle Eight at length; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 26-
32. The ideas developed in Principle Eight and elsewhere are obviously crucial to understanding 
Maimonides’ approach to the terms amr and nahy, which were discussed at length by Jewish and Muslim 
grammarians and legal theorists, but are not central to Principle Nine. 
1075 As far as I can tell, Maimonides never used the plural ʿasin, which appears in some medieval 
texts. 
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address one “concept” do not constitute evidence of multiple commandments. 
Maimonides therefore needed to define what constitutes “repetition,” as the Pentateuch 
frequently repeats itself, using different formulations. The second part of Principle Nine, 
which he described as “appended to” (yanḍāf ilā)1076 the first, asserts that each “concept” 
must be based on “an exclusive verb in the prohibitive1077 mood” (lav mujarrad).1078 
Yeruḥam Fischel Perla noted tension between the first part, which constructs “concepts” 
that transcend scriptural formulations, and the second, which relies solely on Scripture in 
grouping distinct laws as a single commandment.1079 I would suggest that the division 
within Principle Nine may preserve an earlier conceptualization which treated only 
repeated commands and prohibitions; the second part may have been appended later. 
As Maimonides was almost certainly the first enumerator of the commandments 
to deal in a systematic way with the problems posed by Principle Nine,1080 I only treat 
earlier literature in cases where it has bearing on his claims. This chapter is organized 
around the two theses of Principle Nine; it considers their impact on the “verification” of 
                                                 
1076 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 37 (Prin. Nine). See the (nearly?) identical language 
in the supplemental introduction after Principle Fourteen; ed. Bloch, 56, reads tanḍāf ilā (note the variants 
recorded there), and ed. Kafiḥ, 54, yanḍāf ilā. See also ed. Heller, 31n58. 
1077 On the Positive Commandments; see below, n1142. 
1078 He termed the opposite a lav shebe-khlalot, perhaps “a verb in the prohibitive mood that 
covers several laws”; on both terms, see below. 
1079 Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:34-37. 
1080 Sefer ha-Miṣvot itself is the best indication of this: although Maimonides claimed that an 
unnamed predecessor erred regarding one ramification of this Principle (see below, n1193; see also below, 
n1128), he was far less concerned with “errors” of earlier enumerators in Principle Nine than he was in 
other Principles. Compare Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 9, 12 (Prin. One), 13-14 (Prin. Two), 
16-17 (Prin. Three), 41-42 (Prin. Nine), 52-53 (Prin. Fourteen). For other criticisms, see there, 18 (Prin. 
Four), 20 (Prin. Five), 25-26 (Prin. Seven), 27-28 (Prin. Eight), 43 (Prin. Ten), 48 (Prin. Twelve); see also 
4-5 (introduction). Note the comment that he could not “remember for the moment” (fī mā adhkuruhu al-
ān) anyone who erred concerning the topic of Principle Six (there, 20); compare the text in Baneth, 
“Hatḥalat Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rav Saʿadya,” 381. 
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the commandments, and it closes with the exchange of Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham 
Maimonides’ regarding this Principle. 
 
Overlapping Pentateuchal Commands and Prohibitions 
It may be of significance that the heading of Principle Nine focuses only on its 
first argument: “It is inappropriate to count the do nots (al-lavin) or the dos (al-ʿaseh), 
but [only] the forbidden or commanded things (al-ashyāʾ al-manhī ʿanhā wal-maʾmūr 
bihā) [should be counted].”1081 Or, as Maimonides summarized at the end of this part of 
Principle Nine: “It is inappropriate to count every do not (lav) found in the Torah or 
every do (ʿaseh), for it [i.e., these] may be repeated. Rather, it is appropriate to count the 
commanded or forbidden concepts (al-maʿānī al-maʾmūr bihā aw al-manhī ʿanhā).”1082 
Maimonides asserted that these “concepts” (a term used interchangeably with “things”) 
fit into four categories: opinions (ārāʾ),1083 actions, character traits, and utterances.1084 He 
                                                 
1081 אהב רומאמלאו אהנע יהנמלא אישאלא לב השעלאו ןיואללא דעי ןא יגבני אל הנא עסאתלא לצאלא; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 8, 32 (Prin. Nine). 
1082  ינאעמלא דעת ןא יגבני אמנאו ררכמ ןוכי דק הנאל השע לכ אלו הרותלא יפ ד'גוי ואל לכ דעי ןא יגבני אל הנא
אהנע יהנמלא וא אהב רומאמלא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine). Compare Isaac ben 
Sheshet, Teshuvot ha-Rivash, 2:556 (§387): ןיואלה תוברתהבש תוצמה הניברתת אל . 
1083 Or, one line later, “belief” (iʿtiqād). Kafiḥ repeatedly insisted that iʿtiqād denotes 
“knowledge,” not “belief”; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 32n90, and the references there. 
Many have rejected this; see Avraham Nuriel, “Remarks on Maimonides’ Epistemology,” in Maimonides 
and Philosophy: Papers Presented at the Sixth Jerusalem Philosophical Encounter, eds. Shlomo Pines and 
Yirmiyahu Yovel (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1986), 40-50; Simon Rawidowicz, “On Maimonides’ ‘Sefer Ha-
Madda’,” in Essays in Honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J.H. Hertz, 333-39; repr. in idem, Studies in Jewish 
Thought (Philadelphia: JPS, 1974), 319-23; Herbert Davidson, “The First Two Positive Commandments,” 
in Creation and Re-Creation, 129n61; repr. in idem, Maimonides the Rationalist, 35n72; and Blau, 
Dictionary, 444, s.v. دقع VIII. 
1084 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 32-33 (Prin. Nine). Kafiḥ (32n88) noted that Guide 
III:28 speaks of a similar division. Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:16, added that Abraham Ibn Ezra 
divided the law similarly: (1) “faith of the heart” (emunat ha-leiv), (2) commandments of the mouth, and 
(3) commandments of action; see Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 
131 line 11 (7:2). The editors of that work noted a similar division in Ibn Ezra’s “Long Commentary” to 
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claimed that the rabbis, as “the commentators who transmit the tradition” (al-shāriḥīn al-
rāwīn), relay reports regarding the “division of concepts” (tafṣīl al-maʿānī) that 
occasionally override the presumption that the “ẓāhir” (apparent or literal) meaning of 
Scripture reflects the divine intent. In some such cases, the rabbis may clarify that a 
seemingly repetitive do or do not actually “includes” (yataḍammanu),1085 or “adds,” a 
novel concept (li-ziyāda maʿnā).1086 
The imposition of punishments offers the most important evidence regarding the 
“division of concepts.” Maimonides posited a one-to-one correspondence between the 
number of “concepts” that a sinner violates, the number of punishments that he incurs, 
and the number of commandments that he contravenes. However, when the rabbis state 
that a given act violates two (or more) prohibitions (i.e., laʿavor ʿalav be-shnei lavin),1087 
the prohibitions are deemed repetitions and do not qualify as distinct commandments.1088 
Citing several rabbinic statements to support this claim, Maimonides noted that failure to 
wear phylacteries “violates eight positive commandments” (ʿover be-shmonah ʿaseh; 
                                                 
Ex. 20:1; see Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 2:131. Compare Twersky, Introduction to the Code of 
Maimonides, 275. 
1085 In the enumeration, the root ḍ-m-n occasionally denotes cases that the sages explain that a 
commandment includes multiple acts; see, e.g., Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 59 (Pos. 3), 182 (Neg. 4). In 
one instance, Maimonides contrasted gufei di-qera (“the verse itself”) with acts that the sages explained are 
included in a given prohibition (there, 204; [Neg. 45]).  
1086 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33-34 (Prin. Nine); see Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 120-21. Similarly: עמ ןכמי אלוג הנא ררכתמלא השעלאו ואללא ֿהפר' ילע ףקוי ףקומב אלא ינעמ ֿהדאיזל א
ד'ס"ע ריספתלא תאור םהו ךל  (ed. Kafiḥ, 36; Prin. Nine). Throughout Principle Nine, Maimonides stressed the 
rabbis’ role as transmitters, most likely because this Principle addresses rules of divine origin and 
Maimonides held that non-revealed interpretations yield laws rabbinic in status. 
1087 On this phrase, see the brief comment in Yaakov Elman, “Le-Toldot ha-Ribbuy be-Talmud ha-
Bavli,” Proceedings of the World Congress of Jewish Studies Division C: Thought and Literature, Volume 
I: Rabbinic And Talmudic Literature (1993): 91. 
1088 He also understood the statement that a verse is “superfluous” (yetar) to mean that it is 
repeated. 
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bMen 44a), and that the Pentateuch warned against wronging a convert (ger; “stranger” 
in biblical Hebrew) thirty-six times (bBM 59b). In neither case, he claimed, can each 
scriptural mention possibly correspond to a distinct commandment.1089 (In both Sefer ha-
Miṣvot and the Mishneh Torah, however, Maimonides often used the phrase ʿover be-
shnei lavin to denote two commandments.1090) Maimonides therefore had an easier time 
identifying a Negative Commandment than a Positive one, for, with two exceptions, 
punishment is only incurred for violation of the former.1091 Futhermore, Maimonides’ 
decisions about what constitutes a Positive “concept” tend to be more subjective.1092 
According to Principle Nine, repetitions, even “in different formulations” (bi-
alfāẓ mukhtalifa),1093 may be for “emphasis” (taʾkīd) – in which case a designated sin is 
                                                 
1089 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34, 35-36 (Prin. Nine). On the latter, see ed. Heller, 
20n36. Compare Hilkhot Tefillah u-Nesiʾat Kapayim, 15:12, and Hilkhot Tefilin, 4:26. In at least one 
instance, he asserted the inverse, that the lack of lashes for violating a specific rule shows that this rule 
merely completes (tatmīm) the law; ed. Kafiḥ, 262 (Neg. 170). On tension between “received traditional 
interpretation” and philological readings of Scritpure in qurʾānic tafsīr, see Walid Saleh, The Formation of 
Classical Tafsīr Tradition: The Qurʾān Commentary of al-Thaʿlabī (d. 427/1035) (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 
134-37. 
1090 See, e.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 280 (Neg. 201), 297-98 (Neg. 246), 311 
(Neg. 280), 328 (Neg. 317); note that there, 229 (Neg. 94), he implied that some sages used the term ʿover 
differently than proposed in Principle Nine. For the Mishneh Torah, see, e.g., Hilkhot Sekhirut, 11:2; 
Hilkhot Roṣeaḥ u-Shemirat ha-Nefesh, 1:15; and Hilkhot Gezeilah ve-Aveidah, 1:12. Note the careful use of 
the terms ʿover and loqeh in Hilkhot Kilaʾim, 10:31, and the comments in Joseph Karo, Kesef Mishneh, 
there (Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 6:72). I have not found this phrase in the Commentary. 
1091 Compare Friedberg, Crafting the 613 Commandments, 34-35. The exceptions are circumcision 
and offering the paschal sacrifice; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 54 (supplemental 
introduction), 86 (Pos. 45), 277-78 (Neg. 196). See also above, n679. 
1092 For example, Perla (Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 2:48) argued that one of Saʿadya’s 
enumerations considers “You shall love the convert (ger)” (Deut. 10:19) part of the commandment to “Love 
your fellow as yourself” (Lev. 19:18) because the convert is just an example of a fellow Jew. Maimonides 
marshaled several arguments in order to show that these verses ordain two commandments (Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 163-64 [Pos. 207]; see also Hilkhot Deiʿot, 6:3-4), and reported that no enumerator 
counted them as one. For Perla’s claim about the Saʿadya’s approach to the Negative Commandments, see 
there, 1:37-40; compare however Tobi, “Piyuṭei Rav Saʿadya Gaon,” 1:100; and Abraham Ibn Ezra, Yesod 
Mora ve-Sod Torah, eds. Cohen and Simon, 98 lines 57-60 (2:9). 
1093 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine); see Cohen, Opening the Gates of 
Interpretation, 121n114. Maimonides’ example appears to overlook an explicit mishnah. He claimed that 
the verses “You shall not pick your vineyard bare (teʿolel), or gather the fallen fruit of your vineyard” (Lev. 
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“very significant” (ʿaẓīm jiddan); alternatively, the repetition may “complete” (tatmīm or 
takmīl) the rules of a commandment, in which case it is immaterial to the 
enumeration.1094 Maimonides was not the first Andalusian Rabbanite to reflect on the 
concept of “emphasis.” Jonah Ibn Janāḥ (11th c.) dedicated a lengthy chapter of his Kitāb 
al-Lumaʿ (The Book of Variegated Flower Beds) to scriptural taʾkīd; following Muslim 
grammarians, Ibn Janāḥ used taʾkīd to explain superfluous letters and words.1095 In the 
                                                 
19:10), “When … you overlook a sheaf in the field, do not turn back to get it” (Deut. 24:19), and “When 
you beat down (tefaʾer) the fruit of your olive trees, do not go over them again” (Deut. 24:20) all command 
a single “concept,” namely, that one may not return to collect forgotten fruits, and that grapes and olives are 
just two examples of this concept (mithlayn; ed. Kafiḥ, 36-37 [Prin. Nine]; see similarly, 121 [Pos. 123], 
283 [Neg. 212]). Based on the editio princeps, Bloch included an explicit statement that leftover grapes are 
ʿolelot and olives peʾarot (תוראפ םיתזה ןמ היקבלאו תוללוע םיבנעלא ןמ היקבלא ימסו; see ed. Bloch, 37n3). Such a 
statement also appears in Ibn Tibbon’s translation, and Naḥmanides quoted it as well, indicating that it is 
original; see ed. Heller, 20 (Prin. Nine) and n42; and Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. 
Chavel, 149 (supplemental introduction). Solomon ibn Ayyub’s translation, in David ben Kokhavi, Sefer 
ha-Batim, 2:240 (Pos. 180), 2:399 (Neg. 212), repeats the position in standard versions of Sefer ha-Miṣvot. 
However, mPea 7:4 defines ʿolelot (from Lev. 19:10) as a grape that lacks “shoulder (kateif) and pendant 
(nateif)” (trans. in Danby, The Mishnah, 18), not as forgotten grapes. Naḥmanides (there) noted that 
Maimonides followed the mishnaic definition of ʿolelot in Hilkhot Matanot ʿAniyim, 4:17-18 (see also 1:5), 
and not the definition in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. The editio princeps of Sefer ha-Miṣvot includes the following 
interpolation: וב רכזנ אלו טרפו תוללועו טקלו האפ רכזנ םישדקב יכ ברה תעד יכ הארנ 'הגה החכש  אל ךתיז םירכזנ אבת יכבו
 'ינפל 'יפא אוה יכ םישדקב 'ותכה ללועת אל ךמרכו ןיממ הז ןיאו תונליא ראשל ה"הו ךירחא ללועת אל ךמרכ םיבנעבו ךירחא ראפת
יד ןיאו םיינעל הלכ תוללוע םרכה לכ 'יפאו 'וסא'כ'ע דבל םרכב אלא תוללועו טרפ ן . See Dror Fixler, “ʿOlelot – Halakhah u-
Maʿaseh,” Teḥumin 28 (2008): 355-56, 365-67. Kafiḥ struggled mightily with Maimonides’ deviance from 
the Mishnah; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36-37nn22, 25, 121n88, 283n32, 283-84n35. Kafiḥ suggested 
that the text in Ibn Tibbon’s translation reflects an early version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot and that Maimonides 
eventually removed it. (Kafiḥ’s text appears to have been altered to accord with mPea 7:4 and the Mishneh 
Torah.) There is no hint to the understanding of ʿolelot found in Sefer ha-Miṣvot in the Commentary on the 
Mishnah to mPea 7:4 (Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:122). In fact, Sefer ha-Miṣvot follows the 
definition of ʿolelot as khuṣāṣ (sing., khāṣaṣa) in Ibn Janāḥ’s Kitāb al-Uṣūl; see The Book of Hebrew Roots, 
ed. Adolf Neubauer (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1875), 521. Ibn Janāḥ derived his definition from 
“lexicographic books of the Arabs” (kutub lugha al-ʿarab). 
1094 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 33-34 (Prin. Nine). 
1095 Jonah Ibn Janāḥ, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, ed. Joseph Derenbourg (Paris, 1886), 278-90. For the claim 
that several words can simply be for emphasis, see there, 288. See the brief treatment in Cohen, Opening 
the Gates of Interpretation, 58-59; see also there, 121 and n113. At least one claim of this chapter copies 
from a Muslim grammarian; see Dan Becker, “Linguistic Rules and Definitions in Ibn Janāḥ’s Kitāb al-
Lumaʿ (Sefer ha-Riqmah) Copied from the Arab Grammarians,” JQR 86, nos. 3-4 (1996): 278; and idem, 
Meqorot ʿAraviyim le-Diqduqo shel R. Yonah Ibn Janāḥ (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University Press, 1998), 342-
44. On Judah Ibn Tibbon’s translation of the term taʾkīd, see Jonah Ibn Janāḥ, Sefer ha-Riqmah be-Tirgumo 
ha-ʿIvri shel R. Yehuda Ibn Tibbon, ed. Michael Wilensky (Jerusalem: Ha-Aqademiyah le-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit, 
1964), 1:52n5. On taʾkīd among Muslim grammarians, see Owens, Early Arabic Grammatical Theory, 56-
57, 62-63, 74-76, 99-100; idem, “The Historical Linguistics of the Intrusive *-n in Arabic and West 
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Commentary on the Mishnah, Maimonides invoked taʾkīd to explain superfluities in 
Scripture and in the Mishnah itself.1096 Citing “one of the principles of language usage” 
(aṣl min uṣūl al-lugha) in one discussion, Maimonides argued that repeated letters in the 
quinquiradicals (words with five root letters) yeraqraq and adamdam (Lev. 13:49) are 
added for “emphasis”; they respectively denote the deepest green and the deepest red.1097 
According to the Guide, scriptural instances of taʾkīd emphasize the evil of idolatry or the 
importance of love of God.1098 However, in one place in the Commentary on the 
Mishnah, Maimonides wrote that, according to tradition (naql), the five scriptural 
prohibitions against offering blemished animals as sacrifices are not simply repeated for 
“emphasis”; rather, each covers a distinct “concept” (maʿnā). One might refer to the 
                                                 
Semitic,” JAOS 133, no. 2 (2013): 217-48; and Tamar Zewi, “Energicus,” in Encyclopedia of Arabic 
Linguistics, 2:22-25. For use in tafsīr, see Wansbrough, “Majāz al-Qurʾān,” 251, 258; and idem, Quranic 
Studies, 230-31. I have not found extensive discussions of taʾkīd among Rabbanites who predate Ibn Janāḥ. 
In another context, Éric Chaumont translated the title Kitāb al-Lumaʿ as Le livre des rais 
illuminant; see his Le livre des rais illuminant les fondements de la compréhension de la loi: traité de 
théorie légale musulmane (Berkeley: Robbins, 1999). 
1096 For the application to Scripture, see Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 1:397 
(mʿOrl 1:2); for the application to the Mishnah, 2:376 (mḤag 1:8; explaining the phrase hen hen gufei 
torah). 
1097 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 6:388 (mNeg 11:4); see Hilkhot Tumat Ṣaraʿat, 
12:2. This follows the rabbinic understanding, and was adopted by Ibn Janāḥ, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ, 120, and Ibn 
Ghiyāth, in Kafiḥ, Ḥameish Megillot, 173. Others argued that quinquiradicals denote the weakest shades of 
these colors; see Dunash ben Labrat, Sefer Teshuvot Dunash ha-Levi ben Labraṭ ʿal Rabbi Saʿadya Gaon, 
ed. Robert Schröter (Breslau: Schletter’sche Buchhandlung, 1866), 11-12 (§35); Abraham Ibn Ezra, 
Peirushei ha-Torah, ed. Weiser, 3:41 (Lev. 13:49); idem, Yesod Diqduq hu Sefat Yeter, ed. Neḥemyah 
Allony (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1984), 155 and n379; see also idem, Yesod Mora ve-Sod Torah, 
eds. Cohen and Simon, 174 lines 8-9 (11:2). Rashi cited Dunash’s position in his commentary to Ps. 68:14 
(a verse that seems to indicate that yeraqraq means “yellow”). On these roots, see Igal Yannai, “Peʿalim 
Merubei-ʿIṣurim be-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit,” Lĕšonénu 38, 1-2 (1974): 118-30, no. 3: 183-94; and idem, 
“Augmented Verbs in Biblical Hebrew,” HUCA 45 (1974): 71-95. On the ascription of this treatise to 
Dunash, see David Herzog, “The Polemic Treatise Against Saadya Ascribed to Dunash ben Labrat,” in 
Saadya Studies, 26-46. 
1098 E.g., Maimonides, Dalālat al-Ḥāʾirīn, eds. Munk and Joel, 373 (III:28), 400 (III:37), 411 
(III:41), 423 (III:45). 
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blemished animal’s sanctity, and another to the sprinkling of its blood.1099 The distinction 
between repetitions for the sake of taʾkīd and repetitions to denote separate “concepts” is 
central in Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1100 
Principle Nine offers two simple examples of taʾkīd: the Pentateuch’s twelve-fold 
repetition of the command to rest on the Sabbath, and its seven-fold repetition of the 
prohibition against eating blood; nobody, insisted Maimonides, would count each more 
than once in an enumeration of the commandments.1101 Maimonides usually used the fifth 
form of the Arabic root k-r-r (to be repeated or reiterated) to denote repetitions, and 
frequently wrote that Scripture repeats a law “in another formulation” (bi-lafẓ ākhar).1102 
However, this claim that the Pentateuch may, sometimes, add new information in order to 
“complete the particular ruling of the commandment” (takmīl ḥukm al-miṣvah)1103 elides 
the neat delineation between emphasis and the teaching of a new commandment. 
Maimonides argued, for example, that several prohibitions addressed to both regular 
priests and the High Priest do not teach distinct commandments; rather, they are repeated 
                                                 
1099 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:144-45 (mMen 8:7). He revisited this 
conclusion, however; see below, n1189. 
1100 As far as I can tell, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 250 (Neg. 152), is the only discussion of taʾkīd 
in this work that is not connected with the problem of repeated verses. 
1101 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34-35 (Prin. Nine); see there, nn6-7, for the verses. 
1102 E.g., Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 221 (Neg. 77), 231 (Neg. 98), 342 (Neg. 355); 
see above, n1093. 
1103 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 34 (Prin. Nine). For example, the various types of 
capital punishment for different classes of women “complete (tatmīm) the law of the punishment for 
adultery” (שיא תשא ץאצק םכח םימתת; see above, n947), and the examples of improper weights and measures 
(Lev. 19:36; Deut. 25:13-15) “come to complete the laws (li-tatmīm aḥkām) of the miṣvah” ( הלוק ןא ן'טת אלו
פיא ךל היהי אלהוצמלא םאכחא םימתתל תא'ג אמנא ןיואל ינש]לא[ ןאל תוצמ יתש ןבאו ןבא ךל היהי אלו הפיאו ה ); there, 23 
(Prin. Seven), 309 (Neg. 272). 
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in order “to clarify a given matter”1104 or in order to rule out an otherwise logical 
conclusion (see below).1105  
Maimonides also asserted that acts which incur multiple punishments violate 
multiple sheimot (sing., sheim). In rabbinic literature, the term sheim (and the related 
term, mi-shum) denotes a legal category, i.e., a heading that covers disparate 
institutions.1106 Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s novel argument is that each sheim constitutes a 
“concept,” and a discrete, enumerated commandment.1107 
 
Identifying Distinct “Concepts” 
Principle Nine asserts, rather than defends, the claim that the enumeration of the 
commandments consists of 613 “concepts.” Maimonides did not clarify the notion of a 
“concept,” and its parameters appear somewhat subjective. Maimonides, however, was 
not the first to equate “enumerated commandment” with the word maʿnā, i.e., concept; in 
                                                 
1104 אמ ינעמ ןייבתל לודג ןהכ יפ תררכת; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 258. 
1105 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 256 (Neg. 163). He repeated this in Hilkhot Biʾat ha-
Miqdash, 2:6. Two rules derived from the same prohibition do not constitute distinct commandments (for 
example, the prohibitions against shaving various parts of the face or beard); Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
202-204 (Neg. 43-44).  
1106 See Moscovitz, Talmudic Reasoning, 105-107, 148-50, 156-59. See also, Shlomo Naʾeh, “ʿAl 
Gevul ha-Diqduq veha-Milon,” Meḥqarim be-Lashon 5-6 (1992): 302-303; and Shamma Friedman, “Shum 
Davar,” in ʿIyunim be-Leshon Ḥakhmaim, ed. Moshe Bar Asher (Jerusalem: ha-Mekhon le-Limudim 
Mitqadmim, 1996), 79-84. 
1107 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 35 (Prin. Nine); see also there, 229 (Neg. 94). The 
term sheim denotes distinct commandments in Hilkhot Malveh ve-Loveh, 3:5. However, Maimonides also 
connected the term sheim with two rules created by the same prohibition; compare Hilkhot Shegagot, 4:1 
(see also 4:4), with Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 338 (Neg. 350). On the term sheim, see Joshua ha-Nagid, 
Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 101; see further above, n979, and below, n1207. 
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a passage quoted by Maimonides, Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ used this word to denote a distinct 
commandment.1108 
In the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides announced that the Mishneh 
Torah would group together laws that share one “maʿnā” (i.e., meaning or intent).1109 
This terminology suggests that the classificatory project of the Mishneh Torah 
overlapped with that of determining the parameters of a “concept” (maʿnā) in Sefer ha-
Miṣvot.1110 Principle Six appears to blur maʿnā’s two senses – as “meaning” and as 
“concept,” arguing that commands and prohibitions that pertain to a single topic (e.g., 
“keep the Sabbath” and “do not violate the Sabbath”) constitute distinct commandments, 
because “the maʿnā of the command (amr) is unlike the maʿnā of the prohibition (nahy) – 
they are two distinct maʿnās.”1111 In Principle Nine, he contrasted the enumerated maʿnā 
with repeated “prohibitions” (lavin), and in Principle Eleven, insisted that laws that share 
a single goal are combined as one “enumerated concept” (al-maʿnā al-maʿdūd).1112 
Elsewhere, Maimonides cited other evidence from rabbinic literature to identify distinct 
                                                 
1108 ןומ'צמ אהעימ'ג ןחנ אל אהלעפ אלותי ילאעתו ךראבת הנאב אנרב'כא ינעמ ןי'תאל'תו ןינ'תא הנמו; Maimonides, 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 53 (Prin. Fourteen).  
1109 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 4 (introduction). Note that “Do not curse a leader 
(nasi) in your people” (Ex. 22:27) applies both to one who holds the title nasi and a king, because the 
“meaning” (maʿnā) of this prohibition relates to anyone in a position of power; there, 326 (Neg. 316). 
1110 On this project, see Twersky, Introduction to the Code of Maimonides, 238-323; Haym 
Soloveitchik, “Hirhurim ʿal Miyuno shel ha-Rambam be-Mishneh Torah: Baʿayot Amitiyot u-Medumot,” 
Maimonidean Studies 4 (2000): 107-115; trans. in idem, “Classification of Mishneh Torah: Problems Real 
and Imaginary,” in Collected Essays, 2:367-77; Kaplan, “Further Reflections on Classification of Mishneh 
Torah,” 29-70; and the literature cited there, 30n2 
1111 ןיניאבתמ ןיינעמ אמהו יהנלא ינעמ ריג אהיפ רמאלא ינעמ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 20 
(Prin. Six). 
1112 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 44, 45; see also there, 49 (Principle Twelve); treated 
above, nn966-967. 
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“concepts”;1113 these included distinct punishments or sacrifices,1114 and statements that 
one is culpable (ḥayav) for multiple prohibitions.1115  
One notable discussion pertains to the three-fold repetition of the pentateuchal 
prohibition against cooking a kid in its mother’s milk (Ex. 23:19, 34:26, Deut. 14:21). 
The rabbis had understood this as prohibiting the cooking, eating, and benefiting from 
mixtures of milk and meat, but unlike others,1116 Maimonides only counted the first two 
of these as commandments. Explaining his calculus in detail, he cited talmudic assertions 
(bMak 21b; bḤul 114a) that the cooking and the eating of milk and meat together make 
one liable for punishment. Missing from these sugyot, he implied, is any claim of a 
penalty for benefiting from such mixtures. Maimonides went added what he called an 
“important principle” (aṣl kabīr): despite the three-fold repetition of this prohibition, and 
despite the fact that “the transmitters of the interpretation” (ruwāt al-tasfir) explain that 
                                                 
1113 For example, the requirement to count years and seven-year cycles for the jubilee derives from 
“two scriptural statements” (shenei ketuvim, lit., two verses; both statements are in Lev. 25:8), showing that 
“this concept (maʿnā) … must be one commandment” ( דנמו ילע לד םיבותכ ינשמ אלא לצחי םל ינעמלא א'דה ןא לאק '
הרור'צ תחא הוצמ אהנא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 130 [Pos. 140]; see however there, n80). See 
similarly, there, 141-42 (Pos. 161), 161 (Pos. 201); compare there, 305 (Neg. 264). Likewise, leavened 
bread and leaven are equivalent, based on the statement that Ex. 13:7 “opened with leavened bread and 
closed with leaven” (pataḥ ha-katuv be-ḥameiṣ ve-siyem be-seʾor; see bBeṣ 7b); therefore, the prohibitions 
“No leavened bread shall be found with you and no leaven shall be found in all your territory” ordain a 
single commandment; there, 279 (Neg. 200) and see n2. Elsewhere, neshekh and marbit, two terms for 
prohibited interest, constitute a single commandment because the Talmud (bBM 60b) equates them; there, 
291 (Neg. 235). 
1114 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 35 (Prin. Nine), 38 (Prin. Nine), 98-99 (Pos. 77). See 
the challenges to this cited below, n1180. 
1115 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 232 (Neg. 103), 253 (Neg. 157), 254 (Neg. 161), 260 
(Neg. 168), 275 (Neg. 191), 306 (Neg. 266; see Hilkhot Gezeilah ve-Aveidah, 7:11). He reinterpreted this 
term there, 296 (Neg. 242). In Guide II:46 (eds. Munk and Joel, 288-89), Maimonides used the term ḥayav 
for two laws that are not distinct commandments. See Levinger, Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-Foseq, 177; 
and Maimonides, Moreh Nevukhim, trans. Yosef Kafiḥ (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1972), 267-
68n16. 
1116 See above, nn910-911. 
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each prohibition (lav) covers a distinct “concept,” these prohibitions constitute only two 
commandments, because eating is a type of benefiting.1117  
 
Applications in the Enumeration of the Commandments 
The idea that repetitions “emphasize” or “complete” a commandment appears 
throughout Sefer ha-Miṣvot, and Maimonides frequently grouped similar verses under the 
heading of one commandment. Thus, he claimed, the prohibition against priests 
wounding their heads (Lev. 21:5) repeats (karrara) and completes (tatmīm) a related 
prohibition warning all Jews not to wound the front of the head when mourning the dead 
(Deut. 14:1). Following the rabbis, he explained that certain aspects of each verse are 
legally operative.1118 In reference to two prohibitions addressed to both priests and 
Levites, Maimonides formulated a general rule: “any case of the general and particular 
(al-ʿumūm wal-khuṣūṣ) similar to this is only repeated for emphasis or in order to 
complete (li-tatmīm) the law, because the law cannot be completely deduced (lam 
yuḥaṣṣal al-ḥukm kāmil) from one prohibition (nahy).”1119 This is why each prohibition 
                                                 
1117 He further argued that if benefiting from mixtures of milk and meat constitute a distinct 
commandment, then all prohibitions against benefiting from an object that is forbidden to eat would be 
counted separately (even though other prohibitions against benefiting are not based on repeated verses). He 
concluded by explaining why the Pentateuch repeated this prohibition three times; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272-74 (Neg. 187); compare Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 9:2, treated briefly in above, 
n652. In the Commentary on the Mishnah, he referred to this “important principle” as a “wondrous point, 
… a key to many other matters” ( התכנ אישאל חאתפמ יה 'דא אהילע הבננ הבי'גע ר'כא ); Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 5:360 (mKer 3:4). 
1118 The prohibition applies to any part of the head but only to wounds inflicted due to mourning; 
see bMak 20a; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 262-63 (Neg. 171); see similarly Hilkhot ʿAvodat 
Kokhavim, 12:12, 15. Likewise, two prohibitions forbidding Jew and a priest from shaving (Lev. 19:27; 
21:5) are stated “only in order to complete the law” (li-takmīl al-ḥukm fa-qaṭ); there, 262 (Neg. 170); see 
also, 263 (Neg. 171). 
1119  ןמ למאכ םכחלא לצחי םל 'דא םכחלא םימתתל וא דיכאתלל ררכי אמנא ץוצ'כלאו םומעלא ןמ א'דה הבשי אמ לכ
ולא יהנלאאדח ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 261 (Neg. 170). He repeated this, writing:  י'דלא יהנלא
י'דלא וה טקפ םומעלא ילע הניעב ינעמלא ךל'ד יפ י'גי י'דלא ןאו דעני א ץוצ'כלא ילע ר'כא יהנםלעתל וה אמנ  םימתתל וא אמ םכח
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against marrying certain classes of women, repeated for both regular priests and the High 
Priest (Lev. 21:7, 14), constitute only a single commandment.1120 Maimonides rarely 
attempted to explain why the Pentateuch could not state the laws for different populations 
at the same time.1121 
Maimonides’ comments on the recurring pentateuchal prohibitions against 
oppressing a convert (ger) suggest that he continued to think about the phenomenon of 
literary repetition. Principle Nine asserts that the talmudic statement (bBM 59b) that one 
who wrongs a convert (i.e., transgresses the prohibition of onaʾah, lit., oppression; in 
financial contexts, overcharging) violates (ʿover be-) three prohibitions actually refers to 
a thrice-repeated prohibition; the number of commandments involved, however, is only 
two.1122 In his discussion of these commandments in Sefer ha-Miṣvot, Maimonides listed 
four relevant negative commandments: (1) financial onaʾah of a Jew; (2) verbal onaʾah 
of a Jew (onaʾat devarim); (3) verbal onaʾah of a convert; and (4) financial onaʾah of a 
convert. In other words, wronging a convert violates the relevant commandments 
pertaining to the Jew as well as to the convert.1123 However, in the Mishneh Torah, 
Maimonides’ perspective was closer to that of the talmudic statement. He explained that, 
because the Pentateuch uses the same words for financial and verbal onaʾah of a Jew (lo 
                                                 
היי'צקלא. Maimonides insisted that the reader “understand this principle (aṣl) and obtain it” ( א'דה םהפאפ
הלצחו לצאלא); ibid, 262 (Neg. 170). Curiously, the first of these commandments was omitted in the editio 
princeps; see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 1n1 (introductory pagination). See also Allegri, Leiv 
Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 328 (Neg. 98). 
1120 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 261 (Neg. 170). See below, n1193 
1121 E.g., above, n1118. 
1122 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 36 (Prin. Nine): “this is clear, there is no doubt 
regarding it” (היפ לאכשא אל ןיב א'דהו). See above, n1089. 
1123 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 300-301 (Neg. 250-53); the reading in Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 288, is preferable to the one in ed. Kafiḥ, 301n41.  
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tonu; Lev. 25:15, 25:17), but “explicitly” (be-feirush) repeats the prohibitions against 
financial and verbal onaʾah of a convert, formulating each in different words,1124 the 
financial or verbal onaʾah of a convert violates one prohibition pertaining to a convert, 
but it violates both prohibitions pertaining to a Jew (Hilkhot Mekhirah, 14:16-17).1125 
A dense subject related to this part of Principle Nine (though not discussed in this 
Principle) pertains to a talmudic statement (bPes 24a-24b etc.) that one who eats a puṭita 
(eel-like fish?1126) receives four sets of lashes; a nemalah (ant), five; and a ṣirʿah (hornet 
or wasp), six. Given his insistence that multiple punishments are only incurred for the 
violation of distinct commandments, Maimonides was forced1127 to conclude that the 
eating of these creatures entailed the violation of four, five, and six unique 
commandments respectively. He noted that his conclusion disagreed with “all” earlier 
interpreters of this sugya, who had explained that, in this case, repeated verses prescribe 
multiple punishments.1128 
                                                 
1124 I.e., “Do not wrong the convert (lo toneh) and do not oppress him (lo tilḥaṣenu)” (Ex. 22:20). 
He cited the Mekhilta’s reading that the former refers to verbal onaʾah and the latter to financial onaʾah. 
1125  ינפמ םירבד תיינוהב ףא ןוממ תיינוה לש אל לעו ןוממ תיינוהב ףא םירבד תיינוה לש ואל לע רגב רבוע המ ינפמו
בותכה איצוהש ינשב רגב ןיואלה לפכו םתס היינוה ןושלב ןהינש תא ץחלת אלו ונות אל שוריפב םירבדה ; compare above, 
n1107. The exemption from lashes (Hilkhot Mekhirah, 12:1) means that punishments cannot be used to 
determine the number of violations. My reading follows that of Solomon ben Moses of Chelm, Merkevet 
ha-Mishneh (Jerusalem, 2000), 1:84b-85a; see also Feintuch, Sefer ha-Misvot le-Rambam ʿim Peirush 
Piqudei Yisharim, 2:879-80. Yom Tov ben Moses Ṣahalon, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot Maharitaṣ (Venice, 1694), 
123a (§190), remarked that this passage “bothered me my entire life” (ם"במרה ירבד לע יתרעטצנ ימי לכ). 
1126 So Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Babylonian Aramaic of the Talmudic and Geonic 
Periods (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 2002), 888-89, s.v. אתיטופ; following a responsum ascribed 
to Amram bar Sheshna Gaon in Ginzberg, Geonica, 1:340; see below. 
1127 See Aharon ha-Levi of Barcelona [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Charles Baer Chavel (Jerusalem: 
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 2002), 237 (§164):  העומש התוא שוריפב קוחדל ול היה וילא עובקה הזה שרושה דצמו... הברה ; and 
Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin. Nine): הברה ומצע קחד אוהש. 
1128 He wrote that “all (jamīʿ) those whose statement I have heard or view I have seen” ( ריספתלא
דלא'י רספ ג'עימ ןמ תעמס הלוק וא תיאר המאלכ ) offered this interpretation; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266 (Neg. 
179). See Mirsky, Sheʾiltot de-Rav Aḥai Gaon, 3:87-89; Hildesheimer, ed., Halakhot Gedolot, 3:195; 
Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel la-Talmud, ʿEiruvin, eds. David Meṣger 
and Elijah Dickman, 62 (Jerusalem: Leiv Sameaḥ, 1992) (bʿEiruv 28a); idem, Pesaḥim, ed. David Meṣger 
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Maimonides argued that the nemalah and ṣirʿah are not generic ants or hornets1129 
but, rather, specific types of these insects, and because of their characteristics, one who 
eats them incurs five or six sets of lashes. (It is more compelling to offer such a definition 
of the puṭita, which is not mentioned elsewhere in rabbinic literature). He listed four 
relevant commandments: Negative Commandment #174: not to eat non-kosher birds; 
Negative Commandment #175: not to eat flying insects (shereṣ ha-ʿof / dabīb al-ṭayr); 
Negative Commandment #176: not to eat crawling insects (shereṣ ha-areṣ / dabīb al-
arḍ); and Negative Commandment #179: not to eat water insects (shereṣ ha-mayim).1130 
He also identified two other prohibitions that pertain to the eating of these insects in their 
spontaneously-generated forms, namely: Negative Commandment #177: not to eat insects 
spontaneously generated in putrid matter (al-mutakawwin min al-ʿufūnāt);1131 and 
                                                 
(Jerusalem: Leiv Sameaḥ, 1991) 51 (bPes 24a-24b); and Alfasi, Halakhot, Ḥullin 25a (though 
commentators noted problems with the text of this passage). See also Alexander Kohut, ʿArukh ha-Shaleim 
(Vienna: Menorah, 1926), 6:322-32 s.v. אתטפ; and Kasher, Torah Shleimah, 28:86. Post-Maimonidean 
jurists also rejected Maimonides’ view; see Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments below, Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 100-113 (Prin. Nine); Aharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Chavel, 
236-38 (§164); Yom Tov Asevilli, Ḥidushei ha-Ritva, Masekhet ʿEiruvin, ed. Moshe Goldstein (Jerusalem: 
Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 2008), 262-63 (bʿEiruv 28a); and Menaḥem ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah, Masekhet 
Makkot, ed. Shimon Sṭarliṣ (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav Herzog, 1965), 90-93 (bMak 16b). Duran, Zohar ha-
Raqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin. Nine), described Naḥmanides’ position as “the explanation of the 
early and the late ones” (םינורחאהו םינושארה שוריפ). 
1129 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 251 (Neg. 175), offered the zunbūr as an example of 
non-kosher creeping birds (dabīb al-ṭayr; ed. Kafiḥ, 264, has dabīb al-ṭāʾir (translated as ha-sheraṣim ha-
meʿufafim; see n70), but Ibn Tibbon, who translated shereṣ ha-ʿof, clearly had Bloch’s text; ed. Heller, 
142). Both Ibn Tibbon and Kafiḥ translated zunbūr as ṣirʿah (hornet or wasp). Later, however, Maimonides 
wrote that eating a ṣirʿah incurs six sets of lashes, so he must have understood the ṣirʿah to be a different 
animal, not the zunbūr; see ed. Kafiḥ, 264n71, 269n100; and ed. Heller, 142n2. The difficulties in 
Maimonides’ view are evident in Aryeh Leib Horowitz, Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Hellman, 514 (Prin. Nine). Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:5, categorizes these prohibitions as shereṣ ha-ʿof, 
and offers the ṣirʿah as an example; see also idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 50 lines 250. Note 
that in the Kifāya, Abraham Maimonides wrote that the zunbūr qualifies as a dabīb al-ṭāʾir; David, 
“Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 19 line 13. 
1130 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 264-69 (Neg. 174-79). Maimonides did not offer a 
concise Arabic term in Negative Commandment #179. 
1131 He cited the Sifra’s reading of “You shall not make yourself unclean through any swarming 
thing that moves [ha-romes] upon the earth” (Lev. 11:44) as the source of this prohibition. His text read: 
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Negative Commandment #178: not to eat animals generated (al-mutawallida)1132 in food 
once they have crawled outside the food.1133 
Maimonides based the prohibition against eating water insects on the sweeping 
phraseology of the verse, “You shall not draw abomination upon yourselves through 
anything that swarms” (Lev. 11:43). In so doing, he differed from earlier jurists who, he 
reported, held that “anything that swarms” merely replicates other prohibitions against 
eating insects. In this sense, he wrote, they saw this verse as being “similar to a 
                                                 
הב]ו[רו הר]ו[פ וניאש יפ לע ףא ץראה לע שמורה; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 265 (Neg. 177). This comment is absent 
from standard editions of the Sifra. 
1132 It appears that Maimonides treated mutakawwin and mutawallida as synonyms; note  למנלא
דלותמלא ראיטלא יתלא הכאופלא ֿהנופע ןמ הבורו הרופ וניא ; and הערצלאו  הנופעלא ןמ הדלותמלא ...ענתמי אלו  וא הערצלא דלות
 וא הלמנלא ...יפו תאנופעלא ןמ הכאופלא ל'כאד ; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 268-69; Neg. 179. 
1133 He reformulated this in Hilkhot Maʾakhlot Asurot, 2:16; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 
265n79, 268n99; see also Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 115-16. Spontaneous generation was 
widely accepted in this period. Maimonides testified to his belief in it in many places; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 269 (Neg. 179); idem, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:220 (mḤul 9:6; calling it 
“confounding” [mudhish]); Hilkhot Shabbat, 11:2-3; Hilkhot Tumat Meit, 3:10; Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 
2:13-14; Guide, I:72 (eds. Munk and Joel, 130); and his Medical Aphorisms, 24:11, in idem, Pirqei Moshe 
bi-Refuʾah: be-Tirgumo shel R. Natan ha-Meʾati, ed. Sussmann Muntner (Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 
1959), 304; treated in Fred Rosner, Medicine in the Mishneh Torah of Maimonides (New York: Ktav, 1984) 
294-95; and Davidson, Maimonides, 160n155. Kafiḥ was troubled by this; see Maimonides, Mishneh 
Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 3:231-32 (Hilkhot Shabbat, 11:2); and idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 269n2. Note his 
inconsistent translations of Maimonides’ terms for spontaneous generation; there, 265n78, 267n96. On 
Aristotelian discussion of spontaneous generation, see James G. Lennox, “Teleology, Chance, and 
Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 219-38; 
and Allan Gotthelf, “Teleology and Spontaneous Generation in Aristotle: A Discussion,” in Nature, 
Knowledge, and Virtue: Essays in Memory of Joan Kung, eds. Terry Penner and Richard Kraut (Edmonton: 
Academic Print. and Pub., 1989), 181-95. For medieval Jewish views of spontaneous generation, see Harry 
Austryn Wolfson, “Hallevi and Maimonides on Design, Chance and Necessity,” PAAJR 11 (1941): 146-48; 
and Ahuva Gaziel, “Spontaneous Generation in Medieval Jewish Philosophy and Theology,” History of 
Philosophy and Life Sciences 32 (2012): 461-80. For medieval Muslim views, see Remke Kruk, “A Frothy 
Bubble: Spontaneous Generation in Medieval Islamic Thought,” JSS 35 (1990): 265-82; idem, “Ibn Ḥazm’s 
Tadpoles: A Ẓāhirite Reads the Book of Nature,” in Words, Texts and Concepts Cruising the 
Mediterranean Sea, eds. R. Arnzen and J. Thielmann (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 401-409; idem, “Ibn Sīnā on 
Animals: Between the First Teacher and the Physician,” in Avicenna and His Heritage, eds. Jules Janssens 
and Daniel de Smet (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2002), 334-39; and Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, 
Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories of the Active Intellect, and Theories of 
Human Intellect (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 233-35. 
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prohibition that includes additional acts” (shibh isur kolel).1134 Since Maimonides was 
adamant that repeated prohibitions could only incur a single punishment (as set forth in 
Principle Nine, a conclusion which he termed “the true, demonstrated principles of the 
text of the Talmud”), he regarded earlier interpretations of “anything that swarms” as 
misguided.1135 Instead, without citing any evidence in rabbinic literature, Maimonides 
asserted that “anything that swarms” refers specifically to swimming insects. He 
recognized that “anything that swarms” could conceivably cover flying, crawling, and 
swimming insects1136 – unlike the prohibitions against consuming flying and crawling 
insects, whose prohibitions “are made clear” (alladhī tabayyana fīhi al-lav) – yet he 
nevertheless contended that this phrase must address creatures not yet mentioned, 
                                                 
1134 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 265 (Neg. 179); see n83. Though he rejected this, he 
appears to echo it in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12 (םימה ץרשו ףועה ץרשו ץראה ץרש הז ואלב ללכ ירה); see 
Horowitz, Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 519 (Prin. Nine). R. Moses ben Jacob of 
Coucy, who did not have access to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, read this line in the Mishneh Torah to adopt the view 
of Alfasi and others; see Sefer Miṣvot ha-Gadol, 43b-44a. On Moses of Coucy’s lack of access to 
Maimonides’ Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see Ephraim E. Urbach, Baʿalei ha-Tosafot: Toldoteihem, Ḥibureihem, Shit
̣atam (Jerusalem: Mosad Bialik, 1986), 1:472; and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 2 
(introductory pagination). Joseph ben Meir Teomim, Shoshant ʿAmaqim (Frankfurt, 1782), 120b-121a, also 
wondered about this phrase. Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 115, asserted that shibh isur kolel 
accords only with the rejected view; he did not explain the similar line in the Mishneh Torah. For 
Maimonides’ definition of isur kolel, see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 5:359-60 (mKer 3:4); see also 
there, 5:84 (mZev 3:2). 
1135 דומלתלא ץנ יפ הנהרבתמלא החיחצלא לוצאלא ףאל'כ ילע אלא םתי אלו דרטי אל חיחצ ריג ריספת והו; 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266-67 (Neg. 179). 
1136  ץרשה לכב םכיתושפנ תא וצקשת לא הלוק והו ץרש לכ ללכב א'ציא םימה ץרש םרחי י'דלא םכיתושפנ תא וצקשת לא
ץרושה; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 267; or י'דלא ץנלא א'דה וה םכיתושפנ תא וצקשת לא אנדפתסא אמנא 
םירחת הנמ םימה ץרש םל י'דלא הצא'כ ךל'ד םהפאפ א'דה ריג דר'גמ ואל היפ י'גי  (268; Neg. 179). Compare the definition 
in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12:  ץרשה לכב םכיתושפנ תא וצקשת לא רמאנש הרותה ןמ הקול םימה ץרשמ תיזכ לכואה
םימה ץרשו ףועה ץרשו ץראה ץרש הז ואלב ללכ ירה םהב ואמטת אלו ץרושה. It is not clear why he did not offer Lev. 
11:11 (“Anything … that has no fins and scales, among all the swarming things of the water and among all 
the other living creatures that are in the water, they are an abomination for you”) as the source. Perhaps he 
understood “swarming things of the water” to refer to fish; see Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 264 (Neg. 173). 
He may also have accepted Lev. 11:43 as the source for this prohibition before offering this interpretation; 
see the next note. See also Vidal of Tolosa, Magid Mishneh, to Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:12, in idem, 
Mishneh Torah, ed. Frankel, 4:133; and Kafiḥ’s comments in Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 8:63-64. On 
Maimonides’ interpretation of Lev. 11:43, compare Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 19; first noted in Horowitz, 
Marganita Ṭava, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 514 (Prin. Nine). 
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namely, swimming insects, because one cannot receive two punishments for overlapping 
verses.1137 
Armed with these claims, Maimonides identified the commandments violated by 
eating the puṭita, nemalah, and ṣirʿah, respectively. In his view, consumption of the 
puṭita violates the prohibitions against eating (1) a non-kosher bird, (2) a flying insect, (3) 
a crawling insect, and (4) a water insect;1138 consumption of the nemalah violates the 
prohibitions against consuming (1) an insect born in fruit, (2) a crawling insect, (3) a 
spontaneously generated insect, (4) a flying insect, and (5) a water insect. All of these 
prohibitions would also be violated by consumption of the ṣirʿah, along with the 
                                                 
1137 Kafiḥ (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 266n88) suggested that Maimonides’ first 
draft of Sefer ha-Miṣvot adopted the earlier view, arguing that when Maimonides usually cites views that he 
opposed, he would first outline his own position. If so, Maimonides could have originally held Lev. 11:43 
to be different from other repetitions because it covers multiple distinct commandments and does not repeat 
the same commandment. For the suggestion that harsh language indicates that Maimonides first held a 
rejected position, see Fixler, “Lashon Taqifah,” 161-88. It may also be significant that Negative 
Commandment #179, which may have, at one point, covered all types of insects, appears at the end of this 
list. If it is merely a prohibition against consuming water insects, why is it not Negative Commandment 
#177? Compare the order of these prohibitions in Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:23:  ץרשמ הירבה התיהש ירה
ץראה ץרשמו םימה ץרשמו ףועה (see below, n1139). (The verses listed in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 268 [Neg. 179], are clearly corrupt; the text in ed. Bloch, 254-55 [Neg. 179], is much more 
coherent.) 
1138 This is the conclusion in published editions (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 255; ed. 
Heller, 144; and ed. Kafiḥ, 268 [Neg. 179]). Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 22 (introductory pagination; Prin. 
Nine), claimed that this is “the first edition” (ha-haʿataqah ha-rishonah), but that he found “the final 
edition” (ha-haʿataqah ha-aḥaronah) that described the puṭita as (1) born in fruit, (2) a crawling insect, (3) 
spontaneously generated, and (4) a flying insect. Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides had this latter 
text; see ibid, ed. Heller, 9 (introductory pagination), 144n6; and MS. Hunt. 185, 147a, 160a; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 27, 42-43 (§4). It appears more likely that Daniel and Abraham worked with an earlier version, as 
in other cases (e.g., those treated below, nn1153, 1197). This factor and the fact that Bloch, Kafiḥ, and Ibn 
Tibbon have what Duran considered to be the “first edition,” lead me to conclude that Duran’s “final 
edition” was actually the earlier edition. The approach in this earlier version had the advantage of adding 
one commandment to each of the nemalah (a water insect) and ṣirʿah (a water insect and non-kosher bird), 
while the other version assumes that the puṭita is not spontaneously generated. Naḥmanides’ text agreed 
with published editions; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 106 (Prin. Nine). Solomon ibn 
Ayyub’s translation, in Kokhavi, Sefer ha-Batim, ed. Hershler, 2:383 (Neg. 179), includes an incomplete 
list. 
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prohibition against eating (6) a non-kosher bird.1139 Maimonides defended the claim that 
the ṣirʿah is both a bird and an insect, writing that it has conditions (ḥālāt) and performs 
actions (afʿālahu) of each.1140 
 
Verbs in the Prohibitive Mood that Cover Many Acts (Lav shebe-Khlalot) 
The lengthy section “appended” to Principle Nine – “the important principle” (al-
aṣl al-kabīr),1141 in Maimonides’ words – further complicates the relationship between 
the Pentateuch and the enumerated “concepts” and underscores the role of punishments in 
the enumeration. Maimonides argued that every “concept” must either be based on a lav 
mujarrad, “a verb in the prohibitive mood with a single attached object” (which I will 
term “exclusive verb”),1142 or be identified as a discrete commandment by “the 
transmitters” (al-nāqilīn). However, he wrote, if a single do not “includes many 
concepts” (yashtamil ʿala maʿānī kathīra), then all associated “concepts” count as a 
                                                 
1139 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 268-69 (Neg. 179). In Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 
2:23, he did not mention these creatures and listed the prohibitions in a different order: (1) flying insects, 
(2) water insects, (3) crawling insects, (4) creatures created (nivraʾu) in fruit, (5) spontaneously generated 
creatures, and (6) non-kosher birds. This change is noted and discussed in Berlin, Haʿamek Sheʾelah, 2:95. 
Standard editions of Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 2:23, are corrupt; recent editions fix the error. Abraham 
Maimonides’ version agrees with the correct text; see MS. Hunt. 185, 158b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 41 (§4); 
noted in Maʿaseh Nissim, ed. Kahana, 9-10n63. 
1140 After all, he noted, others described the puṭita as both a fish and water insect; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 268 (Neg. 179). 
1141 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 42 (Prin. Nine). 
1142 Blau, Dictionary, 84, s.v. د َّرَجُم, offered: simple, uncomplicated, unaccompanied by proofs, and 
explicit. Among other possibilities, E.W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (Beirut, 1968), 407, s.v. د ًّّرَجُم, 
has divested of every accessory. Ibn Tibbon used lav be-yiḥud (Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 
20; Prin. Nine); and Kafiḥ, lav meyuḥad (ed. Kafiḥ, 37; Prin. Nine). In two places, Maimonides appears to 
use the phrase lav mujarrad to denote a verse that repeats a commanded “concept” but is more specific or 
focused; there, 307 (Neg. 269), 308 (Neg. 270). Two other appearances of this phrase conform better to the 
usage in Principle Nine; there, 269 (Neg. 179), 337 (Neg. 349). Though he mentioned positive commands 
(al-maʿānī al-maʾmūr), I have found no evidence that this section impacts the Positive Commandments.  
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single commandment.1143 In other words, “don’t do X and don’t do Y” constitutes two 
commandments, but “don’t do X and Y” only constitutes one. 
Maimonides used the Aramaic term lav shebe-khlalot in order to describe the 
opposite of a lav mujarrad. Medieval talmudists noted the complexity of this term,1144 
which may be provisionally translated “a prohibition that covers multiple laws.” The 
Babylonian Talmud applies this term to eleven verses.1145 A brief overview of some of 
this term’s talmudic appearances will provide background for Maimonides’ deployment 
of lav shebe-khlalot. Two sugyot use the term lav shebe-khlalot to designate a verse 
understood by the rabbis to mandate numerous unrelated and non-explicit prohibitions. 
One such example is, “Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26); violation of laws derived 
from this type of lav shebe-khlalot incurs no punishment.1146 Other sugyot consider a do 
not with several explicit prohibitions a lav shebe-khlalot, such as “Eat no fat of ox nor 
                                                 
1143 'ץעב ןמ אה'צעב ]אהלכ[ ינאעמלא לצפ הנא ןילקאנלא הנולוקי לילד וא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 37 (Prin. Nine). 
1144 See Judah ben Kalonymus ben Meir, ʿErkhei Tanaʾim ve-Amoraʾim, ed. Moses Blau (New 
York, 1994), ed. Moses Blau, 1:101: םהיקוליחב ]שי[ לודג קוליח ואלב ןילולכ ןהש פ"עא יתבתכש ולא לכו; Isaiah di 
Trani the Elder, Tosafot ha-Rid (Lemberg, 1869), 16a (bPes 41a): ןיא תומוקמ הברהב רכזומה תוללכבש ואלד וישכע 
פתנורם ושה יד ןיאונוש םה ; Solomon ben Abraham Ibn Adret, Teshuvot, 1:74 (§141):  ןיא ארמגב תוללכבש ואל ןינע
דחא דצ לע ולוכ; Aharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer ha-Ḥinukh, ed. Chavel, 136 (§79):  רפסב והוראב רבכ הז ןינע שוריפ
 רודה ילודג ינש יעישתה רקיעב תווצמה ... הפי רבדה ררבל הזב םהיתויארו םהישוריפ םש וביחרהוןינעה ךיראיו ; and Menaḥem 
ha-Meiri, Beit ha-Beḥirah, Masekhet Bava Qamma, ed. Kalman Shlessinger (Jerusalem: Meqiṣei 
Nirdamim, 1959), 423 (bBQ 115a-115b): םישרפמה דיב הברה לבלובמ (see there, 428). See Babad, Minḥat 
Ḥinukh, 1:48: ע לכה ראבל ןוכנ לרטנוק ךירצדחוימ ס . 
1145 The most organized presentation of the talmudic sources is Judah ben Kalonymus, ʿErkhei 
Tanaʾim, 1:98-101. For full discussion, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav shebe-khlalot, 35:617-70. The 
phrase lav shebe-khlalot is apparently Babylonian in origin (Breuer, “Ḥidushim Miloniyim,” 56-57); 
tannaitic literature seems unaware of this concept; see Rabad to Hilkhot ʿAvodah Zarah, 3:9 (citing tMak 
5:7, Moses Samuel Zuckermandel, Tosefta ʿal pi kitvei yad Erfurṭ u-Vienna [Jerusalem, 1937], 444 lines 
15-16). The Babylonian Talmud does impute lav shebe-khlalot into a tannaitic debate (bKer 4a). Note also 
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 118 (Prin. Nine), treating yNaz 6:1 (54d), and 
Teomim, Shoshanot ʿAmaqim, 122b-123b. 
1146 See bSan 63a; see also bPes 24a citing Ex. 29:34 
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sheep nor goat” (Lev. 7:23).1147 Two other types of verses classified as lav shebe-khlalot 
that are central to Maimonides’ treatment are less clear: “Do not eat of it [i.e., the paschal 
sacrifice] raw or cooked, but roasted over fire” (Ex. 12:9),1148 and “Throughout his term 
as a nazirite, anything obtained from the grapevine, even seeds or skin, he shall not eat” 
(Num. 6:4).1149 Is each a lav shebe-khlalot because it contains a single “do not”? Or was 
it included in this designation because the prohibitions against eating a non-roasted 
paschal sacrifice and against consuming “anything obtained from the grapevine” cover 
many items? The Talmud also notes that “superfluous” words (miyater[ei] qera) serve “to 
divide” (le-ḥaleq) a lav shebe-khlalot verse and to impose multiple punishments (bKer 
4a-5a). 
In a recurring talmudic debate (e.g., bPes 41a, bNaz 38b), Abaye and Rava debate 
whether violation of the prohibitions pertaining to the paschal sacrifice and the nazirite 
results in punishment for each explicit prohibition1150 or in no punishment (manuscripts 
disagree about who adopted which view 1151). In several discussions of this debate, the 
Talmud offers two interpretations (ika de-amrei) of the statement that violation of these 
prohibitions incurs “no punishment”: either violating all of the explicit prohibitions 
                                                 
1147 See bKer 4a. 
1148 See bPes 41a. 
1149 See bNaz 38b. “Seeds” (ḥarṣanim) and “skin” (zag) are hapax legomena; translation follows 
rabbinic interpretation. 
1150 I.e., eating a cooked paschal sacrifice violates “cooked” and “not … roasted,” and eating grape 
seeds, “anything obtained from the grapevine” and “even seeds” 
1151 As noted by medieval commentators; see, e.g., Tosafot, bMen 58b, s.v. ve-ika; Judah ben 
Kalonymus, ʿErkhei Tanaʾim, 1:99; Rabad to Hilkhot Nezirut, 5:8; Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-
Rambam, ed. Chavel, 125-26 (Prin. Nine); Ibn Adret, Sheʾelot u-Teshuvot, 1:74 (§141); and Daniel ha-
Bavli and Abraham Maimonides’ statements, treated below. See also Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Heller, 21-22n68; ed. Kafiḥ 39n38, 229n66; and Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav shebe-khlalot, 35:661-
62nn457-58, 461. 
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incurs one punishment (miha ḥada laqi) or none at all.1152 Maimonides ruled that 
violation of a lav shebe-khlalot with several discrete prohibitions incurs only one 
punishment. He seems to have initially ascribed this position to Abaye, but later to 
Rava.1153 (Notably, both Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel – whose approach to lav shebe-khlalot 
prefigures, and may have influenced, Maimonides’ views1154 – and Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ 
attributed this view to Abaye.1155) 
The Commentary on the Mishnah contains two definitions of lav shebe-khlalot, 
and it appears that they were written at different times.1156 The first defines lav shebe-
khlalot as a prohibition that “is not stated (lam yaʾtī, lit., does not arrive) with a clarifying 
                                                 
1152 Different manuscripts record this in different sugyot. 
1153 Daniel ha-Bavli reported that Principle Nine and Negative Commandment #94 cite Abaye, but 
some copies (baʿḍ al-nusakh) of Principle Nine cite Rava. Abraham Maimonides instructed Daniel to 
change all texts to Rava; MS. Hunt., 149a-149b, 164b-165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30, 49 (§4). Bloch has Rava 
in Principle Nine and Abaye in Negative Commandment #94; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 40 
(Prin. Nine), 216 (Neg. 94); see there, nn1-2; and the version cited in Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. 
Raṣhabi, 102; see there, 41n62. The translation of Negative Commandment #94, in Kokhavi, Sefer ha-
Batim, ed. Hershler, 2:348, has Abaye. Kafiḥ and Ibn Tibbon have Rava in both places; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Heller, 21-22n68, 122n21; ed. Kafiḥ, 39 (Prin. Nine), 229 (Neg. 94).  
1154 See below, n1167. 
1155 At least in contemporary editions; Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel, 
Pesaḥim, ed. Meṣger, 93 (bPes 41b); and Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 176 lines 4-5. 
1156 The first definition appears in the body of the text at the bottom of a page and continues 
midsentence in the first four lines of an eight-line marginal note, and the second appears in the remainder of 
the note (the next page begins a new topic.) The first part of the note is written in what Solomon Sassoon 
called “Slow Cursive,” but the second in a tighter script. Most likely, an earlier draft included the entire 
first definition and Maimonides later added the second. (I find it less likely that the entire note was added 
from an earlier draft, in part because the second definition starts at the beginning of a new line.) Sassoon 
thought that the whole note was added at one time, writing: “It may be remarked that in trying to conjecture 
the period of an alteration, not only the form of the writing but its subject matter also may help in the 
determination. For instance, the long addendum in Tractate Makkoth (II.314) on the subject of תוללכבש ואל 
may well be contemporary with the writing of תוצמה רפס where this subject is also discussed at some length. 
Furthermore, it is in a condensed Slow Cursive, and would therefore fit in with the very early alterations 
mentioned above”; Maimonidis Commentarius in Mischnam (Hafniae [Copenhagen]: Ejnar Munksgaard, 
1956), 1:33. This overlooks the different scripts and the fact that the first four lines pick up the discussion 
midsentence. Kafiḥ wrote that the first four lines were added first and the second later; Maimonides, 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238n45 (mMak 3:1). I thank Robert Brody for helping me work through 
some of these issues. 
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[statement] (bi-bayān) but is derived (yustakhraj) from another statement;”1157 
Maimonides related this definition of lav shebe-khlalot to the talmudic phrase “implicitly 
stated” (mi-khlala itmar). He offered two simple examples: (1) “You shall eat no bread 
or parched grain or fresh ears … until you have brought the offering” (Lev. 23:14; see 
bKer 5a) implies a prohibition against consuming any part of the new crop (ḥadash) 
before offering its sacrifice; and (2) “Do not eat of it raw or cooked,” implies “do not eat 
it other than roasted.” He explained that “implied” prohibitions incur no punishment, but 
each explicit prohibition (i.e., “bread or parched grain or fresh ears” or “raw or 
cooked”) does.1158 
In Maimonides’ third example, the case of the nazirite, who is forbidden to 
consume “anything obtained from the grapevine, even seeds or skin” (Num. 6:4), he 
understood the words “anything obtained” to imply other grape products. While the 
Talmud (bNaz 38b) reports that the Amoraim, Abaye and Rava, debated the number of 
punishments a nazirite would incur (if any) for consuming combinations of grape seeds 
and skins – whether this incurs “no punishment,” or one for grape seeds, one for skins, 
and one for “anything obtained,” Maimonides assumed (based on other sugyot) that “no 
punishment” in fact means one punishment.1159 He also claimed that this talmudic debate 
was applicable to all five prohibitions in Num. 6:3-4 (“[1] Vinegar of wine or of any 
other intoxicant he shall not drink, anything in which grapes have been steeped he shall 
                                                 
1157 ר'כא םאלכ ןמ 'גר'כתסי הנכל ןאיבב יתאי םל ואל; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:237 
(mMak 3:1). 
1158 Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:237-38 (mMak 3:1); see however there, n48. 
See Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 179 (Prin. Nine). He revised this in Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot; see below. 
1159 It is conceivable that this appeared in Maimonides’ text of bNaz 38b. 
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not drink, grapes [2] fresh or [3] dried he shall not eat. Throughout his term as a nazirite, 
anything obtained from the grapevine, even [4] seeds or [5] skin, he shall not eat”).1160 
According to Maimonides, had the Pentateuch stated, “anything obtained from the 
grapevine he shall not eat, even seeds or skin he shall not eat,” the consumption of seeds 
would have resulted in two punishments, one for each “he shall not eat” (i.e., each do 
not). However, since “anything obtained from the grapevine” lacks an independent do 
not, it qualifies as a lav shebe-khlalot; for this reason, the eating of seeds or of skin 
violates “only [one] prohibition” (ghayr lav).1161 
Maimonides’ early understanding of lav shebe-khlalot formulations as statements 
that “imply” prohibitions might conceivably account for all talmudic uses of this term, 
and his later definition of lav shebe-khlalot in the Commentary on the Mishnah may have 
been added when he was writing Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1162 In the later definition, he wrote that 
a lav shebe-khlalot may also be “one verb in the prohibitive mood (lav eḥad) that 
encompasses (yaʿumm) two [or] three prohibitions (isurei),”1163 and he labeled this 
                                                 
1160 The Mishnah (mNaz 6:2) omits the distinction between “fresh” and “dried” grapes; it is added 
in bNaz 38b (both cited in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 281; [Neg. 206]). In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 280 (Neg. 202), he insisted that the prohibition “vinegar of wine or of any other intoxicant he 
shall not drink” is one commandment because the verse does not read “he shall not drink wine, he shall not 
drink vinegar of wine.” “Anything … steeped” prohibits the taste of wine (ṭaʿam ke-ʿiqar; lit., taste is like 
the essence); see also Hilkhot Nezirut, 5:5, 9. 
1161 ואל ריג הרוכ'דמלא ןמ דחאו לכ ילע המזלי אל; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238 
(mMak 3:1). Two medieval translations (Naples, 1492, and the text in Meiri’s Beit ha-Beḥirah) read: “only 
one prohibition” (ele lav eḥad). On these translations, see Hopkins, Peirush ha-Rambam le-Masekhet 
Shabbat, xx-xxiii, and the literature cited there. The phrase lav shebe-khlalot appears nowhere else in the 
Commentary. Kafiḥ explained Maimonides’ claim that a certain prohibition imposes no punishment 
because “it is not clearly forbidden” (laysat bi-bayyanat al-taḥrīm; i.e., not explicit) to be based on the 
concept of lav shebe-khlalot; see Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:185 and n6 (mSan 7:6). 
1162 As suggested by Sassoon, though I disagree with Sassoon’s treatment; see above, n1156. 
1163 ירוסא התלת ירת םעי דחא ואל יתאי ןא; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238 (mMak 
3:1). The similar statement in idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 38 (Prin. Nine), includes “or”:  תוללכבש ואל
ואל דחמ ירוסיא אתלת וא ירת ותאד אוה. 
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meaning “clearer and easier to understand” than the first.1164 The sole example he cited is 
“Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26), describing this as a phrase that “included 
(kalal) many prohibitions, none of which was made clear (lam yatabayyan) so that we 
[must] impose (lit., say) one [additional] set of lashes over that which was made 
clear.”1165 This definition distinguishes between a lav shebe-khlalot that implies 
additional prohibitions beyond what is explicit, and a lav shebe-khlalot that lacks any 
explicit prohibitions. 
Maimonides offered two definitions of lav shebe-khlalot in Principle Nine of his 
Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Reiterating the point made in the passage that was added 
to the Commentary on the Mishnah, he gave the example of prohibitions like, “Do not eat 
upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26), which creates five1166 prohibitions. The “concepts” that are 
“included under” (mushtamila taḥta) such statements constitute a single commandment, 
and their violation incurs no punishment. The second definition in Principle Nine, offered 
by earlier talmudists1167 but not explicitly discussed by Maimonides in the Commentary 
on the Mishnah, is that a do not with several “attached” (maʿṭūfa)1168 objects (ashyaʾ 
                                                 
1164 המדקתמלא תאלא'תמלא ןמ םהפ להסאו ןיבא; Maimonides, Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:239 
(mMak 3:1). 
1165 דחא תוקלמ ןיבת י'דלא ילע ןיקול לוקנ 'תיח ןמ דחאו אהנמ ןיבתי םלו הברה ןירוסא ללכ הנא; Maimonides, 
Mishnah ʿim Peirush, ed. Kafiḥ, 4:238-39 (mMak 3:1). 
1166 Ibn Tibbon has six; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 21 (Prin. Nine) and n54. See 
also idem, Mishneh Torah, ed. Kafiḥ, 22:170 (Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 18:1). On Ibn Janāḥ and Ibn Balʿam’s 
interpretations of Lev. 19:26, which are relevant here, see Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 62, 
65, 69; see also there, 168-70, 396. 
1167 Ḥananel ben Ḥushiel, Peirushei Rabbeinu Ḥananel, Pesaḥim, ed. Meṣger, 93 (bPes 41b):  ואל
לשובמ לכואהו אנ לכאוה ללוכ דחא ואל רמולכ תוללכבש. See also the so-called Mainz commentary to bMen 58b:  לע
ל דחד תוללכבש ואלויבוריעו שבדו רואש וב ללוכו וריטקת אל אוה וא . For others, see Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. lav 
shebe-khlalot, 35:647n329. Joshua ha-Nagid, Teshuvot, ed. Raṣhabi, 101, explained lav shebe-khlalot as a 
“compound term, meaning, a prohibition that includes many goals” ( 'ץארגא תוללכ ובש ואל ינעי הבכרמ ה'צפל
הרי'תכ); see there, 40n57. 
1168 On this term, see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38n35. 
 
322 
 
kathīra, lit., many things) constitutes a single commandment (e.g., “Do not eat of it raw 
or cooked”; Ex. 12:9).1169 This claim echoes the assertion in the Commentary about the 
hypothetical verse, “anything obtained from the grapevine he shall not eat, even seeds or 
skin he shall not eat.” Such a formulation, Maimonides had asserted, would not constitute 
a lav shebe-khlalot, but would, instead, impose punishment for each “shall not eat.”1170 
Integrating talmudic evidence, Maimonides explained that each “attached” object 
may impose a distinct punishment if it is based on Sinaitic tradition (i.e., the tafsīr marwī) 
or if one “thing” appears in a separate verse. In such cases, he wrote, each “thing” is a 
distinct sheim (category) and a discrete commandment. However, without such evidence, 
the prohibition constitutes a single commandment and the violation of any or all of the 
“things” incurs only one punishment.1171 He summarized his entire presentation in 
Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 18:3, citing examples crucial to Principle Nine: 
What is meant by a lav shebe-khlalot? It is a do not (lav) that includes several 
matters (she-kolel ʿinyanyim harbeh), such as the injunction “Do not eat upon the 
blood” (Lev. 19:26). Moreover, it comprises such cases as Scripture’s saying, “do 
not do this and that.” Since there is no unique do not prohibiting (lo yiḥed lo lav) 
each act, violation does not incur the penalty of flogging, unless [Scripture] 
divided it [the matter] with other do nots (ḥalaq otah be-lavin aḥeirim), or there is 
an aural tradition (neʾemar mi-pi ha-shemuʿah) that each be treated separately. 
How so? For example, Scripture says, “Do not eat of it raw or cooked” (Ex. 12:9). 
If one eats of it raw and cooked, he is flogged not twice but once. Concerning new 
produce (ḥadash) it says, “You shall eat no bread or parched grain or fresh ears” 
(Lev. 23:14), and if one ate all three, he is liable for three floggings, for we 
learned by way of aural tradition that this [i.e., extra words] serves to divide (le-
ḥaleq). It is said, “Let none be found among you who passes his son or daughter 
through the fire, or who is an augur” (Deut. 18:10). Although these matters are 
covered by a single prohibition, they are divided by other prohibitions, saying, 
                                                 
1169 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 37-38 (Prin. Nine). 
1170 “Implied” prohibitions appear tangentially in Principle Nine; see below. 
1171 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38, 41-42 (Prin. Nine); the latter conclusion helped 
Maimonides reduce the number of enumerated commandments. 
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“You shall not practice divination and you shall not practice soothsaying” (Lev. 
19:26). This teaches (melammed) that each one is affected by its own do not (be-
lav bifnei ʿaṣmo). So, too, all similar cases.1172 
Single Prohibitions that Cover Multiple Non-Explicit Acts 
Principle Nine cites two other prohibitions that cover several non-explicit laws: 
“You shall not place a stumbling block before the blind” (Lev. 19:14) and “You shall not 
carry false reports” (Ex. 23:1). In the enumeration, Maimonides wrote that although the 
peshaṭeh di-qera of Lev. 19:14 refers to giving improper advice, the rabbis said that this 
verse encompasses (yaʿumm) many “things,” such as helping another sin, or lending with 
interest; it is, therefore, a lav shebe-khlalot.1173 The rabbis also understood Ex. 23:1 as 
including a number of prohibitions.1174 
“Do not eat upon the blood” (Lev. 19:26) serves as the archetype of this kind of 
lav shebe-khlalot, but Maimonides’ enumeration privileges one talmudic interpretation 
(bSan 63a), which sees this verse as a “warning” (azharah) for the rebellious son (Deut. 
                                                 
1172  ינולפ רבד השעת אל רמאנ םא ןכו םדה לע ולכאת אל ןוגכ הברה םינינע ללוכש דחא ואל הז תוללכבש ואל והז יא
 יפמ רמאנ וא םירחא ןיואלב התוא קלח ןכ םא אלא דחאו דחא לכ לע ןיקול ןיא ןהמ דחאו דחא לכל ואל ול דחי אלו ליאוה ינולפו
וקלחנש העומשה  אוה שדחבו תחא אלא םיתש לשובמהו אנה לע הקול וניא לשובמ לשבו אנ ונממ ולכאת לא רמאנש הז ןוגכ דציכ
ילקו םחלו רמוא  ונב ריבעמ ךב אצמי אל רמאנ ירה קלחל הזש ודמל העומשה יפמ תויקלמ שלש ןתשלש לע בייחו ולכאת אל למרכו
 דמלמ וננועת אלו ושחנת אל רמאו םירחא ןיואלב םתוא קלח ירה דחא ואלב םינינעה לכ ללכש יפ לע ףאו םימסק םסוק שאב ותבו
 ןהמ דחא לכשהזב אצויכ לכ ןכו ומצע ינפב ואלב ; translation based on Maimonides, The Code of Maimonides, Book 
Fourteen: The Book of Judges, trans. Abraham M. Hershman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), 
51, with changes.  
1173 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin. Nine), 320-21 (Neg. 299). My interpretation 
disagrees with Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 318-20, esp. 320n111, who argued that 
Maimonides considered only the peshaṭ reading biblical in status and other readings, rabbinic (he called the 
latter furūʿ, a term that Maimonides did not use). As Cohen noted, in his other works, Maimonides 
considered other readings biblical in status, consistent with his comment in Principle Nine. Similarly, I am 
hesitant to accept Cohen’s treatment of Maimonides’ understanding of Deut. 23:24; see Maimonides, Sefer 
ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 109 (Pos. 94); and Cohen, Opening the Gates of Interpretation, 325-27; compare 
there, 301n67. This case is less clear; I treat Cohen’s larger argument above, n445. 
1174 Such as a judge may not hear claims of one litigant in the absence of the other, one may not 
speak or accept evil speech, nor bear false witness; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin. 
Nine), 312 (Neg. 281). See Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 21:7. See similarly Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 246 (Neg. 
163), for a lav that prohibits distinct but related acts. 
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21:20), a glutton and drunkard. Characterizing the verse in question as a “prohibition 
against desiring much (istikthār)1175 food and drink as a youth,”1176 Maimonides 
explained that, because the punishment is explicit (Deut. 21:21), “it remains for us to 
seek the warning according to our principles (uṣūlinā) ‘Scripture did not punish unless 
[first] it warned’.”1177 Maimonides elsewhere emphasized that an explicit punishment 
may supersede the lack of “particularized (mukhtaṣṣa) warning.”1178 “It is not 
impossible,” he wrote, “for one prohibition (al-nahy al-wāḥid) to prohibit many things, 
and its rule not be that of lav shebe-khlalot, if the punishment is made clear for each and 
every concept (maʿnā).”1179 In each case, Scripture’s statement indicating a punishment 
constitutes Maimonides’ preferred source for the prohibition.1180 
                                                 
1175 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Bloch, 264 (Neg. 195); ed. Kafiḥ has istihtār, excessively 
following desires; see ed. Kafiḥ, 276n28, 276-77n74-75. Ibn Ayyub had Bloch’s text; Ibn Tibbon’s is not 
clear; see ed. Heller, 148 and n16. 
1176 רגצלא ןס יפ בארשלאו םעטלא יפ רא'תכתסאלא ןע אניהנ י'דלא יהנלא; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Bloch, 264 (Neg. 195). 
1177 ריהזה ןכ םא אלא בותכה שנע אל אנלוצא ילע הרהזאלא ןע 'תחבנ ןא יקבו שנועלא ןאבו; Maimonides, Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 276-77 (Neg. 195). This also appears in Principle Nine (there, 37), but not in the 
Commentary. See also Hilkhot Mamrim, 7:4, Hilkhot Sheḥita, 1:2, and Hilkhot Sanhedrin, 13:4, 18:3. 
1178 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 211 (Neg. 60). On this rule, see above, n663. 
1179  לכ יפ שנועלא ןייבת א'דא תוללכבש ואל םכח המכח ןוכי אלו הרי'תכ אישא ןע יהני דחאולא יהנלא ןוכ ענתמי אלו
ינעמו ינעמ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 193-94 (Neg. 26). 
1180 I have found four examples: (1) “You shall not curse elohim” (Ex. 22:27) constitutes the 
warning against cursing God and a judge (elohim can denote both in biblical Hebrew). The punishment for 
the former is Lev. 24:16; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 210-11 (Neg. 60), 326 (Neg. 316). (2) 
“You shall not curse the deaf” (Lev. 19:14) constitutes the warning against cursing any Jew and one’s 
parents. The punishment for the latter is Ex. 21:17; there, 326-29 (Neg. 317-18); see also Hilkhot Mamrim, 
5:4. (3) “He may be given up to forty lashes, but no more” (Deut. 25:2-3) constitutes the warning against 
hitting any Jew and one’s parents. The punishment for the latter is Ex. 21:15; there, 322 (Neg. 300), 329 
(Neg. 319). (4) “Make no mention of the names of other gods” (Ex. 23:13) constitutes the warning against 
taking an oath and prophesying in the name of a false god. The punishment for the latter is Deut. 18:20; 
there, 189 (Neg. 14), 193-94 (Neg. 26). In each case, the Short Enumeration quotes the “punishment” 
verse; idem, Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 35 line 19, 36 line 35, 39 lines 83-86, 60 line 416, 61 lines 
435, 437-40. The Short Enumeration reads “Do not eat upon the blood” to prohibit “eating and drinking the 
way of a glutton and drunkard, as it says ‘This son of ours … is a glutton and drunkard’,” and omits “Do 
not eat upon the blood” (אבוסו ללוז הז וננב רמאנש אבוסו ללוז ךרד תותשלו לוכאל אלש); there, 51 line 274. See 
Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 337-38 (Neg. 195); Aharon ha-Levi [?], Sefer ha-
Ḥinukh, ed. Chavel, 331-32 (§252); and Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 109-110 (Neg. §15), 136 (Neg. §58), 
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Prohibitions with Several “Attached” Laws  
Maimonides declared that, “in order that the intended matter be clarified with the 
utmost clarity,” he would list “many, … or perhaps all” of the lav shebe-khlalot 
prohibitions with “attached” laws.1181 His first example was eating the paschal sacrifice 
“raw or cooked” (Ex. 12:9). The Commentary on the Mishnah asserts that this verse 
“implies” a prohibition against eating a non-roasted paschal sacrifice (from “Do not eat 
of it … but roasted”; Ex. 12:9), and it asserts that the words raw and cooked each impose 
a punishment.1182 Principle Nine, however, claims that since the prohibition (lav) is not 
“isolated” (yafrud) for each “concept” (i.e., the “concepts” of raw and cooked), this 
prohibition constitutes a single commandment. For this reason, the violation of both raw 
and cooked incurs just one punishment. Although Maimonides also mentioned the 
“implied” prohibition of non-roasted paschal sacrifices, no other “implied” prohibitions 
appear in Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1183 The six final examples that Maimonides offered are mostly 
                                                 
207-208 (Neg. §131). Similarly, the “warning” “Do not turn to spirits and necromancers” (Lev. 19:31), 
should constitute a lav shebe-khlalot, but Maimonides explained that separate punishments in Lev. 20:27 
lead to the enumeration of two commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 186 (Neg. 9). The Short 
Enumeration lists the “warning”; Mishneh Torah, eds. Cohen et al., 35 lines 14-15.  
1181  ןמ יתלא אהלכ ןיואללא ךלת תרכ'ד אמבר דקו ינא'תלא עונלא א'דה ימסק ןמ הרי'תכלא תאלא'תמלא רכ'דא אנאו
א'דה ינא'תלא עונלא ינעמלא ןייבתי יתח ןאיבלא ֿהיאג דוצקמלא ; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38 (Prin. 
Nine). 
1182 Above, n1158. 
1183 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 38-39 (Prin. Nine), 238 (Neg. 125). The second 
example, “anything obtained from the grapevine,” appears out of place; see below. The third, “No meal 
offering … shall be made of leaven, for no leaven or honey may be offered” (Lev. 2:11), is significant 
because Maimonides did not consider the first clause to institute a unique commandment, unlike some 
claims treated below; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39-40 (Prin. Nine). 
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formulated, “don’t do X or Y,” and, significantly, they do not appear in rabbinic 
literature.1184  
Two cases not discussed in Principle Nine reveal difficulties that Maimonides had 
with this type of lav shebe-khlalot. The first treats the “extraneous” word “of them” 
(meihem) in “Anything blind, or injured, or maimed … you shall not put any of them on 
the altar” (Lev. 22:22). The Talmud (bTem 7b) considers the word meihem a lav shebe-
khlalot that prohibits the sacrifice of parts of blemished animals, but ultimately concludes 
by noting that the position that exempts this (every?)1185 lav shebe-khlalot from 
punishment is “refuted” (teyuvta de-X).1186 Accepting the conclusion that violation of the 
prohibition to sacrifice parts of blemished animals incurs punishment in the Commentary 
on the Mishnah, Maimonides described this prohibition as a distinct “concept” (maʿnā); 
in other words, it imposes punishment.1187 Sefer ha-Miṣvot, however, accepts the view 
that the Talmud had refuted, ascribes it to Rava,1188 and terms it “the sound principle” 
(al-aṣl al-ṣaḥīḥ).1189 In the second case, “A handmill or a millstone shall not be taken in 
                                                 
1184 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 40 (Prin. Nine). Notably, entering the Temple and 
giving a legal ruling while drunk, which share a single do not (Lev. 10:10-11), incur different punishments; 
there, 219-20 (Neg. 73). Somebody wrote to Maimonides asking why another example, “You shall not 
bring the fee of a harlot or the pay of a dog into the house of the Lord” (Deut. 23:18), appears as two 
commandments in the Short Enumeration. Maimonides replied that his correspondent’s text was corrupt; 
Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:724-25 (§447); see idem, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 231 (Neg. 100). I see no reason 
to doubt this; note that Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ counted these as two commandments; Halper, A Volume of the 
Book of Precepts, 70, 85, 156 line 7. See above, n904. 
1185 The Talmud simply renders the statement that one is not punished for violation of a lav shebe-
khlalot “refuted”; whether this applies only to the specific lav shebe-khlalot at issue or all such prohibitions 
is unclear; Daniel ha-Bavli took the latter view (see below, n1223). 
1186 This is Maimonides’ version. Other texts read “teyuvta de-X teyuvta”; see also below, n1262. 
1187 See above, n1099. 
1188 At least in what appears to be the final draft; see above n1153. 
1189 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 229-30 (Neg. 94); see Hilkhot Isurei Mizbeaḥ, chap. 
1. 
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pawn” (Deut. 24:6), Maimonides attempted to limit the consequences of the Talmud’s 
characterization of the verse as a lav shebe-khlalot (bBM 115a-116a).1190 
While most cases of “attached” laws constitute a single commandment in his 
enumeration, Maimonides explained that Sinaitic tradition, as preserved in rabbinic 
literature, may identify such laws as multiple commandments. Principle Nine cites the 
two talmudic examples in which “superfluous” words (according to the rabbis) in specific 
verses qualify them as this type of lav shebe-khlalot (Lev. 23:14 and Deut. 12:17; see 
bKer 4a-5a).1191 Based on the idea that “attached” laws may, in some cases, constitute 
distinct commandments, Maimonides asserted that nine idolatrous practices joined by one 
do not in Deut. 18:10-11 constitute nine discrete commandments because two are 
separated in Lev. 19:26 (“You shall not practice divination and you shall not practice 
soothsaying”).1192 An unnamed enumerator, who had counted as a single commandment 
the prohibitions in Lev. 21:7 (“They [i.e., the priests] shall not marry a [1] harlot, [2] a 
defiled woman [ḥalalah], [3] nor shall they marry one divorced from her husband”), in 
Maimonides’ view, failed to understand this. Though Maimonides “excused” this 
enumerator for grouping together the first two cases, which share a single do not, he 
                                                 
1190 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 295-96 (Neg. 242). The Mishnah (mBM 9:3) renders 
one “guilty” (ḥayav) for each; bBM 115a-116a records a debate as to whether Deut. 24:6 is a lav shebe-
khlalot. Maimonides claimed that this asks whether the taking of two interdependent utensils receives two 
punishments. Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Hellman, 155 (Prin. Nine), argued 
that this shows that Maimonides ignored the presence of punishments when counting commandments; I 
think that this just shows the challenge of applying talmudic evidence to Maimonides’ system. 
1191 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 40-41 (Prin. Nine); see also there, 246 (Neg. 143). 
On the text of this passage, see ed. Heller, 23n91. Maimonides cited the statement that burning was singled 
out to impose separate liability for each Sabbath labor (havʿarah le-ḥeileq yaṣat; bSab 70a), but not to 
count distinct commandments; ed. Kafiḥ, 330 (Neg. 322). Note that the Commentary considers the first a 
lav shebe-khlalot due to an “implied” prohibition; see above, n1158. 
1192 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 41 (Prin. Nine). Note that rabbinic literature does not 
designate Deut. 18:10-11 or Lev. 21:7 as lav shebe-khlalot verses.  
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ultimately rejected this, inasmuch as the Talmud says that one is “guilty” (ḥayav; i.e., for 
Maimonides, worthy of punishment) for each (bQid 77a). The unnamed enumerator’s 
inclusion of the third case with the others, was, for Maimonides, “absolutely inexcusable” 
(lā ʿudhr fīhi al-batta), as it has a “clarifying, stand-alone prohibiting verb” (be-lav bi-
fnei ʿaṣmo mubayyin).1193 
 
Grape Products Prohibited to the Nazirite 
A window onto the process of the editing of Sefer ha-Miṣvot is offered by textual 
alterations that Maimonides appears to have made regarding the scriptural prohibition of 
grape products to the nazirite. Two talmudic claims regarding these grape products are in 
tension in Maimonides’ system: One is that “anything obtained from the grapevine, even 
seeds or skin, he shall not eat” (Num. 6:4) constitutes a lav shebe-khlalot; the second is 
the assertion that consumption of each of grape seeds and skin incurs a distinct 
punishment (bNaz 38b). The first claim should have led Maimonides, according to the 
rules put forward in Principle Nine, to count just one commandment, but the second, five 
                                                 
1193 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 41-42 (Prin. Nine). I have not identified the 
“offending” enumerator. Hildesheimer, ed., “Haqdamat Halakhot Gedolot,” 66n296, and others cited there, 
argued that the enumeration in Halakhot Gedolot did not adopt the opposing view, though Maimonides 
may have had a different version of this count. Maimonides applied this rule to four prohibitions pertaining 
to the High Priest that appear to be a lav shebe-khlalot (“[1] A widow, [2] or a divorcée, [3] or a defiled 
woman, [4] or a harlot [ḥalalah zonah] – such he may not marry”; Lev. 21:14). He explained that the latter 
three prohibitions are repeated (karrara) for the High Priest in order to teach that their rules are identical 
for all priests, and cited the fact that the prohibition against marrying a divorcée is “isolated” (ʾafrada) by 
Lev. 21:7 and bQid 77a in order to show that all four are distinct commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Kafiḥ, 255 (Neg. 161); see also 256 (Neg. 162), 262 (Neg. 170), and above, n1120. He offered a similar 
argument about Num. 18:20 and Deut. 18:2; there, 260-62 (Neg. 170), and Hilkhot Shemiṭah ve-Yovel, 
13:10. I translate Lev. 21:7, 14 according to the rabbinic understanding; ḥalalah zonah could be “one who 
is degraded by harlotry,” as NJPS has (on zonah, see bYeb 61b).  
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(as consumption of each of the five grape products incurs punishment1194). In the earlier 
Commentary on the Mishnah, he integrated both statements by explaining that the lack of 
a do not means that “anything obtained from the grapevine” imposes no punishment and 
that eating each grape product incurs a distinct punishment.1195 Sefer ha-Miṣvot (as we 
know it) also counts these prohibitions as five distinct commandments.1196 However, two 
thirteenth-century witnesses to Sefer ha-Miṣvot suggest that Maimonides’ view shifted 
over time. Daniel ha-Bavli wrote that in Principle Nine, Maimonides had cited Abaye’s 
(!) view that one who eats grape seeds and skins incurs just one punishment (even 
though, according to Daniel’s text, Maimonides had listed five commandments in his 
enumeration).1197 According to Naḥmanides, his text of Sefer ha-Miṣvot counted the five 
grape products as one commandment, while his text of the Mishneh Torah counted them 
as five!1198  
There is no reason to doubt the veracity of these claims, which come from 
opposite ends of the Jewish world. Counting these prohibitions as one commandment is 
eminently reasonable; it accords with the enumeration of Ḥefeṣ ben Yaṣliaḥ,1199 and it 
would have entailed silent rejection of the Commentary on the Mishnah, which 
                                                 
1194 See above, n1160. 
1195 See above, nn1160-1161. 
1196 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 280-82 (Neg. 202-206). 
1197 MS. Hunt. 185, 149a-149b, 151a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 29-30, 32 (§4). 
1198 Naḥmanides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 123-24 (Prin. Nine); this apparently 
refers to the Short Enumeration, see the notes there. See Duran, Zohar ha-Raqiʿa, 29 (Heb. pagination), 
148 (Neg. §63), 231 (concluding remarks); Allegri, Leiv Sameaḥ, in Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. 
Hellman, 181 (Prin. Nine); and Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 8, 24 (introductory pagination). 
On Naḥmanides’ text of Principle Nine, see below. 
1199 Halper, A Volume of the Book of Precepts, 173-76; see there, 75-76. 
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Maimonides frequently did.1200 Assuming that these reports are correct, at an earlier stage 
of Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s composition, when Maimonides considered these prohibitions to 
constitute a single commandment, Principle Nine would have mentioned the verse that 
prohibits grape products to a nazirite as one that exemplifies the first type of “attached” 
prohibitions (i.e., those that constitute just one commandment). However, once 
Maimonides came to see these prohibitions as constituting five distinct commandments, 
he would have considered them an example of the second type of “attached” prohibitions. 
There are several incongruities in Principle Nine’s treatment of these prohibitions. 
Maimonides included “anything obtained from the grapevine” within his listing of the 
three archetypal “attached” prohibitions that do not constitute distinct commandments, 
but in summarizing this section, he only mentioned the other two.1201 Moreover, Principle 
Nine does not include this verse when mentioning the “attached” prohibitions that incur 
distinct punishments.1202 And lastly, the editio princeps of Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
(Constantinople, 1510) includes the following text: “So too, all of the do nots (lavin) 
incumbent on the nazirite that are included in the prohibition (be-isur) ‘anything obtained 
from the grapevine’ are a single commandment because they are all a detail (peraṭ), as 
explained in the gemara.”1203 In light of the testimony of Daniel ha-Bavli and 
                                                 
1200 See Guttmann, “The Decisions of Maimonides,” 230-31 and passim; Saul Lieberman, Hilkhot 
ha-Yerushalmi le-Rabbeinu Moshe ben Maimon (New York: Beit ha-Midrash le-Rabbanim shebe-America, 
1948), 6-13; and, systematically, Aaron Adler, “Ha-ʿEqronot he-Shiṭatiyim ke-Yesod le-‘Ḥazarotav’ shel 
ha-Rambam mi-Feirush ha-Mishnah le-Mishneh Torah,” (PhD diss., Bar Ilan University, 1986). 
1201 Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39-40 (Prin. Nine). 
1202 In fact, these are the only “attached” prohibitions treated in the Talmud that go unmentioned. 
1203 ארמגב ראבתהש ומכ טרפ םלכ םהש ינפמ תחא הוצמ ריזנה לע ןפגמ אצויה לכ רוסיאב ואבש ןיואל לכ ןכו; cited in 
Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Heller, 23n78. 
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Naḥmanides, it is highly likely that this sentence reflects the original Arabic of an early 
version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot.  
Maimonides’ discussion of “attached” prohibitions that constitute a single 
commandment also includes the following: 
And there it is also stated: “Abaye said: ‘one who eats grape seeds is punished 
twice, skins twice, seeds and skin thrice.’ And Rava said: ‘violating a lav shebe-
khlalot does not incur punishment’” (bNaz 38b) – meaning, [God’s] statement 
“anything obtained from the grapevine,” which, Abaye claimed, imposes 
punishment.1204 
Daniel ha-Bavli’s comments show that this text originally reversed the views of Abaye 
and Rava, not an unexpected finding, given similar inconsistencies between Sefer ha-
Miṣvot manuscripts.1205 I would suggest that Maimonides added the explanation of this 
talmudic quotation (beginning with the word “meaning”) after he had concluded that the 
verse pertaining to forbidden grape products contains five commandments. (Without this 
claim, this text would mean that these prohibitions constitute a single commandment, 
fitting more smoothly with this type of “attached” prohibitions.1206) Imagining the text 
without this later addition would make Principle Nine compatible with the view that these 
prohibitions constitute a single commandment and would account for the problems 
                                                 
1204  ואל לע ןיקול ןיא רמא אברו שלש הקול ןצרחו גז םיתש הקול ןצרח םיתש הקול גז לכא ייבא רמא א'ציא ליק ךאנהו
וילע ןיקול הנא ייבא םעזי י'דלא ןייה ןפגמ אצי רשא לכמ הלוק ינעי תוללכבש; Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 39; 
ed. Bloch, 40-41 (Prin. Nine). I would further hypothesize that Maimonides removed this example from his 
summary of this discussion.  
1205 See above, n1153. 
1206 Naḥmanides appears to have quoted such a claim: וא לשובמ וא אנ לכאש ןיב תחא הקול אוהש תמאהו 
ןצרחו גזב ריזנב ןכו הקול דבלב תחא לשובמו אנ; Sefer ha-Miṣvot leha-Rambam, ed. Chavel, 114 (Prin. Nine). 
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outlined above.1207 In any event, reevaluating these five prohibitions required 
Maimonides to adjust his count to reach the number 613.1208 
 
* * * 
 
Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides on Principle Nine 
Daniel ha-Bavli attempted to dismantle Principle Nine by pointing out difficulties 
in Maimonides’ system and by rereading key talmudic passages. His comments on this 
Principle, more copious than on any other, demonstrate that its foundations in rabbinic 
literature were fragile. Taken as a whole, they underscore the complexity of Maimonides’ 
assertion that the Pentateuch and the enumeration of the 613 commandments are directly 
linked. 
While Maimonides’ presentation influenced Daniel’s thinking,1209 two of Daniel’s 
comments suggest that he placed more emphasis on rabbinic literature than did 
                                                 
1207 In the enumeration, Maimonides explained that the fact that these prohibitions incur distinct 
punishments signal that they constitute five distinct commandments; Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 281-82 
(Neg. 206); he cited this factor as determinative in Teshuvot, ed. Blau, 2:724-25 (§447). In Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
he added: “what you must know is that these nazirite prohibitions combine to create an olive’s bulk [to 
incur culpability for consumption]” (תיזכל ןלוכ ןיפרטצמ ריזנ ירוסא ה'דה ןא המלעת ןא ב'גי אממו; ed. Kafiḥ, 282; see 
mNaz 6:1). This somewhat out of place comment may reflect his earlier view that these prohibitions 
constitute one commandment, because, elsewhere, he argued that two objects only combine if they 
constitute a single category (sheim), and if not, they are two; as mentioned (see above, n1107), sheim and 
independent commandment are equivalent in Sefer ha-Miṣvot. Compare the following: (1) Sefer ha-Miṣvot, 
ed. Kafiḥ, 240 (Neg. 131), claims that meat sacrificed with the intent to consume it after its proper time 
(piggul) and meat left over after its proscribed period for eating (notar) do not combine because they are 
two sheimot. (2) Hilkhot Maʾakhalot Asurot, 14:6, claims that all untithed produce (ṭevel), whether the 
priestly (terumah) or the levitical tithes (maʿaser) have not been separated, combines because it is one 
sheim. 
1208 For earlier treatment of the editing of Sefer ha-Miṣvot, see above, n1003. 
1209 In addition to examples in this paragraph, note the use of k-r-r and taʾkīd; MS. Hunt. 185, 
146a, 148a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 25, 28 (§4). 
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Maimonides. The first pertains to verses that prohibit farming during the sabbatical year; 
according to Maimonides, these contained four commandments: “[1] You shall not sow 
your field [2] and you shall not prune your vineyard; [3] you shall not reap … your 
harvest [4] and you shall not gather grapes of your vines” (Lev. 25:4-5).1210 In 
challenging Maimonides’ enumeration, Daniel cited a rabbinic comment that describes 
pruning as “included under” (be-khlal) the act of sowing (insofar as both benefit growth), 
and the gathering of grapes as “included under” the act of harvesting (bMQ 3a). In short, 
argued Daniel, each pair of actions comprises one “concept” (maʿnā). He claimed that 
this talmudic assertion overrides what appears to have been Maimonides’ chief 
consideration, the four do nots in these verses.1211 Daniel also challenged Maimonides’ 
assertion in Principle Nine that nobody would consider the seven-fold repetition of the 
prohibition against eating blood to constitute more than one commandment.1212 Citing the 
Talmud’s claim that five of these verses ordain five different rules (bKer 4a),1213 Daniel 
claimed that since the rabbis “divided” (faṣṣalū) these “repeated” verses into different 
“concepts,” they constitute five commandments.1214  
 
                                                 
1210 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 287-88 (Neg. 220-23). 
1211 MS. Hunt. 185, 148a-148b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28-29 (§4). He added that Maimonides elsewhere 
ignored the distinction between trees and bushes; see Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 121 (Pos. 
120), 284-85 (Neg. 214). 
1212 See above, n1101. 
1213 E.g., the prohibition against consumption of the blood of non-consecrated animals and the 
requirement to cover blood from slaughter with dirt. 
1214 MS. Hunt. 185, 148b-149a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 29 (§4). Compare Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-
Rasag, 2:120. Daniel here also used the root ḍ-m-n as Maimonides did (see above, n1085). See also MS. 
Hunt. 185, 154b-155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4). 
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Daniel ha-Bavli’s Critique of Principle Nine 
Daniel’s criticism of Principle Nine focused primarily on three topics. The first 
was the relationship between punishments, enumerated commandments, and legal 
categories (sheimot). The second was the meaning of the term lav shebe-khlalot, and its 
connection to the enumeration. The third was Maimonides’ portrayals of the puṭita, 
nemalah, and ṣirʿah, and his method of explaining the number of commandments 
implicitly contained in the prohibitions against their consumption.  
(1) Daniel cited talmudic evidence to reject Maimonides’ link between 
punishments and the enumeration. In order to refute his claim that the term ʿover 
(violates) only denotes repeated verses, Daniel identified instances in which the Talmud 
equates the phrase “violates (ʿover) two prohibitions” with the imposition of two 
punishments.1215 He also rejected Maimonides’ understanding of the term sheim 
(category). Quoting the mishnaic statement that two distinct prohibitions – one forbidding 
a priest’s marriage with a divorcée, and the second forbidding his marriage to a woman 
released from the obligation to perform levirate marriage (ḥaluṣah) – constitute a single 
“sheim” (mMak 3:1), Daniel argued that sheim denotes a “lav,” and that such a sheim 
may include multiple distinct prohibitions.1216 Daniel also concluded that violation of a 
                                                 
1215 MS. Hunt. 185, 144a-145b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 24-25 (§4); e.g., bPes 25a; bTem 7b. He cited the 
conclusion that although R. Ishmael holds that eating forbidden fats of three different species incurs three 
punishments, inadvertent consumption of all three only incurs the obligation to bring a single sacrifice 
(bKer 4a) in order to argue that this prohibition constitutes a single commandment, regardless of the 
number of punishments; MS. Hunt. 185, 153b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 35 (§4); see also MS. Hunt. 185, 154a; 
Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4). Maimonides did not address this because he rejected R. Ishmael’s position; see 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 272 (Neg. 185). 
1216 Because the rabbis derive the latter prohibition from the superfluous “from her husband” in 
“nor shall they [i.e., the priests] marry one divorced from her husband (Lev. 21:7; see bYeb 24a, bQid 
78a); MS. Hunt. 185, 147b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28 (§4); citing bKer 3a (on this text, see below, n1262).  
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lav shebe-khlalot incurs multiple punishments; in so doing, he dismissed one of 
Maimonides’ primary strategies for reducing the number of punishments, and, 
consequently, the number of commandments.1217 Lastly, Daniel adduced examples that 
undercut the punishment-commandment-category matrix established in Principle Nine; 
Maimonides’ claim that “the separation commandments follows punishments” was, for 
Daniel, “very dubious.”1218 
At the end of his comments, Daniel expressed frustration that Maimonides had 
highlighted the role of punishments yet failed to “take advantage of ‘categories’ 
(sheimot).”1219 The rabbinic determination of punishments, he claimed, is similar to the 
division of prohibited labors on the Sabbath. Though inadvertent performance of two 
prohibited labors incurs two sacrifices (bSab 70a), nobody, wrote Daniel, would count 
each labor as a distinct commandment!1220 Reiterating his claim that prohibitions related 
to different types of blood constitute unique “concepts,” Daniel asserted that the 
enumeration should follow conceptual units rather than punishments.1221 
(2) Turning to Maimonides’ understanding of lav shebe-khlalot, Daniel 
maintained – against Maimonides’ final view – that Abaye, not Rava, held that the 
violation of a lav shebe-khlalot incurs one or no punishment.1222 Noting that Rava is 
generally followed over Abaye and that the Talmud (bTem 7b) rejects Abaye’s 
                                                 
1217 MS. Hunt. 185, 149b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30 (§4). 
1218 אדג לכשמ והפ תוקלמלל עבאת תוצמלא זימת; MS. Hunt. 185, 149a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30 (§4). 
1219 תומשב לבתהי םלו; MS. Hunt. 185, 154a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36 (§4). Goldberg transcribed לכתהי. 
1220 He argued that one view imposes multiple sets of flagellation for multiple labors (see bSab 
154a, bMak 13b), but would not dream of counting each labor as a distinct commandment. 
1221 MS. Hunt. 185, 154b-155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 36-37 (§4). See above, n1214. For the verses, see 
above, n1101. 
1222 See above, nn1151-1153. 
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position,1223 Daniel concluded that Maimonides should have ruled that a lav shebe-khlalot 
imposes multiple punishments. Daniel also rejected Maimonides’ claim, found in his 
(early) text of Principle Nine, that a nazirite incurs one punishment for eating several 
forbidden grape products, on the grounds that it contradicts an explicit mishnah.1224 By 
citing a passage – present in one family of manuscripts of bPes 41b1225 – that equates the 
punishments for nazirite consumption of grape products with eating the paschal sacrifice, 
raw or cooked,1226 Daniel also showed the “error” of claiming that the verses prohibiting 
grape products to a nazirite contain many commandments, while the prohibition 
pertaining to the paschal sacrifice contains just one.1227 
Daniel instead offered an interpretation of lav shebe-khlalot that was similar to 
Maimonides’ earlier presentation in the Commentary on the Mishnah; he argued that this 
term denotes “non-explicit” (ghayr maṣfūḥ) prohibitions, or those “derived from general 
statements.”1228 Daniel denied that the formula “don’t do X or Y” qualifies as a lav 
                                                 
1223 Daniel’s text read teyuvta de-Abaye teyuvta; on this passage, see above, n1186, and below, 
n1262. 
1224 This is probably what motivated Maimonides to change his mind; see above, nn1160, 1197, 
1207. 
1225 Despite recent reevaluations of Bavli Pesaḥim manuscripts, all agree on the connections 
between those containing this passage; see E.S. Rosenthal, Talmud Bavli Masekhet Pesaḥim: Ketav-Yad 
Sason-Lunzer u-Meqomo be-Masoret-ha-Nusaḥ (London: Valmadonna Trust Library, 1984), 5-6, 55-59; 
idem, “Toldot ha-Nusaḥ u-Vaʿayot-ʿArikhah be-Ḥeiqer ha-Talmud ha-Bavli,” Tarbiẓ 57, no. 1 (1987): 10; 
Stephen G. Wald, Pereq Elu ʿOvrin: Bavli Pesaḥim, Pereq Shlishi, Mahadurah Biqortit ʿim beiʾur maqif 
(New York: Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 2000), 269-72, 276-83; and Aaron Amit, “Kitvei ha-
Yad ha-Teimaniyim be-Mesoret ha-Nusaḥ shel Bavli Pesaḥim,” HUCA 73 (2002): 31-77 (Heb. pagination); 
see also idem, “ʿAl Girsat Rabbeinu Ḥananel be-Bavli Pesaḥim 8b,” Sidra 21 (2006): 133-44. 
1226 Daniel cited only a few words of his version. MS Munich 6 reads:  'מא םתה חספ אנת יאד אכירצו
 ןיקול ןיא ייבא 'מא םתה ריזנ אנת יאו ייבאל היל הדומ אמיא תוללכל ואל הימדק אלד ריזנב לבא שלש הקול אבר תוללכבש ואל לע
אכירצ אברל היל הדומ אמיא אכה לבא תוללכל ואל םידק אלד. Lunzer-Sassoon preserves a similar reading. Daniel had 
ןינעמשא יאד instead of אנת יאד, like MS Columbia X893 and JTS Rab. 1623/2 (EMC 271). 
1227 MS. Hunt. 185, 148a-150b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 30-31 (§4). 
1228 ללכלא ןמ אלא לצחי אל; or: הלמגלא ןמ לצאחלא; MS. Hunt. 185, 151b, 152b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 33, 34 
(§4). Thus, “anything obtained from the grapevine” prohibits unmentioned grape products, and “but 
roasted over fire” eating the paschal sacrifice in non-roasted form. 
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shebe-khlalot, and he held that the Amoraim debated whether or not a verse containing a 
lav shebe-khlalot imposes punishments beyond the explicitly named prohibitions.1229 This 
perspective led Daniel to reject Maimonides’ claim that a Sinaitic tradition had served to 
divide (le-ḥaleq) certain verses and to mandate the consequent imposition of multiple 
punishments. Daniel explained that the Talmud assumes that the verses prohibiting the 
consumption of animal fats (Lev. 7:23) and grain of the new crop (Lev. 23:14)1230 are 
examples of a lav shebe-khlalot, not because each contains a single do not, but because 
the prohibited objects in each of the verses share a “name” (ism). Although each of the 
prohibitions should incur a distinct punishment by dint of having been mentioned 
explicitly in the Pentateuch, Daniel asserted that their grouping under an overarching 
“name” means that each constitutes just one commandment. Here too, Daniel emphasized 
conceptual relationships over the role of Scripture in the enumeration.1231 
(3) Lastly, Daniel ha-Bavli rejected Maimonides’ descriptions of the puṭita, 
nemalah, and ṣirʿah, writing that Maimonides’ view “is neither found among any of the 
early ones, nor established truthfully.”1232 Daniel asserted that by ignoring the 
“unrestricted denotation” (muṭlaq) meanings of these terms and defining them as specific 
types of ants and hornets, Maimonides needlessly narrowed the import of the talmudic 
discussion.1233  
                                                 
1229 MS. Hunt. 185, 151a-152b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 31-34 (§4). 
1230 See bKer 4a-5a. 
1231 MS. Hunt. 185, 153a-154a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 34-36 (§4). 
1232 הקקאחמלא ילע תב'תי םלו ןימקדתמלא דחאל ד'גוי םל יאר א'דהו; MS. Hunt. 185, 146b-147a; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 27 (§4). Maimonides himself proclaimed the novelty of his interpretation; see above, n1128. 
1233 MS. Hunt. 185, 146a-146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 26 (§4). On muṭlaq in Islamic legal theory, see 
Weiss, The Search for God’s Law, 382-88, 434-38; Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 46-47; and 
Sherman Jackson, “Taqlīd, Legal Scaffolding and the Scope of Legal Injunctions in Post-Formative 
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Daniel’s close reading of Sefer ha-Miṣvot led him to make a surprising polemical 
charge. Maimonides had asserted that a prohibition can only apply to something which 
already exhibits its characteristic,1234 but Daniel argued that this claim violates the 
principle that an already forbidden object cannot be the locus of additional prohibitions 
(ein isur ḥal ʿal isur).1235 In what may be his harshest jab, he exclaimed that Maimonides 
had, in effect, adopted the view of “some Qaraites” (baʿḍ madhāhib al-qarāyīn), who 
claimed that consumption of the jāmūs (water buffalo) is forbidden because it rests in 
water, thus exhibiting characteristics of a fish, but lacks the signs of a kosher fish!1236 
Daniel therefore accepted the view of earlier jurists, as framed by Maimonides; they had 
asserted that repeated verses impose multiple punishments and that “general” (ʿāmma) 
verses (e.g., Lev. 11:43; “Anything that swarms”) apply to all relevant creatures.1237  
Daniel added that the fact that the Talmud associates Abaye’s comment that fish 
“are created from water” (mi-maya ivru; bʿEiruv 27b) with the puṭita, proves that the 
                                                 
Theory: Muṭlaq and ʿĀmm in the Jurisprudence of Shihāb Al-dīn Al-Qarāfī,” Islamic Law and Society 3, 
no. 2 (1996): 165-92. 
1234 See Maimonides, Sefer ha-Miṣvot, ed. Kafiḥ, 267-68 (Neg. 179). Abraham Maimonides 
accepted this as the “apparent” (ẓāhir) meaning of Maimonides’ words; MS. Hunt. 185, 185a; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 40 (§4). 
1235 MS. Hunt. 185, 146a-146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 26 (§4). On this concept, see above, n851.  
1236 MS. Hunt. 185, 146b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 27 (§4). I have not identified any Qaraites who 
adopted this view; I thank Daniel Frank for his assistance on this matter. The geonim debated how to 
classify the jāmūs; Saʿadya considered it a beheimah (“domesticated animal”), but Hayya a ḥayah (“wild 
animal”); see Greenbaum, Peirush ha-Torah le-Rav Shmuel ben Ḥofni, 516 and n7; Abramson, “Sefer ha-
Tanjīs (‘ha-Ṣimud’),” 120-21; Zucker, Peirushei Rav Saʿadya Gaon le-Bereishit, 48; and Saʿadya ben 
Joseph, Ha-Egron, ed. Neḥemya Allony (Jerusalem: Ha-Aqademiyah le-Lashon ha-ʿIvrit, 1969), 311. See 
also Mordechai Kislev, “Beḥinat ha-Zihuyim shel ʿAseret Minei Maʿalei-ha-Gerah ha-Ṭehorim ʿal-pi ha-
Ṭaqsonomiyah,” Sinai 125 (2000): 218-19. For Abraham Maimonides’ view of the jāmūs, see also David, 
“Qeṭaʿim Ḥadashim,” 18 line 19. For other seemingly incongruous references to Qaraites in the exchange 
between Daniel and Abraham, see MS. Hunt. 185, 93b, 211b; Bikrat Avraham, 51 (§38); Maʿaseh Nissim, 
105 (§13). I hope to return to this subject. 
1237 MS. Hunt. 185, 147b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 28 (§4). 
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puṭita is born in water; this was in contradiction with the Maimonidean position recorded 
in Daniel’s version of Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1238 
 
Abraham Maimonides’ Response to Daniel ha-Bavli 
Abraham was acutely aware of the significance of Daniel’s challenges and of their 
potential impact on Maimonides’ image. He twice apologized for his own lengthy 
refutations. The first of these, comprising almost twenty lines in the manuscript, praises 
Daniel as, “without doubt, one of the noble ones occupied with the study of the Talmud 
and speculative investigation regarding it,”1239 but suggests that Daniel requires 
additional “transmission from the sages” (naql min al-ʿulamāʾ)” in order to properly 
analyze the “principles of [Maimonides’] speculation.”1240 Abraham wrote that “one who 
is unaware [of the truth] may stumble due to the ostensible meaning (ẓawāhīr) of 
[Daniel’s] statements,”1241 leading the ignorant to ascribe errors to Maimonides. 
Switching to rhyming prose, he cautioned Daniel to take extreme care, as many might 
misunderstand Daniel’s words.1242 At the end of this responsum, Abraham defended his 
lengthy rebuttal as necessary “in order that these doubts do not cause error,” in 
fulfillment of the verse “Remove the obstacle in the way of My people” (Isa. 57:14).1243 
As was his wont, Abraham steadfastly defended his father, offering a point-by-
point rebuttal of Daniel’s claims. Like Maimonides, Abraham insisted that the explicit 
                                                 
1238 MS. Hunt. 185, 147a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 27 (§4); see above, n1138. 
1239 ךש אלב היפ ר'טנלאו דומלתלא הארקב ןילגתשמלא אלבנ ןמ תנכ ןאו; Goldberg read אלכנ. 
1240 .הר'טנ לוצא ליצחת יפ  
1241 הבנתי אל ןמ לואקאלא ךלת רהאוטב ר'תגיפ; on the exchange of ʿayn and ghayn in Judeo-Arabic texts, 
see Blau, Diqduq ha-ʿAravit-ha-Yehudit, §24. 
1242 MS. Hunt. 185, 164a-164b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 48-49 (§4). 
1243 ךוכשלא ה'דה טלגת אל יתח; MS. Hunt. 185, 172b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 59 (§4). 
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nature of particular prohibitions overrides other considerations for the purposes of 
enumeration. Therefore, he explained, although pruning and gathering grapes could each 
be “derived (tastamidd) … through qiyās (here: reasoning),” and although “their concepts 
are not distinct” (maʿānīhuma ghayr munfaṣila), explicit mention of each activity serves 
as a “specification” (takhṣīṣ),1244 which renders them as two discrete commandments. 
Abraham further cited the rule that “a biblical verse does not leave the realm of its 
peshaṭ,” along with Principle Two in the Introduction to Sefer ha-Miṣvot, in order to 
argue that repeated prohibitions against the consumption of blood constitute a single 
commandment.1245 This, he argued, is because Scripture’s “peshaṭ” governs the 
enumeration, and not rabbinic interpretations. 
Abraham firmly rejected several of Daniel’s claims. He censured Daniel for 
associating Maimonides’ words with Qaraism, asserting that Daniel’s accusation would 
lead to “mockery [in the eyes of] one whose mind is too feeble to achieve understanding 
of [Maimonides’] words.”1246 These “bad manners” (sūʾ adab), he reminded Daniel, “are 
not proper for us; … we are forbidden from responding to such [accusations],” he 
wrote.1247 Regarding Daniel’s view of lav shebe-khlalot, Abraham exhorted Daniel to 
“know the remote depths of the statements of the masters of knowledge, accurately 
render their utterances, toil in examining them, and be assiduous in clarifying their 
                                                 
1244 On takhṣīṣ, see above, n649. 
1245 MS. Hunt. 185, 163b-164a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 47-48 (§4); סאיקלאב ... דמתסת. Abraham used the 
tenth form of m-d-d throughout; Goldberg repeatedly transcribed the dalet as a reish, reading רמתסת and 
רתמסא, etc. Note that Maimonides did not invoke Principle Two in this regard. Compare Abraham’s 
mention of Principle Nine in another context; MS. Hunt. 185, 202a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 95 (§10). 
1246 .הלוק םהפל לוצולא ןע ןה'דלא יבג ןמב םכהתלא יוס ינעמ היפ םלעא אלפ  
1247 הל'תמ ילע באו'גלא ןע יהנ דק הנאל הילע הלבאקמלא ןחנ אנב קילי אל בדא וס א'דהו; MS. Hunt. 185, 159a; 
Maʿaseh Nissim, 42 (§4). 
 
341 
 
meaning before hurriedly responding to them.”1248 Similarly, he dismissed Daniel’s 
assumption that it is biblically prohibited for a priest to marry a woman who has been 
released from the obligation to perform levirate marriage,1249 as well as his claim that this 
prohibition, and the prohibition against a priest marrying a divorcée, constitute a single 
“category” (sheim). Abraham wrote that this “baseless” challenge was due to the 
“paltriness of [Daniel’s] transmission from the sages (ʿulamāʾ).”1250 
Elsewhere, Abraham defended his father but nevertheless praised Daniel. He 
labeled Daniel’s claim that the term lav shebe-khlalot denotes “non-explicit” prohibitions 
as “sound” (ṣaḥīḥ) but incomplete, describing it as one that reflects only part of the 
“proper” definition.1251 He similarly labeled Daniel’s proof about the term “violates” 
(ʿover), “a good challenge, and only a stubborn person would deny its excellence. 
However,” continued Abraham, “despite its excellence, it does not compel doubt about 
his Principle,” because Maimonides had cited other evidence.1252 Elsewhere, he admitted 
that the “apparent” (ẓāhir) meaning of Maimonides’ words is in contradiction with a 
specific rabbinic text; his father’s words, he wrote, require careful consideration.1253 He 
also recognized one of Daniel’s readings of Sefer ha-Miṣvot as “a good challenge and an 
excellent examination.”1254 Nevertheless, Abraham declared that Maimonides’ 
                                                 
1248  חפצת יפ ןעמאו אהיפ תחבלא ילע באדאו םהת]א[ראבע רירחתו הקיקחלאב םלעלא יו'ד ליואקא רוג דעב םלעאו
אהילע דרלל תפאהתלא לבק אהינאעמ; MS. Hunt. 185, 167b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 52 (compare 166a; 50-51; §4). 
1249 See Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Ḥaluṣah de-Rabanan Hi?” in Peraqim be-Hishtalshelut ha-Halakhah 
(Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1992), 273-80; and Encyclopedia Talmudit, s.v. ḥaluṣah le-kohen. 
15:374-75. 
1250 אמלעלא ןע ךלקנ הלקל; MS. Hunt. 185, 162a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 45 (§4). 
1251 MS. Hunt. 185, 169a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 55 (§4). See above, n1229. 
1252 ךש הב ל"ז הלצא םזלי אל התדו'ג עמ הנא אלא רנאעמ אלא התדו'ג רכני אלו אדי'ג א'צארתעא; MS. Hunt. 185, 
155a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 37 (§4). See above, n1215. 
1253 MS. Hunt. 185, 162b-163a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 46 (§4); see also above, n1234. 
1254 .די'ג ביקנתו ןסח 'ץארתעאל ךל'ד ןא הללא םלעיפ 
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“speculation (naẓarahu) surpasses this speculation, and his statements are accurate – he 
[i.e., Maimonides] is not among those who are ignorant of such things to such an 
extant.”1255 Abraham also used the Mishneh Torah, completed after Sefer ha-Miṣvot, to 
reread the earlier work, and he conceded that Maimonides’ formulations in Sefer ha-
Miṣvot could indeed “lead to suspicion” (muwahhima).1256 
Abraham also invoked formal logic to defend his father. Daniel had cited the 
talmudic statement that fish “are created from water” (bʿEiruv 27b) in order to show that 
the puṭita is a water insect, but Abraham described this statement as “indesignate” 
(muhmal), i.e., it refers to a particular but unspecified class of fish, not all fish. Echoing 
his father’s Treatise on Logic, he asserted that “indesignate statements have the force of 
the particular (jazāʾ),” and concluded that this talmudic declaration refers only to kosher 
fish.1257 
For apparently apologetic reasons, Abraham placed little emphasis on 
Maimonides’ claim that punishments are linked to the project of enumeration. He wrote 
that his father never claimed that one cannot receive multiple punishments for violating a 
single commandment; indeed, his father counted as a single commandment the 
                                                 
1255 .רדקלא א'דה ל'תמ לפגי ןממ סילו הררחמ הליואקאו ר'טנלא א'דה קופ ל"ז הר'טנ ןא םלעת ןא ב'גי 
1256 Goldberg translated this as “unclear” (einah brurah); MS. Hunt. 185, 157b-158b; Maʿaseh 
Nissim, 39-41 (§4). Daniel had asserted that traits of forbidden creatures cannot appear at different times 
(above, n1235), but Hilkhot Maʿakhalot Asurot, 2:23, reads:  ץרשמו םימה ץרשמו ףועה ץרשמ הירבה התיהש ירה
ץראה. In Abraham’s words, these animals possess these attributes in their “nature” (ṭabīʿa). 
1257 יאזגלא הוק התוק למהמלאו; MS. Hunt. 185, 160a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 43 (§4); Goldberg made the 
connection to the Treatise on Logic. See Efros, “Maimonides’ Treatise on Logic,” 36 (English pagination): 
“If however no sign is attached to the subject of the proposition, as when we say ‘Men are animals’ or 
‘Men write’, we call this proposition indesignate. … We regard it always as a particular proposition, 
whether affirmative or negative. Thus when we say ‘Men write’, it has for us the same force as if we said 
‘Some men write’; and when we say ‘Men do not write’, it is as if we said ‘Not every man writes’.” I do 
not know why Abraham’s view of the puṭita ignored Maimonides’ later claims; above, n1138. 
 
343 
 
prohibition banning blemished priests from service in the Temple, even though each and 
every disqualifying blemish within a group of one hundred forty-four makes a priest 
liable for punishment (see Hilkhot Biʾat ha-Miqdash, 8:14). Rather, claimed Abraham, 
Maimonides simply meant that a single punishment for numerous acts serves as evidence 
that these acts constitute a single commandment. Therefore, one may incur an obligation 
to bring two atoning sacrifices for the performance of two forbidden labors on the 
Sabbath.1258 While Abraham correctly noted that his father did not explicitly reject the 
possibility of incurring multiple punishments for violating a single commandment, his 
larger argument ignores many of Maimonides’ claims.1259 
In addition to these substantive disagreements, Daniel and Abraham disagreed 
about the accurate reading of several texts. Abraham insisted that texts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot 
should be corrected to read that it was the amora Rava who held that violation of a lav 
shebe-khlalot incurs one, or no, punishment.1260 Abraham conceded uncertainty about the 
views adopted by Abaye and Rava, given the conflicting evidence. Still, he wrote, “we 
preferred” (rajjaḥnā) the conclusion of Maimonides because it is consistent with various 
principles of adjudication.1261 Abraham also disagreed with a number of Daniel’s 
                                                 
1258 MS. Hunt. 185, 171b-172b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 58-59 (§4); see above, n1220. See similarly, 
above, n1190. 
1259 For various reasons, priestly blemishes and forbidden Sabbath labors were more likely 
exceptions to Maimonides’ claim that violating one commandment incurs one punishment; for this and 
other criticism of Abraham’s assertions here, see Perla, Sefer ha-Miṣvot le-Rasag, 1:35. 
1260 MS. Hunt. 185, 164b-165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 49 (§4). See above, nn1153, 1197, 1205, 1222. 
1261 MS. Hunt. 185, 165a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 50 (§4). Abraham, in fact, showed tremendous 
flexibility regarding principles of adjudication, writing that he could defend texts of Sefer ha-Miṣvot that 
associate this view with Abaye by suggesting that the rule that Abaye is followed over Rava only in six 
cases (see bQid 52b, etc.) does not apply when Abaye’s view is shared by others. He similarly remarked 
that one of Daniel’s claims could be dismissed by invoking the principle “one cannot learn from general 
rules” (ein lemedin min ha-kelalot; bʿEiruv 29a etc.); MS. Hunt. 185, 169a; Maʿaseh Nissim, 55 (§4). And 
he described the rule that the law follows the second version of a statement (lishna batra) as not 
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readings of specific sugyot, even preferring a reading that varied from one adopted in 
Sefer ha-Miṣvot.1262 
 
Conclusion 
From several perspectives, the relationship between the Pentateuch and the 
enumeration of the commandments constitutes Sefer ha-Miṣvot’s most sustained concern. 
Maimonides’ attempt to provide a systematic and consistent map of this relationship – 
perhaps the most daunting and multifaceted problem in this work – forced him to ask 
novel questions, to draw on diverse bodies of knowledge, and to struggle with the impact 
of numerous talmudic passages. As many scholars have observed, medieval Jews who 
accepted the authority of the Talmud were usually hesitant to derive new laws from 
readings of Scripture that do not appear in rabbinic literature (though there are some 
                                                 
“systematic” (munaẓẓam; on this principle, see Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 83-85) but subject to 
exceptions, just like the rule that the law follows the majority (bBer 9a etc.); MS. Hunt. 185, 167b; 
Maʿaseh Nissim, 53 (§4). On principles of adjudication, see Brody, Geonim of Babylonia, 165; idem, 
Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 78-87; Tsvi Groner, The Legal Methodology of Hai Gaon (Chico, California: 
Scholars Press, 1985), 44-116; Assaf, Tequfat ha-Geonim, 224-45; and Jonathan S. Milgram, 
“Methodological Musings on the Study of ‘Kelalei Pesak’: ‘Hilkheta ke-Rav be-issurei ve-khi-Shemuel be-
dinei,” JJS 61, no. 2 (2010): 278-90. 
1262 He asserted, thus, that bTem 7b does not render the view that violating a lav shebe-khlalot 
incurs no punishment “fully rejected” (teyuvta de-X teyuvta) but “difficult” (qashya; unlike the reading 
offered in Sefer ha-Miṣvot); MS. Hunt. 185, 168b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 53-54 (§4); see above, nn1186, 1223. 
Various versions of this text are recorded even in standard printings of the Vilna Talmud. Abraham also 
rejected Daniel’s reading of bPes 41b; MS. Hunt. 185, 165b-166b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 51-52 (§4; see above, 
n1225); and bKer 3a; MS. Hunt. 185, 150b-151a, 169a-169b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 32, 54-55 (§4); on the latter, 
see Yoav Rosenthal, “Masekhet Keritut (Bavli): Le-Ḥeiqer Masoroteha,” (PhD diss., Hebrew University, 
2003), 155, 170n123, 171-73, 215, 219-22, 225-30. Abraham further asserted that Daniel’s claims about 
when the two explanations (ika de-amrei) of the view that violating a lav shebe-khlalot does not incur 
punishment appear in the Talmud is incorrect; MS. Hunt. 185, 165b-167b; Maʿaseh Nissim, 50-52 (§4).  
Both Daniel ha-Bavli and Abraham Maimonides used the Arabic word dars to denote “the correct 
textual reading”; on this term, see Adam Gacek, The Arabic Manuscript Tradition: A Glossary of Technical 
Terms and Bibliography—Supplement (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 23, and idem, The Arabic Manuscript 
Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 67. I thank Joseph Lowry for his assistance with this matter. Abraham used 
this word in a similar sense in Sefer ha-Maspiq, ed. Dana, 247; and High Ways, ed. Rosenblatt, 2:319. 
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notable exceptions).1263 This makes Maimonides’ willingness to do so – in the context of 
enumerating the commandments – all the more striking. In his eyes, it was Scripture that 
determined which acts incur punishments and that was the source of the 613 “concepts” 
that structure the law. 
Diachronic analysis of Maimonides’ writings, and of Sefer ha-Miṣvot in 
particular, opens a window onto Maimonides’ thought process and reveals his ongoing, 
and occasionally incomplete, editing of this work.1264 The fact that Maimonides 
continued to rethink the implications of Principle Nine, in Sefer ha-Miṣvot itself, in his 
edits to the Commentary on the Mishnah, and in the Mishneh Torah underscores this 
Principle’s importance. 
Daniel ha-Bavli’s careful analysis of the Talmud and emphasis on different 
concepts in rabbinic literature showed that many of Maimonides’ conclusions in Principle 
                                                 
1263 For treatment and examples, see Yiṣḥaq Gilat, “Midrash ha-Ketuvim be-Tequfah ha-Batar-
Talmudit,” in Mikhtam le-David: Divrei Torah, Meḥqarim, ve-Ḥinukh le-Zikhro shel ha-Rav Dr. David 
Oks, eds. Yiṣḥaq Gilat and Eliezer Stern (Ramat Gan: Bar Ilan University Press, 1978), 210-31, repr. in 
idem, Peraqim be-Hishtalshelut ha-Halakhah, 374-93; Gerald Blidstein, “Who is Not a Jew? – The 
Medieval Discussion,” Israel Law Review 11, no. 3 (1976): 379, 383, 384n56, 385, 389n74; Abraham 
Grossman, Ḥakhmei Ashkenaz ha-Rishonim (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1981), 87, 155-57, 188, 324, 430-31, 
434n92; idem, “Ziqatah shel Yahadut Ashkenaz el Ereṣ-Yisrael,” Shalem 3 (1981): 70-73; David Berger, 
“Ḥeiqer Rabbanut Ashkenaz ha-Qedumah,” Tarbiẓ 53, no. 3 (1984): 484n6; idem, “Jacob Katz on Jews and 
Christians in the Middle Ages,” in The Pride of Jacob: Essays on Jacob Katz and His Work, ed. Jay M. 
Harris (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), 49n21; Brody, Teshuvot Hilkhatiyot, 65, 69; Oded 
Irshai, “Mumar ke-Yoresh be-Teshuvot ha-Geonim – Yesodoteha shel Pesiqah u-Maqbiloteha be-Mishpaṭ 
ha-Nokhri,” Shenaton ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri 11-12 (1984-1986): 442-43; Elon, Ha-Mishpaṭ ha-ʿIvri, 1:326-
33; Jeffrey R. Woolf, “Between Law and Society: Mahariq’s Responsum on the ‘Ways of the Gentiles’ 
(ḥuqqot ha-‘akkum),” AJS Review 25, no. 1 (2000): 51n30; Michael Rosensweig, “Reflections on the 
Conceptual Approach to Talmud Torah,” in , ed. h Learning: The Conceptual Approach to Jewisתודמול
-Im Yesh Reshut li-ayim Sabbato, “HaḤYosef Blau (New York: Yeshiva University Press, 2006), 228n55; 
-, 499Amosʿ-Teshurah leTalmud?” in -lo Neʾemru be-Pesuqim af she-Hilkhatiyot min ha DerashotDrosh 
Two examples that I do not believe have been  103.-:85, 2Collected Essays519; and Soloveitchik, 
(Jerusalem, 2006), 68 (Heb. pagination;  imʿiTemim De, resèAbraham ben David of Posquimentioned are 
-ar haṣO§237; note the comments of Nissim of Gerona in bShev 7b [Alfasi pagination]); and Lewin, 
 ).70(§ 27, Teshuvot-ha eileqḤin, Eiruvim, Masekhet ʿGeon  
1264 In addition to the discussions of the definition of lav shebe-khlalot and the grape products 
prohibited to the nazirite, see above, nn1093, 1099, 1125, 1134, 1137-1138. 
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Nine were vulnerable to criticism. Daniel missed few opportunities to attack Maimonides 
or to challenge many of Maimonides’ innovative claims. Even Abraham Maimonides, 
who valiantly defended his father, accepted the strength of many of Daniel’s arguments. 
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Conclusion  
Rabbanite jurists in the Islamic world were deeply concerned with questions of 
legal theory. This interest was manifest in their ongoing discussions of supra-legal topics 
and in the complexity and nuance of the ideas that they developed in order to place the 
talmudic legal system on firm theoretical footing. Maimonides may well have been the 
Rabbanite author most concerned with problems of jurisprudence; more of his systematic 
writings on legal theory survive than those of any other Rabbanite.1265 His statements of 
Rabbanite legal theory, particularly in his Commentary on the Mishnah and Sefer ha-
Miṣvot, reframed age-old questions and posed new ones. Earlier Rabbanites who 
embraced the idea that God gave precisely 613 commandments had used this number to 
consider abstract legal problems, but Maimonides, by contrast, wedded legal theory to the 
enumeration of the commandments, and was thus able to bring together a variety of 
epistemological, interpretive, and conceptual themes under a single rubric. 
This dissertation seeks, in part, to widen the scope of scholarly understanding of 
Rabbanite legal theory by subjecting Rabbanite ideas to synchronic and diachronic 
analysis. In so doing, it aims to demonstrate that Rabbanite writings were engaged in a 
multilayered conversation, one that involved their talmudic and post-talmudic past, 
Rabbanite and non-Rabbanite coreligionists, and elements of the Islamic intellectual 
tradition that were most helpful for the explanation and reconsideration of their own 
tradition. Foremost among these were uṣūl al-fiqh, qurʾānic exegesis, logic, and 
linguistics. By investigating, interpreting, and manipulating talmudic concepts, 
                                                 
1265 Compare above, n378. Future research, particularly on David ben Saʿadya al-Ger’s Kitāb al-
Ḥāwī, will likely fill in the picture of pre-Maimonidean jurisprudence. 
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Rabbanites articulated legal theory that addressed the needs of medieval Judaism and its 
ideologues. Though cloaked in rabbinic garb, this project was innovative and profoundly 
contemporary. 
Rabbanite jurisprudential writings underscore the dynamism of medieval Jewish 
thought and its ability to embrace new challenges. Theoretical reflections on the 
enumeration of the 613 commandments were largely detached from those aspects of 
Jewish law that Jews encountered on a regular basis; in my view, it was precisely this 
distance from the practical elements of law that made this project attractive to jurists as 
an entry point into meta-halakhic thinking. 
Rabbanite jurists elaborated their legal theory in the shadow of Islamic thought. 
Its most extreme manifestation is discussed in Chapter One, where I suggest that the 
geonic presentation of revelation, particularly that of Saʿadya, was informed by broader 
societal emphasis on prophetic authority. But the primary reason for Rabbanite adaptation 
of modes of thinking and terminology from contemporaneous Muslim legal texts may 
have been quite simple: the concepts and terms current in wider society were helpful in 
the articulation of Rabbanite ideas. The commonalities between Rabbanite Judaism and 
Sunni Islam in this period facilitated Rabbanite engagement with ideas in contemporary 
Islamic law, allowing them to apply these ideas to their own legal system. These common 
features included the affirmation of a two-fold written and oral revelation; the assumed 
closure of foundational legal canons (i.e., the Talmud and ḥadīth); and the emphases on 
the study and performance of religious law as a crucial vehicle of religious expression.  
Post-talmudic legal theory was not limited to the topics addressed in this study 
and it did not conclude in the mid-thirteenth century, the chronological endpoint of this 
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dissertation, which focuses on specific aspects of Rabbanite legal theory within a discrete 
timeframe. Certain themes discussed in the Fourteen Principles in Maimonides’ Sefer ha-
Miṣvot have been excluded from this project and demand further scholarly attention. 
These include the eternality of the law (Principle Three) and the interpretation of legal 
language (Principles Five and Eight, and, to a certain extent, Four and Six). It would be 
fruitful to examine these and other subjects in conjunction with Qaraite legal thought in 
order to examine the ways that Jews of different orientations in the Islamic world 
developed systematic legal theory. 
Jewish jurists outside of the Islamic context also continued to explore legal 
theory. The writings of later Spaniards such as Naḥmanides and his school were the first 
to engage Maimonides’ jurisprudential legacy beyond the Arabic-speaking world.1266 The 
medieval legacy as a whole loomed large in the theoretical writings of rabbis Nafatli Zvi 
Yehuda Berlin (1816-93) and Zadok ha-Kohen of Lublin (1823-1900), among many 
others.1267 
 
                                                 
1266 The approaches of Naḥmanides’ successors, other than Nissim of Girona, remain 
understudied; for now, see the discussion in Gerald Blidstein, “Lo Masran ha-Katuv ele le-Ḥakhamim: le-
Gilgulei ha-Niv u-Mashmaʿuto,” Netuʿim 14 (2006): 9-29; and David Weiss Halivni, “On Man’s Role in 
Revelation,” in From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism, 2:45-47. 
1267 On Berlin, see Yaakov Elman, “History, Halakhah, and Revelation: The Historicization of the 
Sinaitic Revelation in ‘Ha’ameq Davar’,” in Mishpetei Shalom: A Jubilee Volume in Honor of Rabbi Saul 
(Shalom) Berman, ed. Yamin Levy (Riverdale: Yeshivat Chovevei Torah Rabbinical School), 157-78. On 
Zadok ha-Kohen, see Amira Liwer, “Torah shebe-ʿal Peh be-Khitvei R. Zadoq ha-Kohen mi-Lublin,” (PhD 
diss., Hebrew University, 2006). On modern Zionist thinkers, see Alexander Kaye, “The Legal 
Philosophies of Religious Zionism 1937-1967,” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2012). 
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Rabbanite Legal Theory in the Shadow of Islamic Thought 
S.D. Goitein’s characterization of the relationship between Judaism and Islam as 
marked by “creative symbiosis” is one of the most enduring scholarly notions pertaining 
to Jewish life in the Islamic world. Goitein borrowed the term “symbiosis” from the field 
of biology, defining it, in an early article, as “the coexistence of two organs in such a way 
as to benefit from the proximity, in the sense that one party benefits while the other does 
not suffer.”1268 In his magnum opus, A Mediterranean Society, Goitein applied the idea of 
symbiosis primarily to economic and other modes of interpersonal relations between 
Jews and Muslims.1269 But in his earlier, programmatic work, Jews and Arabs, Goitein 
took a broader view, speaking of “the influence of Islam on Jewish thought” and “the 
impact of Muhammadan spiritual life on the Jewish mind,” and asserting that “traditional 
Judaism received its final shape under Muslim-Arab influence.”1270 While Goitein 
himself paid considerably less attention to the “spiritual” aspects of symbiosis, Steven 
Wasserstrom has noted that scholars have tended to view the impact of symbiosis most 
acutely in the “efflorescence of freethinking, … interreligious tolerance, [and] the 
                                                 
1268 S.D. Goitein, “ʿAl Simbiozah Yehudit-Aravit,” Molad 2, no. 11 (1949): 259; translation in 
Gideon Libson, “Hidden Worlds and Open Shutters: S.D. Goitein Between Judaism and Islam,” in The 
Jewish Past Revisited: Reflections on Modern Jewish Historians, eds. David N. Myers and David B. 
Ruderman (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 175. 
1269 S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Communities of the Arab World as 
Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 2:289-
99; see also 5:9, speaking of “physical and educational symbiosis.” 
1270 Goitein, Jews and Arabs, 11, 140 (see similarly, 127), 10. He emphasized that “the first and 
most basic aspect of Jewish-Arab symbiosis is the simple fact that the great majority of the Jews … 
adopted the Arabic language” (131), and described Maimonides’ Guide as “a great monument of Jewish-
Arab symbiosis, not merely because it is written in Arabic by an original Jewish thinker and was studied by 
Arabs, but because it developed and conveyed to large sections of the Jewish people ideas which had long 
occupied the Arab mind” (146-47). For treatment of Goitein’s approach, see Wasserstrom, Between Muslim 
and Jew, 3-12, 222-32; idem, “Recent Works on the ‘Creative Symbiosis’ of Judaism and Islam,” Religious 
Studies Review 16, no. 1 (1990): 43-47; and Libson, “Hidden Worlds and Open Shutters,” 175-79. 
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enlightened character of … interfaith relations.” Reflecting something of a scholarly 
consensus, Wasserstrom explained that “it is difficult to avoid positing Jewish-Muslim 
philosophy as the intellectual end product of symbiosis.”1271 In a somewhat broader 
formulation, Sarah Stroumsa concluded that: 
In the sciences, in philosophy, and in theology, the Jews became an integral part 
of Islamic culture. Judeo-Arabic works on these subjects are often 
indistinguishable from Muslim or Christian compositions on the same topics. … 
The prevalent Arabic terminology, the topoi, the concerns and the mentality of 
their non-Jewish neighbors, all became internalized by Jewish authors.1272 
While many of the philosophers and theologians who penned exemplary texts of 
symbiosis in the realm of Jewish thought were also prominent jurists (e.g., Saʿadya, 
Maimonides, and Abraham Maimonides, to name figures central to this dissertation), the 
field of law was obviously less inter-confessional than that of philosophy. As a result, 
“symbiosis” of Jews and Muslims within the field of law necessarily had different 
contours.1273 Nevertheless, as David Friedenreich noted, significant elements of non-
                                                 
1271 Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and Jew, 225; see there, 225-35; and idem, “The Islamic Social 
and Cultural Context,” in History of Jewish Philosophy, eds. Daniel Frank and Oliver Leaman (New York: 
Routledge, 2005), 73-75. On the encounter of Judaism and Sufism as the “epitome” of symbiosis, see Russ-
Fishbane, Judaism, Sufism, and the Pietists of Medieval Egypt, 32-39. Wasserstrom, Between Muslim and 
Jew, 9, pointedly rejected Goitein’s rosy picture of symbiosis: “Symbiosis, as a thinly happy and 
monovalently positive benefit, did not happen. Its complexity is reduced to mere benefit only by a 
tendentious dilution” (emphasis in original). 
1272 Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam, 218. 
1273 See David Friedenreich, “Fusion Cooking in an Islamic Milieu: Jewish and Christian Jurists 
on Food Associated with Foreigners,” in Beyond Religious Borders, 145. On this issue, scholars have 
generally distinguished between the formative and post-formative periods of Islamic law. Concerning the 
“origin and early develop of Islam in its Jewish environment,” Goitein described “Islam [as] an Arab recast 
of Israel’s religion”; Jews and Arabs, 11. For his more measured statements, see idem, “The Interplay of 
Jewish and Islamic Laws,” in Jewish Law in Legal History and the Modern World, ed. Bernard Jackson 
(Leiden: Brill, 1980), 65-66; and idem, “The Birth Hour of Islamic Law,” in Studies in Islamic History and 
Institutions (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 132-34. Libson, Jewish and Islamic Law, 7, affirmed this chronological 
distinction: “During … the first phase, … it was generally Judaism that influenced Islam. Only in the 
second phases, during the 8th and 9th centuries, did the nature of the contacts between the two religions 
begin to change.” For criticism of this approach, see Lena Salaymeh, “‘Comparing’ Jewish and Islamic 
Legal Traditions: Between Disciplinarity and Critical Historical Jurisprudence,” Critical Analysis of Law 2, 
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Muslim legal works, such as the structure of legal compendia, the selection of topics, and 
certain modes of legal reasoning,1274 would have been recognizable to Muslim jurists and 
unique to the Islamic world. Yet Friedenreich added that while scholars might label such 
ideas “Islamic” – due to their origin (when this can be ascertained), or because they are 
predominantly found in works of Islamic (in the narrow sense) law, or because they 
flourished in the Islamic world – non-Muslim jurists would never have considered these 
elements to be “Islamic” in nature.1275 I would suggest that Jewish jurists engaged the 
“terminology, topoi, and concerns” in question because they were the predominant means 
of legal expression; these constituted central issues that any jurist was expected to 
address, especially in light of the overlap in the content of legal traditions that was a 
legacy of late antiquity. 
Reading Jewish law in concert with other legal traditions is a scholarly imperative 
when seeking to understand Jewish law in the Islamic world. Ultimately, scholars must 
balance the contradictory truths contained in the aphorisms “people resemble their 
contemporaries more than their own ancestors” (al-nās bi-azmānihim ashbah minhum bi-
aslāfihim) and “they are more like their ancestors than their contemporaries” (annahum 
ashbah bi-abāʾihim minhum bi-azmānihim).1276
                                                 
no. 1 (2015): 158. For application of “symbiosis” to later legal history, see Goitein, “The Interplay of 
Jewish and Islamic Laws,” 62. For a review of scholarship in Goitein’s wake, see Phillip Ackerman-
Lieberman, The Business of Identity: Jews, Muslims, and Economic Life in Medieval Egypt (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2014), 4-41. On comparative Jewish and Islamic law, see above, n8. 
1274 Friedenreich, “Fusion Cooking in an Islamic Milieu,” 148-50, 155-56. 
1275 Ibid, 160. 
1276 On these maxims, see S.D. Goitein, “Changes in the Middle East (950-1150) as Illustrated by 
the Documents of the Cairo Geniza,” Islamic Civilization, 950-1150, ed. D.S. Richards (Oxford: Cassirer, 
1973), 19; and Ackerman-Lieberman, The Business of Identity, 332n79.  
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Ḥadīṯ d’al-Šāfiʿī au Muḫtalif al-Ḥadīṯ d’Ibn Qutayba.” Studia Islamica 27 (1967): 
5-40. 
Leiter, Moshe Ḥayim. “Sheʾilta de-Rav Aḥai be-ʿInyanei Ḥanukah.” Yeshurun 19 (2007): 
15-45. 
Lennox, James G. “Teleology, Chance, and Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous 
Generation.” Journal of the History of Philosophy 20 (1982): 219-238. 
Lerner, Myron Bialik. “Peirush Midrashi le-Shir ha-Shirim mi-Yemei ha-Geonim.” 
Qoveṣ ʿal Yad 14 (8) (1976): 141-164. 
———. “The Works of Aggadic Midrash and the Esther Midrashim.” in The Literature 
of the Sages, Second Part: Midrash and Targum, Liturgy, Poetry, Mysticism, 
Contracts, Inscriptions, Ancient Science and the Languages of Rabbinic 
Literature, vol. 2, edited by Shmuel Safrai, Zeʾev Safrai, Joshua Schwartz, and 
Peter J. Tomson, 133-229. Assen: Van Gorcum, 2006. 
Levinger, Jacob S. “ʿAl Torah shebe-ʿal-Peh be-Haguto shel ha-Rambam.” Tarbiẓ 37, no. 
3 (1968): 282-293. 
———. Darkhei ha-Maḥshavah ha-Hilkhatit shel ha-Rambam: Meḥqar ʿal ha-Metodah 
shel Mishneh Torah. Jerusalem: Magnes, 1965. 
———. Ha-Rambam ke-Filosof ukhe-Foseq. Jerusalem: Bialik, 1989. 
396 
 
———. “Maʿamadah shel ha-Torah shebe-Khtav be-Maḥshevet ha-Rambam.” In Ha-
Miqra ve-Anaḥnu, edited by Uriel Simon, 120-132. Tel Aviv: Devir, 1979. 
Lewin, Benjamin Manasseh. “Essa Meshali le-Rasag.” In Rav Saʿadya Gaon: Qoveṣ 
Torani-Maddaʿi li-Melot Elef Shanah li-Feṭirato, edited by Yehuda Leib 
Fishman, 481-532. Jerusalem: Mosad ha-Rav Kook, 1943. 
———. Igeret Rav Sherira Gaon Mesuderet bi-Shnei Nusḥaʾot: Nusaḥ Sefarad ve-Nusaḥ 
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Messer Leon, David. Kevod Ḥakhamim, edited by S. Bernfeld. Berlin, 1899. 
Milgram, Jonathan S. “Methodological Musings on the Study of ‘Kelalei Pesak’: 
‘Hilkheta ke-Rav be-issurei ve-khi-Shemuel be-dinei.” JJS 61, no. 2 (2010): 278-
290. 
Milikowsky, Chaim. Seder ʿOlam: Mahadurah Madaʿit, Peirush u-Mavo. 2 vols. 
Jerusalem: Yad Ben-Ẓvi, 2013. 
Miller, Larry Benjamin. “Islamic Disputation Theory: A Study of the Development of 
Dialectic in Islam from the Tenth through Fourteenth Centuries.” PhD diss., 
Princeton University, 1985 
Miller, Philip E. “At the Twilight of Byzantine Karaism: The Anachronism of Judah 
Gibbor.” PhD diss., NYU University, 1984. 
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edited by Z.H. Edelman, 25a-31a. Königsberg, 1856. 
———. Saadia Ibn Danán: El orden de las generaciones ‘Seder ha-Dorot’, edited by C. 
del Valle and G. Stemberger. Alcobendas (Madrid): Aben Ezra, 1997. 
Sabbato, Ḥayim. “Ha-Im hekir ha-Rambam et Sefer ha-Miṣvot ha-Shaleim le-Rasag?” In 
Mi-Birkat Moshe: Qoveṣ Maʾamarim be-Mishnat ha-Rambam li-Khvodo shel ha-
Rav Naḥum Eliezer Rabinovitch, vol. 2, edited by Zvi Heber and Carmiel Cohen, 
757-763. Maʿaleh Adumim: Maʿaliyot, 2011. 
———. “Ha-Im Yesh Reshut li-Drosh Derashot Hilkhatiyot min ha-Pesuqim af she-lo 
Neʾemru be-Talmud?” In Teshurah le-ʿAmos: Asupat Meḥqarim be-Farshanut 
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———. Baʿalei ha-Tosafot: Toldoteihem, Ḥibureihem, Shiṭatam. 2 vols. Jerusalem: 
Mosad Bialik, 1986. 
———. “Ha-Derashah ke-Yesod ha-Halakhah u-Vaʿayat ha-Sofrim.” Tarbiẓ 27, no. 2-3 
(1958): 166-182. 
———. “Halakhah u-Nevuʾah.” Tarbiẓ 18, no. 1 (1946): 1-27. 
———. Ha-Halakhah: Meqorotehah ve-Hitpatḥutehah. Givatayim: Yad la-Talmud, 
1984. 
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